The role of trading intensity in duration modelling and price discovery : evidence from the European carbon market by Kalaitzoglou, Iordanis Angelos
  
The Role of Trading Intensity in Duration 
Modelling and Price Discovery 
Evidence from the European Carbon market 
 
Volume I 
 
Doctoral Thesis Submitted by 
Kalaitzoglou Iordanis Angelos 
For the completion of a three years PhD program 
July 2011 
 
Heriot-Watt University 
School of Management and Languages 
Department of Accountancy, Economics and Finance 
Supervisors: Mohamed Sherif 
Boulis Ibrahim 
Julian Fennema 
 
 “The copyright in this thesis is owned by the author. Any quotation from the thesis or use of any of the 
information contained in it must acknowledge this thesis as the source of the quotation or information."  
ii 
 
Abstract 
In this study, trading intensity is employed to investigate the role of information and 
liquidity in duration modelling and price discovery in the two largest exchanges of the 
European Carbon market, namely European Climate Exchange (ECX) and Nord Pool 
(NP). First, duration modelling is examined for the first time in this market, and existing 
ACD models are empirically extended to explore the impact of stylized facts, such as 
non-linear effects of trading intensity and OTC transactions. Second, the “time 
dimension” of information is investigated focusing on the informational content of 
trading intensity. A Smooth-Transition-Mixture of Weibull Distributions ACD (STM-
ACD) model that distinguishes between three types of trades is proposed. Time, volume 
and OTC transactions measure how related related a trade is to information. Third, the 
price impact of the “time dimension” of information is examined. A new dynamic 
expectations, structural pricing model is proposed in order to account for the learning 
process of traders and their expectations. Trading intensity is used to measure the 
sensitivity of market participants to information and liquidity. 
The main findings indicate that empirical adjustments significantly improve duration 
modelling. In consistence with Bauwens et al. (2004), the specification of the 
conditional mean contributes more to model performance. Trading intensity appears to 
create a momentum, especially in ECX, whereas OTC transactions seem to slow down 
the trading process, probably due to information inflow, especially in NP. Furthermore, 
similar to Easley and O’Hara (1992) higher trading intensity is associated with 
increased presence of information. Trading intensity is found to be able to distinguish 
among three different types of trades, according to their informational content. The 
timing of acquiring information can make it further exploitable. A significant proportion 
of uninformed traders in the Carbon market is found to observe the market trying to 
extract price unresolved information. Consequently, informed traders are found to act 
strategically, according to Kyle (1985), but they are less efficient in covering their 
actions as market gains complexity, mainly because of higher liquidity levels and 
improved learning process. In addition, large transactions appear to increase the 
information price component, while the liquidity component seems to asymmetrically 
decrease, probably due to economies of scale. Consequently, trading intensity appears 
to have a dual impact on price, spread and price change volatility, which is determined 
by current market conditions and dealers’ exposure to risk. Finally, market making in 
this market seems to be profitable only when expected trading intensity is low.  
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1. Introduction 
Finance theory has developed considerably, over the last decades providing new 
insights into market structure and price formation. The availability of Ultra-high-
Frequency (UHF) data offers the opportunity to examine the trading process on a whole 
new level. All transactions are recorded, and individual events, such as profit 
announcements and intraday phenomena, can be examined separately. This provides 
researchers with the opportunity to use all available market information, with the same 
frequency as market participants. This allows the study of issues such as how traders 
aggregate information, how they interpret it and how they act upon receiving it. In 
addition, trading characteristics, such as trading frequency and volume, might have an 
impact on subsequent trading and price formation. 
This can be particularly important in new markets with unique characteristics, such as 
the Carbon market. The analysis of intraday market dynamics and their price impact can 
improve trading practice and, therefore, market quality. The understanding of various 
behavioural aspects of intraday trading patterns can enhance flexibility in regulation, 
which can be adjusted according to particular market needs, as they arise in real time. 
This provides the foundation for more efficient pricing, by sustaining a “healthy” 
trading environment without sacrificing liquidity or information aggregation. The new 
market can develop and gain complexity and maturity faster, providing more 
sophisticated environment and financial instruments that can reflect more accurately 
market “fundamentals”. This can help the Carbon market to service its purpose, to 
reduce emissions, more effectively. 
1.1 Intraday Price Formation 
O’Hara (1995) maintains that, on intraday level, prices are generally seen as being 
determined by the actions of market participants, and not as a macroeconomic 
phenomenon. Their access to relevant information and their liquidity desires, which are 
seen as the main price determinants, determine their strategies. They observe the 
market, they gather information and they build their trading strategies combining new 
information with liquidity needs, which are derived from their optimal portfolio position 
and potential deviations from it. Price equilibrium is achieved as a balance between 
various individual trading approaches. Clearly, time and size dimensions rise, since not 
all market participants’ needs coincide in time or size. 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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Early literature emphasizes the price impact of information and liquidity. Unlike Stigler 
(1967) who sees trading costs as market imperfections, Demsetz (1968) and Bagehot 
(1971) argue that this is a natural outcome of the trading process. Dealers face a 
continuous matching problem and they try to compensate for any severe order flow 
imbalances, by quoting a different price for selling (Ask) and buying (Bid). 
Consequently, the Bid-Ask spread is seen as the price of “immediacy”, which heavily 
depends on incoming information and liquidity levels, and the dealer’s exposure to the 
market.
1
 This changes current market prices and reveals spreads as being directly 
proportional to order flow, and can definitely no longer be ignored. 
“Order processing” 
Naturally, the literature expands to include investigations into the nature of these costs 
specifically to their composition as derived by trading activity. The first component 
identified, is a fixed cost applied to all transactions. This component is known as the 
order-processing cost and is formally recognized first by Demsetz (1971). As further 
studies, such as Stoll (1978), Huang and Stoll (1997) and Ahn et al. (2002), mention, 
this cost should be variable per unit as a decreasing function of volume, since it is fixed 
per transaction. Further, Bollen et al. (2004) recognize that this cost should be a 
decreasing function of competition as well. Dealers can no longer charge a large fixed 
component, because they might lose sales. Instead, order-processing cost should 
asymptotically converge, in perfect competition, to the marginal cost of providing 
liquidity. 
 “Inventory” Models 
Different studies emphasize the liquidity effect as a main price determinant. In a new 
class of models, originating back to Tinic (1972), Tinic and West (1972) and Benston 
and Hagerman (1974), known as “inventory-holding” models, price setting is seen as 
being influenced directly by dealers’ inventories. Since dealers need to continuously 
provide liquidity, they need to set their prices to face two types of risk. One is related to 
increasing inventory (i.e., excessive cost of carry, especially overnight where 
information might change significantly) while the other is associated with decreasing 
inventory (i.e., loss of sales). In the first case, when they keep high inventories, 
                                                 
1
 Market makers are introduced into markets to enhance liquidity. They commit themselves to 
continuously support the trading process, by being ready to buy or sell (i.e., providing “immediacy”), in 
exchange for various market privileges, such as real time full market information or reduced clearing or 
trading fees. For further information please refer to O’Hara (1995) and Jong and Rindi (2009).  
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information might change drastically over a short period of time, or overnight, and they 
might end up in an adverse position due to excessive carrying cost or price changes. On 
the second case, they might miss opportunities of increasing demand, because they do 
not possess the asset, and therefore they might need to buy it at spot, expensive, prices. 
Dealers continuously observe the market and adjust their quoted prices and inventories 
act as a buffer to trading activity that reflects current liquidity. Therefore, inventories do 
not change the perception of investors about the “fair” value of the underlying asset. 
Hasbrouck (1988, 1991a, 1991b) therefore concludes that their effect on prices is only 
temporary. 
These models focus on the “viability” of market makers (Garman, 1976), on the 
maximization of their profits (Amihud and Mendelson, 1980), or the maximization of 
their terminal wealth (Stoll, 1978; Ho and Stoll, 1981, 1983). Several  other studies, 
such as Cohen et al. (1980, 1981), O’Hara and Oldfield (1986), Angel (1994) and Harris 
(1998), generalize investigating potential inventory-holding effects on hybrid markets, 
where market as well as limit orders can be submitted. This introduces another source of 
uncertainty, uncertainty of execution. Cohen et al. (1980, 1981) develop the idea of 
“gravitational pool”, where the aggressiveness of market participants determines the 
appropriate type, time and size of the order.
2
  
Inventory models, although they present noticeably different approaches, raise four 
points that are relevant to the present study. First and most important, these models 
recognize the temporary price impact of liquidity. Second, they recognize that market 
participants observe order flow to formulate expectations concerning future levels of 
liquidity, focusing on imbalances of incoming order flow. Consequently, they recognize 
the importance of intensity of trading as influential to price formation. Volume of 
trading plays an important role in the matching of orders and it might move market 
makers from their optimal positions. Market makers, therefore, alter their quotations to 
deal with incoming imbalances. Third, these imbalances occur because of the 
asynchronous arrival of orders of different initiation, Buyer or Seller. Time is implicitly 
                                                 
2
 The issue of Limit versus Market orders and especially the information efficiency of these markets 
(Brown and Whang, 1997), the relation between type of orders and type of traders (O’Hara and Oldfield, 
1986; Chadravarty and Holden, 1995) and the optimal choice between them, given current market 
conditions (see, inter alia, Cohen et al., 1981; Angel, 1994; Kumar and Seppi, 1994; Harris and 
Hasbrouck, 1996; Parlour, 1998; Foucault, 1999; Goettler et al., 2005; Wald and Horrigan, 2005), has 
been discussed extensively in the literature. More recently Bouchaud et al. (2004, 2006) maintain that the 
marginal profit of the type of order, either in the form of capital gains or in the form of Bid-Ask spread, 
minimizes arbitrage opportunities by allowing market participants to submit either of them. Whichever 
the case, the vast majority of studies confirms that limit orders are associated with wider spreads. 
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assumed to have an impact on intraday price formation, although order flow is still the 
main source of uncertainty. Finally, the price impact of different market structures is 
further examined. In particular, the significance of the choice of which type of order to 
submit is emphasized, introducing a new element of risk. 
 “Information” Models 
In parallel, another class of models has been developed, underlying the role of 
information as an intraday price determinant. In a seminal study, Bagehot (1971) argues 
that spreads would exist even in the absence of explicit trading costs. He explains that 
when market makers transact with better informed traders, their trading will on average 
incur losses. However, they can compensate their “immediacy” and “lack of 
knowledge” by transacting with uninformed traders. They do so by charging a fee, in 
the form of Bid-ask spread, which should be wider when they believe that the presence 
of information based trading is increased. This idea has been developed further in 
“information models”, and emphasizes the informational content of past trades and how 
this information is incorporated into prices. 
These models see intraday price formation, as an equilibrium price arising by a “game” 
among different market participants. Exogenous information is assumed to arrive 
randomly and these market participants are grouped according to their access to 
unresolved, price-relevant information in terms of both level and time dimensions. Early 
literature (cf., Kyle, 1985; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) recognizes two types of traders. 
Market participants in the first group, namely uninformed, are assumed to trade for 
reasons unrelated to the arrival of new information, and they do so because of their 
individual liquidity needs. In contrast, informed traders possess information, which will 
be incorporated into subsequent prices, before this information is revealed to other 
market participants. Therefore they have a timing advantage over the rest of the market 
and have an incentive to exploit it, at the expense of market makers and uninformed 
traders. However, subsequent studies, such as Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), recognize 
that the assumption of the “naivety” of uninformed traders is too strong and is not 
applicable in real markets. Instead, they recognize that uninformed traders can be 
further divided according to whether they can chose the time and size of their 
transaction in order to maximize their “terminal wealth”.3 Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) 
                                                 
3
 This term is borrowed by economics theory and it describes an essential motivation for this group of 
traders to engage themselves into a transaction. If they do not have that incentive, there is no reason to 
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distinguish between non-discretionary, naive uninformed traders, who trade only for 
liquidity reasons, and discretionary liquidity traders, who observe the market to extract 
information upon which they can act. 
Two main streams have been developed, according to how informed traders exploit 
their informational “privilege”. First, in “sequential” models (Glosten and Milgrom, 
1985; Easley and O’Hara, 1987, 1992;  Easley et al., 1997, 2002), trades occur in a 
sequence and informed traders act at once, trading in high volumes, as much as the 
current market conditions and their trading capacity allows. They do not take into 
account the price effect of their trades, because they do not return to the market before 
the information they possess is fully resolved into prices. Market makers observe past 
transactions to extract price-relevant information and to formulate a Probability of 
INformed (PIN) trading, upon which they base their price quotations. In contrast, 
according to “strategic” models (Kyle, 1985; Kyle, 1989; Foster and Viswanathan, 
1993; Holden and Subrahmayam, 1992; Back 1992) informed traders return to the 
market before information is fully resolved. Convergence to fully informed equilibrium 
cannot occur immediately after the transaction and, therefore, informed traders need to 
take into account the post-trade effect of their actions. They need to act strategically, by 
segmenting their trades, in order to fully exploit their information advantage.  
Information models raise the importance of four issues. First, both recognize different 
types of trades/traders and describe intraday price formation as an outcome, 
equilibrium, of the interaction of these traders. Second, and particularly apparent in 
more recent studies, uninformed traders have an incentive to learn. These traders act 
according to expectations formulated from observations extracted from trading history. 
Third, they emphasize the importance of order flow and trading volume. In particular, 
trading time and size are important to identify PIN in sequential models. Finally, 
following Easley and O’Hara (1987, 1992) the literature recognizes the dual effect of 
trading intensity, and thus of past trading activity, on prices, although it is difficult to 
distinguish the permanent from the transitory component (c.f., Madhavan, 2000). Past 
transactions carry both an informational component that has a permanent price impact, 
because it revises beliefs about the “fair” value of the asset, and a liquidity component, 
which has only a temporary influence on prices because of expected order flow 
variations. 
                                                                                                                                               
enter the market and no equilibrium can be achieved. Similarly, with inventory models, in that case, the 
market fails. See De Jong and Rindi (2009). 
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 “Trade Indicator” Models 
The resilience of both information and inventory models to “game” theory gives them a 
theoretical character, and, therefore, their empirical application is fairly limited.
4
 In 
contrast, another branch of literature focuses on empirical issues and examines intraday 
price formation at transaction level. Roll (1984) proposes an empirical way to extract 
trading spreads, summarized in one component, from covariances of price changes. 
Though simplistic, his approach provides a convenient way to model prices and 
estimate spreads. Choi et al. (1988), Stoll (1989) and George et al. (1991) extend Roll’s 
(1984) models, incorporating all three price components. In addition, Hasbrouck (2007) 
suggests that, with certain transformations and assumptions for the innovations, Roll’s 
(1984) model could be transformed into a VAR process.
5
  
Glosten and Harris (1998), introduce another source of uncertainty for both the 
informational and liquidity component of trades. A trade initiation variable, is allowed 
to drive both price determinants. Similar to inventory models, price quoting depends on 
the trade initiation, and since market makers cannot forecast the direction of the next 
trade, they quote two prices (Bid and Ask) and therefore spreads can be estimated. Ho 
and Stoll (1997) propose a general model that nests Autoregressive models and other 
structural approaches as special cases. Their model is “complete” in the sense that all 
three cost components can be derived. However, estimates of half spreads are required 
prior to cost component computation. Madhavan et al. (1997) propose a similar 
approach, in which the information and order-processing components can be estimated 
in one step, where the innovation in order flow measures price-relevant information.  
1.2 Further Issues 
1.2.1 Trading Volume 
Microstructure literature raises several issues, recognizing their potential, direct or 
indirect, impact on price formation. One of the variables that attracted the early interest 
of researchers is trading size. Even in the inventory model developed by Stoll (1978), 
the relation between trading volume and spreads follows a U-shape pattern. In contrast, 
                                                 
4
 O’Hara (1995) comments that for these models to be applicable, the “game” (i.e., the market structure, 
market participants, etc.) must be known in advance. Consequently, these models cannot be the primary 
choice when empirical issues are of interest. 
5
 Roll’s (1984) model is a structural approach that describes a structure of price formation, while VAR 
modelling provides an analytical tool for investigating the price impact of a trade over time, with a view 
mainly at forecasting. Both should provide the same results under specific circumstances. 
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De Jong et al. (1995), Huang and Stoll (1997) and Ahn et al. (2002) report a decreasing 
effect of trading volume on spreads. More recently Angelidis and Benos (2009) confirm 
the decreasing relation between trading volume and spread, but only for the liquidity 
component of price formation. They attribute this effect to economies of scale and 
report an increasing information component for larger transactions. This is fully 
consistent with Easley and O’Hara’s (1987, 1992) proposition that increased volume 
indicates higher presence of information-based trading. Similarly, Chan and Lakonishok 
(1995) further develop this idea that trading frequency increases after large transactions. 
1.2.2 Transaction Time 
Another aspect that has been extensively discussed in the literature is the price impact of 
time. Both inventory and information models implicitly incorporate a time dimension in 
price equilibria. In inventory models, dealers face a matching problem between 
incoming order flow imbalances and their inventories due to the asynchronous arrival of 
order submissions.
6
 Information models focus on the realization of informed trades and 
on any post-trade effects, focusing on both trading size and time.
7
 The first studies that 
explicitly incorporate time into microstructure analysis, examine the relation between 
duration and information. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) show that, under short 
selling restrictions, informed traders are not able to trade upon the arrival of bad news. 
They therefore, associate long durations with bad news. In contrast, Easley and O’Hara 
(1992) conjecture that informed traders will always transact upon the arrival of new 
information. Consequently a low trading frequency should be a sign of “no news”. 
Dufour and Engle (2000b) argue that increased trading frequency indicates increased 
presence of informed traders and thus increased price impact. Ben Sita (2010) 
distinguishes the permanent from the transitory effect of time, which are both found to 
increase the price impact of a trade. In contrast, Grammig et al. (2007) provide evidence 
of higher price revisions after stages of inactivity. 
ACD 
However, unlike data sets of lower frequency, in UHF data time is irregularly spaced. 
Consequently, basic model assumptions might be violated and well-known econometric 
models might not hold unconditionally. In a seminal study, Engle and Russell (1998) 
                                                 
6
 Even if the probability of a Buy or Sell is 50 percent, orders might arrive at different points in time and 
significant temporary imbalances, excessive number of Buys or Sells, might be created. 
7
 Informed traders poses private information and they have the incentive to exploit it before it becomes 
public. In addition, this piece of information is revealed by their actions and a price revision follows. 
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introduce the Autoregressive Conditional Duration (ACD) framework to model time.
 8
 
They argue that duration (i.e., time between two consecutive trades) measures economic 
time. Unlike calendar time, it measures trading activity, which might flow faster or 
slower, and it might carry price relevant information. They model duration as a 
stochastic dependent process and formulate actual durations as being derived from past 
realization times. Their model exhibits strong similarities to the GARCH literature, and 
ACD models require specification of the conditional mean, as a function of past 
durations and a density function with a positive support.
9
  
The original model was criticized for the simplicity both. Bauwens and Giot (2000), 
Dufour and Engle (2000b), Zhang et al. (2001), Meitz and Teräsvirta (2006) and Jasiak 
(1998) challenge the linear assumption and propose non-linear specifications that model 
higher moments of duration and account for longer, persistent, memories. Another 
branch of the literature criticizes the deterministic character of ACD models and 
proposes a stochastic approach (c.f., Bauwens and Veredas, 2004; Ning, 2004; 
Strickland, 2006; Bauwens and Galli, 2009), generally referred to as Stochastic 
Conditional Duration (SCD).
10
 In addition, several studies (e.g., Zhang et al, 2001; 
Grammig and Maurer, 2000; De Luca and Zuccolotto, 2006) argue that distributions 
with monotonic hazard functions, such as the Exponential and Weibull, are insufficient 
in capturing the data’s higher moments and, therefore, fail to describe the Data 
Generation Process (DGP) of duration.  
Furthermore, Bauwens et al. (2004) argue that a single distribution cannot capture the 
idiosyncrasy of duration series and that the main improvement comes from the 
conditional mean specification. Both statements are particularly relevant to the present 
study. First, a new class of models suggests that a mixture of distributions, modelled 
either with a Markov Switching framework (Hujer et al., 2002; Hujer and Vuletic, 
                                                 
8
 Engle and Russell (1998) provide evidence that duration (time) series are exogenous, highly persistent 
(i.e., they have long memory), over-dispersed (i.e., standard deviation is larger than the mean) and 
clustered (i.e., long (short) durations followed by long (short)). 
9
 Various other factors could be introduced as well. However, the majority of studies emphasize the 
exogeneity assumption and investigate the Data Generation Process (DGP) of duration as being 
independent. 
10
 In SCD models an innovation component is introduced into the conditional mean specification, that 
accounts for exogenous shocks. This approach, although it is more flexible, it recognizes that the DGP of 
duration is governed by two sources of uncertainty, that they need to be modelled jointly. This raises 
significant estimation difficulties and therefore these models have not gained popularity. However, 
Ghysels et al. (2004) argues that even SCD is restrictive because higher order conditional moments are 
ignored. They propose the Stochastic Volatility Duration (SVD), which is a joint modelling of the 
conditional mean and variance. They postulate that this approach is essential when intraday liquidity is of 
interest. 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
10 
 
2007) or with switching regimes (De Luca and Zuccolotto, 2006) or using copulas 
(Wing, 2008; De Luca et al., 2008), should better describe the DGP of duration.
11
 
Second, Bauwens et al. (2004) suggest that empirical adjustments should improve the 
performance of the models. This could be beneficial in relatively new markets with 
distinct stylized facts, such as the Carbon market.  
1.2.3 Asymmetric Information and Learning 
In addition, previous literature connects duration with information, and mixture 
distribution ACD models have been employed to investigate this issue further. First, 
several studies (e.g., Wong et al., 2009; Tay et al.; 2009) investigate the relation 
between trading frequency, volume and the presence of informed trading, confirming 
Easley and O’Hara’s (1992) propositions that higher trading activity indicates higher 
presence of informed traders. Second, Hujer and Vuletic (2007), drawing on 
information models, recognize that there are different types of traders in the market by 
their differing access to price-relevant information, namely informed and uninformed. 
Their trading activity should follow different trading patterns that can be described by 
different hazard functions of duration. Gerhard and Hautsch (2007) extend this idea, by 
allowing uninformed market participants to observe the market and extract information 
before it goes public.
12
 This raises two important point that have been extensively 
discussed in the literature. 
First, several studies focus on the nature of the observable information. Easley and 
O’Hara (1992) uses volume of trading, which is often employed to describe the 
intensity of trading. Later studies, such as Dufour and Engle (2000b), Bowe et al. 
(2007), Angelidis and Benos (2009) and Ben Sita (2010), distinguish between trading 
size and trading frequency. These two variables proxy trading activity and traders learn 
                                                 
11
 The Markov Switching and the switching regime frameworks differ significantly in how they treat 
modelling flexibility, although both pursue higher precision. In the Markov framework, the threshold 
variable is latent, while in the mixture of distributions it is pre-determined. This allows for greater 
flexibility in the determining of regimes, while restricts the characteristics of each regime. In contrast, the 
smooth transition framework employs an observable threshold variable, sacrificing generality, but allows 
data to determine the characteristics of each regime. 
12
 The conditional intensity, or else the hazard function, of duration measures the probability of a 
transaction to occur, given that it has not occurred till now. This could proxy the trading rate of different 
market participants (groups) and could be used to distinguish among them. Consequently, the trading 
pattern of uninformed traders could be assumed to follow an Exponential distribution, since it has a flat 
hazard function. In contrast, informed traders should appear only upon the arrival of new information and 
therefore their trading rate should exhibit significant, sharp fluctuations over time. According to Gerhard 
and Hautsch (2000), traders who act fast upon the arrival of new information could be described by a 
decreasing hazard function, while for traders, such as portfolio managers, who need to aggregate 
information the probability of a transaction to occur should increase over time. 
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by observing past trades. Consequently, time and size are recognized to carry 
information signals, without necessarily including prior price changes. Easley and 
O’Hara (1992) and Dufour and Engle (2000b) relate the magnitude of these variables to 
the strength of information signals. High trading size and/or trading frequency have a 
higher price impact. Therefore traders can formulate expectations, concerning 
subsequent price changes, by observing current and historical trading activity. 
Second, the learning process is further investigated. Although all traders observe the 
same stimulus, they do not necessarily react in the same way. This could depend on 
various reasons, ranging from varying liquidity desires to different optimal portfolio 
positions. One of the most extensively discussed reasons, however, is the traders’ ability 
to extract information, or how and what they can learn from it. Several studies (Shiller, 
1981, 1984; De Jong et al., 1990; Chamley, 2003) recognize the dynamic nature of the 
learning process in that traders observing the same signals might interpret these signals 
in various ways. This depends on their level of “prior knowledge”, their “market share” 
or simply their “expectations”.13 Other studies (Townsend, 1978; Frydman, 1982; 
Blume and Easley, 1984, 1998; Feldman, 1978; Vives, 2008) emphasize that the only 
exploitable information is when traders learn about an equilibrium and not on an 
equilibrium.
14
 These studies raise the importance of the time dimension in the learning 
process, where according to Vives (1993), Jun and Vives (1997) and Vives (2008), the 
speed of learning is a crucial determinant of trading strategies and price formation. 
1.3 The Carbon market 
Information asymmetry and speed of learning appear to be particularly relevant to the 
trading practice in relatively new markets, which are rather illiquid and have distinct 
stylized facts. The Carbon market is a fast growing market, which has gained significant 
complexity over the last years, and given the character of the market, information 
resolution appears to play an important role both in how informative prices are and the 
extent of liquidity levels. Viswanathan (2010) purports that the Carbon market needs 
                                                 
13
 Whatever the source of variation in beliefs is, traders might “herd” in the right or the wrong direction 
towards subsequent price movements (see, inter alia, Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Smith 
and Sorensen, 2000). 
14
 According to empirical microstructure literature, uninformed traders learn any price-relevant 
information on an equilibrium, when prices include all relevant information. No further expectations can 
be exploitable, because there is no unresolved information. In contrast, discretionary liquidity traders can 
learn about an equilibrium before prices incorporate private information, by observing the market trying 
to identify information signals. These traders have the incentive to extract information, learn from it, 
formulate expectations and realize their strategies before the market reaches an equilibrium stage.  
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strict regulation in order to restrict manipulation. However, it should also allow for 
innovations of market participants that would enhance liquidity. A non-regulated, non-
transparent market would be liquid, but inaccurate in terms of price. In contrast, a 
strictly regulated environment would increase price accuracy, but may decrease 
liquidity. Both results would defy the initial purpose of emissions’ reduction.15  
Furthermore, the importance of the Carbon market, in tackling Greenhouse Gases 
emissions is undeniable. However, the literature is sparse and the microstructure of the 
market has only recently been examined. Early studies focus on the nature (Kruger et 
al., 2007), the legal framework (Convery and Redmond, 2007), the design (Burtraw et 
al., 2002; Böhringer and Lange, 2005; Kosobud et al., 2005), the history and origins of 
the market (Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo, 2008), as well as the nature of various 
allowances (Chevallier, 2010).
16
 Other studies (see, inter alia, Rubin, 1996; Schennach, 
2000; Godal and Klaasen, 2006; Schleich et al., 2006; Daskalakis and Markelos, 2008; 
Daskalakis et al., 2009; Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo, 2007; Rotfuss et al., 2009) 
explore the price impact of banking restrictions or of National Allocation Plans 
(NAPs).
17
 Other studies (Kosobud et al., 2005; Daskalakis et al., 2009) discuss the 
nature of the asset, focusing on whether it is a commodity or a financial product, mainly 
by employing a cost of carry model approach (inter alia, Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner, 
2007; Truck et al., 2007;  Daskalakis et al., 2006, 2009). Another branch of literature 
(Christiansen and Arvanitakis, 2005; Bunn and Fezzi, 2007; Alberola, 2007, 2008, 
2009a, 2009b) investigates their relation to other commodities, reporting similar trends. 
Another stream of literature (Benz and Truck, 2006; Paolella and Taschini, 2008; Borak 
et al., 2006) investigates the relation between price formation and volatility. Other 
studies (Chevallier, 2009; Vinocur, 2009; Rittler , 2009; Conrand et al., 2010) examine 
the same issue from an intraday perspective, where a bidirectional causality between 
                                                 
15
 Viswanathan (2010) is based on a seminal study of Kyle and Viswanathan (2008), who argue that 
organized markets improve the aggregation of diverse information, which, according to Hayek (1945), 
increases “market efficiency”. However, this does not necessarily mean that it increases “price accuracy” 
as well. They explain that a highly manipulated market might be highly efficient, in terms of 
incorporating manipulation into price, reflecting current market forces. However, assets are not 
necessarily priced accurately, according to their fundamental macroeconomic characteristics. 
Consequently, market participants and their trading strategies influence asset prices, instead of “just 
reflecting” their “fair” values. In terms of Carbon pricing, over- or under-pricing would lead to a highly 
speculative environment, which would undermine the efforts of emissions’ reduction. 
16
 Emission allowances are the main financial instruments traded in the market. For more information 
please refer to Section 1.4. 
17
 According to the regulatory framework applied on phase one and two and the transition between them, 
banking (storing allowances for future use) was not allowed. This turned the trading interest on more 
complex products like futures contracts. For further information on banking restrictions, phases of the 
market and NAPs, please refer to Section 1.4. 
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spot and futures is observed and the importance of NAPs is underlined. Vinocur (2009) 
postulates that traders under-react on new information, while Mansanet-Bataller et al. 
(2010) provide evidence that traders are influenced more by order flow than by Carbon-
related information. This is relevant to Dufour and Engle (2000b) and Hasbrouck (1988, 
1991a, 1991b), who argue that trading activity has a significant price impact. This 
impact seems to be stronger than exogenous information in the Carbon market. More 
recently, other studies explore the microstructure of the market, such as trading spreads 
(Frino et al., 2010), price leadership (Benz and Klar, 2008) and spreads between various 
types of compliance units (Mansanet-Bataller et al., 2010). 
1.4 Market Description 
This section provides a non-exhaustive introductory description of the foundations and 
stylized characteristics of the European Carbon market to support the analysis in the 
following chapters.
18
 Section 1.4.1 presents briefly the “Kyoto Protocol” and the three 
“flexibility mechanisms”, which aim at emissions’ reduction. Section 1.4.2 focuses on 
the European action towards climate change, which is the organized market for Carbon 
Allowances, namely the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). 
1.4.1 Kyoto Protocol 
Understanding the undeniably negative impact of Greenhouse Gases (GG), the vast 
majority of countries has ratified a treaty known as the “Kyoto Protocol”, aiming at 
their emissions reduction.
19
 More precisely, the Kyoto Protocol aims at the 
“stabilization of GG concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (Article 2 UN FCCC, 
1997). The agreement defines three periods, in which, countries, should meet their 
targets. Phase I (from 2005 to 2007) is the pilot period, Phase II (from 2008 to 2012) is 
the commitment period and Phase III (from 2013 to 2020) is the post-commitment 
period for re-evaluation and further adjustments. The Kyoto Protocol establishes three 
“flexibility mechanisms” that aim at diminishing energy-related costs, while achieving 
                                                 
18
For an in depth analysis please refer to Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2008) and the International 
Emission Trading Association (IETA) annual reports (2005-2009). 
19
 This has been defined as a reduction by at least 5 percent of the emissions in 1990. For this purpose, 
Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the reference gas, against which Methane (CH4), Nitrous Oxide (N2O), 
Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), Perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) are measured. The 
largest emitters worldwide, the USA, which accounts for 30 percent (IETA, 2007, p. 201) of total 
emissions, China, which accounts for 8 percent, and India, which accounts for 5 percent, have yet to sign. 
For updated information please refer to http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php. 
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emission-reduction targets. Each flexibility mechanism provides a different “unit” of 
“emission allowance”, which can be used for compliance. These mechanisms are; the 
Joint Implementation mechanism (JI), under art.6, the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), under art.12, and the Emissions Trading System (ETS), under art.17. 
More specifically, JI provides an incentive to Annex I countries to develop a “green” 
project in another Annex I country.
20
 This project creates an allowance unit, referred to 
as an “Emission Reduction Unit” (ERU). ERUs can be used for compliance by the first 
Annex I country. This provides an incentive to both countries to develop industrial 
activity in an environmentally friendly fashion. Along the same lines, CDM refers to the 
implementation of “green” projects in developing countries. The associated unit is the 
“Certified Emission Reduction” (CER). CERs are issued for projects that have to been 
approved by the Executive Committee of the “CDM Board for Projects”, which is the 
institution that issues these allowance units. The Kyoto Protocol defines the role of this 
mechanism: “to assist Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable 
development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention and to 
assist Parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance” (please refer to the full text, 
which is available at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php).
21
 Another 
important compliance unit is the “Assigned Amount Unit” (AAU). AAUs are allocated 
by national governments to regulated installations, according to their fixed target.
22
 
According to the third flexibility mechanism, namely the Emissions Trading System 
(ETS), when a company has a surplus of allowances of any type of compliance units, it 
can sell it, in an organized market, to another company, who may need it to cover a 
deficit in its emissions-allowances balance.
23
 
                                                 
20
 Countries that have ratified the treaty can be divided into three categories. First, Annex I countries are 
the industrialized economies and the economies in transition. They need to cover their emissions costs. 
Annex II (subcategory of Annex I) includes the advanced economies of OECD, excluding those that were 
economies in transition in 1992. They need to cover the emission costs of the third group, which includes 
the developing countries. These countries are not required to reduce emission levels because that would 
slow down their development, since industrial capacity is connected to emissions levels.  
21
 These countries might not be regulated under the Kyoto Protocol, but they play a crucial role in the 
overall emissions reduction, mainly due to CDM and Carbon leaking (Lecocq and Ambrosi, 2007). 
Regulated companies can either develop “green” projects in developing countries, which is beneficial for 
both in the sense that the first country is issued CER units while enhancing the industrial activity in the 
developing country, or they can transfer their industrial activity to places, where they do not need to 
provide compliance units. In addition, they mention that the projects that are the most beneficial in 
environmental sense, are not necessarily projects that allow for higher growth in developing countries. 
22 This refers to the companies related to the following activities: combustion plants, oil refineries, coke 
ovens, iron and steel plants and factories making cement, glass, lime, brick, ceramics, pulp and paper.  
23
 Another unit that can be used for compliance is the “Removal Unit” (RMU), often referred to as 
“sinks”. They are related to “land use” and cannot be traded. Along the same lines, “Verified Emission 
Reductions” (VERs) are units that cannot be used for compliance but they can be traded in voluntary 
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It follows that each country needs to provide a well-specified plan for regulating its 
emissions, and each year’s emissions need to match the associated allowances. After 
establishing a registry, where emissions and allowance units are registered, countries are 
eligible to start trading. The Independent Transaction Log (ITL) monitors the trading 
process. At the end of each period, governments need to surrender, and consequently 
cancel, the allowances that correspond to their emission levels. In case no sufficient 
number of allowances, R, can be provided to match the level of emissions, E, a penalty, 
P, is payable for each excessive ton of CO2.
24
 R is the balance of allocated allowances, 
AAUs, compliance units due to development of “green” projects, ERUs and CERs, and 
land-based units, RMUs. Allowances can also be traded, where the net balance between 
purchases, P, and sells, S, is taken into account, along with any stored compliance units, 
B. Consequently, each country’s inventory can be written as: 
                         
             
                  
  
When the number of allowances provided equals or exceeds the annual emissions, the 
country is in line with its commitment and no further action is required. When R is 
lower than E, the compliance units provided do not match the annual emissions and then 
the country needs to pay a penalty. This penalty does not “release the company from the 
obligation” to provide the allowances. Therefore, the country needs to purchase the 
remaining number of allowances from the spot market, while a penalty for each missing 
unit is still payable. 
25
  
1.4.2 The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) 
Description 
In Europe, the main effort to tackle the emissions problem embraces the third flexibility 
mechanism, the ETS. For this purpose, the “European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Trading System” (EU ETS) has been set up, creating a new “commodity” market. In 
accordance with AAUs, the unit traded in the EU ETS is the “European Union 
                                                                                                                                               
markets by market participants, such as governments and environmental organisations, or other 
institutions that voluntarily take responsibility of their emissions (see, inter alia, Taiyab, 2006). 
24
 The penalty is €40 (€100) per excessive tonne of CO2 in Phase I (Phase II), which “...shall not release 
the company from the obligation to surrender an amount of allowances equal to those excess 
emissions...” 
25
 Banking, which is defined as storing of allowances for future use, is not allowed between Phase I and 
Phase II, but it is allowed between Phase II and III, as well as between the years of the commitment 
period.  
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Allowances” (EUAs). Purchasing one EUA entitles the holder to emit one ton of CO2 
equivalent GGs. In addition, the phases of the market coincide with the phases of the 
Kyoto Protocol, underlying the significance of the market, both locally (i.e., in Europe) 
and worldwide. Gradually, this market has gained complexity and maturity. More 
sophisticated products have been developed and trading activity has been boosted 
significantly. In particular, EUAs futures contracts, especially the end of the year 
contracts, appear to be the most liquid. In fact the EU ETS is the largest CO2 trading 
system worldwide (Benz and Hengelbrock, 2008) and the most important of the three 
flexibility mechanisms (see, inter alia, Gupta et al., 2008; Ellerman and Buchner, 2008; 
Grubb et al., 2010). Figure 3.1 below presents the relative proportion of the market. 
Figure 1.1: Relative Size of the EU ETS 
 
The first panel of Figure 3.1 compares the size of the EU ETS with other ETSs and the other flexibility 
mechanisms, namely the Joint Implementation, JI, the and the Clean Development Mechanism, CDM. 
The metric unit displayed is Gigatons, Gt. The second panel of Figure 3.1 reports the relative volumes 
and values of the three main Carbon Exchanges, namely the EU ETS, the New South Wales and the 
Chicago Climate Exchange. The units used are Megatons and thousands of US$ for volume and value 
respectively. 
Volume 
(MtCO2e)
Value 
(MUS$)
Volume 
(MtCO2e)
Value 
(MUS$)
Volume 
(MtCO2e)
Value 
(MUS$)
Volume 
(MtCO2e)
Value 
(MUS$)
EU ETS 321 7,908 1,101 24,357 2,060 49,065 3,093 91,910
New South Wales 6 59 20 225 25 224 31 183
Chicago Climate Exchange 1 3 10 38 23 72 69 309
Total 328 7,971 1,131 24,620 2,108 49,361 3,276 92,859
2005 2006 2007 2008
Annual Volumes and Values of Transactions on the Main Allowances Markets
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The first panel in Figure 3.1 shows that the EU ETS is the main action globally in 
achieving emission reduction targets. In 2008 it accounted for around 60 percent of the 
global action against CO2 emissions, in terms of volume of compliance units 
(Mansanet-Battaller and Pardo, 2008). The second panel of Figure 3.1 reports the 
volumes and values of transactions on the main Carbon markets. The EU ETS exceeds 
by far the other two both in total volume of transactions and in total value. 
In the EU ETS, each country allocates to each compliant company a certain amount of 
European Union Allowances (EUAs), which is their limit in CO2 emissions.
26
 Before 
the beginning of each phase, each country needs to make a plan, the National Allocation 
Plan (NAP), concerning the total number of allocated allowances, as well as the way in 
which they will be distributed to the regulated installations.
27
 NAPs must be submitted 
for approval to the European Commission, EC, 18 months before the actual beginning 
of the phase. The assessment and acceptance, or potential correction, period is three 
months. By the end of March, each year, each member state needs to submit to the EC a 
report, about the previous year’s emissions. The final day for the actual delivery of 
allowances is the end of April. The following diagram by Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo 
(2008) shows the process.  
Figure 1.2: Compliance process 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the sequence of events from when the emissions take place till the delivery of the 
allowances. 
Consequently, the EU ETS is a “cap-and-trade” market, where the overall quantity is 
predetermined. This results in a price formation process that is heavily influenced by 
policies. Kruger et al. (2007), commenting on this issue, discusses the centralized-
                                                 
26
 Several independent studies argue that there has been an over-allocation of Carbon Allowances, with a 
direct environmental and financial impact, especially in Phase I (e.g., Daskalakis et al., 2006, 2009). 
27
 95 percent of the allowances in Phase I and 90 percent in Phase II are allocated freely, while the 
remaining proportion is auctioned (Ellerman and Buchner, 2007). 
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decentralized character of the market. According to their study, the EU ETS is 
balancing between a completely decentralized market, in the sense that each country can 
decide on its own emission-reduction plan, and a wholly centralized market, in which 
the total quantity for all member states is regulated by EC. The ultimate goal is to make 
CO2 emissions expensive, in order to provide individual companies the incentive to 
develop environmental friendly technologies. Along the same lines, Viswanathan 
(2010) argues that EUA prices, especially in the futures market, reflect investors’ beliefs 
about future “green” technologies. Consequently, the price of EUA futures contracts 
should fall when cost effective “green” technologies are expected to be utilized. In the 
same study, he also argues that the Carbon market needs a regulatory framework that 
can keep a fine balance between market innovation and liquidity, where the viability of 
the market is of utmost importance.  
Trading System 
Trading, in the EU ETS is monitored by the Community Independent Transaction Log 
(CITL), which, similar to previous experiences, such as the Chicago Climate Exchange 
(CCX), is organized into accounts. Each member state’s registry is connected to its 
account, where any imbalances are monitored.
28
 Compliance monitoring is achieved 
through these accounts and refers only to regulated sectors. However, any physical 
person is allowed to enter the market and start trading. In either case, allowances that 
cannot be stored due to banking restrictions, need to be cancelled. According to 
2003/87/EC (art. 13), “each member state must cancel the allowances that are no 
longer valid and that have not been surrendered and cancelled”. 
Furthermore, Carbon trading in Europe takes place either OTC or in organized markets. 
More precisely, the OTC market pre-existed and acted as a reference point for the 
organized exchanges (e.g., Daskalakis et al., 2006; Ellerman and Buchner, 2008). Even 
in the early stages of the market, in Phase I, OTC transactions were the prevailing 
determinant of price formation (e.g., Cappor and Ambrosi, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009; 
Convery et al., 2008; Alberola et al., 2008) especially in the Futures contracts market 
(Convery and Redmond, 2007), in the voluntary markets (Hamilton et al., 2007, 2008) 
and under banking restrictions (Alberola and Chevallier, 2009). The presence of OTC 
transactions was so profound that their price indices acted as a reference point in Carbon 
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 Since April 2009, all registries in the EU are linked to the United Nations Carbon market, under the 
Integrated Trading Log (ITL). 
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pricing. In addition, some markets allow OTC EUA holders to register their positions, 
by entering the organized trading process.
29
 
As the EU ETS increases in size and gains complexity, the number of operating 
organized markets should be able to accommodate the existing market forces. 
Consequently the importance of OTC transactions is expected to moderate. According 
to the EU ETS market regulation there is no restriction on how many markets or trading 
platforms should exist at any particular moment in time. This emphasizes Kruger et al.’s 
(2007) comments about the centralized-decentralized character of the market, from a 
different perspective. Although the Carbon market is a united, common, market in terms 
of the asset being traded, trading is distributed over various places. Each organized 
market accommodates regional needs, but since the same asset is being traded and its 
total quantity is restricted, the total emissions in Europe are monitored centrally by the 
EC. 
The asset being traded in the EU ETS is the EUA, which is common in all markets. This 
is the EUA spot contracts and the delivery is physical, between accounts. The unit of 
and the minimum price tick (€0.01) are the same in every exchange, but the size of the 
contracts, defined as the number of EUAs, might differ across trading platforms. In 
addition, other contracts, such as futures, forwards and options, which can be traded in 
the organized market, differ slightly, mainly on stylized facts, such as the contract size 
or the maturity date and, consequently, the life of the contract. EUA spot contracts can 
be traded in various exchanges, such as in BlueNext (Paris), in the Energy Exchange of 
Austria (EXAA, Vienna), in Nord Pool (Norway), in the European Energy Exchange 
(EEX, Leipzig), in the European Climate Exchange (ECX, London) and in Gestore 
Mercato Elettrico (GME, Rome). Futures can be traded in ECX, Nord Pool, EEX and 
BlueNext. Options started being traded in ECX on 13 October 2006 and since then, 
more markets have incorporated them into their trading platforms. Since Phase II, all 
compliance units can be traded in most exchanges, while some markets offer financial 
products of higher complexity, such as swaps and futures contracts on the spread 
between EUA and CER. Consequently, potential overlapping periods could transmit 
both information and risk, and markets might have a shared price impact (see Benz and 
Hengelbrock, 2008).  
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 Some of the most well-known early indices include the European Carbon Index and of the European 
Energy Exchange (EEX), as well as the various indices of the London Energy Broker’s Association 
(LEBA), which is an association of 10 members, providing information for all energy commodities.  
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Figure 3.3, below, shows that futures contracts constitute the vast majority of trading, 
77 percent, especially in Phase II, where the relative volume is twice larger than in 
Phase I. In addition, a small proportion, 4 percent, of trading volume relates to options 
on EUAs futures. OTC transactions account for a considerably large market share, 19 
percent. In addition, the main trading activity of the EU ETS is concentrated on ECX, 
which accounts for 95 percent of all contracts being traded. Nord Pool and EEX follow 
with 3 and 2 percent market shares, respectively.  
Figure 1.3: Relative volumes of Spot and Future Contracts 
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Figure 3.3 presents the relative volumes (in tons of CO2) of spot and futures contracts in each phase and 
across markets. Source: Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2008). 
An important characteristic of the market is that block trades are allowed. These trades 
offer the opportunity for market participants to bilaterally negotiate trades, without 
revealing any information to the market and therefore cause an adverse price revision, 
as long as the order exceeds a minimum threshold. 
Another important aspect that is particularly relevant to the present study is that OTC 
transactions can be registered with the organized market to mitigate counterparty risk. 
In Nord Pool they can enter directly, taking part in the normal trading process. 
However, in ECX they need to use either the Exchange for Physical (EFP) or the 
Exchange for Swap (EFS) facilities. EFP provides the opportunity, after a mutual 
agreement, for OTC transactions to be cleared by the London Clearing House Clearnet 
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(LCH Clearnet). The new contract created is standardized and the delivery is physical. 
Therefore, EFP is mainly used to clear futures and forward contracts. EFS provides the 
opportunity to register a non-physical OTC position with the organized market, without 
the physical delivery of the underlying asset. Therefore, it is mainly used to clear 
financial contracts, such as options and swaps. 
1.5 Present Analysis 
Summarizing, the EU ETS has some features that distinguish it from other financial 
markets. First, it appears to be rather illiquid, at least in Phase I, compared to other well-
established markets of other commodities or other financial products. Second, it is a 
“cap and trade” market and refers only to specific energy-demanding, industrial sectors. 
Consequently, the overall quantity is politically influenced, which is expected to have a 
significant impact on prices and trading activity. Third, unlike other financial assets or 
commodities, EUAs futures contracts have a very long time to maturity and their 
examination might reveal different economic patterns. Fourth, standardized contracts 
are being traded in simultaneous, non synchronous, but overlapping trading 
mechanisms. Fifth, OTC transactions are allowed to register with the organized market. 
This allows for information flow, which is expected to affect trading patterns and 
pricing. Consequently, econometric modelling that might be successful in other markets 
might not hold in the EU ETS without further empirical adjustments. 
These characteristics, along with the market’s economic importance in determining 
energy and emission prices, constitute a unique trading environment that has not been 
investigated adequately, in terms of intraday market dynamics. It appears that there is 
no relevant study that models duration. This is the main concern of Chapter 4, where the 
ACD framework is empirically extended to account for market stylized facts. 
Potentially different trading patterns from other financial markets are investigated. 
Market liquidity increases exponentially (Daskalakis et al., 2009) and trading intensity 
is employed to account for non-linear effects of market activity on duration. A new 
model that focuses on the potential asymmetric effects of past durations is proposed, 
where the size of the impact of past realized arrival times is allowed to vary across 
different regimes of trading intensity. Thus, an exogenous variable, such as trading size, 
is allowed to indirectly determine duration expectations. The role of OTC transactions is 
further examined by allowing them to affect the impact of past durations differently 
from normal trades. 
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According to the analysis in this chapter, in a unique market environment, such as the 
EU ETS, further empirical adjustments are needed in duration modelling. This is 
consistent with Bauwens et al. (2004), who argue that the conditional mean 
specification contributes to model performance more than the distributional 
assumptions. Although the flexibility of using a more generic density function increases 
model in-sample or out-of-sample accuracy, linear specifications, which include 
piecewise linear specifications, are found to clearly outperform their non-linear 
counterparts. In-sample goodness-of-fit or out-of-sample forecasting accuracy is 
improved even further when OTC transactions are considered, especially in Nord Pool 
and in Phase II. In contrast, ECX appears to be affected more by order flow imbalances, 
which indicates higher complexity and a more mature trading environment. Moreover, 
OTC transactions appear to increase the expected duration, either because they carry 
information and deter other traders from transacting, or because they consume the 
current levels of liquidity. Consequently some time might be needed for the market to 
reach a new equilibrium.  
These findings are particularly relevant to regulatory authorities, since a better 
understanding of intraday trading activity can enhance market regulation by reaching a 
balance between market innovation and liquidity needs. According to Viswanathan 
(2010), this would provide the foundations for more accurate pricing and would help the 
market serve its purpose of reducing emissions. A more precise duration model could 
also improve market making practices in EU ETS. Market makers can better manage 
risk if they know how long (i.e., expected duration) they are going to be exposed to it, 
and this would result in narrower spreads. Limit order traders can also benefit from a 
better duration model, since they can develop better trading strategies by managing the 
time dimension of “uncertainty of execution”.  
In Chapter 5, focus shifts to the informational content of trading intensity and to 
whether ACD models can be used to identify different types of trades and, 
consequently, different types of traders. A key idea is the role of time in information 
resolution, and more precisely when and for how long a piece of information is 
exploitable. Unlike earlier literature, the proposed model focuses on the process of 
information resolution rather than on its content. Market is seen as being efficient, in the 
sense that rationally incorporates information, but imperfect, in the sense that it takes 
some time from the moment that information hits the market until the moment prices 
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reflect that information.
30
 This period of “price adjustment” provides the opportunity to 
some traders to act before everyone else and make a profit. Consequently, the 
information benefit is now translated into a “timing” benefit. Modelling such time 
dimension of information allows for identifying informed trades/traders in a natural 
way, based on past observable information. 
This is the main contribution to the literature, which is particularly important and 
relevant to various aspects of trading practice. First, it highlights the benefit of 
possessing information before it is fully incorporated into prices. On the microstructure 
level, market imperfections are exploitable, even for a very short period of time, while 
information is obtained at a significant cost. This new “time dimension” of information 
increases the value of “real time” information, since it can increase profitability of 
intraday trading strategies. Consequently, this can affect the attitude of market 
participants towards the timing and the cost of acquiring information. Second, market 
participants can now identify informed trades by simply observing past transactions. 
They can extract price relevant information can act upon it, improving the profitability 
of their strategies. Third, the proposed model can be used for monitoring purposes by 
regulatory authorities. By identifying informed trading, further action can be taken to 
protect the market from “manipulation”. This can also be applied in real time to adjust 
the balance between market innovation and liquidity.  
Drawing on De Luca and Zuccolotto (2006) and on Hujer and Vuletic (2007), a 
Smooth-Transition-Mixture of Distributions ACD (STM-ACD) model of duration is 
proposed. Teräsvira’s smooth transition framework is applied to the shape parameter of 
a Weibull distribution, allowing it to vary across three different regimes of an 
economically relevant variable. This determines the shape of the distribution (the 
Weibull nests the Exponential) and consequently the shape of the hazard function. The 
three recognized regimes correspond to three different types of trades/traders; 
uninformed, fundamental and informed. The smooth transition function accounts for the 
learning process between regimes and therefore for hybrid trades. Following Hujer and 
Vuletic (2007), the shape of the hazard function is then related to a particular type of 
trades/traders, depending on its slope. However, unlike earlier work, trading intensity, 
which is observable, is used as threshold variable, and this allows the identification of 
the regime to which each transaction belongs. Further, focusing on informed trading 
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 Public information is assumed to be incorporated much faster than private information, yet still prices 
are not immediately adjusted. But first, private information needs to be extracted first, after observing 
trading history. By definition, this prolongs information resolution. 
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activity, the probability of the next transaction to be informed can be computed 
following forecasting the level of future trading intensity. 
The most important finding of Chapter 5 involves the role of trading intensity in 
transmitting information signals. First, trading intensity appears to be sufficient in 
identifying three distinct regimes. Then, according to the shape of the hazard function, 
the STM-ACD confirms the theoretical propositions of Easley and O’Hara (1992) and 
Dufour and Engle (2000b) that increased trading activity is associated with information. 
According to the shape of the hazard function, low trading intensity, in the form of 
either low trading size or long duration, is related to uninformed trades/traders, while 
high trading intensity is related to more informed trading. The higher the trading 
intensity, the more informed the trade. Consequently, large or fast transactions are 
interpreted as closely related to information and are, therefore, expected to have a 
greater price impact. Similarly, based on the findings of Pascual et al. (2004), trading 
intensity increases following informed trades, but this happens because of higher 
trading frequency rather than higher trading size. In addition, empirical findings provide 
further evidence that longer durations are associated with no news, according to Easley 
and O’Hara’s (1992) propositions, and contrary to Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), 
who argue that longer durations are associated with absence of new information. 
Findings also support Kyle (1985) indicating that informed traders act strategically by 
segmenting their trades.
31
 
In Chapter 6 the dual pricing impact of trading intensity is further investigated, to 
account for its information and liquidity content. A new dynamic expectations structural 
model for intraday price changes is proposed, extending the existing literature in the 
following ways. First, it deviates from a static approach of modelling intraday prices 
and Bid-Ask spread, in the sense that it allows price components to vary according to 
trading activity. The information and liquidity components are revised after trading 
intensity fluctuations. Second, price revisions depend on the, Bayesian, learning process 
of market participants, who condition their quoted prices upon expectations about the 
price impact of future transactions. Consequently, price and spread components are 
modelled as continuous latent variables that depend on past trading history, public 
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 The average duration of Buys is everywhere found to be longer than that of Sells. Considering that 
informed traders buy (sell) upon good (bad) news, that means that it takes longer to transact upon the 
arrival of good news. However, a closer inspection of the data reveals that the Carbon market is a buyer 
market and therefore, it should be easier for a Seller to find a Buyer than the opposite. Hence, the longer 
durations.  
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information and market participants’ learning ability. Third, the dynamic character of 
the model provides a framework to measure the information and liquidity pricing 
impact of a trade, in a way that the profitability of a market or limit order strategy can 
be maximized. These components are measurable and are revised after every 
transaction. Investors can formulate expectations and then take an appropriate market 
position. Finally, this model further investigates the intraday price formation of Carbon 
allowances, recognising the pricing impact of market participants’ behaviour. This can 
have numerous implications for regulation and trading in the EU ETS.  
In more detail, the model proposed in this chapter extends the original model of 
Madhavan et al. (1997) and draws on the studies of Grammig et al. (2007), Angelidis 
and Benos (2009) and Ben Sita (2010). Market makers, in the context of a hybrid 
market, continuously observe trading history through trading intensity, trying to extract 
price-relevant information. They quote their prices based on liquidity considerations and 
the post-trade effect of their actions. Similar to Madhavan et al. (2007), intraday returns 
are driven by both an information and a liquidity component. In this thesis, however, 
these are allowed to be determined by dynamic expectations of trading intensity, and by 
the expected exposure to risk. The employed risk measures account for both level of 
risk and time of exposure. Thus, the model can be used to define the components of 
estimated spread and intraday volatility, as well as to help identify the most appropriate 
type of order, between Market and Limit Orders. 
One of the main findings is that spread components follow intraday patterns that seem 
to be adequately explained by the dual role of trading intensity. Trading intensity is 
positively related to the information component, and, probably due to economies of 
scale or the illiquid character of the market, expectations of higher trading intensity 
have a decreasing effect on price changes. The higher the expectation, the higher the 
price impact of a trade, which confirms the empirical findings of Dufour and Engle 
(2000b). In addition, and consistent with the literature, risk, in the form of price 
volatility, seems to affect only the liquidity component of the spread and not the 
information component. Another main finding is the confirmation of the positive 
relation between limit orders and spread width. However, it appears that a limit order 
strategy could be profitable only when trading intensity is low. Otherwise, the 
information component indicates that the midpoint deviation would be larger than the 
spread. Finally, Buy orders, especially the large ones, are associated with a higher 
adverse-selection component and wider spreads than Sell orders. 
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These findings are particularly relevant to various aspects of trading process in the EU 
ETS. First, trading practices can be improved, as investors could measure more 
precisely the price impact of their trades, which might vary over time. They can account 
for behavioural aspects of trading in real time and they can formulate trading strategies 
that take into account the actions of other investors. This practice can also be beneficial 
to investors who possess price unresolved information, as they can adjust their trading 
to current liquidity levels and sensitivity towards new information, thus maximizing 
their profits. Second, market making can be further improved, as this model can indicate 
when market orders can be profitable. Dealers can adjust spread width according to 
liquidity and information, thus becoming more efficient in managing both. This, in turn, 
would result in narrower spreads. Finally, a better understanding of trading practices 
and their pricing impact can improve regulation and monitoring, and thus the market 
can be more efficient in achieving its goal of reducing emissions. This model proposes a 
natural measure of market sensitivity towards information and liquidity, which are both 
highlighted in the Carbon market literature. Regulatory authorities can develop policies 
that can manage both and allow the market to reach a balance between “market 
innovation” and liquidity. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a critical review 
of the literature, while Chapter 3 presents the data employed, along with a brief non-
parametric analysis. The following three chapters, Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, 
present the models employed and the empirical findings. Finally, Chapter 7 presents the 
conclusions of this thesis. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Review of Previous Studies 
Technological advancement and market modernization have provided researchers and 
practitioners with data sets of increased frequency. Unlike daily observations, which 
usually aggregate relative quantities, Ultra-High-Frequency (UHF) data consist of 
transaction level information, where all transactions are recorded. This gives the 
opportunity for further insight into the trading process and the microstructure of the 
market, which has become a major and rigorous field of study. Unlike previous studies, 
prices, which are generally considered to summarize market conditions in one figure, 
are no longer seen as macroeconomic phenomena. Instead, intraday dynamics of several 
market relevant variables, called marks, as well as their intraday seasonal patterns are 
realized to have a transitory or permanent price impact. On that level, trades are 
recognized to carry price-relevant information and traders learn by observing past 
transactions. This way, they formulate expectations that influence their price setting. 
Consequently, price movements depend, not only on new incoming information but on 
market participants’ strategies as well. 
Intraday market dynamics have been extensively examined in sophisticated, developed 
and liquid markets, but developing or illiquid markets still remain unexplored. Limited 
studies investigate intraday phenomena in emerging markets, such as the Mexican 
Derivatives Market (Ben Sita, 2010) or the Athens Stock Exchange (Angelidis and 
Benos, 2009), and report that these effects are magnified due to liquidity or information 
shocks. Intraday market characteristics are found to play a significant role in price 
formation, and market dynamics seem to determine prices along with information about 
the “fundamental” value of the underlying asset.  
One of the most recent, and less examined, markets is the European Carbon market. The 
European Emissions Trading System (the EU ETS), which is the European part of the 
global Carbon market, is a fairly new market, which has been developed significantly 
over the last years and has gained complexity and maturity, as well as sufficient 
liquidity and market depth.
32
 The literature on the microstructure of the market is rather 
limited and focuses on the intraday price dynamics, employing, though, models that 
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does not have the pretension to provide an in depth analysis of the market. Consequently, the literature 
references will be limited to present the most relative studies. 
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have been used on lower frequency data sets and in well-developed markets. The 
majority of these models reports that further empirical adjustment is needed in order to 
model the market’s stylized facts. Viswanathan (2010) further comments on it, 
supporting that the Carbon market is sensitive to information and liquidity and that a 
better understanding of market dynamics would improve market efficiency. 
2.1.1 Carbon Market-Early Literature 
Early literature in the Carbon market focuses on the description of the market 
mechanism and the general framework of the Emissions Trading System. Kruger et al. 
(2007) comment on the centralized and decentralized character of the market, 
emphasizing the need of a consolidated legal framework.
33
 Convery and Redmond 
(2007) discuss the institutional framework of the market, as well as common facts with 
other cap and trade markets and the OTC predecessor of the EU ETS. Mansanet-
Bataller and Pardo (2008) emphasize the driving forces and the history of the EU ETS. 
They also provide a short description of OTC and the voluntary Carbon markets. Along 
the same lines, Chevallier (2010) analyzes the nature and origins of CERs (i.e., Certified 
Emission Reduction units), as well as their regulatory framework. Furthermore, Burtraw 
et al. (2002), Böhringer and Lange (2005), Kosobud et al. (2005) and Schleich et al. 
(2006) develop simulation studies to examine the potential effects of market designing 
issues on prices and trading. 
More recently, Viswanathan (2010) argues that the Carbon market needs a regulatory 
approach that would strictly regulate the market in order to restrict manipulation, but 
simultaneously allow exchanges’ and market participants’ innovations to sustain 
liquidity. A non-regulated, non-transparent market would be liquid, but inaccurate in 
terms of price. In contrast, a strictly regulated environment would increase price 
accuracy, but not liquidity. Both would result in a divergence from the EU ETS’s initial 
purpose. This is based on a seminal study of Kyle and Viswanathan (2008), who 
postulate that the organized markets improve the aggregation of diverse information, 
which, according to Hayek (1945), leads to an increased “market efficiency”. However, 
that does not necessarily mean that it increases the “price accuracy” as well. They 
explain that a highly manipulated market, in terms of increased presence of informed 
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 The decentralized character of the market refers to the fact that each country prepares individually a 
NAP of allocating allowances among the companies that are regulated. However, since the EU ETS is a 
cap and trade market these NAPs and the associated quantity of allowances is controlled by the European 
Committee, which is referred to as the centralized feature of the market. 
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market participants, might be highly efficient, in terms of incorporating manipulation 
into price, but the asset is not necessarily priced accurately. In the case of the Carbon 
market, over- or under-pricing would lead to a highly speculative environment, which 
would undermine efforts to reduce emissions. 
Despite its size and importance, the Carbon market literature has only recently attracted 
academic attention. Some studies discuss the very nature of the asset and develop 
models that account for both spot and futures prices. Kosobud et al. (2002) and 
Daskalakis et al. (2009) argue that EUA is a commodity and should be treated as such. 
Other studies, such as Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner (2007), Truck et al. (2007) and 
Daskalakis and Markelos (2008), develop cost of carry models to investigate the price 
formation process. Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner (2007) report evidence in favour of the 
cost of carry approach for Phase I, while Truck et al. (2007) show that inter-phase 
futures exhibit significant convenience yields. Daskalakis et al. (2009), however, argue 
that the standard framework cannot entirely capture market dynamics and, instead, they 
propose a two-factor equilibrium model, based on a jump-diffusion process. They argue 
that it is the best approximation to model intra- and inter-phase options on future prices. 
Other studies extend the inter-phase analysis, examining the impact of banking, defined 
as storing of allowances in one phase to be used in the next, and various other factors of 
trading activity, such as price development. Various studies (see, inter alia, Rubin, 
1996; Schennach, 2000; Godal and Klaasen, 2006; Schleich et al., 2006; Daskalakis and 
Markelos, 2008; Daskalakis et al., 2009) further discuss and empirically examine the 
banking restriction between Phase I and II and its potential impact on prices, volumes 
and trading activity. The main finding of these studies, although each presents results 
analogous to the methodology employed, is that banking restrictions reduce market 
efficiency and increase risk levels. Vinocur (2009) re-examines the issue, using intra-
day data, and emphasizes the importance of repealing the restrictions.  
Along the same lines, several studies (e.g., Christiansen and Arvanitakis, 2005; Bunn 
and Fezzi, 2007; Mansanet-Bataller et al., 2007; Alberola et al., 2007, 2008, 2009a, 
2009b) examine how EUAs interact with commodities. They all conclude that energy 
commodities’ prices are connected to each other and that they tend to follow similar 
pricing paths.
34
 In addition, Carmona et al. (2008) and Kara et al. (2008) show that 
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and electricity demand on the price equilibria of SO2 prices, providing fairly similar results. 
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EUAs have an increasingly significant impact, not only on energy commodities, but in 
all economic activities, since they restrict the availability, or else the price competitive 
advantage of low-cost energy. In contrast, similar studies on the SO2-CO2 relation (see, 
inter alia, Burtraw et al., 2002; Bohringer and Lange, 2005; Kosobud et al., 2005; 
Schleich et al., 2006) reject common revisions. Research interest focuses also on the 
effect of National Allocation Plans (NAPs) on price formation.
35
 All studies (e.g.,  
Uhrig-Homburg, 2007; Milunovich and Hoyeux, 2007; Sanin and Violante, 2009; 
Conrand et al., 2010) that investigate this issue conclude that NAPs have a significant 
price impact, mainly due to the fact that they determine directly future liquidity.
36
 
Moreover, the majority of studies (e.g., Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo, 2007; Rotfuss et 
al., 2009) criticize that, especially in Phase I, NAPs have been really generous and an 
over-allocation of allowances has decreased their trading value, making the market 
deviate from its initial aim - to make energy consumption expensive. 
The majority of the afore-mentioned studies report that several market dynamics have a 
significant influence on price formation, which sometimes is more influenced by trading 
patterns than by macroeconomic information about the “fundamental” value of emission 
allowances. According to Viswanathan (2010) the impact these trading patterns, might 
be magnified by the actions of market participants. The market microstructure literature 
extensively discusses various intraday phenomena and provides the tools for an in depth 
analysis of intraday dynamics, which are not extensively analyzed in the Carbon market. 
2.1.2 Intraday price formation 
Empirical market microstructure literature recognizes information and liquidity as the 
driving forces of intraday price formation. Both are particularly important in the 
presence of market specialists, especially in a relatively illiquid environment such as the 
Carbon market (see, inter alia, Benz and Hengelbrock, 2008) where dealers have been 
introduced to support liquidity. Market’s equilibrium is determined by the trading 
strategies of the market participants, according to their access to relevant information 
and their liquidity desires. Access to information and marginal levels of liquidity 
determine dealers’ risks and consequently investors’ costs mainly in the form of the 
Bid-Ask spread.  
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 As it will be explained further in Chapter 3, NAPs are plans, according to which, individual countries 
try to control their emissions. Every year they are submitted for approval by the European Committee, 
and consequently they are important determinants of the available quantity of allowances in the market. 
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 For further market developments related to NAPs please refer to Zhang and Wei (2010). 
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Unlike Stigler (1967), who sees trading costs as a sign of market “imperfection”, 
Demsetz (1968) raises the importance of spreads as a natural outcome of trading 
activity. Market makers provide a constant demand and supply in the market and they 
need to be rewarded for bearing the risks and the costs of immediate execution of 
trading. This is the price of “immediacy”, which implicitly connects costs with trading 
activity. Therefore, apart from explicit trading costs, such as market charges, the time 
dimension and the size of a transaction are seen for the first time as inextricable 
determinants of quoted prices and, consequently, of costs. Therefore, trading costs can 
no longer be ignored or be seen as mere market frictions since they are directly related 
to trading activity. 
The presence of Bid-Ask spread has a non trivial impact on transaction prices and on 
the time series properties of asset returns. It may create spurious volatility due to the 
Bid-Ask spread bounce, which is defined as the movements from the Bid to the Ask 
depending on whether the transaction is Buyer or Seller initiated, and serial correlation 
in returns (Roll, 1984). In addition, intraday price setting is affected by current levels of 
trading activity (inter alia, Garman, 1976; Stoll, 1978) and asymmetric information 
(inter alia, Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985). These are the most widely 
recognized components of the spread that they are considered to drive the intraday price 
formation. The investigation of these components appears to be critical for investors, 
financial authorities and researchers.  
In earlier studies the spread was viewed as a consequence of the dealer’s need to 
recover fixed transaction costs as well as normal profit arising from traders’ desire of 
immediate executions of orders. These studies were trying to determine empirically 
which variables can capture cross-sectional variation in spreads and the components of 
the spread. The first cost identified in the literature is the order-processing cost. This is a 
fixed cost component and quote action associated costs such as installation costs, 
exchange seat commissions, labour costs, information provision coats, or clearing 
commissions can be subsumed under order-processing costs (Landsiedl, 2005). 
Generally, according to market microstructure theory, the order-processing cost is a 
compensation cost (labour, equipment costs, etc.). It is a fee charged by the liquidity 
supplier for standing ready to match Buy and Sell orders. 
Demsetz (1968) defines order-processing cost as the sum of the buying premium and 
the selling concession linked to order execution, and compares Bid-Ask spreads to the 
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inventory mark-up of retailers or wholesalers.
37
 Using a sample of 200 securities traded 
on the NYSE recorded for two days, and a simple model, his analysis strongly indicates 
that Bid-Ask spreads depend negatively on the intensity of trading activity and 
positively on the price of the transacted security. More specifically, higher transaction 
frequency reduces the fixed cost per transaction and the waiting costs, while higher 
asset prices increase the variable, trading volume dependent, cost linearly. The basic 
assumption is that the per dollar trading cost is constant.  
Demsetz (1968) first recognizes trading costs as the cost of market makers for providing 
“immediacy”. Transaction size and frequency are implicitly assumed to be connected 
with quoted prices, although they are not explicitly modelled. Therefore, costs are 
considered to be directly proportional to trading activity and can no longer be ignored. 
This cost component is largely fixed and therefore is expected to decrease with 
increased trading activity. Huang and Stoll (1997) and Ahn et al. (2002) postulate that 
the per unit order-processing cost is reciprocal to trading volume. However, diversified 
market making in a portfolio of assets could amortize more efficiently this cost and 
weaken this relation. In addition, in a highly competitive market Bid-Ask spreads 
should equal the expected marginal cost of providing liquidity, in which case order-
processing cost may be irrelevant (Bollen et al., 2004). This is consistent with Benz and 
Hengelbrock (2008) and Frino et al. (2010) who report a small fixed cost component in 
both ECX and NP, which further decreases as liquidity increases. 
2.1.3 Theoretical Models 
The second cost identified in the literature is the inventory-holding cost. Inventory-
holding cost, can be considered as of market makers’ compensation for taking undesired 
inventory positions. It is the risk of holding inventory stock. The associated studies, 
referred to as inventory models, investigate the impact of inventory-holding cost on the 
spread without ignoring the order-processing cost. In these models, the trading process 
is a matching problem in which the market maker, facing a risk of incoming order flow 
imbalances, uses the price to balance supply and demand over time. The key factors are 
the inventory position and the uncertainty about incoming order flow. Market makers 
achieve inventory control by shifting the quotes to elicit the imbalance of Buy and Sell 
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 Certain securities are available for purchase by retail investors from dealers who sell the securities 
directly from their own accounts. The dealer’s only compensation for the sale comes in the form of the 
mark-up, the difference between the price the security was purchased at and the price the dealer charges 
to the retail investor. The dealer assumes some risk by acting in this capacity, as the market price of the 
security in his or her inventory could drop before he/she is able to sell it to investors.  
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
34 
 
orders. The focus is on dealers’ optimisation, according to their attitude towards various 
facts that are discussed below. The risk they face can be either in the form of excessive 
carrying cost, in the form of excess inventory, or loss of sales, when inventory levels 
cannot support sharp changes in demand or supply. This particularly relevant in EU 
ETS where market makers have been introduced to support liquidity. This is a rather 
illiquid market and their inventories are expected to be significant price determinants. 
“Inventory” Models 
The first studies dealing with inventory-holding cost are those of Tinic (1972) and Tinic 
and West (1972, 1974). Tinic (1972), using data of 19 trading days (March 1969) from 
the same market as Demsetz (1968), examines the impact of liquidity on spreads. He 
develops a three-way decomposition inventory carrying-cost model.
38
 Following 
Demsetz (1968), he includes competition in his estimations, but instead of the number 
of exchanges on which a stock is listed, he first introduces the Herfindhal Index (HI) of 
concentration, in order to describe the distribution of trading activity among market 
participants. His main findings indicate that spreads increase due to increased price of 
liquidity, caused by increases of the underlying asset prices, market concentration and 
decrease of diversification of risk. Moreover, Tinic and West (1972, 1974) provide 
further empirical evidence concerning the Bid-ask spread components. In their first 
paper (Tinic and West, 1972) they employ data from NYSE for six days, while in the 
second (Tinic and West, 1974) they examine Toronto Stock Exchange (TSO). They aim 
at providing additional evidence concerning the impact of direct inter-dealer 
competition on the price. In their findings they postulate that price, trading activity and 
intensity of competition are the basic determinants of the spread. 
Extending on these ideas, two separate frameworks have been developed to analyze the 
Bid-Ask spread components, emphasizing the inventory-holding cost. The first one is 
the single dealer framework, in which the market maker/dealer has monopolistic power 
on trading activities and determines the spread (Amihud and Mendelson, 1980). In the 
second one a competitive multi-dealer (Ho and Stoll, 1983) framework, extended on a 
multi-period (Ho and Stoll, 1981) setting is examined, where a dealer is considered as a 
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 In this early stage of microstructure literature, prices are seen to be heavily affected by dealer’s 
optimization problem concerning their open inventory positions. Therefore, Tinic (1972) decomposes 
inventory price impact into the following three components: i) Factors affecting the cost of positioning, 
such as price, trading volume, institutional activity. ii) Factors affecting the cost structure of the entire 
unit, such as capitalization, size, nature of specialty portfolio. iii) Factors influencing the profit margin, 
such as exchange surveillance, indirect competition, inter-market rivalry. 
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market participant who faces competitive pressure in quoting his/her prices. In either 
case, market maker/dealer seeks to achieve the optimal inventory level by balancing the 
inventory-carrying costs against the opportunity costs of lost sales. 
In the monopolist setting of Amihud and Mendelson (1980), arrivals of Buy and Sell 
orders are assumed to arrive randomly, following an independent Poisson processes, 
while the quoted Bid and Ask prices are shown to be dependent on the dealer’s stock 
inventory. They conjecture that the quoted prices are monotonically decreasing 
functions of the inventory in hand.
39
 Previous studies, such as Demsetz (1968), 
recognize the stochastic character of the arrival of orders and its importance in 
“temporal” market microstructure. However, their analytical focus on the trading needs 
of the market participants prevents them from explicitly modelling it.
40
 Garman (1976) 
first incorporates these ideas in a one period model, where there is only a single market 
maker who receives, executes and clears all orders, trying to maximize his/her profit per 
unit of time. Simultaneously, the market maker tries to avoid market failure, which can 
occur by either no cash or no inventory. The arrival time of Buys and Sells is 
asynchronous and order flow imbalances, which can occur at any point in time, are the 
main source of risk. However, according to Garman’s (1976) model, the dealer can only 
set prices once, in the beginning of the trading process, and, therefore, his/her main 
concern is to “be prepared” for any “midstream” excessive variations in incoming 
orders. Therefore, formulation of expectations of the arrival of these orders is of utmost 
importance in order for the dealer to “survive”. 
Garman’s (1976) model, although it is innovative in the sense that it emphasizes the 
price impact of order flow variations and recognizes them as independent stochastic 
processes, it involves several strong assumptions. A very strong one is that dealers 
cannot borrow cash and consequently they can run out of it, which is a market failure. 
Amihud and Mendelson (1980) extend Garman’s (1976) model by relaxing that 
assumption. A dealer is assumed to set exogenously an upper and lower bound to 
his/her inventory position and market failure, simply, cannot occur. Therefore, his/her 
                                                 
39
 Stochastic processes are used for modelling random events in time that occur to a large extend 
independently of one another. It is one of the most important models used in queuing theory. For further 
information see Ross, S.M. (1996) Stochastic Processes, 2
nd
 ed, New York: Wiley p.59  
40
 The term “temporal” microstructure refers to Garman’s (1976) propositions that temporal imbalances in 
incoming order flow might deviate market makers significantly from their desired inventory positions. 
Then, they will change their quotes in order to reverse that effect and they will return to normal prices 
after equilibrium is restored. This results in a short-term price variation due to inventory positions and 
therefore the effect is only temporal. As it will be discussed below Hasbrouck (1988, 1991a, 1991b) 
confirms this idea. 
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incentive is shifted from “market failure” to profit making.41 The optimal strategy for 
the dealer suggests a preferred inventory position, supposing that the dealer can define 
it, based on the available information. If the dealer aims at liquidating his/her position 
he/she could increase (decrease) the Ask (Bid) price in order to increase (decrease) 
investors’ demand (supply). Order flow imbalances are still the main source of 
uncertainty, the analytical focus now shifts to inventory positions. Consequently, this 
model suggests that there is a direct bond between incoming trades, inventory positions 
and quote setting, where spreads increase with inventory positions in an analogous 
fashion (Madhavan and Smidt, 1993; Hasbrouck and Sofianos, 1993). 
However, a monopolistic framework imposes two unrealistic restrictions. First, optimal 
position and consequently price quoting depends only on the volume of incoming orders 
in one or the other side of the spread. Dealers need to compensate for these imbalances 
and therefore they charge a spread. According to the afore-mentioned models, they 
would charge the same cost for any given price, as inventory plays a “buffer” role. The 
optimal position, though, depends on various other factors (e.g., Stoll, 1978) that in the 
monopolistic framework they are not allowed to have a price impact. Second, these 
models describe spreads as reflecting the dealer’s market power and they account for 
unit transactions. However, in the presence of competition, spreads would effectively 
reach zero. This makes spreads a market trading cost. 
In contrast, Stoll (1978) places the dealer in a competitive environment. The market 
maker is seen as another market participant, with a given portfolio, who is willing to 
deviate from his/her ideal position, to accommodate trading desires of other market 
participants. Doing that, he/she is exposed to risk, for which he/she needs to be 
compensated and thus charges the spread. The difference with previous studies is that 
dealers’ behaviour deviates from being risk-neutral and they are considered to be risk 
averse. This means that they are willing to undertake extra risk for analogous return. 
Consequently, spread is no longer a sign of market power but reflects dealers’ costs for 
bearing that risk.  
This cost is similar to what Demsetz (1968) calls cost of “immediacy”, which, 
according to Stoll (1978), can be decomposed into carrying, order-processing and 
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 Deviations from the dealer’s preferred inventory position result in price changes. This happens simply 
because the dealer wants to return to that preferred position. There is no risk of market failure and 
therefore the incentive is to maximize profit. This profit making is not a result of speculation, but it is a 
compensation for inventory deviations due to incoming trades. Therefore spreads reflect the dealer’s 
market power. 
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asymmetric information costs. Carrying cost measures the risk of exposure. It consists 
of price change, order flow imbalances, storing and loss of sales costs. Order-processing 
cost summarizes any fee related to the trading process and it is largely fixed. This means 
that economies of scale can be developed decreasing the, per unit, cost for larger 
transactions. In combination with the fact that excessive exposure, in the form of more 
or less inventory, increases the actual spreads, this model conjectures that there is an 
optimal level of transaction size that minimizes trading costs. Finally, asymmetric 
information cost accounts for the fact that the dealer might transact with traders who 
possess superior information, concerning the “fair” value of the underlying asset. This 
will definitely result in losses, caused by unfavourable price movements. Dealers can 
compensate by charging an increased spread to all transactions, in order to balance the 
loss with excessive gains from transacting with uninformed transactions. This cost 
component has been developed extensively in the literature and it is particularly relevant 
to this study. Therefore, it will be further developed in this and the following chapters. 
Stoll’s (1978) model, although revolutionary, has a simplicity that raises concerns about 
its generality. One of the main drawbacks, present in previous inventory models, such 
as in Garman (1976) and Amihud and Mendelson (1980), is that the time horizon of risk 
exposure is fixed at one period. This simplifies the decision process, since dealers know 
in advance how long they need to keep the inventory for. However, this is a strong 
assumption for real markets, where the time horizon should determine dealer’s risk 
aversion as well. Ho and Stoll (1981), extending Stoll’s (1978) model to a continuous 
time framework, examine the Bid-Ask spread as consisting of two components. The 
first component is the risk-neutral spread and the second is a risk premium that depends 
on dealer’s risk profile, transaction size and return variance.42 They demonstrate that the 
uncertainty in demand is not eliminated by dealers’ strategy and they have to increase 
both Ask and Bid prices if they want to build inventories, while in the opposite case 
they need to decrease both. Their model produces three main findings. First, spreads 
depend on the time horizon, which is arbitrarily set by dealers, since that determines 
their level of exposure. Second, there is a risk-neutral, monopolistic, spread that dealers 
add a premium to, analogous to their risk aversion.
 43
 Finally, probably the most 
important property of the model is that prices do not depend on inventories. Similar to 
Stoll (1978), the fair price is exogenously determined and inventory only affects the size 
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 The risk-neutral spread maximises expected profits for a given stochastic demand function 
43
 This is particularly relevant to this thesis, where intraday prices are allowed to vary according to 
dealer’s expectations. Dealers are assumed to formulate expectations concerning the level of risk and how 
long they are expected to exposed to it. For further information please refer to chapter 6. 
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of the spread around it.
44
 Several other studies, such as Zabel (1981), O’Hara and 
Oldfield (1986) and Madhavan and Smidt (1993), extend the continuous time 
framework to an infinite horizon, where prices are set to maximize the current present 
value of expected future cash flows minus the carrying cost of inventory. 
In the multi-dealer framework, the individual dealer recognizes that his/her welfare 
depends on the actions of other dealers. Ho and Stoll (1983) examine the impact of 
inventory-holding cost on securities’ spreads under a competitive environment using, 
contrary to Garbad and Silber (1979), a “transaction by transaction” method. In their 
study dealers are assumed to face stochastic stock returns and transactions of fixed 
size.
45
 The Bid-Ask quotes are shown to depend on the degree to which transactions are 
correlated across securities at a given period of time and in a given security over several 
time periods as well as on the anticipated actions of other dealers. Similarly, Biais 
(1993) introduces the idea of “incomplete” information, concerning other dealers’ 
inventory positions.
46
  
Some studies examine other possible determinants of the Bid-Ask spread, accounting 
for various market stylized facts. Benston and Hagerman (1974), based on a randomly 
drawn sample of 314 OTC stocks, report that the unsystematic risk and the number of 
transactions are positively related to the spread. In addition, Copeland and Galai (1983) 
show that the spread is positively related to price and return variance, but reversely 
related to market activity. In their analysis, they characterise the cost of supplying 
quotes as writing a call or a put option to an information-motivated trader.  
However, previous models mainly refer to dealer/auction markets and consequently 
they do not account for limit orders. O’Hara and Oldfield (1986) account for both types 
of incoming trades, namely market and limit orders, examining the influence of dealers’ 
risk aversion on their pricing policies for securities. Similar to Ho and Stoll (1981), they 
consider a risk averse market maker, who adds a premium that accounts for risk 
aversion to a risk neutral, monopolistic, spread, but they only examine a discrete 
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 For example, supposing that the dealer formulates an expectation that determines the fair price to be 50, 
then spread could be 49-51 (48-52) when dealers have excessive (less) inventory. 
45
 This is in opposition to more recent studies, such as Easley and O’Hara (1987), Engle (2000) and 
Manganelli (2005), where trade volume is examined as a factor influencing the spread rather than being 
constant. 
46
 According to Madhavan (2000), in dealer markets, inventory variations are simply measured by 
reciprocal order flow variations. However, that is not the case in a hybrid market, where traders can 
become market makers in one side of the spread (Madhavan et al., 1997). Therefore, in some cases 
dealers cannot even extract this information. 
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framework.
47
 They show that the spread can be decomposed into a portion for the 
known limit orders, a risk neutral adjustment for expected market orders and a risk 
adjustment for uncertainty concerning market orders and inventories. They demonstrate 
that a risk-averse market maker may set a narrower spread compared to a risk neutral 
specialist and that the placement and the size of the spread are strongly influenced by 
the desired inventory position. Their main finding, though, is that inventory affects 
spreads only when the dealer faces both price and order flow risk. 
In contrast, Cohen et al. (1980, 1981) following a similar methodology with Ho and 
Stoll (1983), examine the price impact of inventories in hybrid markets, such as the 
European Carbon market. They describe price movements in securities markets, over 
time, as being partly the result of underlying economic changes and partly a reflection 
of the impact of indiosyncratic orders that come in from individual investors. Moreover, 
they explain finite spreads in a continuous price setting, developing the idea of the 
“gravitational” pool.48 Order flow imbalances have now a manageable time dimension 
that needs to be taken into account. Inventory deviations from optimal positions affect 
prices only when limit order submissions are driven to switch to market orders, and 
consequently to increase demand or supply, because of limit order trader 
aggressiveness.
49
 
Summarizing, inventory models explain deviations from the “fair” or “efficient” price 
as resulting from either risk of market failure and the incentive of “survival” (Garman, 
1976), or market power and maximizing profit (Amihud and Mendelson, 1980), or 
dealer’s risk aversion and maximizing terminal wealth (Stoll, 1978), or because of the 
“gravitational pool” and market participants’ aggressiveness (Cohen et al., 1980, 
1981).
50
 However, despite the different explanations, the basic idea of the inventory 
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 Other studies that employ a discrete framework include Zabel (1981) and Bradfield (1979). 
48
 Hasbrouck (2007) defines gravitional pool as: “When the market Ask price, approaching form above, 
hits the limit order price, the limit order Buyer is pulled to the Ask-switches to a market Buy order”. 
49
 Limit order trader aggressiveness is a key concept in a broader class of equilibrium models (see, inter 
alia, Chakravarty and Holdern, 1995; Parlour, 1998; Foucault, 1999), where it is a determinant of the 
order type selection. The present study covers partially this issue, which is further developed in chapter 6. 
A new model is proposed which could provide an analytical tool for selecting the most profitable type of 
order. 
50
 In contrast to all previous approaches, there are some researchers like George et al (1991) who reject 
the assumption that inventory-holding cost should be considered as a component of the Bid-Ask spread. 
Hanousek and Podpiera (2004) relax this assumption and they argue that this component exists but only 
in the extreme situation of a general trading pressure. They assert that the traditional assertion only holds 
true where there is only a single market maker. They also argue that the same risk of undertaking 
unwanted inventory is shared by a larger number of dealers. In addition, the reaction to inventory is 
weakened by the behaviour of dealers. However, empirical evidence, presented in Madhavan and Smidt 
(1991, 1993) and Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993), report preferred, but not necessarily time variant, 
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based models’ approach focuses on the dealer who faces a balancing problem and tries 
to moderate deviations of the incoming order flow.
 
These deviations though only 
depend on the behaviour of the market, in the short run. Therefore the dealers’ effect on 
price, especially expressed by their desired inventory position, can only be temporary.
51
 
According to Hasbrouck (1998, 1991a, 1991b) and Madhavan and Smidt (1991, 1993), 
a permanent price impact can only be caused by information. The market maker 
changes the quotes and therefore the price, depending on the trading costs, on the 
dealers’ previous inventory position and on the net demand to the dealer. 
“Information” Models 
The next spread component identified in the literature, is the asymmetric information 
cost. Asymmetric information has a permanent price impact and accounts for the fact 
that different market participants have access to different levels of information. 
Information models focus on the impact of information on prices, and consequently on 
spreads, using different methods to proxy the informational content of trades. Generally 
this cost is considered to arise because of the presence of informed traders in the market. 
All models consider as informed, traders who possess price-relevant, exploitable, 
information prior to other market participants. When market makers trade with them 
they will, on average, incur a loss. Therefore, part of the spread is considered as a 
compensation for that risk.  
This seems to be particularly relevant in the Carbon market, where the relevant 
literature (Daskalakis et al. (2009) reports information and liquidity shocks, which are 
expected to be significant price determinants. Dealers in the Carbon market might face a 
magnified information risk, due to decreased liquidity. On average they will lose money 
when dealing with better informed agents, but they can usually compensate by trading 
with other traders who do not posses price relevant information. However, they might 
be more susceptible when liquidity levels are low. 
The asymmetric information models allow for heterogeneously informed traders. If a 
trade is information motivated, its occurrence will send a signal to the market revealing 
                                                                                                                                               
inventory positions for market makers that have a rather weak, but existing, influence on spread width. 
Furthermore, Lyons (1993) provides evidence of significant inventory effects in the FOREX market. 
Along the same lines Madhavan (2000) reports that, although inventory data are difficult to acquire or to 
extract in hybrid markets, the liquidity effect of past trades cannot be neglected, even if it is not directly 
related to inventories. 
51
 At the end of the adjustment process, price and inventory are completely reverted. Revision is not 
immediate, but there is no permanent price impact in this model because trades are independent of 
information. 
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part of this information. Other traders who observe the market will capture this signal 
and they will learn from it. This “knowledge” will lead them to formulate expectations 
and revise his/her opinion about the “fair” value of the asset and therefore prices will be 
revised accordingly. These price revisions are permanent and they will hold until a new 
piece of information is revealed
52
 Consequently, the trading process is viewed as a 
“game” involving different types of traders, according to their access to information. 
Early theory tries to explain the source, the flow and the destination of the information 
by studying price fluctuations, order flow innovation and other transaction related 
liquidity parameters.
53
 Theory differentiates between three types of agents on asset 
markets; noise traders, informed traders and market makers.
54
 
The basic idea was firstly developed by Bagehot
55
. In his study, he explains why 
investors as a whole lose from trading and why informed investors win. He argues that 
market makers will always lose to informed traders with superior knowledge when 
fulfilling their duties. He emphasizes the time dimension of information and the time it 
takes for any incoming piece of information to be incorporated into prices, arguing that, 
even without explicit trading costs, spreads would still exist. Rational market makers 
recover their losses by charging widened Bid-Ask spreads. This way they can 
compensate by transacting with uninformed noise traders. 
His study triggered a rapid expansion of this idea and early models can be divided into 
two broad categories. One class of model considers that traders who possess any price-
relevant information enter the market sequentially and independently. The key idea here 
is that they have the incentive to exploit their information advantage at once, without 
being affected by adverse, subsequent, price changes. These models are known as 
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 According to the efficient market hypothesis, prices summarize all price-relevant information up to that 
time, discounting future, expected cash flows. Therefore, they express expectations, which are seen as to 
be influenced by past trading history. Consequently, when dealers believe that they have extracted a piece 
of information, they believe that it will eventually be incorporated into prices. Therefore, they revise their 
beliefs about the “fair” value of the asset permanently. 
53
 Information models are mainly theoretical models based on “game” theory. Their main aim is to 
describe market dynamics and determine market equilibria. A key idea in these models is the Rational 
Expectation Equilibrium (REE), which is the market balance that summarizes rational, Bayesian learning, 
traders. This branch of literature has been developed in parallel with the empirical microstructure 
literature. Considering that the aim of this study is mainly to empirically examine various stylized facts of 
the European Carbon market, the most relevant literature refers to the empirical examination of various 
issues.  However, whenever is considered relevant some references will be discussed. For a detailed 
discussion of REE literature, please refer to Vives (2008). 
54
 Noise traders trade for liquidity reasons in order to rebalance their portfolio, or just randomly, 
according to their private beliefs (Kyle, 1985). They have common knowledge and information sets 
containing only public information. (Landsdiel, 2005).
 
Informed traders are risk-neutral “insiders” or have 
access to private information. (Stigler, 1967). Market makers provide immediacy and trade with some 
superior knowledge concerning order flow. 
55
 The author’s name is Jack Treynor and he uses the pseudonym Bagehot 
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sequential trade models. They examine the determinants of the Bid-Ask spread in a 
competitive framework with heterogeneously informed agents. They are characterised 
by a probabilistic approach, where prices act as signals, according to the semi-strong 
form efficiency hypothesis, and there is a Bayesian learning problem confronting 
market participants.
56
 The Bid-Ask spread increases with the degree of asymmetric 
information and decreases as time elapses and the market maker acquires information. 
In contrast, another class of models, known as strategic, examine the case where a 
single informed agent can trade at multiple times, trying to cover up his/her actions. 
This might happen when there are capital constraints or insufficient order book depth. 
Obviously, these models recognize that trades carry informational content which can be 
revealed to other traders who observe the market. Therefore, informed traders need to 
take into account the price impact of their trades. These models maintain that private 
information provides incentives to act strategically in order to maximise profits. 
Informed traders choose an appropriate timing and they might prefer to separate their 
trades in smaller sized transactions, in order not to reveal their private information, 
which would move the price against them. This strategic behaviour might be affected by 
the trading mechanism and it may induce patterns in trading activity, returns and 
volatility (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Kyle, 1985, 1989).
 
 
The first sequential model that extends the idea that spreads would exist even without 
explicit trading costs is the study of Copeland and Galai (1983). They consider the price 
setting as writing a call or a put option to an informed trader, independently from 
dealer’s inventory position. This way, market makers are seen as trying to maximize 
their wealth by increasing the gains from liquidity, uninformed, trades, minimizing 
potential losses by transacting with informed traders. They postulated that spreads 
increase with price and variance levels, while competition, trading activity and market 
depth result in narrower spreads. Contrary to inventory models, which consider 
information is exogenously determined, information models connect trade history with 
information.
57
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 The Bayesian school of statistics is based on a different view of what it means to learn from data, in 
which probability is used to represent uncertainty about the relationship being learned. Prior opinions 
might influence the interpretation of the data. These opinions can be expressed in a probability 
distribution over the network weights that define this relationship. For further information please refer to 
Edwin (1994), Probability Theory: The logic of science. From investors’ perspective, the actions of 
informed traders reveal partially their private information, but the interpretation depends on each 
uninformed investor. 
57
 In inventory models, market makers observe order flow variations and they try to determine 
expectations concerning potential future imbalances. On the contrary, in information models, past trades 
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One of the most influential studies is the one of Glosten and Milgrom (1985). They 
examine the dynamic properties of Bid-Ask spreads and transaction prices in a pure 
dealer market.
58
. They assume that informed traders have the incentive to exploit their 
informational advantage at once. The only thing that market makers can do is to 
estimate a Probability of INformed (PIN) trading and to set their prices accordingly, in 
order to compensate their losses by trading with uninformed traders. They do so by 
observing past transactions and their learning is assumed to be Bayesian. They conclude 
that the Bid-Ask spread quotes differ from the price that would prevail under 
homogenously distributed information, partially because of adverse-selection. In 
addition, they assert that the expectations of specialists and of traders tend to converge 
over time and that superior private information would lead to higher spreads. As in 
Akerloff (1970), the market might fail in cases of excessive informed trading, because 
enormously wide spreads would prohibit trading. 
Moreover, both studies play an important role in shifting trading interest from the 
liquidity component of order flow to endogenous information and they emphasize the 
direction of the incoming trade. However, they still assume non-variant price impact of 
transactions of different sizes. In contrast, Easley and O’Hara (1987, 1992) differentiate 
the effect of various transaction sizes. Using transaction data to examine a sequential 
information model, they provide empirical evidence that informed traders prefer to trade 
in large amounts at any given price and, more importantly, that transaction size, 
sequence of trades and trading frequency are significant spread determinants. They 
observe that larger size transactions are executed at less favourable prices. This might 
occur because of insufficient liquidity or because they move market makers far from 
their desired positions (Stoll, 1978; Ho and Stoll, 1981, 1983), or because they are 
connected to information. In addition, they postulate that volume of trading can be used 
to identify the type of traders. This idea is particularly relevant to the analysis presented 
in chapter 5, where it will be developed further. 
Sequential models, although they emphasize the informational content of various 
market related variables, ignore any potential strategic behaviour and the sequence of 
transactions, which makes convergence to full information problematic. There are many 
                                                                                                                                               
convey information, which can be revealed by order flow variations. Hasbrouck (1988, 1991a, 1991b) 
emphasize the dual content of trades, while Madhavan and Smidt (1991, 1993) mention the difficulties in 
distinguishing them. 
58
 Specialists perform no brokerage fees and all orders are market orders. They assume that all risk-
neutral specialists operate in a competitive environment, in which the expected profits from each 
transaction are zero and there are no other transaction costs. 
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informed agents, but they can only transact once. On the contrary, Kyle (1985) is the 
first to develop and examine a strategic information-based model. He considers a single 
informed trader in a multi-period framework. Transactions have a significant 
subsequent price impact that needs to be taken into account in advance. He employs a 
dynamic model to examine the informational content of prices, the liquidity 
characteristics of a speculative market and the value of information to an insider. He 
argues that the informed trader makes positive profits by exploiting his monopoly 
power optimally in a dynamic context, where noise traders offer a camouflage which 
conceals his actions from market makers. Prices follow a Brownian motion, assuming 
the depth of the market to be constant and that all private information is incorporated 
into pieces by the end of trading.
 59
 This study draws from Rational Expectation 
Equilibrium (REE) literature and introduces a strategic pattern in informed trading. It 
tries to describe how markets incorporate information by combining market makers’ 
price setting with informed strategies.
60
 
The same author in 1989 conjectures that noise traders ignore the impact of their trades 
on prices and given a distribution of private information, prices become less informative 
when they diverge from competition equilibrium.
61
 Along the same lines Jackson 
(1991) and Rochet and Vila (1994) examine strategic behaviour variations in different 
microstructure settings and trading mechanisms. Other extensions of Kyle’s (1985) 
model include Back (1992), Holden and Subrahmayam (1992, 1994), Foster and 
Viswanathan (1996) and Back et al. (2000) who extend the initial model by considering 
multi-period versions, with multiple competitive traders. In addition, Admati (1985) and 
Subrahmanyam (1991b) consider a multiple securities framework. They show that 
diversification in an index mitigates individual asymmetric information, making it 
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 Brownian motion is a mathematical model, a continuous-time stochastic process, used to describe 
random movements, often called a particle theory. For further information please refer to Karatzas and 
Shreve (1991), “Brownian Motion and Stochastic Calculus. 
60
 Kyle’s (1985) model is closely related to REE literature and it can be considered as the meeting point 
of theoretical and empirical streams of literature. However, the model deviates from the simple setting of 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) in three main points. First, traders are not necessarily described as liquidity 
traders submitting their orders simultaneously. Second, risk neutrality of uninformed traders is no longer 
considered to be valid. Otherwise, uninformed market makers would not have an incentive to transact, or 
to provide immediacy, and therefore the model would collapse. Finally, price formation is explicitly 
modelled through an auction setting, unlike the REE model which can be considered as an auction model 
without price formation modelling. For more information please refer to De Jong and Rindi (2009).  
61
 This is in line with Dufour and Engle (2000b) who define a liquid market as a market in which 
information takes longer to be incorporated into prices. According to Kyle (1989) less competition results 
in less informed trading and therefore prices are less informative. According to Easley and O’Hara (1992) 
that happens when trading volume is low. High trading volume indicates higher presence of informed 
traders. For Dufour and Engle (2000b) this is when trades have a lower price impact, which is translated 
into increased liquidity. 
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cheaper to trade. Another issue discussed in Foster and Viswanathan (1990) concerns 
the life of information and the trading strategies that can be developed in the presence of 
long-lived information. 
Several comments can be made concerning the sequential and strategic approaches of 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985). First, these two models mainly differ in 
the way in which they treat informed traders. In the sequential model of Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985), informed traders will trade intensively as if it is their only opportunity 
to trade and maximize their profits. But, in the strategic model of Kyle (1984), informed 
traders choose to trade gradually in order not to reveal their private information. 
Second, a time dimension is implicitly assumed to be present in both models, since 
prices converge at different rates for uninformed and informed traders. Third, both 
models capture the same phenomenon; the informational content of trades moves prices, 
which are assumed to reflect the expected presence of informed traders. Notably, Back 
and Baruck (2004) combine both models and demonstrate that, under specific time 
considerations, they can meet when informed (uninformed) traders trade with lower 
(higher) trading rate. They assert that informed traders might decrease their rate of 
trading, when they realize that strategic trading can maximize their profits. In addition, 
Foucault et al. (2003) show that informed traders need to compensate patient traders for 
providing liquidity, which definitely decreases their incentive to act aggressively. 
Another important issue, extensively discussed in subsequent strategic models, is the 
characteristics of each group of traders. All previous models dissect market participants 
into two large groups, according to their access to price-relevant information. Informed 
traders have an exploitable time advantage, whereas uninformed traders possess only 
public information. However, several studies criticize the naivety assumed for 
uninformed traders, which are considered to transact only for liquidity reasons, without 
observing transaction history. They are usually assumed to ignore informational signals 
in favour of their exogenously determined liquidity reasons. In more detail, Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1988) relax the assumption that uninformed traders do not manage the time 
and the size of their transactions. They introduce the idea of discretionary liquidity 
traders, who, although uninformed, try to extract information from order flow variations 
and chose accordingly when to trade. This formulates a market setting with three groups 
of market participants; informed, discretionary and non discretionary liquidity traders. 
Along the same lines, Subrahmanyam (1991a), who assume risk-averse market makers, 
and Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992), who assume risk-averse hedgers, model 
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uninformed traders as risk averse traders, who request extra compensation for bearing 
extra risks. 
Summarizing, information models recognize that trades might convey information that 
uninformed traders could extract by observing past trading history. The information 
they can extract refers to the “fundamental” value of the underlying asset and it changes 
their expectations concerning the associated future cash flows. Therefore, price 
revisions due to revision in beliefs are considered to be permanent. This class of model 
tries to describe how new information is incorporated into prices. Furthermore, 
combining the information and the liquidity component of trades, described in inventory 
models, Hasbrouck (1988, 1991a, 1991b) suggests that trades have a dual impact on 
intraday price formation. The first is associated with liquidity and its effect is transitory 
and last only till liquidity imbalances soothe, while the second is associated with 
information and has a permanent price impact, since it revises expectations. In addition, 
Madhavan and Smidt (1991, 1993), Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) and more recently 
Bowe et al. (2007) and Ben Sita (2010) develop models in which past transactions are 
allowed to have both a permanent and a temporary impact on prices. They underline the 
difficulty in distinguishing between them.
62
 
2.1.4 “Empirical” Models 
Both sequential and strategic price models provide a further insight into the 
microstructure of the market and the intraday dynamics of price formation. However, 
their resilience to game theory is their greatest disadvantage. According to O’Hara 
(1995), “in order for equilibrium to exist, the dynamics of the “game” played and the 
“game” itself must be known”. Their theoretical approach restricts their empirical 
application and generality. For that reason another part of literature that examines 
several empirical aspects of market microstructure has emerged.  
An excellent benchmark is the “covariance” model, originally developed by Roll 
(1984). He extends the martingale property of transaction prices to the “efficient”, “fair” 
price, by allowing returns to be affected by the trading process. The transaction price is 
assumed to consist of a random walk component plus a component that accounts for 
trading costs, which is covariance stationary (i.e., covariance of order two and higher 
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 The model proposed in chapter 6, resembles to the models of  Bowe et al. (2007) and Ben Sita (2010), 
and aims at describing both the transitory and the permanent price impact of transactions, through a 
dynamic formulation of expectations. Trades are assumed to reveal private information and act as a mean 
to formulate expectations for future liquidity levels. 
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are essentially zero). This is a structural approach that models intraday price movements 
as occurring by a permanent revision of the efficient price, captured by the random walk 
component, and a transitory impact of market activity, which summarizes fixed trading 
costs, as well as any price changes due to liquidity variations. This model is 
revolutionary in the sense that it recognizes that intraday price variations are governed 
by both information and trading activity, in a way that it combines revisions in “beliefs” 
about the “fair” price and market, order flow, “imbalances”. It has become popular due 
to its simplicity and due to the fact that it provides a way to estimate spreads directly 
from transaction prices. This triggered a rapid expansion of this branch of the empirical 
microstructure literature. It provides a practical new way to model information and 
liquidity price impacts directly, in a contemporaneous manner. However, it works under 
the assumption that dealers face only order-processing cost and therefore it is 
considered “a naïve order-processing cost model of the posted spread” (O’Hara, 1995). 
A crucial assumption in Roll’s (1984) model is that there is no serial dependence in 
transaction direction (i.e., Buy or Sell).
63
 Choi et al. (1988) relax this assumption and 
extend Roll’s (1984) model by taking into account the serial correlation of trade 
initiation. Results indicate that their model explains more than 80 percent of the cross-
sectional differences in announced Bid-Ask spreads in the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange. Along the same lines, Bhattacharya (1986), examining a stock portfolio in 
the NYSE, allows some orders to be executed at the midpoint. Glosten (1987) analyzes 
serial covariance of price changes assuming that the total spread is the sum of the 
adverse-selection and gross profit components. He points out that the negative serial 
covariance of returns arises only from sources other than information. More recently, 
Stultz (2000) investigates this issue in more detail and maintains that the realized Bid-
Ask spread also measures trading costs net of the information component.
64
  
Moreover, Stoll’s (1989) model is of particular interest, since it gives a way to estimate 
all three widely recognized spread components. In this sense, the model is “full”. Stoll 
(1989) uses data consisting of transaction prices and price quotations for 
NASDAQ/NMS stocks. The serial covariance of transaction returns and the serial 
covariance of quoted returns are modelled as functions of the probability of a price 
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 The conditional probability of a trade flow reversal equals 1/2. P{t is a Sell | t-1 was a Buy} = P{t is a 
Buy | t-1 was a Sell} = 0.5. Flood et al. (1998).  
64
 These studies identify potential downward bias in the Roll estimator. However, none provides an 
adequate explanation of why serial covariance of price changes are so often positive or why the average 
weekly serial covariance is more negative than the average daily serial covariance. 
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reversal, employing a two step estimation.
65
 In addition, George et al. (1991) show that 
the spread estimates provided by Roll (1984) and Stoll (1989) are biased due to the fact 
that they do not account for potentially time varying expected returns. They use daily 
and weekly data derived from AMEX/NYSE and NASDAQ stocks, respectively, in 
order to test their hypotheses.
 66
 In line with Stoll (1989), they employ a two-stage 
analysis.
 
First, they compute the serial covariances of price changes and second, they 
regress them on posted spreads. Also, they measure the spread on the basis of serial 
covariance of the difference between transaction returns and returns at Bid prices, in 
order to overcome the problem of returns’ time variation. Their findings show that 
order-processing and adverse-selection costs are the most significant spread.  
Furthermore, Hasbrouck (1988, 1991a, 1991b) opposes the structural approach, arguing 
that the inclusion of unobservable variables inevitably results in strong assumptions. 
Furthermore, he emphasizes the weakness of the model to provide forecasts and 
underlines that even in the case of a misspecified structural model, a moving average 
representation, whenever it is possible, could be valid.
67
 He proposes MA and AR 
representations instead, but he recognizes that the choice of the model depends on the 
nature of the problem. Autoregressive representations offer a powerful analytical tool, 
especially when it comes to forecasting and impulse functions. Their ability to account 
for long memories offers a flexible framework to examine the impact of a trade over 
time and consequently to forecast future values.
68
 Such attributes do not exist in the 
contemporaneous, structural, framework of Roll’s (1984) model. However, ARMA 
representations are not complete, in the sense that they do not fully describe the DGP of 
returns. If that is the issue, a structural model would be more appropriate. In addition, he 
recognizes that MA and AR disturbances might be serially dependent, which is in 
opposition to the structural specification’s fundamental assumptions.  
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 Traded spreads are estimated first, using the covariance of price change. Then, the adverse-selection 
component is derived by subtracting the posted from the traded spread. The traded spread is decomposed 
into the order-processing and the inventory-holding components, which are combinations of estimated 
probability of trade reversal and the magnitude of a price change as a spread portion (Stoll, 1989). 
66
 They find that 77 and 97 percent of the downward bias in previous estimates (Roll, 1984; Stoll, 1989) is 
caused by time variation in expected returns. 
67
 The VAR and VMA (Hasbrouck, 1988, 1991a, 1991b) formulations are based on the Wold theorem 
that any zero-mean covariance stationary process      can be represented in the form: 
          
 
   
     
where      is a zero-mean white noise process,     , and    
 
      is a linearly deterministic 
process. Similar results are discussed in Ansley et al. (1977). In microstructure models, return mean is set 
to be zero. Although this is a biased estimator of that parameter, its estimation error is lower than the one 
of the arithmetic mean. For further information see Hasbrouck (2007). 
68
 These issues have been further discussed in Hasbrouck (1996) and Dufour and Engle (2000b). 
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Another influential extension of Roll’s (1984) model was developed by Glosten and 
Harris (1998). They “re”-introduce the trade initiation variable, which has already been 
discussed in inventory models and in Glosten (1994), as another source of uncertainty in 
the formation of the, latent, “fair” value of the asset. They relax the assumption that the 
random walk component is the only information-related price determinant, and they 
postulate that trades, along with the liquidity component, carry information that makes 
investors revise their beliefs. Therefore, they need to take into account in their price 
setting, the post-trade effect of their transaction. This is consistent with the empirical 
findings of Hasbrouck (1988, 1991a, 1991b, 1996) and incorporates the dual price 
impact of trades on a structural framework.  
This idea has created a new class of models, which base their inferences on order flow 
variations; the “trade indicator” models. Madhavan et al. (1997), in an influential study, 
extend Glosten and Harris’s (1998) approach towards Glosten and Milgrom’s (1985) 
propositions. They postulate that the informational content of a trade is better measured 
by the innovation in order flow, considering that the surprise indicates unexpected 
information. Several other studies extend this model to incorporate the price impact of 
volume (e.g., Angelidis and Benos, 2009), time (e.g., Grammig et al., 2007; Ben Sita, 
2010) or both (e.g., Bowe et al., 2007). In addition, Huang and Stoll (1997) propose a 
variation of Glosten and Harris’s (1998) “full”, in the sense that it includes all three 
spread components, model that summarizes many previous approaches, structural and 
time series, as special cases. Along the same lines, De Jong et al. (1995, 1996), examine 
closely the relation between the structural model of Glosten (1994) and various VAR 
specifications, under various transaction sizes. 
In contrast, covariance based and trade indicator models have been criticized by other 
empirical studies, although they confirm the significance of order-processing, 
inventory-holding and adverse-selection costs as components of the Bid-Ask spread. 
Clarke and Shastri (2000) find that the Huang and Stoll’s (1997) model provides 
implausible estimates of the adverse-selection component in 60 percent of cases, for a 
random sample of 360 NYSE listed stock. Van Ness and Warr (2001), examining how 
various adverse-selection models are related in measuring information asymmetry, find 
that, for a sample of 856 NYSE stocks, Huang and Stoll’s (1997) model gives 
impermissible estimates of the adverse-selection component in more than 50 percent of 
all cases. Along the same lines, Henker and Martens (2003), using the Huang and Stoll 
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(1997) model, find a negative average adverse-selection cost component for the stocks 
of S&P 500 index under both fractional and decimal trading.
 69
  
Concerning the Carbon market, recently, academic interest has shifted to intraday 
phenomena, such as the Bid-Ask spread formation. Spread components seem to be of 
particular interest for regulatory authorities, which are in charge of the design of the 
upcoming commitment periods. A better analyzed decomposition of the spread 
components can lead to a more efficient market with smaller spreads. This is of 
particular interest to operators of exchange platforms, for actively trading investors and 
agents, such as market makers, as well as for researchers. Only two relevant studies 
seem to examine the issue. First, Benz and Hengelbrock (2008) have studied the 
intraday trading process of this young market during Phase I, with respect to price 
discovery and liquidity. They analyze liquidity and the spread components using the 
structural model of Madhavan et al. (1997), while price discovery is examined under the 
VECM (Vector Error Correction Model) framework of Engle and Granger (1987). They 
find that spreads are always smaller in ECX than in Nordpool, which is also found to 
contribute to price discovery. Second, Frino et al. (2010) examine the relation between 
liquidity and trading costs, and find that liquidity has remarkably increased over the past 
years, resulting in lower spreads. 
2.1.5 Further Empirical Issues 
Volume 
The importance of the empirical models is undeniable, because they address further, 
empirical, issues in understanding intraday dynamics. One of the most significant issues 
examined is the price impact of trading volume. Many studies have used transaction 
volume as an explicit variable to model spread components (e.g., Angelidis and Benos, 
2009). Easley and O’Hara (1987) argue that informed traders, under liquidity and 
optimal strategy considerations, choose either to trade intensively or to strategically 
segment their trades. Both generate a number of information-motivated trades. In this 
sense trading volume may convey information, which might have a direct price impact. 
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 These models are build on the idea that in the presence of quote adjustments for inventory 
management, order flow must be negatively correlated (i.e., Buy (Sell) orders are more likely to be 
followed by Sell (Buy) orders) as quote adjustments make a transaction on the other side of the market 
more likely (Serednyakov, 2005). In practice, positive correlation might be observed, and that would be 
consistent with informed traders splitting their orders into many small orders to disguise their trades. Such 
behaviour of informed traders does not necessarily mean that liquidity suppliers do not adjust quotes to 
cover inventory-holding cost when order flow is persistent. 
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Furthermore, De Jong et al. (1995) focus on transaction costs and show that these costs 
are lower in small trades, in Paris Burse compared to LSE, and that they are a 
decreasing function of trading volume. One year later, De Jong et al. (1996), extending 
Glosten (1994), argue that price changes in Paris Burse increase with trading volume, 
by 25 percent for small and 60 percent for large trades (De Jong et al., 1996).
70
 They use 
Hasbrouck’s (1991a) model and find that the permanent price impact of trading volume 
varies between 40 percent and 115 percent. Along the same lines, Dufour and Engle 
(2000b), using again Hasbrouck’s (1991a) model, stochastically model time and argue 
that trading activity is positively associated with volumes. Meanwhile, Pascual et al. 
(2004) show that trading activity increases after a transaction with information content. 
Furthermore, Berkman et al. (2005), studying the impact of trading volume on 
execution costs in the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange 
(LIFFOE), establish that effective spreads are smaller in futures than in spot markets, 
confirming Subrahmanyam (1991a). 
Other studies examine the effect of volume on spreads, execution costs and order flows. 
Chan (2000) points out that, in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, the information 
component exceeds the inventory spread component, contrary to Bollen et al. (2004), 
who, developing a market makers’ model, postulates exactly the opposite. In addition, 
Chan and Fong (2000) indicate that, in NYSE and NASDAQ, trade volume is a more 
significant variable than the number of trades, though the factors affecting it remain 
unclear. Moreover, Huang and Stoll (1997) and Ahn et al. (2002) find a reciprocal 
relation between order-processing cost and trading volume. Degryse (1999) shows that 
the total trading cost is lower (higher), for small (large) trading volumes, in the Brussels 
CATS system than in LSE. Moreover, Easley et al. (1997) point out that large trades 
contain twice as much information as small trades, with Buys and Sells differing only 
marginally. In contrast, Aitken and Frino (1996) find that Buy orders are associated 
with larger cost than Sell orders, in the Australian Stock Exchange, due to short-selling 
restrictions. Their findings confirm those of Chan and Lakonishok (1995). In addition, 
Hedvall et al. (1997) report that order flow asymmetries depend on the traded volume.
71
 
More recently, Bowe et al. (2007) examine the price impact of trades in MexDer 28-day 
interest rate futures contracts, modelling trading volume stochastically, and report that 
trading activity is inversely related to price changes. 
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 According to their study “There are more often information reasons behind large Buy trades than large 
Sell trades” (Hedvall et al., 1997) 
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Time 
Another branch of the empirical microstructure literature examines the price impact of 
trading intensity under time considerations. Unlike data of lower frequency, when UHF 
data sets are employed, time is not set in regular time intervals. Instead, it is irregularly 
spaced, while time series of “time” appear to be clustered and over-dispersed. Although 
it took some time for empirical research to widely embrace its importance, the 
stochastic nature of transaction arrival time has two direct implications. The first is 
quite straightforward and refers to the fact that several econometric models might not 
hold, due to heteroskedasticity introduced because of periods of intensive trading 
activity. Second, following Easley and O’Hara’s (1987, 1992), these fluctuations in 
trading activity might carry price-relevant information, which, if it is correctly specified, 
could increase the accuracy of microstructure models. 
The importance of duration, defined as the time between consecutive trades, emerges 
clearly in the studies of Diamond and Verrechia (1987) and Easley and O’Hara (1992). 
Diamond and Verrechia (1987), using an information-based sequential model, postulate 
that the motivation of trading in equity markets, lies in information, and especially in 
the arrival of good or bad news. The implication is that informed traders will always 
trade upon the arrival of new information. They will buy on good news and sell/short 
sell on bad news. However, in the case of short-selling restrictions, the price effect of 
adverse-selection becomes milder, especially with respect to bad news. In contrast, 
uninformed traders’ trading is considered to be motivated by reasons other than 
information. Therefore, longer durations are more likely to be associated with bad news. 
However, Easley and O’Hara (1992) provide a different explanation for the relation 
between time and the existence of new information. Following Diamond and Verrechia 
(1987), uninformed traders’ transactions are considered to be unrelated to the arrival of 
good or bad news, but informed traders’ actions are seen as being motivated only by 
new information. An informed trader will choose to transact only if there is new 
information on the market. Consequently, lower trading activity could be observed due 
to a decrease in the presence of informed traders, and thus, due to absence of 
information.
72
 In the opposite case, informed traders may tend to trade more frequently 
upon the arrival of good or bad news, and their presence may quickly be ascertained by 
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 Easley and O’Hara (1992) use the change in participation rate to measure the presence of informed 
traders. 
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observing larger trading volumes (Easley and O’Hara, 1987).73 Therefore, longer 
durations are associated with absence of price-relevant information.
 74
 
These two studies differ in their interpretation of trading frequency variations, but they 
raise two important points. First, they both suggest that time, in the price adjustment 
process, is not exogenous to information. This is also confirmed by other studies. 
Hausman Lo and MacKinlay (1992) and Fletcher (1995) introduce duration into their 
ordered probit models as an explanatory variable, without, though, discussing further 
the implications of time.
75
 Pai and Polasek (1995), although they treat time as an 
exogenous variable, allow the parameters of their model to depend on duration in 
simple ways. Similarly, Allen et al. (2005) examine further the information content of 
durations, when empirically investigating the informational role of the market activity. 
Second, they emphasize that time homogeneity should not be taken for granted in 
intraday modelling, since duration might contain price-relevant information. The 
necessity to consider the time dimension of price process is stressed in the empirical 
market microstructure literature (Easley and O’Hara, 1992; O’Hara, 1995; Easley et al., 
1997) and according to O’Hara (1995) it is an empirical matter. However, no relevant 
study seems to explicitly model time in the Carbon market. 
Drawing on previous studies, Engle and Russell (1998) propose a new simple and 
convenient model, for modelling inter-trade time intervals, which has gained popularity 
and has become a benchmark in the empirical microstructure literature. They model 
duration time-series as dependent point processes, using a new model called 
Autoregressive Conditional Duration (ACD). The concept is not new and it shares a 
very strong resemblance with Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models. This triggered a rapid expansion of both 
theoretical modelling and empirical applications. ACD models consist of a conditional 
                                                 
73
 In that period the term trading volume refers to aggregated transaction size. It is a measure of trading 
intensity that accounts for volume of trading over a period of time. However, time deformation is not 
widely modelled yet and any time effects are implicitly incorporated into the analysis.  
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 The above model ascertains that information flow is not continuous and that the absence of informed 
traders could be interpreted as no new information. However, this can only be valid under the assumption 
that liquidity is not a hurdle for informed traders to trade at their convenience and that they do not act 
strategically as in Kyle (1985). O’Hara (2003) points out that liquidity is an important factor for price 
discovery and hence absence of traders does not necessarily mean absence of information. Traders could 
also be kept out of the market because of trading halts and/or strategic reasons (Back and Baruck, 2004; 
Foucault et al., 2003). Market regulators might voluntarily suspend informed trading when the new 
information is expected to have an extreme impact on price (Diamond and Verrchia, 1987).  
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 The ordered probit model for discrete random variables  is used to estimate the conditional probability 
of trade-to-trade stock price changes on the effects of volume, past price changes and the time between 
trades. 
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mean specification and an associated distribution assumption for the DGP of durations. 
Any formulation that contain past durations is sufficient for the conditional mean, while 
the associated density function should have a positive support.
 76
 The initial model 
examines the linear-ARMA specification and the Exponential and Weibull distributions. 
One of the main objections in the literature criticizes the simplicity of the conditional 
mean specification, in the sense that it does not take into account the asymmetric effects 
of past durations. Even in the original paper of Engle and Russell (1998) evidence of 
non-linear effects is reported. The first and quite obvious solution is proposed by 
Bauwens and Giot (2000), who use a log transformation on both sides of the equation of 
the conditional mean. This way, short past durations have a decreasing impact on the 
expected duration, while long durations have an increasing impact. The new model is 
called Log-ACD. However, Dufour and Engle (2000a) argue that it results in an over-
adjustment after very short durations, due to convergence to infinity of the log of zero 
values. Instead, they propose two other specifications in order to deal with asymmetric 
effects of past durations in a data-driven way. In the first model, they employ a Box-
Cox transformation of the Log-ACD model, namely Box-Cox-ACD (BCACD), 
allowing the data to determine the size of the effect of past durations. This imposes 
highly non-linear indirect asymmetric effects on the expected duration. In the second, 
they extend Nelson’s (1991) EGARCH model, and use a piecewise linear 
parameterization that allows past durations considerably larger or shorter than the mean 
to have different impacts on the expected duration.  
In addition, Jasiak (1998), drawing on the IGARCH model of Bougerol and Picard 
(1992), and the FIGARCH model of Baillie et al. (1996), conjectures that the linear-
ARMA specification fails in capturing duration dynamics in the presence of very long 
memories. He proposes the Fractionally Integrated ACD (FIACD), which improves 
significantly the fitting of the initial model. Along the same lines, several other studies 
account for structural breaks and develop a regime-switching framework. The relevant 
literature refers to the effect of external events on the expected duration, in a way that 
different regimes of duration might be present. Zhang et al. (2001) propose the, so-
called, Threshold-ACD (TACD), in which different parameters are estimated for 
different economic events. This is a piecewise specification, where different regimes of 
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 Researchers using the ACD framework, need to specify an equation for the conditional mean along 
with a distribution. The distribution durations are explicitly assumed to be i.i.d..  Also because of the non-
negativity of the durations the potential density functions need to have a positive support. Finally, the 
chosen distribution determines the Log-Likelihood function that will be maximized. 
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an relevant variable are allowed to have a different impact on expected durations. Meitz 
and Teräsvirta (2006) extend the TACD model allowing a smooth transition between 
regimes. This model is referred to as Smooth Transition ACD (ST-ACD).  
Other studies criticize the deterministic character of the conditional mean and propose a 
“latent-factor”-based alternative. Bauwens and Veredas (2004) propose the Stochastic 
Conditional Duration (SCD), where the expected duration is modelled as a latent 
variable. The new innovation series introduce another source of uncertainty. This is a 
joint distribution model, and its estimation is, computationally demanding.
77
 Several 
studies, such as Liesenfeld and Richard (2003), Ning (2004), Strickland (2006) and 
Bauwens and Galli (2009), develop this model further, mainly introducing different 
estimation methods. However, Ghysels et al (2004) argue that the specification of the 
conditional mean is linked with higher order conditional moments. They ascertain that, 
not allowing for independent variation of the conditional mean and variance, is a very 
strong restriction,. Therefore, they propose the Stochastic Volatility Duration (SVD) 
model, which models jointly duration and volatility. They argue that this is particularly 
important when intraday liquidity dynamics are of interest. However, this model is not 
popular due to its complexity. 
Moreover, some studies criticize the simplicity of the distribution employed, arguing 
that it is equally significant to the conditional mean specification and determines the 
fitting of the model. First, different single density functions have been utilized. The 
most common distributions used are the Exponential, the Weibull (Engle and Russel, 
1998), the Generalized Gamma (Zhang et al., 2001), the Pareto (De Luca and 
Zuccolotto, 2006) and the Burr (Grammig and Maurer, 2000) distributions. The main 
findings, concerning the density function employed, indicate that fitting varies 
considerably, and that depends on the data set employed and on the individual 
characteristics of the market. A common finding, though, is that increased flexibility is 
usually rewarded with higher precision in fitting and forecasting. 
Furthermore, Bauwens et al. (2004) argue that durations exhibit an idiosyncrasy that 
cannot be captured by traditional models, especially when a single distribution is 
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available. The probability of a transaction to occur given that it has not occurred till now is now 
influenced by two sources of uncertainty, one for the actual duration and one for the expected. Bauwens 
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assumed for the DGP of duration. This gave rise to a new statistical approach, which 
allows the distribution of durations to be described as a mixture of distributions. This 
provides researchers with great flexibility, allowing them to account for various issues 
and stylized facts present in each market. A threshold variable that captures these 
features can be employed, in order to determine different regimes of duration and/or 
structural changes. Each one of these regimes can then be associated with a different 
distribution, or sometimes with different shape of the same distribution.  
The models proposed can be divided into two broad categories. In the first, an 
observable variable can be employed to proxy an economic event that it is assumed to 
have an impact on durations. De Luca and Zuccoloto (2006) propose a switching regime 
Pareto ACD model using Terasvirta’s logistic smooth transition function, where the 
shape parameter of a Pareto type-II distribution is allowed to vary across different 
regimes determined by trading intensity. In the second category, the threshold variable 
used is a latent, and thus unobservable variable. This way, the unobservable regimes can 
indicate the presence, or the absence, of factors that cannot be observed but are assumed 
to have an impact on durations. Some authors have proposed a discrete model (De Luca 
and Gallo, 2004), while some others have proposed a continuous mixture of 
distributions (Bauwens and Veredas, 2004; Ghysels et al., 2004).
78
 Furthermore, Hujer 
et al. (2002) propose the Markov-Switching ACD model, which appears to be capable 
of higher forecasting accuracy. However, these models come at a high computational 
cost. As a compromise, Hujer and Vuletic (2007) propose the, so-called, Static Mixture 
ACD model, which shares a strong resemblance to the discrete mixture model proposed 
by De Luca and Gallo (2004), and provides equally good forecasts. In more detail, they 
allow the distribution of duration to be a discrete mixture of distributions with regimes 
determined by a latent variable. Each regime is associated with a different conditional 
mean equation specification in a way similar to TACD proposed by Zhang et al (2001).  
Lately, the idea of copulas has been introduced in duration modelling.
79
 Past durations 
are assumed to come from different distributions that are combined, using a weighting 
function. Wing (2008) suggests a dynamic copula approach that introduces a time 
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 Copula is a statistical tool that allows for a flexible formulation of multivariate distributions, 
accounting for a weighting factor among them. Copulas can combine distributions of different variables 
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varying mixing parameter, which measures the degree of time dependence and describes 
its structure. Furthermore, De Luca et al. (2008) examine a bivariate and trivariate 
copula function, comparing it with single distributions of increased flexibility. 
Duration and Information 
The afore-mentioned studies of Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) and Easley and O’Hara 
(1992) raise the importance of time in relation to information. Recent ACD studies 
extend this concept further by examining the connection of time deformation and 
presence of informed trading. Wong et al. (2009) examine the issue empirically, by 
utilizing a non-linear, volume enhanced ACD specification. They draw inferences for 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange, confirming Easley and O’Hara’s (1992) propositions 
about trading activity and information. In addition, Tay et al. (2009) propose an 
Asymmetric ACD (AACD) to estimate the PIN, assuming a Poisson distribution for the 
arrival rates of information.  
Hujer and Vuletic (2007) develop further this idea by connecting directly duration with 
type of trading through the associated hazard functions. They conjecture that the 
instantaneous transaction rates (i.e., the probability that a transaction will occur, given 
that no transaction has occurred till now) of uninformed traders, since they tend to 
transact independently of information, tend to be moderately progressive or even 
constant over time (i.e., not changing, independently of when the last transaction 
happened). This is a characteristic of the Exponential distribution.
80
 In contrast, the 
presence of informed traders depends on the arrival of news, which is not constant 
usually and is usually assumed to follow a Poisson distribution. Therefore, the 
instantaneous transaction rates of their trades should have a different, sharper shape. 
Consequently, whenever the distribution is Exponential, the regime captures uniformed 
trading. In contrast, when other distributions, with variant hazard functions, are applied, 
the associated trades are assumed to be related to information. However, one major 
drawback of their methodology is that the associated distributions, which determine the 
shape of the hazard function, are predetermined and not data-driven. Similarly, Gerhard 
and Hautsch (2007), following Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), conjecture that among 
uninformed traders there are traders, who observe order flow trying to extract 
information signals. Then they aggregate relevant information and act according to their 
individual trading needs (i.e., portfolio composition or risk aversion). This is translated 
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into different trading patterns, which can be described by different hazard functions. 
Gerhard and Hautsch (2007) connect different shapes with different types of traders.
81
 
Moreover, duration has been utilized to proxy several variables when testing market 
microstructure hypotheses. Easley and O’Hara (1992) postulate that short durations 
reflect information-based trading. Diamond and Verrechia (1987) postulate that long 
durations tend to decline prices. Engle (2000) uses duration as a measure of trading 
intensity and his results confirm that higher trading frequency is associated with 
information, while longer durations tend to be associated with declining prices. In 
contrast, Dufour and Engle (2000b) utilize duration as a measure of liquidity. Duration 
can be interpreted as a natural measure of the speed by which market liquidity is 
enhanced and prices incorporate new information. Their findings are in line with Easley 
and O’Hara (1992), in the sense that higher trading activity, measured by shorter 
durations, is associated with a higher presence of information. Finally, Gourieoux et al. 
(2004) utilize duration as a measure of risk, in a similar way to Renault and Werker 
(2002) and Ghysels et al. (2004). In these studies, duration is modelled in a way that 
captures the risk associated with trading under both price and time uncertainty. 
Another similar issue, discussed in the literature, is the time dimension of the price 
impact of trades and how fast new information is incorporated into prices. Hasbrouck’s 
(1991a) VAR framework provides an excellent analytical tool for examining the after 
trade effects of a transaction and the time it takes for the information that is revealed by 
that trade to be fully incorporated into a fully informative price. Dufour and Engle 
(2000b), analyzing the price impact of trades in a large sample of 18 NYSE frequently 
traded stocks, use a 5-lags VAR-type model with coefficients varying according to 
durations. Their results, in line with Hasbrouck (1991a) and Easley and O’Hara (1992), 
indicate stronger positive autocorrelations of signed trades and larger quote revisions for 
shorter durations. They postulate that more frequent trading indicates increased 
information presence and therefore trades have a higher informational price impact. 
Spierdijk (2004), examining a sample of five NYSE stocks, extends Dufour and Engle’s 
(2000b) findings and shows that large trades increase the trading speed while large 
returns decrease it. Volatility is also found to be higher for shorter durations. Similar 
results were reported by Manganelli (2005). Recently, Holder et al. (2004) apply a 
similar methodology to Dufour and Engle (2000b) in Treasury Note Futures traded in 
Chicago Board of Trade. They provide empirical evidence that, in contrast to equity 
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markets, trade durations are significantly positively related to subsequent returns and 
the sign of trades. 
Duration and Volatility 
In parallel, the relation between duration and trading volatility cannot remain unnoticed. 
The main category duration-enhanced volatility models originated in Engle (2000). He 
argues that a simple GARCH framework should be insufficient in capturing intraday 
volatility patterns, if duration is not taken into account. He introduces a class of models, 
which try to examine issues, such as to predict the next volatility by predicting first the 
next duration or to test how duration affects the current volatility and whether lagged 
volatility influences the next duration. More specifically, Engle (2000) combines the 
ACD and GARCH methodologies into a new model, the ACD-GARCH, or otherwise 
called UHF-GARCH model.
82
 He finds both returns and variances to be negatively 
influenced by long durations in IBM’s stock transactions. His findings are in line with 
the theoretical predictions of information models, where high trading frequency is 
expected to have an increased price impact, which would result in higher volatility. 
Alterations and extensions of the UHF-GARCH model are proposed by Drost and 
Werker (1996), Ghysels and Jasiak (1998), Grammig and Wellner (2002), Meddahi et 
al. (2006), Bollerslev et al. (2006), Maller et al. (2008) and Czado and Haug (2009).  
The general finding in these models describes a positive relation between return 
volatility and trading activity. Volatility is found to increase after short durations. This 
is strong evidence that market participants observe market activity, acquire knowledge 
and act accordingly. Most studies conclude that when traders observe increased trading 
activity, they interpret it as information inflow. Consequently, they revise their beliefs 
and price changes are expected to be more volatile. This is consistent with Easley and 
O’Hara’s (1987, 1992) propositions, which connect trading activity with information. 
The price volatility of EUA prices has also been discussed in the Carbon market 
literature, on an intraday level, as well as on lower frequencies. GARCH-type models 
seem to be the preferred choice. Earlier studies (inter alia, Benz and Truck, 2006; 
Paolella and Taschini, 2008) employ simple GARCH specifications on daily data for 
various energy commodities. Borak et al. (2006) find that price volatility increases 
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closer to the maturity date. This contradicts the normal convention that volatility is 
higher the longer the period of uncertainty and they attribute that to the long life of the 
EUA futures contracts. Along the same lines, Benz and Truck (2006), employing an 
AR-GARCH model, postulate that spot volatility affects the long-term investment risk 
and the efficiency of the market. They also argue that the model outperforms other, 
constant volatility, models. 
Furthermore, other models (see, inter alia, Chevallier, 2009; Vinocur, 2009; Isenegger 
and Wyss, 2009) investigate the same issue from an intraday perspective. Rittler (2009) 
employs a GARCH-BEKK model and provides evidence that futures contracts lead the 
long-run price formation, while in the short-run, bidirectional causality is observed. In 
parallel, Conrand et al. (2010) employ an Asymmetric Power GARCH and postulate 
that potential non-linearities, present in the intraday price formation, might not be 
sufficiently captured by simple GARCH specifications. Further, they underline the 
importance of NAPs, emphasizing that prior knowledge creates an exploitable 
information advantage. This contradicts Vinocur (2009) who argues that traders in the 
Carbon market under-react to new information. Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2010), 
examining the spread between EUAs and CERs, report that traders in the Carbon 
market seem not to be influenced by fundamental Carbon related information.
83
 Instead, 
they confirm Viswanthan’s (2010) propositions that traders are mainly influenced by 
microstructure variables. Similar to Conrand et al. (2010), Benz and Truck (2009) 
model returns and price change variance stochastically, using combination of AR-
GARCH and Markov regime-switching models. They conclude that the increased 
flexibility, in terms of non-linear effects, provides better fitting and forecasting, since it 
can capture certain characteristics better, such as skewness, excess kurtosis, or structural 
changes. 
Intraday variations 
Furthermore, many studies examine the intraday formation of volatility in relation to 
trading activity, as well as intraday seasonal patterns of other marks. In actual markets, 
trading occurs in predetermined trading sessions separated by periodical and regular 
time intervals. Opening and closing times are pre-defined, as well as the lunch break, 
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the overnight periods, the weekends and the holidays. Several studies investigate the 
effects of these intervals on intraday variables, as well as their intraday variations. More 
specifically, Easley and O’Hara (1997) report that trading activity and price volatility, in 
NYSE and NASDAQ, demonstrate U-shape patterns for liquid stocks. Goodhart and 
Demos (1991) report similar intraday variations for volume and quoted spreads. In 
general, well-established markets with well defined opening and closure times, such as 
NYSE, NASDAQ and LSE, tend to follow similar patterns, while markets, such as the 
Forex Interbank market, with round-the-clock, partially overlapping trading tend to 
follow more complex fluctuations (see, inter alia, Wood et al., 1985; Harris, 1986; 
Dacorogna et al., 1993; Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998). 
In addition, weekend returns tend to be lower than the week days’ returns (French, 
1980; Gibbons and Hess, 1981; Keim and Stambaugh, 1984). Intraday returns and 
volatility seem to exhibit U-shape patterns (Harris, 1986, 1988, 1989; Gerety and 
Mulherin, 1994; Andersen and Bollerslev, 1994, 1997; Kleidon and Werner, 1996; 
Foster and Viswanathan, 1993). Furthermore, open-to-open returns are more volatile 
than close-to-close returns (see, inter alia, Amihud and Mendelson, 1987, 1988; Stoll 
and Whaley, 1990; Gerety and Mulherin, 1994). Finally, evidence shows that returns 
over trading periods are more volatile than returns over non trading periods (Fama, 
1965; French and Roll, 1986; Amihud and Mendelson, 1991; Barclay et al., 1990). 
Furthermore, Amihud and Mendelson (1987) examine the characteristics of stock 
returns as reflected by their time series, under the two trading mechanisms of NYSE. 
They compare the open-to-open and close-to-close returns on the basis of variance 
ratios of these returns (Amihud and Mendelson, 1991; Stoll and Whaley, 1990). Greater 
deviations from the random walk form, and therefore from market efficiency, are 
observed for opening than for closing prices. These differences are attributed to NYSE 
special characteristics. Other studies find that the variance of the morning call is greater 
than that of the afternoon call (see, inter alia, Amihud et al., 1990; Stoll and Whaley, 
1990; Amihud and Mendelson, 1991), which are attributed to the trading mechanism’s 
special characteristics. Another explanation, though, is given by Leach and Madhavan 
(1992) and Madhavan (1993) who argue that the higher morning variance is more 
associated with the overnight closure than with the trading mechanism itself. 
Baillie and Bollerslev (1989, 1990) model the dynamic and distributional properties of 
daily, weekly, fortnightly and monthly returns in the Foreign Exchange market (DM-$). 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
62 
 
They estimate GARCH models with t-distributed errors and introduce daily dummies in 
both the conditional mean and the conditional variance equations. Furthermore, 
Andersen and Bollerslev (1997) and Andersen et al. (1999) use a flexible Fourier 
framework into a standard volatility model, in order to model the frequencies 
corresponding to the different seasonal peaks.
 84
 Moreover, Dacorogna et al. (1993) use 
a different time-scale, the J-time, which expands daytimes with high mean volatility and 
contracts daytimes with low volatility, and seasonal patterns almost vanish with this 
time scale. Similarly, Muller et al. (1990) and Muller and Sgier (1992) investigate time 
patterns in the Forex market and account for the time dimension of the global market 
activity as a combination of regional time patterns. 
The intraday patterns of other components have also been examined. Several studies 
focus on the intraday seasonality of the Bid-Ask spread components. Brockman and 
Chung (1998) and Chan (2000), studying the intraday price formation of the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange, report that the spread components and their impact on price 
formation tend to follow a U-shape pattern. Menyah and Paudyal (2000) examine the 
spread components in the London Stock Exchange. They find that the inventory cost 
component is smaller than the order-processing, while the asymmetry information 
component accounts for approximately 47 percent of the quoted spreads. Kim and 
Ogden (1996) report a similar proportion for the adverse-selection component in 
NYSE/AMEX stocks. In contrast, Declerck (2000), examining the trading costs and 
their components in CAC 40 (i.e., Cotation Assistée en Continu)  index stocks, reports 
that the order-processing cost explains 82 percent of the spread, while all components 
are found to be positively related to trading volume. Similar to Kim and Ogden (1996) 
and Menyah and Paudya (2000), Silva and Chavez (2002) report that the higher 
execution costs of the Mexican Stock Exchange can be attributed to a higher adverse-
selection cost. Furthermore, Ahn et al. (2002) provide evidence of order handling cost 
components that follow U-shape intraday patterns in the Tokyo Stock exchange.  
In a similar study, of the SIMEX futures contracts on the NIKKEI 225 index, Kim et al. 
(2002) report an L-shape pattern for asymmetry information cost component and an 
inverse U-shape pattern for inventory-holding costs. Gwilym and Thomas (2002) 
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examine several spread measures using trades and quotes of the LIFFE FTSE 100 index 
of futures contracts and reports wider spreads on the opening and narrower on the 
closing of the trading day. Transaction spreads are found to be biased estimators of the 
quoted ones. Furthermore, intraday seasonality of spreads has been studied in options 
markets as well. Norden (2003), using data from the Swedish OM market, provides 
evidence of both in- and out-of-the-money options being more asymmetric than at-the-
money ones. He also reports that the theoretical option value is closer to the Bid. Pinder 
(2003), examining spread components in the Australian Options Market, before and 
after a switch from a quote-driven floor-traded to an order-driven screen-traded system, 
reports narrower spreads when quoted prices are continuously provided.  
More recently, Ben Sita (2010), using data from Helsinki Stock Exchange and NYSE, 
argue that the Bid-Ask spread in a pure limit order book market contains a risk 
component associated with managing time, which accounts for 19.6 percent, and that 
the adverse-selection cost exhibits a U-shape pattern. Angelidis and Benos (2009), 
report that adverse-selection cost exhibits a U-shape pattern in Athens Stock Exchange 
(ASE). The cost component follows a U-shape curve for high priced stocks and it is a 
function of time for lower priced stocks. Consequently, the vast majority of the studies 
concludes that the intraday behaviour of all variables of interest exhibits strong seasonal 
patterns that need to be modelled accordingly. 
Concerning the Carbon market, only two relevant studies seem to exist. First, Benz and 
Hengelbrock (2008) examine intraday spread formation, using Madhavan et al. (2007) 
model. They report that the only trade related price determinant is information, while 
the liquidity component is small and rather insignificant. The information component is 
found to significantly vary in the more liquid ECX, which is also found to be the price 
leader in intraday price formation. Along the same lines, Frino et al. (2010) examine the 
relation between liquidity and trading costs, and report that spreads decrease as market 
gains complexity and liquidity increases. In addition, they examine the impact of 
informed trading on prices, spreads and volatility. Their findings confirm previous 
literature, providing evidence of an inverse relation. Higher presence of informed 
traders results in wider spreads. 
Learning, Type of order and Liquidity 
Two issues referring to the behaviour of market participants are particularly relevant to 
the discussion of the following chapters. First, several studies recognize that market 
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participants observe and learn from the actions of others. In the inventory models (inter 
alia, Amihud and Mendelson, 1980; Stoll, 1978) dealers try to extract information by 
observing past trading activity and then formulate expectations concerning potential 
incoming order flow imbalances. In the information models (see, inter alia, Kyle, 1985; 
Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Easley and O’Hara, 1987, 1992) they aggregate 
information and revise their beliefs for the “fair” value of the asset. However, several 
phenomena occur because different traders interpret differently the same information 
signal and they probably have different learning curves.  
The actual definition of learning and the speed of information dissemination have been 
extensively discussed in previous studies.
85
 Market participants observe the same 
information (i.e., trading process), but they might interpret order flow signals in a 
different way, because of factors related to their prior knowledge or their market share. 
In addition, their access to information and the speed of disseminating it varies 
considerably and therefore a more dynamic approach should be more relevant. REE 
literature (see, inter alia, Shiller, 1981, 1984; De Long et al., 1990; Chamley, 2003; 
Sandroni, 2005) recognizes that learning is a dynamic process and that apart from the 
“actual” truth, there are various signals that might turn traders towards the “right” or the 
“wrong” direction (see, inter alia, Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Smith and 
Sorensen, 2000). “Actions speak louder than words” and therefore traders might “herd” 
towards an unexpected signal. However, according to Vives (1993) and Jun and Vives 
(2004), the way they interpret this signal, as well as the speed in which they accumulate 
and disseminate information, might vary considerably. 
The second issue refers to the price impact of different types of orders. As Limit Order 
Markets (LOMs) have developed, many studies discuss the informational efficiency of 
these markets (e.g., Brown and Zhang, 1997), the relation between type of orders and 
traders or spreads (e.g., O’Hara and Oldfield, 1986; Chakravaty and Holden, 1995) or 
more importantly the trader’s choice concerning the type of trades (see, inter alia, 
Cohen et al., 1981; Angel, 1994; Kumar and Seppi, 1994; Harris and Hasbrouck, 1996; 
Harris, 1998; Parlour, 1998; Foucault, 1999;  Goettler et al., 2005; Wald and Horrigan, 
2005). More recently, Bouchaud et al. (2004, 2006) and Wyart et al. (2008) derive the 
lagged impact function from the structural model of Madhavan et al. (1997) and 
conjecture that the main determinant of the spread is the adverse-selection component 
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while liquidity causes most of the volatility. Their derivation helps to determine the 
marginal profit of limit and market orders. However, all studies seem to agree that limit 
orders are associated with wider spreads. 
The majority of studies deals with high liquid stocks in well-established markets. Some 
recent studies, however, examine less liquid, emerging and new markets. Landstiel 
(2005) studies the market microstructure of illiquid option markets and their 
interrelations with the underlying spot markets. Decomposing the spread to order-
processing, δ hedging, inventory-holding costs and competition, he shows that the 
spread depends positively on δ hedging cost and the spread of the underlying security. 
More recently, Angelidis and Benos (2009), extending on the well-known Madhavan 
(1997) model, analyze the components of the spread in the Athens Stock Exchange 
(ASE), by introducing trading volume. They estimate the spread components for large 
and medium capitalization stocks and find that the adverse-selection component follows 
a U-shape pattern and that all cost components depend on the stock price. Bowe et al. 
(2007) focus on the price impact of duration and trading volume in the emerging futures 
market of Mexico (MexDer 28-day interest rate futures contracts). They find that the 
duration between transactions exerts a positive influence on price changes, similar to 
order flow innovations. In contrast, trade volume affects prices negatively. They 
conclude that the dominance of the liquidity component suggests that liquidity traders 
dictate the time to trade. 
2.2 Reflections on Literature 
Price formation, unlike the macroeconomic approach, on an intraday level, is considered 
to be driven by information and liquidity. Information changes investors’ beliefs about 
the “fair” value of the asset and therefore it moves prices permanently. In contrast, 
liquidity variations might affect market participants’ exposure, especially on a dealer 
assisted environment such as the Carbon market. Large order flow imbalances might 
force them to deviate from their optimal portfolio positions. As a result, they will adjust 
their price setting in order to build or decrease their inventory. Therefore, that effect is 
only transitory and it lasts only until they return to their desired position. Consequently, 
information and liquidity are seen as the main determinants of the Bid-Ask spread as 
well. Market makers will on average lose money when they transact with better 
informed traders. However, they can compensate by charging a higher spread and 
achieving higher profits from trading with uninformed traders. Along the same lines, 
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liquidity variations have a direct impact on trading costs, especially the cost of 
providing “immediacy”, where spreads might widen when trading activity is low. 
The literature recognizes two types of trade, and consequently associated traders, with 
respect to information. First, informed traders possess price-relevant information prior 
to other traders and they have an incentive to exploit it. Uninformed investors, however, 
trade for liquidity reasons, unrelated to information. These traders can be further divided 
according to whether they can choose the optimal time or size of transaction, in order to 
maximize their profits. Some uninformed traders are considered to observe the market 
trying to extract information. This way, they try to partially exploit the informational 
advantage of informed traders before it becomes public knowledge. This implicitly 
assumes three things. First, there is a period of time in which information is exploitable, 
from the moment it hits the market up until it becomes public knowledge. Second, a 
different learning process is assumed for different market participants, both in terms of 
quality and speed of learning. Third, investors observe specific market variables, trying 
to extract price-relevant information from their variations. 
Transaction size and trading frequency have been extensively discussed in the literature. 
Inter-trade duration is irregularly spaced and higher transaction arrival rate is seen as a 
sign of information presence. Similarly, transaction size has long been utilized as a key 
concept in identifying the informational content of transactions. Increased transaction 
size and/or shorter durations are seen as indicators of increased presence of informed 
trading. Therefore, investors can observe variations in intensity of trading, measured by 
both size and time, and they can draw inferences on whether there is still price-
unresolved information. In addition, these trades are recognized to have a more 
significant price impact. In practice, this means wider price variations in active stages of 
the market and consequently increased volatility and risk. Furthermore, both trading 
volume and frequency are recognized to be determinants of the Bid-Ask spread.  
Concerning the Carbon market, researchers have only recently shown an interest and in 
the last couple of years an increasing number of studies investigate various aspects of 
regulation, structure and trading activity. Early literature, especially in Phase I, is quite 
sparse and deals mainly with describing the legal framework, the origins and the 
structure of the market. However, academic interest shifts to more empirical issues, 
such as the price impact of banking restrictions and allocation of allowances. In 
addition, the economic nature of the asset, as well as the relation between spot and 
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future prices, or other commodities, has been further examined. More recently, the 
investigation of price volatility has gained some attention. Several studies use the UHF-
GARCH framework to investigate intraday price and volatility formation, as well as 
several other stylized facts. Furthermore, UHF-data provide the opportunity for 
examining further the microstructure issues, such as price leadership between exchanges 
or alternative products (EUAs and CERs), or simply intraday price discovery. Some 
microstructure issues can be further examined. For example, to my knowledge there is 
no relevant study, modelling duration in the EU ETS or in the Carbon market in general. 
In addition, spreads have not been investigated extensively, with only two relevant 
published studies, while intraday price formation is dominated by GARCH-type time 
series models. Structural approaches can be investigated further, since there is only one 
relevant (Benz and Hengelbrock, 2008).  
Drawing on the relevant literature, the present study emphasizes several issues that they 
can be developed further. First, the scarcity of empirical studies in the Carbon market 
provides an excellent opportunity for further issues to be discussed. The unique 
characteristics of the market, along with the absence of relevant studies, make the 
investigation of time deformation particularly important. In a politically influenced, 
“cap and trade” environment, in which market innovation is supported by allowing OTC 
EUA holders to enter the market, duration modelling might reveal further insights of the 
trading process. Second, the simultaneous modelling of transaction size and time 
provides the opportunity to examine their combined effect. Emphasizing the 
informational content of trades, previous studies consider them as indicators of 
subsequent price changes. In addition, the hazard function of duration has been 
previously used to identify different types trades with respect to information. Therefore, 
the implementation of duration analysis with trading intensity could provide a more 
accurate depiction of informed trading. Third, several studies have examined the 
learning process, in terms of quality and speed, but their approach is mostly theoretical. 
A empirical approach could reveal further structural aspects. Fourth, it would is 
important to examine how trading history affects traders’ expectations and consequently 
prices, when trades can carry information, which can be extracted by discretionary 
uninformed traders. Structural models recognize that prices incorporate investors’ 
expectations and, therefore, provide a solid foundation for that analysis. Finally, this 
idea can be further developed to account for the dual character of the information that 
can be extracted from order flow. Investors can formulate expectations regarding the 
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“fair” value of the asset, as well as the future levels of liquidity. This could be achieved 
by utilizing a dynamic approach in formulating expectations, jointly modelled with 
price. 
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3. Data 
Chapter 3 presents the data employed for the analysis in the following three chapters, as 
well as a preliminary analysis of various market variables. Section 3.1 presents the data 
collection process as well as the preparation of the specific data sets for the following 
intraday analysis. Section 3.2 presents a preliminary, non-parametric analysis of price, 
duration and trading volume formation over the years and on an intraday basis. 
3.1 Data Collection and Preparation 
The data employed in this study concerns the two largest exchanges, namely ECX and 
Nord Pool, of the EU ETS market. The data sets cover the period from market 
inception, namely January 2005, till the end of 2008.86 This period includes the whole 
Phase I and the first year of Phase II. These phases are examined separately in each 
market. The data consists of all recorded transactions of futures contracts. The 
information, marks, reported for every transaction, includes date, time stamp, price, 
volume, direction of trade and an indication of whether a transaction was OTC.  
The particular asset of interest is the European Union Allowances (EUAs) futures 
contracts with maturity date December 2008. These contracts have been chosen because 
they are by far the most liquid contracts and for consistency with previous literature.87 
In more detail, all previous, relevant studies employ future contracts, instead of spot 
prices, due to liquidity reasons and in order to account for the impact of banking 
restrictions in between phase I and II. In addition, these studies focus on futures 
contracts with maturity date December 2008, because the liquidity levels of the other 
contracts (futures with different maturity and options) is restrictive for an intraday 
analysis. 
Futures are standardized contracts that give the right, with the symmetric obligation, to 
their holder to buy or sell a certain amount of EUAs at a predetermined future date at a 
predetermined price. Every contract, lot, corresponds to 1000 EUAs and every EUA 
gives the right to emit 1 ton of CO2 equivalent greenhouse gases. The settlement of the 
                                                 
86
 2005 was the first year of operations for the EU ETS and as the market was in a very early stage and 
rather unstable, all observations of that year are omitted. 
87
The precise maturity date is the first business day of December on Nord Pool and the last Monday of 
December on ECX. These contracts can be used for compliance reasons on April 2009. Regulated 
companies that they need to comply for their emission for 2008, can use futures contracts either for 
hedging or for speculation.  For further information refer to www.ecx.eu 
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contracts is guaranteed by the respective clearing house, while counterparty risk is 
mitigated by a margin account.88 Prices in both exchanges are quoted in Euros and the 
minimum tick is €0.01. Trading is continuous from Monday to Friday, with trading 
hours 08:00-18:00 Central European Time (CET) on ECX and 08:00-15:30 on Nord 
Pool). 
In addition, the microstructure literature poses some issues concerning data 
manipulation that need to be taken into account. First, all transactions out of the official 
trading hours are excluded, since only trading patterns within the normal continuous 
trading period are to be examined. These are observations before 08:00 (08:00) or after 
18:00 (15:30) in ECX (Nord Pool). Second, the data is organized as a continuous 
trading session. This is done in order to account for intraday patterns over a period of 
time. Durations, similar to Ben Sita (2010), are calculated in seconds and the overnight 
exchange close period is treated as if it does not exist, in order to avoid 
heteroskedasticity of known form. This, contrary to Manganelli (2005), implicitly 
assumes that there is no price-relevant information revelation during this time.
89
 Third, 
in order to deal with the asymptotic convergence to minus infinity at zero of the 
logarithmic function, all zero durations are omitted and all associated “marks” are 
aggregated into the first transaction reported.90  
Another important issue is the treatment of outliers. Phase I was the pilot period for the 
EU ETS and some unusual observations, such as extremely long durations or high 
volumes, are observed. In addition, the construction of continuous trading data sets that 
ignore non-trading periods creates some artificial observations, such as durations longer 
than the official trading hours. Therefore, the following filters are applied. First, all 
                                                 
88
 The ICE Clear Europe, clearing fee is €3.50 and €3.00 per lot per side in ECX and Nord Pool, 
respectively. 
89
 For example, the time elapsing between 16:59:30 of day t-1 and 07:00:10 of day t is considered to be 
only 40 seconds. The same rule is applied in all days without transactions, such as weekends and 
holidays. They are treated as if they do not exist. There is a great debate on the implications of either 
including or excluding these time intervals. More specifically, authors like Ben Sita (2010) maintain that, 
when non-trading periods, such as weekends, are included in the data sets, heteroskedasticity of known 
form is imported because of the seasonality involved. On the contrary, Manganelli (2005) argues that the 
elimination of the overnight period results in the loss of important information. 
90
 The term “aggregation” refers to volume, where the value used in the final data set is the sum of all 
relevant values from the omitted transactions. For example, assume that there are four transactions with 
the same time stamp, where the associated volume for each one is five contracts. In the final data set, 
these four transactions would be included as one, single transaction. The volume of this transaction would 
be 20 contracts. In addition, the price, the trade sign and the dummy variable that picks OTC transactions 
are also affected. However, the majority (over 90 percent) of these transactions have the similar figures. 
For example, when there are many transactions with the same time stamp, in 90 percent of the cases, 
these transactions have the same price, the same trade direction and they are of the same type (i.e., OTC 
or non-OTC). Therefore, only the relevant marks of the first transaction are taken into account. 
Chapter 3 Market and Data 
72 
 
observations, with durations longer than the official trading period, are omitted. Second, 
all observations, with durations longer than the mean plus five standard deviations that 
can be considered outliers are omitted. The same procedure is applied to price as well. 
Finally, all observations, with volumes larger than 500 contracts, are omitted to account 
for recording discreteness. This filtering procedure generates four data sets.  
Phase I 
In sample 1/2/2006-31/10/2007 
ECX 42,606 observations 
Nord Pool 3,804 observations 
Phase II 
In sample 1/2/2008-31/10/2008 
ECX 91,264 observations 
Nord Pool 3,606 observations 
 
Finally, the vast majority of the microstructure literature reports a strong intraday 
trading seasonality, with markets being more active than average immediately after the 
opening and just before closing. This inserts heteroskedasticity into duration and trading 
intensity time series and therefore needs to be dealt with. Figure 3.4, below presents the 
intraday variations of inter-trade durations in both markets and phases. All four panels 
indicate that duration exhibits the usual inverse U-shape intraday pattern in both 
markets and phases. Market activity is more intense during the opening and closing 
sessions, while duration is notably longer during the lunch break. 
Figure 3.1: Intraday seasonal pattern of Duration 
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Figure 3.4 presents the intraday patterns of actual durations and trading intensity in both markets and 
phases.  
Engle (2000) uses a diurnal adjustment of durations, which is applied to the duration 
series in this study. Trading intensity is also de-seasonalized. Briefly, raw values of 
duration and trading intensity are regressed on a cubic spline function of the daily 
trading time. The new values are then divided by the expected, modelled on time, 
values. Time series of this ratio is taken as the diurnally adjusted series. 
Specifically, each trading day is divided into five time intervals, each two hours long. 
The nodes, or time benchmarks, used, are 10:00:00, 12:00:00, 14:00:00, 16:00:00, 
18:00:00, which represent 36,000, 43,200, 50,400, 57,600 and 64,800 seconds after 
midnight, respectively. Then, raw durations (          ) and raw trading intensity, 
   
  
  
 , where    is the number of contracts per transactions, are regressed on the 
following time function, in order to obtain            and           . 
                    
 
 
 
   
 
   
  (2.1) 
where         stands for the five nodes used,          and   ’s are five dummy 
variables, calculated as: 
 
    
                  
         
   
(2.2) 
Then, after estimating    and the   ’s, durations and trading intensity are normalized, 
and thus diurnally adjusted, as follows. 
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   (2.3.1) 
    
  
          
   (2.3.2) 
where    is the diurnally adjusted durations and    is the diurnally adjusted trading 
intensity. 
3.2 Preliminary, Non-Parametric Analysis 
Before the main empirical analysis, which is presented in the following three chapters, 
this section presents some preliminary features of the data series under investigation. 
The trends over time of the main variables are discussed first. This is followed by an 
examination of the unconditional. basic statistics. The analytical focus is upon potential 
differences between the two markets, namely ECX and Nord Pool, and between phase I 
and phase II. 
Figure 3.5 presents daily prices and daily aggregated volumes from the beginning of the 
market in 2005 till the end of the first year of Phase II, in both markets, namely ECX 
and NP. These two graphs reveal some interesting features of the market. First, an 
increasing trend in market activity is observed throughout the time period plotted. The 
total trading volume increases constantly and seems to exhibit seasonal patterns. 
Trading activity seems to reach high peaks during the summer and at the year end, while 
low peaks are observed at the beginning of calendar years. A partial explanation could 
be related to the weather and the operating cycle of energy-intensive, regulated 
companies. In addition, the total number of traded contracts decreases as maturity 
approaches. This is to be expected, since, in case of compliance, the information 
advantage of futures contracts expires, since traders can buy spot contracts directly with 
considerably lower exposure risk. Probably for similar reasons, price decreases as 
maturity approaches. In addition, the average price remains under €25. Considering that 
the aim of the market is to make energy consumption expensive, a relatively low price 
per tonne of CO2 raises concerns about the over-allocation of allowances that results in 
a relatively low price, especially in Phase I (e.g., Daskalakis et al., 2006, 2009; 
Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo, 2008)  
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Figure 3.2: Trade Price and Volume 
 
  
Figure 3.5 presents the daily prices and aggregated volumes across markets and phases 
Another observation refers to the two sharp price drops. The first is observed in the 
beginning of 2006, while the second is observed at the end of 2008. In March 2006, 
Spain announced an excessive surplus of allowances, due to conservative expectations 
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of emissions. Following the announcement of its NAP, markets interpreted this as a sign 
of increasing supply. This caused futures contract prices to fall drastically. As it appears 
in the graph, this unexpected announcement introduced uncertainty into the market, 
which had a long lasting effect. Carbon prices remained under 20 Euro for long, while 
signs of recovery appeared a year later. Similarly, in October 2008, two months before 
the maturity date, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, economic growth slowed 
down universally. The Carbon market followed all other markets and the credit crisis 
decreased EUA prices sharply. 
Emphasizing the trading process in the market, Figure 3.6 presents the progression of 
duration, volume and trading intensity from the inception of the market until the end of 
the first year of Phase II. The first panel of Figure 3.6 presents the average duration in 
both markets and phases. The second panel reports the average diurnally adjusted 
duration and trading intensity, as well as the average volume, in ECX in both phases. 
The third panel presents the same statistics for NP.  
Figure 3.6 confirms an increasing trading activity over the years. The average duration, 
defined as the time between consecutive trades, decreases drastically over the years, 
indicating an increased number of transactions per unit of time. This is consistent with 
the increased trading volume and is confirmed by the next two panels. These show that 
trading intensity fluctuates a lot, but it follows an increasing trend towards the end of 
the life of the contracts. A closer inspection of these graphs reveals that the increased 
intraday trading activity is mainly caused by higher trading frequency, in the form of 
shorter durations, and not by higher trading volume. In fact, the average transaction size 
decreases. 
Table 3.1 reports the basic statistics of the variables under examination. The first panel 
of Table 3.1 reports the mean, the median, the max and min, the standard deviation, the 
skewness and the kurtosis of the actual duration (in seconds), trading volume (contracts 
per transaction), trading intensity (volume over duration) and price (in Euros), as well as 
of the diurnally adjusted duration and trading intensity. This panel is divided into four 
sections one for each market and phase, namely, ECX I, ECX II, NP I and NP II. The 
second panel of Table 3.1 presents the average and the standard deviation of the same 
variables, in both markets per quarter. The first section of that panel refers to ECX, 
while the second refers to NP.   
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Figure 3.3: Duration, Volume and Trading Intensity 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 presents Duration (diurnally adjusted), Volume (transaction size) and Trading Intensity 
(diurnally adjusted) across markets and phases.  
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A quick inspection of Table 3.1 reveals that the two markets differ significantly. ECX is 
far more liquid than NP with the average duration in both phases being considerably 
shorter (e.g., 375.87 in ECX I, 75.73 in ECX II, 1,912.21 in NP I and 1,370.57 in NP 
II). These statistics indicate that liquidity is an important issue between Phase I and 
Phase II. As market gains complexity and maturity it becomes more liquid as well. The 
average duration in Phase II is considerably shorter than in Phase I. But the average 
volume, measured as the average number of contracts per transaction, appears to be 
fairly similar in both markets and phases (e.g., 12.45 in ECX I, 9.69 in ECX II, 10.81 in 
NP I and 10.67 in NP II). However, the aggregated figures reported in Figure 3.5 show 
that ECX is more active and that volume increases over time. This indicates that the 
increased trading activity over the years and especially in ECX, observed in the second 
panel of Table 3.1 (diurnally adjusted duration progresses from 0.10 to 1.28 in ECX and 
from 0.01 to 0.37 (in Q2) in NP), is mainly caused by higher trading frequency.  Along 
the same lines, prices are fairly similar in both markets in every phase. This pattern is 
expected since the assets traded are almost identical, apart from the date to maturity. 
The standard deviation of price is considerably lower than the mean (e.g., the mean and 
the standard deviation of price are 19.85 and 2.97 in ECX I, 22.60 and 3.33 in ECX II, 
20.33 and 3.00 in NP I and 22.73 and 2.80 in NP II). This, along with the considerably 
low values for skewness and kurtosis (the skewness and kurtosis of price are 0.37 and 
2.74 in ECX I, 0.41 and 2.65 in ECX II, 0.64 and 2.78 in NP I and 0.35 and 4.47 in NP 
II), indicates a distribution with observations closely scattered around the mean.  
However, duration, volume and trading intensity appear to be over-dispersed. The 
standard deviation of duration is two to four times larger than the mean (e.g., the mean 
and the standard deviation of duration is 375.87 and 1,264.1 in ECX I, 75.73 and 157.15 
in ECX II, 1,912.21 and 3,727.12 in NP I and 1,370.57 and 2,195.64 in NP II). This 
indicates a distribution with positive support and long right tails. In addition, the 
relatively small mean, and the large maximum values (e.g., the mean and the maximum 
values of duration are 375.87 and 30,979 in ECX I, 75.73 and 4,332 in ECX II, 1,912.21 
and 29,933 in NP I and 1,370.57 and 20,542 in NP II) indicate that observations are 
gathered around the mean, which is closer to zero, and that the right tail is indeed long. 
This effect is milder in Phase II, due to increased trading activity, but it is still 
noticeable.  
A closer inspection of the the values for skewness (e.g., the skewness of duration is 11 
in ECX I, 7.29 in ECX II, 3.71 in NP I and 3.28 in NP II), indicates that the 
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distributions of the variables in ECX have a longer right tail than in NP. Trading 
activity is higher in ECX and therefore durations are more concentrated closer to zero, 
than in the less liquid NP, and thus the higher values for skewness are observed. 
Furthermore, the median of duration and volume (e.g., the median of duration and 
volume is 79 and 10 in ECX I, 23 and 5 in ECX II, 480 and 10 in NP I and 540 and 10 
in NP II) reveals that ECX is far more liquid than NP and that Phase II is more active 
than Phase I. In Phase II the average duration is shorter in both markets and according 
to the standard deviation observations are closer to the mean. Also, the relative values 
for the skewness and kurtosis are smaller, indicating less frequent and large values.  
These findings are confirmed in Figure 3.7, which presents the histograms of duration 
and trading intensity in both markets and phases. The first four panels of Figure 3.7 
present the distributions of durations, while the next four panels show the distributions 
of trading intensity in ECX I, ECX II, NP I and NP II. Similar to previous findings, the 
observations of duration are gathered closer to the mean in ECX than in NP, which 
results in longer right tails. In addition, the observations of trading intensity, in the last 
four panels in the bottom of Figure 3.7, are closer to the mean, and thus closer to zero, 
in Phase II than in Phase I. 
The last section of Table 3.1 shows the time trends of the variables under examination. 
Duration decreases (e.g., from 5,191.40 to 66.05 in ECX and from 15,413.75 to 1327.78 
in NP) over the years. Over-dispersion also decreases. Volume also decreases over the 
years, but, according to the standard deviation, is more scattered, as the market gains 
liquidity and complexity (e.g., the mean and the standard deviation of volume change 
from 17.88 and 18.38 to 9.86 and 23.29 in ECX and from 13.75 and 11.09 to 10.82 and 
17.66 in NP). Trading intensity, however, increases and becomes more concentrated 
(e.g., the mean and the standard deviation of trading intensity change from 0.10 and 
0.65 to 1.28 and 5.09 in ECX and from 0.01 and 0.01 to 0.18 and 0.93 in NP). This 
confirms that trading activity mainly increases due to higher trading frequencies rather 
than higher transaction size. Last but not least, prices appear to follow a decreasing 
trend and volatility appears to be higher closer to the maturity date (e.g., the mean and 
the standard deviation of price change from 24.58 and 1.95 to 18.83 and 2.71 in ECX 
and from 24.08 and 0.10 to 19.97 and 2.56 in NP). This could be attributed either to the 
credit crisis, or to the unique features of the underlying asset.  
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Table 3.1: Basic Statistics 
 A. 
 
Actual 
Duration 
(Seconds)
Actual 
Volume 
(No of 
Contracts)
Actual 
Trading 
Intensity
Price       
(In Euros)
Diurnally 
Adjusted 
Duration
Diurnally 
Adjusted 
Trading 
Intensity
Actual 
Duration 
(Seconds)
Actual 
Volume 
(No of 
Contracts)
Actual 
Trading 
Intensity
Price       
(In Euros)
Diurnally 
Adjusted 
Duration
Diurnally 
Adjusted 
Trading 
Intensity
 Mean 375.87 12.45 0.69 19.85 1.16 0.98 75.73 9.69 1.12 22.60 1.01 1.01
 Median 79 10 0.11 20.40 0.25 0.15 23 5 0.25 22.85 0.3 0.21
 Maximum 30979 500 53.00 33.70 110.25 78.93 4332 500 104 32.35 62.67 96.27
 Minimum 1 1 0.00 10.75 0.00 0.00 1 1 0.00 11.16 0.01 0
 Std. Dev. 1264.1 18.16 2.13 2.97 3.87 3.02 157.15 19.4 3.18 3.33 2.09 2.79
 Skewness 11 10.93 8.56 0.37 10.86 8.67 7.29 11.02 10.77 0.41 7.99 10.58
 Kurtosis 168.44 216.24 121.38 2.74 165.71 124.43 109.26 198.51 210.47 2.65 137.48 203.04
Actual 
Duration 
(Seconds)
Actual 
Volume 
(No of 
Contracts)
Actual 
Trading 
Intensity
Price       
(In Euros)
Diurnally 
Adjusted 
Duration
Diurnally 
Adjusted 
Trading 
Intensity
Actual 
Duration 
(Seconds)
Actual 
Volume 
(No of 
Contracts)
Actual 
Trading 
Intensity
Price       
(In Euros)
Diurnally 
Adjusted 
Duration
Diurnally 
Adjusted 
Trading 
Intensity
 Mean 1912.21 10.81 0.27 20.33 1 1.06 1370.57 10.67 0.27 22.73 0.95 1.01
 Median 480 10 0.02 21.20 0.25 0.03 540 10 0.02 22.92 0.38 0.056
 Maximum 29933 250 15.00 33.50 17.52 71.92 20542 308 15 37.25 17.54 71.92
 Minimum 1 1 0.00 12.00 0 0 1 1 0.00 1.00 0 0
 Std. Dev. 3727.12 11.77 1.09 3.00 1.99 3.92 2195.64 14.5 1.09 2.80 1.54 3.92
 Skewness 3.71 7.07 7.10 0.64 4.05 8.55 3.28 9.28 7.10 0.35 3.68 8.56
 Kurtosis 19.69 92.87 61.60 2.78 23.56 100.11 17.63 130.03 61.60 4.47 23.85 100.11
ECX I ECX II
NP IINP I
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B. 
 
Average 
Duration
Std 
Duration
Average 
D/A 
Duration
Std D/A 
Duration
Average 
Volume
Std 
Volume
Average 
D/A Trading 
Intensity
Std D/A 
Trading 
Intensity
Average 
Price Std Price
Qtr1 5191.40 6801.86 15.73 20.63 17.88 18.38 0.10 0.65 24.58 1.95
Qtr2 2213.64 3752.81 6.81 11.37 17.91 18.71 0.18 1.04 22.24 3.57
Qtr3 1847.13 2899.49 5.68 8.85 18.77 27.83 0.20 1.32 17.92 1.26
Qtr4 619.17 1157.95 1.90 3.60 14.39 21.02 0.56 1.88 17.24 1.26
Qtr1 296.50 515.06 0.92 1.62 12.51 12.59 0.57 1.90 15.10 1.28
Qtr2 198.31 423.14 0.62 1.41 11.78 14.35 0.77 2.87 21.04 2.53
Qtr3 173.03 299.37 0.54 0.95 12.93 22.09 0.83 2.71 20.22 0.95
Qtr4 236.20 507.39 0.73 1.70 10.10 16.42 0.78 2.20 22.54 0.65
Qtr1 82.27 153.79 1.09 2.04 8.81 15.81 0.92 2.67 21.27 1.22
Qtr2 85.91 164.80 1.14 2.14 10.91 20.13 1.09 3.28 25.73 1.51
Qtr3 70.98 164.09 0.94 2.22 9.29 17.51 1.22 3.50 24.52 1.90
Qtr4 66.05 143.73 0.88 1.92 9.86 23.29 1.28 5.09 18.83 2.71
Qtr1 15413.75 14195.22 7.59 6.57 13.75 11.09 0.01 0.01 24.08 0.10
Qtr2 14033.27 9752.76 7.93 5.80 20.78 15.27 0.01 0.02 22.29 4.68
Qtr3 10113.75 8276.41 5.27 4.58 24.33 25.02 0.02 0.05 17.69 1.34
Qtr4 5171.03 6330.17 2.80 3.58 15.95 22.14 0.03 0.07 17.57 1.11
Qtr1 2396.67 3953.52 1.25 2.07 11.16 11.11 0.11 0.90 15.28 1.42
Qtr2 1165.22 2114.56 0.60 1.06 9.56 7.92 0.22 1.09 21.40 2.52
Qtr3 1792.24 3303.23 0.92 1.66 10.52 12.16 0.30 1.49 20.32 0.97
Qtr4 1303.02 2505.22 0.68 1.32 10.54 11.41 0.28 1.20 22.59 0.68
Qtr1 1102.16 1772.28 0.76 1.17 11.32 13.93 0.40 1.64 21.24 1.32
Qtr2 1536.60 2467.28 1.08 1.77 9.76 12.07 0.37 1.41 25.45 1.48
Qtr3 1616.53 2509.06 1.14 1.82 10.58 14.65 0.15 0.59 24.36 1.87
Qtr4 1327.78 2033.75 0.91 1.35 10.82 17.66 0.18 0.93 19.97 2.56
NP
2007
2008
2006
2007
2008
2006
ECX
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Table 3.1 reports the basic statistics of the variables under examination. The first panel of Table 3.1 
reports the mean, the median, the max and min, the standard deviation, the skewness and the kurtosis of 
the actual duration (in seconds), trading volume (contracts per transaction), trading intensity (volume over 
duration) and price (in Euros), as well as of the diurnally adjusted duration and trading intensity. This 
panel is divided into four sections one for each market and phase, namely, ECX I, ECX II, NP I and NP 
II. The second panel of Table 3.1 presents the average and the standard deviation of the same variables, in 
both markets per quarter. The first section of that panel refers to ECX, while the second refers to NP.  
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Figure 3.4: Duration and Trading Intensity, Empirical Distributions 
  
  
  
 
Figure 3.7 presents the distributios of Duration and Trading Intensity across markets and phases
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4. Duration Modelling in The European Carbon Market 
4.1 Introduction 
One of the most significant difficulties in modelling intraday data sets is the stochastic 
nature of the time of occurrence of various events. Unlike daily data, the arrival time of 
events is irregularly spaced, as a stochastic process. According to the microstructure 
literature, the arrival time of a transaction might convey price-relevant information, 
because it measures economic time, which might run faster than calendar time (Engle 
and Russel, 1998). Aggregation or averaging over fixed time intervals might result in a 
loss of vital information, therefore a proper modelling of arrival times is required. 
Duration, defined as the time between two consecutive events, is the variable employed 
to account for it. Duration appears to be persistent, i.e., it has a memory of a certain 
length, clustered, and over dispersed, i.e., the standard deviation is larger than the mean. 
Hence, no concrete conclusions can be drawn using ordinary econometric models, 
without first adjusting for intraday duration variations. 
Engle and Russell (1998), model the persistence and over-dispersion of duration as a 
dependent point process, using a new model called Autoregressive Conditional Duration 
(ACD).
91
 The modelling of the DGP of duration requires a specification for the 
conditional mean, conditioned on past durations, and a specification for the density 
function, which needs to have a positive support.
92
 Engle and Russell (1998) employ the 
linear ARMA specification, as well as the Exponential and the Weibull distributions. 
ACD bears a very strong resemblance to GARCH models, which has triggered its rapid 
expansion. Different models have been proposed to deal with different stylized facts and 
peculiarities of duration series.
93
 Several models challenge the simplicity of the 
conditional mean specification, as inadequate to capture non-linear effects, and 
distributions of higher complexity are examined for higher accuracy. 
A major part of the literature criticizes the inability of the ARMA specification to 
capture asymmetric effects of past durations. The linear-ARMA has two main 
drawbacks (Dufour and Engle (2000b). First, there are parameter constraints to ensure 
                                                 
91
 Dependent point process is a stochastic process where each point depends on past values. 
92
 Researchers using the ACD framework need to specify an equation for the conditional mean along with 
a distribution. Standardized durations are explicitly assumed to be iid. Also because of the non-negativity 
of the durations the potential density functions should have a positive support and thus long right tail. The 
most widely used distributions belong to the Exponential family. Finally, since the Maximum Likelihood 
is the method of estimation, the chosen distribution determines the Log-Likelihood function.  
93
 For an up-to-date extensive discussion and presentation of various models see Pacurar (2008) 
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stationarity and avoid negative expectations. Second, it fails to capture non-linear 
dynamics of higher moments of duration series. The effects of very short or very long 
durations are assumed to be equal to moderate durations, while another specification, 
which differentiates between these effects might be more efficient. Dufour and Engle 
(2000a) postulate that the effect of extreme durations should be different from the 
impact of “normal” durations, so as to avoid under- or over-prediction.  
The first solution proposed by Bauwens and Giot (2000) is the use of the log 
transformation of the variables. This allows short, lower than the mean, past durations 
to have a decreasing effect on the expected duration, while long, higher than the mean, 
durations have an increasing effect. Thus, past durations affect the conditional mean 
asymmetrically without estimating any additional parameters, or applying any 
parameter constraints. In Log-ACD there is enhanced sensitivity to clustering, but 
Dufour and Engle (2000a) criticize the over-adjustment after short durations, due to 
convergence to minus infinity for very small, close to zero, values of the log function. 
In contrast, they propose two other models to deal with asymmetric effects of past 
duration in a data-driven way. First they suggest the Box-Cox-ACD (BCACD), which is 
a Box-Cox transformation of duration series. This allows the data to determine the size 
of the effect of past durations. The model nests the linear and the Log-ACD models as 
special cases. Second, they extend Nelson’s (1991) EGARCH model using a piecewise 
linear parameterization of the conditional mean specification. Thus, the effect of past 
durations remains linear, but it also allows past durations that are considerably larger or 
shorter than the mean to have a different impact on the expected duration.  
Other studies employ a regime-switching framework to capture strong asymmetries that 
cannot be summarized in a single coefficient. Zhang et al. (2001) propose the 
Threshold-ACD (TACD), which allows for a piecewise modelling of expected duration, 
where the conditional mean specification in each regime can be linear or non-linear. 
Meitz and Teräsvirta (2006) extend TACD model (Zhang et al., 2001) to allow for a 
smooth transition from one regime to another. This model is referred to as the Smooth 
Transition ACD model (ST-ACD). The regime-switching framework adds flexibility to 
duration modelling, where other economically relevant variables can have an indirect 
impact on duration expectations. This idea will be further developed in the next chapter. 
Another branch of the literature tests the appropriateness of the distribution. They 
challenge the simplicity of the Exponential distribution as insufficient for capturing 
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higher moments of duration. The most common distributions used are the Exponential 
(Engle and Russel, 1998), the Weibull (Engle and Russell, 1998) and the Generalized 
Gamma (Zhang et al., 2001). These three distributions are nested, allowing for 
generalization and flexibility. Grammig and Maurer (2000) propose Burr as a mixture of 
Weibull distributions, which includes the Exponential, the Weibull and the Log-logistic 
distributions as special cases; Hautsch (2002) employs the Generalized F distribution; 
De Luca and Zuccolotto (2006) utilize the Pareto type-II distribution. These studies 
provide evidence that the fitting and forecasting power of the models varies depending 
on the data set employed and on the individual market characteristics. Usually, higher 
flexibility is rewarded with better fitting and higher forecasting accuracy (Dufour and 
Engle, 2000a; Bauwens et al., 2004; De Luca and Zuccolotto, 2006). 
Furthermore, Bauwens et al. (2004) postulate that durations exhibit an idiosyncrasy that 
cannot be captured by a single density function. The implication of this statement is 
twofold. First, according to Grammig and Wellner (2002), the conditional mean 
specifications should be of utmost importance compared to the density functions. They 
argue that the marginal contribution of higher complexity in the assumed distributions is 
limited and that usually fails to capture market stylized facts. Consequently, a 
misspecification of the conditional mean would have a greater impact on expectations, 
compared to a misspecification in the assumed distribution. Second, other studies use a 
different statistical approach that allows for a mixture of different distributions to 
describe the DGP of durations. The different regimes of durations, which are associated 
with different density functions, can be determined by either past durations (i.e., self-
exciting process) or another economically relevant variable. De Luca and Gallo (2004) 
and De Luca and Zuccolotto (2006) propose a discrete mixture of distributions, while 
Bauwens and Veredas (2004) and Ghysels et al. (2004) propose a continuous mixture of 
distributions. In parallel, Hujer et al. (2002) and Hujer and Vuletic (2007) propose a 
Markov-Switching-ACD model where the threshold variable is latent. 
The new dynamics of the mixture of distributions have implications for various 
microstructure issues that exceed the scope of the current chapter. The regime-switching 
framework allows the connection of each regime with special features of the market, 
opening new horizons in market microstructure analysis. In addition, these models 
allow other variables to affect duration expectations, thus increasing significantly 
flexibility when examining inter-relations between market variables. Several issues, 
such as information dissemination, liquidity and pricing, have been debated in the 
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literature and need to be developed further. These topics constitute the main analytical 
focus of the following empirical chapters. In more detail, Chapter 5 presents an analysis 
of the relation between duration, trading intensity and information, while Chapter 6 
focuses on their price effects. The current chapter provides the foundation for this 
analysis. 
The vast majority of the afore-mentioned studies employs data sets from liquid and 
well-established markets. The Carbon market, however, appears to have some unique 
characteristics that might challenge the suitability of some ACD models. The market is 
relatively new and relatively less liquid. But it is progressively gaining complexity and 
“depth”, while remaining politically influenced. This creates a highly speculative 
environment where liquidity, information asymmetry and regulation play an important 
part (Viswanathan, 2010). This market might exhibit different trading patterns driven by 
different stylized facts, and previously applied models may not be appropriate without 
further empirical adjustments.  
One of the most important facts is the presence of OTC transactions. OTC EUA holders 
are allowed to enter the market directly in Nord Pool and use Exchange For Swap (EFS) 
or Exchange For Physical (EFP) facilities in ECX. Considering that the non-organized 
market existed before the organized, and that OTC transactions are larger than the 
organized exchange transactions, they might decide to register their positions for a 
reason.
94
 Therefore, these trades might convey price-related information that could 
result in more frequent trading, and therefore shorter durations. In contrast, given the 
“cap and trade” character of the market, these trades might express excessive liquidity 
needs.
95
 Given their large size in combination with the relatively low market liquidity, 
their presence might increase the expected duration, either because they deter other 
traders from entering the market or simply because they consume current liquidity. 
Furthermore, OTC transactions account for about 30 percent of the total transactions in 
ECX and for about half of the transactions in Nord Pool. These transactions might have 
a different impact on expected durations that cannot be ignored. 
                                                 
94
 Indeed, countries other than those in ANNEX I (i.e., countries that participate in emissions reduction 
scheme under the Kyoto Protocol) can enter the market, and their motivation for trade is not only 
compliance. (see, inter alia, “State and Trends of the Carbon Market”, Information Emissions Trading 
Association (IETA), 2009). 
95
 In the literature two types of traders are recognized, informed and uninformed traders. Informed traders 
are the investors who have private information and trade to make money by using it. On the contrary, 
uninformed traders transact because of various other reasons, like portfolio optimization, risk 
management or because they simply need or want to. This is particularly relevant in the EU ETS, since 
companies need to be able to present each April the allowances related to their energy consumption. 
These traders are often called liquidity traders due to the fact that they supply liquidity to the market. 
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Several comments related to market structure can also be made. First, the legislation 
applied in each phase of the market is different and it is in line with the predetermined 
aims of emission reductions for each period. Consequently, different trading patterns 
might dominate each phase and should be examined separately. Moreover, ECX and 
Nord Pool are two different exchanges. Although the same asset is traded in both, there 
are significant differences. ECX is far more liquid, offers more instruments and differs 
in structure. Geographical location and investment environments are important aspects 
as well, since ECX is based in London while NP in Norway.
96
 Thus each market and 
each phase should be treated separately, allowing for different parameterizations. EU 
ETS market is a new market and some financial instruments such as EUA futures have 
been introduced later on. Their trading has gradually gained complexity, and durations 
appear to be larger at the beginning of trading. Similarly, the fixed maturity date of 
these contracts is expected to seasonally influence the realized durations. “Long-life” 
future contracts are expected to exhibit fluctuations in the number and frequency of 
trading throughout their trading time, depending on various factors, such as seasonal 
patterns or OTC transactions.  
Another influential fact is trading intensity. In a relatively less liquid market, such as the 
EU ETS, liquidity is expected to play an important role in determining trading 
conditions. The available liquidity is undeniably a main determinant of the ability of 
market participants to develop their trading strategies, as well as of how information is 
resolved into prices. Higher trading intensity might help in incorporating new 
information faster, but according to Grammig et al. (2007) it might provide coverage for 
informed traders. Depending on market structure and sensitivity of market participants 
in anticipating incoming information, in the first case trading is expected to be more 
intensive because information is quickly revealed, while in the second case, trading 
should not be affected since informed traders have more time to exploit their 
information advantage, due to the fact that they can conceal their actions for longer. The 
analysis in this present and the following two chapters is supportive of the first scenario 
that information dissemination becomes faster as trading size and frequency increase.  
EU ETS has become the major mechanism for emission reduction, but the 
microstructure of the market has yet to be examined in depth. Analytical efforts focus 
mainly on price dynamics and the unique features of the underlying commodity. It 
                                                 
96
 For a further discussion see “Derivative Instruments in the EU ETS an early market Perspective” 
Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner (2007). 
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appears that there is no relevant study that explicitly models time between events. The 
rapid expansion of the market, its increasing complexity, and its political influence 
might create a significant asymmetric information dynamics over time and across 
markets. Different phases and structures might attract different traders with different 
needs. Their trading strategies are realized in transactions instigated at specific points in 
time and, therefore, patterns in durations might express the combination of different 
trading groups. These groups are expected to have an asymmetric impact on 
expectations. In addition, abnormalities and extreme values are expected, especially in 
early stages, and more flexible distributions might better describe the DGP of duration. 
Finally, the potentially increasing impact of OTC transactions is also examined. 
The present chapter constitutes primarily an attempt to provide some evidence on 
duration modelling in the EUA futures market considering various stylized facts. This 
contributes to the literature in various ways. First, an extensive examination of trading 
patterns in the European Carbon market is conducted, focusing on the time dimension 
of trading. This provides a solid ground for further analysis concerning the information 
that can be extracted from the arrival times of various events. Second, several stylized 
facts, such as increasing market liquidity and OTC transactions, are incorporated in the 
analysis. This further examines the trading environment of the market, and empirically 
extends ACD literature. ACD specifications that have been employed in more advanced 
markets might not hold in such a unique market, and, according to Bauwens et al. 
(2004), a more explicit conditional mean specification might significantly improve 
model performance. Third, the models proposed in this analysis, further extend the 
ACD literature, concerning the asymmetric effect of extreme durations. Two new 
models are proposed, whereby past durations are allowed to have an asymmetrically 
non-linear effect on expectations, which depends on other, economically relevant 
variables. Thus, exogenous variables are allowed to have an impact on the conditional 
mean without challenging the exogeneity assumption (Engle and Russel, 1998). In this 
analysis, the impact of trading intensity and OTC transactions is examined, but this 
framework can be extended to account for other factors.  
In more detail, the fitting and the forecasting ability of various existing models are 
initially examined. The original ACD, the Log-ACD, the BCACD and the EX-ACD 
have been chosen, along with the Exponential, the Weibull and the Generalized Gamma 
distributions to examine whether higher complexity is needed. Furthermore, two new 
models are proposed to account for non-linear asymmetries of trading intensity and 
Chapter 4 Modelling Duration in The European Carbon market 
 
91 
 
OTC transactions. Drawing on the BCACD model, the size of the effect of past 
durations is allowed to smoothly vary (Meitz and Teräsvirta, 2006) across another 
variable and is data-driven. The new model practically introduces a highly non-linear 
component in duration modelling, which is associated with duration and trading 
intensity. Another specification that allows for the impact of past durations to be revised 
according to another variable is also proposed. The effect of past durations is still linear 
on every regime of the variable employed, but the overall effect is non-linear.  
The most important finding of the empirical analysis presented in the chapter maintains 
that empirical adjustments of the ACD specifications, significantly improve the 
performance of the models in the European Carbon market. This confirms the claim by 
Bauwens et al. (2004) that the correct specification of the mean equation contributes 
more to duration modelling than the distributional assumptions. However, the right 
choice of an appropriate density function further increases accuracy. In more detail, the 
linear models consistently outperform their non-linear counterparts, while the 
Generalized Gamma distribution outperforms the other two distributions. It is also 
found that OTC transactions have an increasing effect on expected duration. This can be 
explained either by information or liquidity effects. The analyses, in Chapters 5 and 6, 
will show that it is more likely to be related to information.  
Furthermore, past durations and trading intensity provide consistent results, indicating 
that intense trading is followed by more intense trading, while in relatively less active 
stages of the market, longer durations are expected. Both transaction size and trading 
frequency appear to have a long-lasting effect and higher volume of trading decreases 
expected duration. This could be an indication of episodes of intense trading, which 
according to Easley and O’Hara (1992), could be a sign of increased presence of 
information. Building on this idea and taking into account the highly speculative nature 
of the Carbon market, these intense trading episodes may indicate episodes of 
exogenous information, which is gradually being revealed through the trading process.  
In addition, OTC models improve model performance, especially in Nord Pool and in 
Phase II. This could indicate increased informational content of OTC. Other market 
participants appear to react more quickly to exogenous information than to order flow 
signals. Trading intensity attempts to capture these signals. Therefore, although large or 
fast transactions tend to increase the frequency of trading, an OTC transaction, 
whenever it occurs, seems to deter trading, probably due to asymmetric information. In 
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contrast, ECX appears to be more affected by order flow imbalances, which indicates 
higher complexity and a more mature trading environment. 
These findings are particularly relevant to regulatory authorities, as a better 
understanding of intraday trading activity can enhance market regulation by finding a 
balance between market innovation and liquidity needs. According to Viswanathan 
(2010), this would provide the foundations of more accurate pricing and would help the 
market serve its purpose of reducing emissions. A more precise duration model could 
also improve market making practices in EU ETS. Market makers can better manage 
risk if they know how long (i.e., expected duration) they are going to be exposed to it, 
and this would result in narrower spreads. Limit order traders can also benefit from a 
better duration model, since they can develop better trading strategies by managing the 
time dimension of “execution” risk. 
 The next section, 4.2, discusses the methodology employed, while section 4.3 presents 
the empirical results. The last section, 4.4, summarizes the main findings. 
4.2 Methodology 
4.2.1 Previous studies 
The Basic ACD Model 
Engle and Russell (1998) propose the ACD models for high frequency irregularly 
spaced data. They model the Data Generation Process of inter-trade intervals, namely 
durations,   , as a dependent stochastic process. ACD models are a class of dependent 
point processes (i.e., stochastic processes that generate sequences of time intervals). The 
conditional mean,                  of duration,   , varies over time as a function of 
past durations.
97
 ACD is formalised as: 
         (4.1) 
                    (4.2) 
                                 (4.3) 
                                                 
97
 The ACD framework allows for the inclusion of other economically relevant factors in the conditional 
mean specification. However, the vast majority of studies assumes exogeneity and allows durations to be 
determined only by past durations. In this study, only linear and non-linear conditional mean 
specifications that condition duration on its past values will be employed, for comparability reasons. 
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where    is the diurnally adjusted duration,    is the expected duration conditioned on 
past durations,    are the residuals, otherwise called the standardized durations, and    
and    are vectors of parameters, stacked in the vector            . 
This general model allows researchers to choose various parameterizations and 
formulations for the conditional mean, as well as for the density functions,   . Different 
formulations of the conditional mean equation can be employed as long as they model 
the expected duration on past values of    and a function of past durations,      , or a 
function of past standardized durations,      .98 In addition, any distribution defined on 
a positive support can be specified as a density function      ; for different distributions 
see Lancaster (1997). The most popular density functions used in the literature are the 
ones belonging to the Exponential family of distributions.
99
 This way, various 
combinations are made available and researchers have the freedom to model durations 
using the parameterizations and the distributions that best fit the data set employed. The 
function in Eq. (4.2) can either be linear or non-linear, perhaps drawing on the stylized 
facts of the market examined. Moreover, life distributions, which have positive support 
and long right tales, with more parameters can be chosen for a better fitting. However, 
usually greater flexibility comes at a cost of higher complexity. The various 
specifications considered in this analysis are presented next. 
Conditional Mean Equation Specifications 
ARMA-specification 
The simplest version, proposed by Engle and Russell (1998), is the linear-ARMA 
specification (ACD):
 
 
             
 
   
        
 
   
  (4.4) 
where ω (omega), α (alpha) and β (beta) are parameters to be estimated,   is the 
expected duration and x is the realized duration. The expected duration is modelled as a 
linear combination of past actual and expected durations.
 
 
                                                 
98
 In the ACD literature, in many parameterizations of the conditional mean equation the standardized 
durations          are used instead of the normal durations.  
99
 Engle and Russell (1998) use Exponential and Weibull distributions. Some other studies also use a 
mixture of distributions belonging to the Exponential family. Grammig and Maurer (2000) use a mixture 
of Weibull distributions to estimate the so-called Burr-ACD model.  
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Log-ACD 
Another specification that introduces asymmetry between the effects of long and short 
past durations on expected duration is the Logarithmic ACD (Log-ACD) (Bauwens and 
Giot, 2000).100 
                  
 
   
          
 
   
  (4.5) 
or                  
 
   
    
 
      
 
   
  (4.6) 
In this specification, for positive a’s the effect of durations larger than the mean 
(            ) are separated from the effect of durations shorter than the mean 
(            ). Durations, larger than the mean, have a positive and rather 
increasing effect, while shorter durations have a negative effect. 
EXACD 
Dufour and Engle (2000a) propose a piecewise linear specification (Exponential ACD) 
(EXACD).  
                            
 
   
          
 
   
  (4.7) 
where ζ (zeta) is a parameter to be estimated that captures the effect of the dispersion of 
the mean.
 101
  This is a peace-wise linear specification. The effects of past durations are 
still linear. However, when durations are shorter than the mean (    ), the slope of 
their effect on the conditional mean is       with an intercept (     and when 
durations are longer than the mean (    ), the slope is       with an intercept 
(    . In this model, the distance from the mean, where          measures how far 
the realized duration is from the expected, acts as a correction factor to the ω and the 
                                                 
100
 Where    
  
    
 and is the standardized duration and           . In addition, for a comparison 
see Fernandes and Grammig (2006). Readers familiarised with GARCH literature, can easily spot the 
similarities with Log-GARCH. 
101
 Where    
  
    
 is the standardized duration. Readers familiar with GARCH literature can easily 
spot the similarities with EGARCH. 
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α΄s estimated. The effect of past realized durations that are close to the expected, and 
thus     , is different from the “abnormal” ones that are not appropriately predicted. 
When    , the expected duration increases when abnormal returns are observed, 
either very short or very long durations. In contrast, the expected duration decreases 
when    . This effect is stronger the farther is the realized duration from the 
expected.
102
 
BCACD 
Dufour and Engle (2000a) also propose another specification. The so-called Box-Cox 
ACD (BCACD) is given by: 
                 
 
 
   
          
 
   
 (4.8) 
where δ (delta) is a parameter to be estimated indicating the size of the effect of the 
realized durations.103 This model nests the first two specifications as special cases. The 
linear when    , and the logarithmic when   
 
  . Here the impact of the shocks 
(past durations) on the conditional mean is data-driven.  
 Conditional Density Function Specifications 
According to the above, the specification of an ACD model follows two steps. The 
researcher needs to identify a conditional mean equation and then a density function for 
the residuals. The density functions that can be employed need to have a positive 
support and the most popular in the literature belong to the Exponential family. 
Following Dufour and Engle (2000a) the following distributions will be employed in 
the analysis of this chapter. 
Exponential  
                   
 
  
       
  
  
   (4.9) 
                                                 
102
 The same authors propose a more general form, where the threshold does not necessarily need to be 
one and the model can be generalized with a number of thresholds K>1. More specifically, the 
generalization of EXACD, for thresholds K>1 could be: 
                            
 
              
 
   
 
    
103
 Where    
  
    
 is the standardized duration. Readers familiarised with GARCH literature, can 
easily spot the similarities with Power-GARCH (PGARCH). 
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Weibull  
 
                 
 
 
    
      
 
   
  
 
 
       
      
 
   
  
 
 
  
(4.10) 
Generalized Gamma  
 
                 
 
 
      
 
      
 
   
  
 
  
       
      
 
   
      
 
 
  
(4.11) 
In these equations Γ( ) is the gamma function of the distribution parameters       , 
where     and     . 
These three distributions belong to the Exponential family and are nested. When     
the Generalized Gamma nests the Weibull distribution, and when     the Weibull 
nests the Exponential distribution. More specifically, the Exponential distribution is a 
decreasing function while the Weibull assigns higher (lower) probability to extreme 
values (i.e., very short or very long durations) when          . The Generalized 
Gamma distribution allows γ to vary and offers higher flexibility.  
However, what is of particular interest in survival analysis is the hazard function.
104
 The 
hazard function is defined as the ratio of the probability of the density function over the 
survival function.
105
 This is an instantaneous rate of transition from a non-transaction 
state to a transaction state. In other words, hazard functions measure the probability of a 
transaction to occur at a particular point in time, given that no transaction has occurred 
till now. This is different at every point of time and consequently different data sets will 
have different hazard functions. In addition, different distributions, depending on their 
parameters, have different shaped hazard functions. In particular, the theory of Survival 
analysis holds that the hazard function of the Exponential distribution is constant. In 
                                                 
104
 Two remarks should be mentioned here concerning the use of the term “the hazard function”. First, the 
term hazard function is associated with cross sectional data, while the term “intensity” is used more often 
in time series. In addition, since the distribution functions refer to the conditional density of durations, it 
is more appropriate to use the term “conditional intensity”. However, mainly for consistency reasons with 
the literature the term hazard will be used throughout this thesis. This will also avoid confusing the hazard 
function with “trading intensity”, which is defined as the ratio of volume over duration as in Eq. (4.16).  
105
 Survival function is defined as the probability of an event to occur after a predetermined time Y. For a 
more extensive discussion see Peter J. Smith “Analysis of failure and survival data” Chapman & 
Hall/CRC (2002). 
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contrast, the hazard function of the Weibull distribution is monotonically decreasing 
(increasing) when          . The economic meaning of a decreasing hazard is that 
the probability of occurrence of a transaction decreases with time. In the more flexible 
Generalized Gamma distribution, the hazard function is non-monotonic (Lunde, 2000). 
When      and    , the hazard function follows an inverted U-shape pattern, 
indicating that the probability of a transaction to occur now increases up to a specific 
duration (i.e., time since last transaction) and then decreases. In the opposite case of 
     , and     the hazard function follows a normal U-shape pattern. 
4.2.2 Extensions proposed 
ACD-OTC 
One of the main questions raised in this study is whether OTC transactions follow a 
different trading pattern than normal trades and how that affects expected duration. 
Statistical analysis of the data indicates a large amount of OTC transactions in both 
exchanges. Almost half of the transactions in Nord Pool are made by OTC EUA 
holders. In addition, the size of some of these transactions exceeds the average 
transaction size of normal transactions, sometimes even by hundred times. Large 
volume trades can be an indication of new information or significant changes in 
fundamental market forces that have yet to reach the organized market. Furthermore, 
sometimes these trades seem to come in blocks of transactions.
106
 
In order to identify any potential effects of OTC transactions the following empirical 
extension of the basic ACD model is employed. Starting from the linear ACD model of 
Engle and Russell (1998), a dummy variable is introduced to account for any different 
effects that OTC transaction might have.  
The new model is formulated as: 
                                                 
106
 This is particularly apparent in Nord Pool. A close examination of the data set provides evidence of 
OTC transactions coming in waves. This could be anticipated as an information inflow signal that might 
be followed by participants of the organized market. On the contrary, it could be seen as a signal from the 
market, where information is exported and OTC EUA holders enter the market to take advantage of it. 
Finally, it could simply be a lack of demand or supply, where OTC EUA holders want to enter the market 
with a large volume, but there are no sufficient counter orders.  
This could probably be investigated in greater depth when other variables, such as trade direction or price 
movements, are also taken into account. However, following the relevant literature, this study uses the 
ACD framework to model duration without using any other marks. Therefore, in order to be consistent 
and have comparable results, only past durations are allowed to have an impact on duration. Even in the 
cases of ACD-OTC or switching regimes models, duration is modelled on past durations, organized 
though in groups determined by OTC transactions or trading intensity.  
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 (4.12) 
where ζ (zeta) is the parameter that captures the effect of OTC transactions and  
    
                         
                     
  (4.13) 
In this model, OTC transactions are allowed to have an impact on the coefficient of 
realized durations, α. In this case, α, compared to the linear model, represents the 
average impact of past durations on the expected duration. Zeta,  , is allowed to change 
this average impact when the last transaction, or any other past transaction depending on 
the memory length of the model, is an OTC transaction. When   is statistically 
significant, OTC transactions appear to have a significant impact on the DGP of 
durations, which means that OTC transactions probably follow different patterns from 
normal market transactions.  
The sign of ζ allows for a further interpretation. When            it means that, 
when the last transaction is an OTC transaction, the expected duration is longer 
(shorter). Various economical explanations might link the sign of ζ to an economic 
event. First, a positive ζ could possibly mean that, when an OTC transaction is reported 
to the market, market members understand its presence as information inflow and they 
seem reluctant to trade for the fear of losing money by trading with informed traders. 
Second, a positive    could possibly mean that these transactions “exhaust” the current 
demand or supply, since some OTC transactions are really large, and the market needs 
some time to find a new balance, thus the longer durations. In contrast, a negative ζ 
could indicate an inflow of information but for a different reason. Traders obsever OTC 
transactions as informative and try to follow their trading pattern. Whatever the sign is, 
its interpretation lies in the microstructure of the market under examination. 
In order to take into account any non-linear effect, reported extensively in the ACD 
literature, the BCACD parameterization is also employed. The new model, BCACD-
OTC, could be formulated as: 
                            
 
 
   
           
 
   
 (4.14) 
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where notation is defined as above. Note that the coefficient delta ( ) is also influenced 
by the insertion of the OTC dummy variable. It still remains to be data-driven, but in 
this case it measures the average size of the impact of past durations. Indeed, the total 
coefficient of past durations (i.e.,    ) is not constant, depending on whether the last 
transaction was an OTC one.
107
 
ST-BCACD 
A significant issue that has been discussed extensively in the ACD literature is the 
asymmetric effects of past durations on expected duration. Many studies report that 
non-linearity issues arise when ACD models are employed. Two of the most widely 
used methods are the non-linear and the threshold specifications. In this study a 
combination is employed by allowing the size of the impact of past durations on the 
expected duration to vary across different regimes. A general title for the models 
proposed could be Smooth Transition BCACD models.
108
 
More specifically, features of the non-linear BCACD model of Dufour and Engle 
(2000a) are combined with the Smooth Transition-ACD model of Meitz and Teräsvirta 
(2006). The main idea is that the impact of past durations on the conditional mean could 
depend on other economically relevant factors as well. The values that these factors can 
take on can be divided into regimes that may possibly determine different effects of past 
durations on the conditional mean.
109
 These different effects might indicate asymmetric 
effects of past durations.  
Therefore, the new model proposed is formulated as: 
                                                 
107
 Delta can be allowed to differ between normal and OTC transactions. In that case the model could be 
formulated as: 
                
                  
   
             
 
    , 
where δ1 is the size of the effect of the duration of normal transactions, while δ2 is the size of the effect of 
the durations of the OTC transactions. In the BCACD-OTC model though delta is common for both 
effects (it is chosen this way for parsimony and comparison reasons) and it works as an average. 
Furthermore, if the size of the impact of past durations is of particular interest, a probably more effective 
linear model would be: 
                         
  
           
 
    , 
where delta in that case captures the size of the effect of OTC transactions only. 
108
Several issues can be explored in dealing with seasonalities other than intraday seasonalities. Seasonal 
and market dummies can be employed. Data sets can be separated into segments belonging to a different 
phase or a different market, but this is like working with dummy variables. However, this way the long 
memory of observed durations is being ignored. To deal with it, instead of using additional dummy 
variables, the idea of regime-switching models is used here.  
109
 In order for these economically relevant factors to have economic meaning ,they need to be derived by 
values observable variables, such as price, volume etc. that come along with time stamps. In the literature 
these events are called marks. 
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  (4.15) 
where notation is as above, apart from δ, which is allowed to vary across a threshold 
variable. The regimes of this threshold variable determine different δ coefficients and, 
therefore, different sizes of the effect of past durations. The threshold variables that 
appear to be more related to durations are past durations and trading intensity, which is 
used to proxy the state of the market.   
Meitz and Teräsvirta (2006) are the first to implement ACD models with the STAR 
framework, as a self-exciting process. The initial idea of BCACD models is that short 
durations affect the expected duration differently than long durations do. The difference 
should be even larger after very short or very long durations.  
In addition, investors are believed to gain information from various transaction-related 
sources. One of them is how “thick” (i.e., how active) the market is at any particular 
moment. This “knowledge” allows them to have an opinion about the “fair” value of the 
underlying asset at the time, and it influences when and how they transact. 
Consequently, along with past durations, some other variables might affect the expected 
duration. One variable, which is also present in the literature, is lagged trading intensity. 
In this study trading intensity is used to capture the “thickness” of the market in the 
context of trading activity. Trading intensity of transaction    ,   , is defined as:  
    
    
    
 (4.16) 
where     is the time stamp of trade  ,           is raw duration and    is volume or 
transaction size, measured as number of contracts, of trade  . When high trading volume 
and/or high trading frequency, measured as short duration, are observed    increases and 
this is interpreted as a “thick” or active stage of the market.   is restricted to one, 
allowing only the last transaction to have an impact on the size of the effect of past 
durations, and thus an asymmetric effect on the conditional mean. 
Two stages of this threshold variable (i.e., two regimes of trading intensity) will be 
used. This allows for potentially different effects of past durations. When the duration 
of the previous transactions is higher (lower) than the threshold value, the previous 
value of trading intensity indicates a “thin” (“thick”) market. Moreover, since a gradual 
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adjustment of the expected duration to the changing market conditions could be more 
relevant, a smooth transition between the regimes is assumed. Formally,    is defined as: 
                                   (4.17) 
where    and    are coefficient parameters, to be estimated, that measure the size of the 
effect of past durations in regime one and two respectively;            is the smooth 
transition function used, where   is the smoothness parameter, where smaller values 
indicate smoother the transition,    is the economically relevant variable chosen as the 
threshold variable, which is specified to be trading intensity, and   is the threshold value 
of the threshold variable that determines the regimes. Similar to Meitz and Teräsvirta 
(2006), the general form of smooth transition function used is the logarithmic function, 
which is written as: 
                            
 
   
  
  
 (4.18) 
where     and   is restricted to 1, indicating high and low states of the threshold 
variable. This way, for every duration,    is a weighted average of the coefficients    
and    (i.e., the coefficients of regime one and two respectively. When the threshold 
variable is considerably smaller than the threshold value,      , the transition 
function is tends to one,          
 
  , and therefore the    tends to    ,  
 
 
    . In 
contrast, when      ,          
 
   and   
 
    . 
Finally, just for clarity reasons, when past durations are employed as the threshold 
variable, the model is called Self-Exciting Smooth Transition BCACD (SEST-
BCACD). But, when trading intensity is employed, the model is abbreviated as STV-
BCACD Smooth Transition Volume BCACD (STV-BCACD) to indicate the 
implementation of volume into the analysis. 
4.2.3 Estimation 
The estimation method used is maximum likelihood using the Broyden–Fletcher–
Goldfarb–Shanno (BFGS) (1970) algorithm with numerical derivatives. The Log-
Likelihood functions,     , maximized, depending on the error distribution assumed, 
are as follows. 
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For the Exponential (henceforth abbreviated E) distribution:
110
  
                
  
 
 
 
    
   
 (4.19) 
For the Weibull (henceforth abbreviated W) distribution: 
         
 
  
 
    
   
     
          
  
   
          
  
 
 
 (4.20) 
For the Generalized Gamma (henceforth abbreviated G) distribution: 
         
 
  
 
    
   
                
          
      
 
  
          
      
 
 
 
(4.21) 
4.2.4 Performance 
In-sample Modelling 
Following the literature, the first test will be the remaining autocorrelation in the 
squared standardized durations,  
  
  
  
 
.
111
 Under the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation left, the Ljung-Box statistics (i.e., Q-statistics) at 15 lags, which is the 
lag length used in the literature, should be lower than 25.
112
 In addition, the 
Schwarz/Bayesian information criterion is calculated.
113
 Wald hypothesis tests for the 
additional conditional mean specification and the distribution parameters will be 
calculated.  
                                                 
110
 Engle and Russell (1998) propose this Log-Likelihood function for exponential distribution, showing 
that the maximizer of L( ) will be consistent and asymptotically normal with a covariance matrix given 
by the familiar robust standard errors from Lee Hansen. 
111
 The rationale for using the remaining autocorrelation as a measure of goodness of fit originates back to 
the Engle and Russell (1998) study. 
112
 The test statistic is distributed as a    
  with a 5 percent critical value of 25. 
113
 (BIC = [-2*(Log-Likelihood) + k * ln(R)]/R). The lower the BIC is the better. BIC penalizes over 
parameterized models.   is the total number of estimated parameters (model and distribution). R stands 
for the number of observations. BIC is more conservative than Akaike information criterion (AIC) and is 
usually preferred. 
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For the Weibull distribution the null hypothesis is that    , which is the case when 
the distribution reduces to Exponential. For the Generalized Gamma there are three null 
hypotheses, γ=1, λ=1 and γ=λ=1. When λ=1 G reduces to the W; when γ and λ are 
jointly one G reduces to the E. Furthermore, in the EXACD model the null hypothesis is 
that ζ=0, where no asymmetric effect, measured as the distance from the mean, is 
present. In BCACD the null hypothesis is that δ=1, where the size of the impact of past 
durations is determined only by the parameter α. In the ACD-OTC framework, the null 
hypothesis for ζ is that it is zero. When it cannot be rejected no OTC effects can be 
assumed. Moreover, the null hypothesis for δ is similar to the BCACD model. 
Finally, the in-sample long- and short-term “forecasts” will be used as an additional 
measure of goodness of fit, along with the KS-statistics.
114
 
Out-of-sample Forecasting Analysis 
Out-of-sample one-step forecasts can be easily generated using the conditional mean 
Eqs. (4.4), (4.5), (4.7), (4.8), (4.12), (4.14) and (4.15). However, for generating the ten-
step forecasts the methodology of Dufour and Engle (2000a) will be employed.
115
 More 
specifically: 
Linear models 
The long-term forecasts of the linear and non-linear specifications are given by: 
           
          
       
              (4.22) 
When OTC transactions are taken into account (ACD-OTC) the following formula is 
used instead. 
                                                 
114
 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic (KS) is a non-parametric test of goodness of fit continuous 
Probability Density Functions (PDFs) that can be used to compare a sample with a reference probability 
distribution. KS is: 
      
 
              
where       is the empirical distribution function,      the theoretical and        is the supremum of the 
set of distances. The closer the empirical distribution is to the theoretical, the closer KS is to 0. 
Practically, the test needs large samples to properly reject the null hypothesis.  
115
 This methodology is preferred because it relies only on the assumption that the residuals are correctly 
specified, and not on their distribution. For further information see Dufour and Engle (2000a). However, 
this methodology is based on the assumption that longer forecasts tend to be closer to the mean. 
Therefore, the longer the forecasting horizon the closer, asymptotically, to the mean is the forecast. This 
is a very general approach that summarizes in a very rigid way past information. 
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(4.23) 
where         and    are the estimated parameters of the respective ACD model. 
Non-linear models 
Ten-step forecasts for non-linear models are given by: 
                            
      
   
                 (4.24) 
where       and     are the estimated parameters from the ACD models and      is 
the forecasting horizon, and 
                  
               (4.25) 
are parameters that are used to correct biased forecasts (Dufour and Engle, 2000a), and 
can be estimated using the following sample moment;  
             
             
 
   
 (4.26) 
where m=1, … , s-1 and       is a non-linear function of past standardized durations 
Appendix 4.A Table 4.2. 
Performance Measures 
The in-sample fitted values and out-of-sample forecasts, generated by each specification, are 
tested using the following loss function: 
        
  
  (4.27) 
            
               
 
   
   
 (4.28) 
where UNL is the unitized loss, which measures the average squared error for forecasted 
durations, MSE is the mean squared error,    is the realized duration,   is the forecasted 
duration, and    is the number of observations. Unitized Loss (UNL) could be a measure of 
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expected loss, or the expected risk when dealing with pricing models, for the average 
duration. 
Moreover, the Correlation Coefficient (CORR) between predictions and corresponding realized 
values is also calculated as a measure of goodness of forecasting accuracy: 
               
          
            
   
   
  (4.29) 
4.3 Empirical Results 
The estimation and forecasting results are presented in Appendices 4.B and 4.C. In 
Appendix 4.B there are four broad tables, each of them with three panels. Tables 4.3, 
4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 summarize the estimation results for ECX I, ECX II, NP I and NP II, 
respectively. Panel A of each table presents the estimation results, the associated 
statistics and the hypothesis tests for three existing models: ACD, Log-ACD and 
EXACD. Panel B of each table presents similar information for the ACD-OTC family 
of models. Panel C of each table presents similar information for the ST-BCACD 
family of models. E, W and G stand for Exponential, Weibull and Generalized Gamma 
distributions. In addition, the first section of each table presents the estimation results, 
where the values in parentheses are the associated t-statistics. The next section presents 
the Log-Likelihood function value, L, and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). 
The next section presents the hypothesis testing for the additional parameters in W and 
G models, where the values in parentheses are the associated p-values. The last section 
presents the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic, KS-stat, and the associated p-values.  
Furthermore, Table 4.7 in Appendix 4.C presents the ranking of the models according to 
their Q-statistics. The first column presents the models and the associated distributions. 
The next three columns report the ranking, the Q-statistic and the p-value in parenthesis 
for ECX I. The next three sections present similar results for ECX II, NP I and NP II, 
respectively. Table 4.8 in Appendix 4C reports the ranking of the models according to 
their in-sample one-step “forecasts”. The first column presents the models along with 
the associated distributions. The first section reports the rank and the actual value of 
UNL in both markets and phases. The next section reports similar results according to 
CORR loss function. The next two columns present the average ranking of each model 
in each phase. The next two columns present the average ranking of each model in each 
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market, while the last one reports the average ranking, Total, of each model. Table 4.9 
presents similar results according to the out-of-sample one-step forecasts of the models, 
while Table 4.10 focuses on the out-of-sample ten-step forecasts.  
Finally figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 present the Q-Q plots of all models in ECX I, ECX 
II, NP I and NP II, respectively. Panel A of each figure presents the Q-Q plots of 
existing models. The first column refers to the basic ACD model, the second refers to 
the Log-ACD, while the last to the EX-ACD. Panel B of each figure presents the Q-Q 
plots of new models proposed in this study. The first two columns refer to the ACD-
OTC and BCACD-OTC models, while the last column refers to the STM-ACD, T-ACD 
and T-ACD-OTC models. Panel C of each figure presents the Q-Q plots of the BCACD, 
in the first column, the SEST-BCACD, in the second column, and the STV-BCACD, in 
the third column. E, W and G refer to the Exponential, Weibull and Generalized Gama 
distributions.  
A quick inspection of Tables 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 reveals a consistency of parameter 
estimates in the Carbon market with more liquid markets. More specifically, the 
parameter ω is positive in ACD and Log-ACD models and negative in EXACD. Similar 
results have been reported by Dufour and Engle (2000a). The range is from 0.0201 in 
the E-ACD in ECX I to 0.2483 in G-Log-ACD in ECX II. For EXACD ω varies from   
-0.0494 in E-EXACD in NP II to -0.0982 in W-EXACD in NP I. In general, ω 
coefficient increases in magnitude when more complex distributions are employed. 
Generalized Gamma (G) is associated with the largest values. In addition, ω is larger in 
absolute value when the non-linear, log, specification is employed for the conditional 
mean instead of the linear-ARMA. Further, this coefficient is on average larger in ECX 
II and in NP I, which are the most liquid data sets in each market. This raises concerns 
about the liquidity impact on the performance of the models.  
The estimated value of parameter α is also consistent with the literature. It is always 
positive, varying from 0.1133 (E-Log-ACD in NP II) to 0.4401 (G-EXACD in ECX II). 
It increases across distributions in a way similar to ω, i.e., as flexibility increases by 
using additional distribution parameters. Moreover, estimates of the coefficient β, as 
reported in the literature, are always positive and less than 1. β varies from 0.5811 (G-
Log-ACD in NP II) to 0.9751 (E-EXACD in ECX I). Contrary to ω and α, it decreases 
across distributions. A closer inspection of the tables reveals that in the same family of 
models β has smaller values for larger ω’s and α΄s. In panel A of Table 4.3, β in the 
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ACD model decreases from 0.8586, when E is employed, to 0.6970, when G is 
employed. The corresponding values for ω are 0.0201 and 0.0451. In addition, it is 
always larger in EXACD, probably because of high negative values of ω. Moreover, it 
is consistently larger in ECX (e.g., 0.8586 (E), 0.7962 (W) and 0.6970 (G) in ECX I and 
0.7334 (E), 0.6880 (W) and 0.6533 (G) in NP) and especially in Phase I (e.g., in ECX is 
0.8586 (E), 0.7962 (W) and 0.6970 (G) in Phase I and 0.7892 (E), 0.7114 (W) and 
0.5853 (G) in Phase II).  
With respect to modelling, almost all parameter estimates presented in the four tables 
are statistically significant. This is somewhat expected for large samples, such as the 
one we have for ECX, but is also the case for NP, which has a markedly lower number 
of observations. In particular, significant estimates for α and β in all tables indicate the 
underlying autoregressive dynamics, and hence the appropriateness of the ARMA/ACD 
modelling framework for duration. Furthermore, estimates of α and β for ACWD in all 
four tables add up to less than, but close to, one. This indicates stationarity with high 
persistence. Thus, intensity shocks have prolonged subsequent effects, in the sense that 
a shock does not die out quickly, but it persists over time. 
Another parameter of particular interest is coefficient ζ.116 This parameter captures the 
effect of extreme durations on the conditional mean. Estimates of this parameter are 
negative and always statistically significant. This implies that after very long or very 
short durations the expected duration is more conservative, thus shorter. Specifically, 
the longer or shorter the duration is compared to the mean, the shorter is the forecast. It 
is always smaller than α in absolute value and works as a correction factor to both α and 
ω. ζ increases across distributions like α and ω. It varies from -0.0932 (E-EXACD in 
ECX I) to -0.3925 (G-EXACD in ECX II). In addition, it appears to be larger in Phase 
II (e.g., -0.0932 (E), -0.1723 (W) and -0.2340 (G) in ECX I and -0.1690 (E), -0.2578 
(W) and -0.9325 (G) in ECX II), especially in ECX (e.g., -0.1690 (E), -0.2578 (W) and 
-0.9325 (G) in ECX II and -0.2007 (E), -0.2467 (W) and -0.2580 (G) in NP II). The 
larger parameter ζ in Phase II and in ECX is a sign that the Carbon market is more 
mature after the completion of Phase I, especially in the larger exchange, because it can 
absorb duration shocks faster. Moreover, the initial hypothesis that ζ=0 is rejected in 
almost all markets and phases. 
                                                 
116
 This parameter is named delta in the original work of Dufour and Engle (2000a). In this study the 
name ζ is used mainly for abbreviation reasons. 
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The estimation results for the OTC family of models are presented in panel B of Tables 
4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 and are totally in line with the previously discussed models. In 
particular, and in accordance with the literature, estimates of ω are always positive in 
linear specifications and negative in the non-linear BCACD-OTC specifications. It 
always increases in absolute value when more complex distributions are employed. Its 
estimated value ranges from 0.0266 (E-ACD-OTC in ECX I) to 0.1432 (G-ACD-OTC 
in NP II) in the linear model and from -2.0810 (G-BCACD-OTC in ECX II) in the non-
linear model to -0.1711 (E-BCACD-OTC in ECX I). In addition, estimates of α are 
always positive and increase along with higher complexity of the assumed distribution 
and varies from 0.1007 (E-ACD-OTC in ECX I) to 2.2348 (G-BCACD-OTC in ECX 
II). In line with parameter estimates of the old models, estimates of β are always 
positive and larger in Phase I and in ECX, and they decrease across distributions. Lower 
estimates of β correspond to larger absolute estimates of ω and α. The range of β is from 
0.5626 (G-ACD-OTC in ECX II) to 0.9653 (E-BCACD-OTC in ECX I).  
The main parameter under examination in this family of models is ζ. It captures the 
effect of OTC transactions on the conditional mean and works as a correction factor of α 
for OTC transactions. From a statistical point of view, estimates of ζ, along with 
estimates of α and ω, increase across distributions. Estimates of ζ range from 0.0250 (E-
ACD-OTC in NP II) to 0.2897 (G-BCACD-OTC in NP I) and tend to be larger in 
BCACD-OTC models (e.g., 0.0509 (E), 0.0736 (W) and 0.1050 (G) in ACD-OTC and 
0.0595 (E), 0.0992 (W) and 0.2801 (G) in BCACD-OTC in ECX I). Finally, ζ is always 
statistically significant, and the null hypothesis that ζ equals 0 is always rejected. ζ is 
always      .  
These estimates mean that when OTC EUA holders enter the market, the durations of 
succeeding transactions tend to be longer. A possible interpretation could be that OTC 
transactions are assumed to be informative trades and, therefore, represent an 
information inflow to the market. OTC EUA holders are not obliged to register their 
positions and when they decide to enter the market, they might do so because they have 
some reason. In this case other market participants might be reluctant to trade following 
an OTC transaction, because of potential asymmetric information. They might believe 
that there is a higher presence of informed traders, or unresolved information in the 
market. This might deter them from trading. Another possible explanation is that, since 
usually OTC transactions are large, they might “consume” the current liquidity and the 
market needs time to reach a new equilibrium. The discussion in Section 5.3 indicates 
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that OTC transactions are likely to be related to information, mainly due to their large 
size. Along the same lines, the findings in Section 6.3 confirm that OTC transactions 
decrease the expected trading intensity and have a significant price impact. 
Consequently, the negative correlation between OTC transactions and expected duration 
is more likely to be related to information.  
Another important parameter estimated here is δ, which measures the size of the impact 
of the innovations on the conditional mean. δ is always positive and usually less than 1, 
   . This implies a milder effect of past durations. Its estimates are slightly higher 
than in the basic BCACD model (e.g., 0.5434 (E), 0.4081 (W) and 0.1332 (G) in 
BCACD and 0.5915 (E), 0.4501 (W) and 0.1816 (G) in BCACD-OTC in ECX I). 
Considering that the models are implemented with the parameter ζ, which is positive, 
the combined effect is a larger impact of past realized durations on the conditional 
mean. Consequently, the associated β’s are smaller. In addition, similar to β, estimates 
of δ decrease across distributions and have a range from 0.1190 (G-BCACD-OTC in 
ECX II) to 0.5915 (E-BCACD-OTC in ECX I). Also, the initial hypothesis that     is 
always rejected.  
The next family of models estimated is the ST-BCACD models (please refer to Panel C 
of tables 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6). These models allow the parameter δ, which measures the 
size of the impact of the past realized durations, to vary across different regimes of the 
threshold variable (i.e., trading intensity). The magnitude of the coefficient estimates is 
in line with that reported in the literature. More specifically, estimates of the parameter 
ω are always negative with higher values across distributions and are always larger in 
ECX and especially in Phase II (-0.1290 (E-SEST-BCACD in NP I) to -2.293493 (G-
STV-BCACD in ECX I)).
117
 The same trends are observed in estimates of coefficient α, 
which are always positive and range from (0.1905 (E-STV-BCACD in ECX I) to 
2.5167 (G-STV-BCACD in ECX I)). In contrast, estimates of the coefficient β are 
always larger in ECX (e.g., 0.9740 (E), 0.9466 (W) and 0.8837 (G) in ECX I and 
0.9080 (E), 0.8718 (W) and 0.8258 (G) in NP I), especially in Phase I (e.g., 0.9740 (E), 
0.9466 (W) and 0.8837 (G) in ECX I and 0.8943 (E), 0.8696 (W) and 0.8482 (G) in 
ECX II), and decrease across distributions (0.7676 (G-BCACD in NP II) to 0.9877 (E-
SEST-BCACD in ECX I)).
118
 Furthermore, estimates of the coefficient δ appear to be 
                                                 
117 Especially in ECX, whenever the Generalized-Gamma distribution is employed, ω>1. Following Dufour and 
Engle (2000a), that seems to be consistent. 
118 Another comment that should be made here is the large values of t-statistics, reported in parentheses, for some 
coefficients, especially β. This is consistent with the literature and it is a result of the deterministic character of the 
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always less than 1 (e.g., 0.5434 (E), 0.4081 (W) and 0.1332 (G) in ECX I). Hypothesis 
tests always reject that    . Its value also decreases across distributions, in a way 
similar to that of β. In addition, δ is always the weighted average of    and   , where 
these two coefficients define a range of possible values depending on the stage that the 
last observation of the threshold variable is in (e.g., in ECX I δ is 0.5434 in BCACD, 
while    is 0.4707 and    is 1.2394, when E is employed).  
When past durations are used as threshold variable and the threshold variable is on a 
high range, indicating long durations,        , the size of the effect of past duration of 
the two regimes is δ1 < δ2. This means that when the previous duration is long, δ΄→ δ2 
and the longer the duration, the higher the size of its impact on the conditional mean. 
The economic interpretation is that this model allows for durations longer than the mean 
to have a larger impact on expected duration, thus increasing its value. This is more 
profound in Phase I, when, due to the early stage of the market, longer durations were 
observed. Both parameters are highly statistically significant. This shows that the 
ARMA specification is not sufficient in capturing a non-linear clustering effect. More 
specifically, the threshold value is everywhere larger than the mean and it is always 
larger in NP and in Phase II, sometimes up to four times the mean. Therefore, it seems 
that as market gains complexity, liquidity increases proportionally. Consequently, 
inactive stages become rarer and they are captured by a separate regime, where the 
associated durations are relatively large. In addition, the difference between ECX and 
NP is emphasized by the large difference in the smoothness parameter, almost eight 
times as large in Phase II. Although still quite high in ECX I, the transition between 
regimes seems to be smoother in ECX. This could be considered as an indication of a 
more sophisticated trading environment, where information dissemination is faster and 
more efficient, or simply as a natural outcome of the increased liquidity. Indeed, in NP 
where the relative intensity of trading is considerably lower, distinct regimes are 
observed, showing potentially sharp adjustments to new information. 
Similarly, when trading intensity is used as a threshold variable,         and        . 
The values of    and    vary across a narrower range, compared with simple durations 
(e.g., in ECX I    and    are 0.4707 and 1.2394 (E), 0.3928 and 0.8003 (W) and 
0.1286 and 0.1463 (G) in SEST-BCACD, while    and    are 1.1861 and 0.4935 (E), 
                                                                                                                                               
model and a combination of the method of estimation and the number of observations. Another factor that contributes 
to that problem is the immature state of the market especially in the beginning. This introduces heteroskedasticity of 
known form. Therefore, all models are estimated using heteroskedasticity robust errors. 
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0.6833 and 0.4082 (W) and 1.466 and 0.1031 (G) in STV-BCACD). This means that 
when the market is in an inactive stage, i.e., the last transaction is of a small size, or the 
associated duration is large, the size of the effect of past durations is expected to be 
large (δ΄→ δ1), and therefore the expected duration is longer. In addition, the inclusion 
of trade size confirms the previous findings that, in Phase II, ST-BCACD captures the 
effect of very inactive stages of the market. Indeed, the threshold values in Phase II are 
always smaller (e.g., in ECX s is 0.7783 (E), 0.8838 (W) and 0.9065 (G) in Phase I and 
0.4051 (E), 0.4517 (W) and 0.5377 (G) in Phase II), indicating lower volumes and/or 
longer durations, without exhibiting systematic patterns between the two exchanges. In 
addition, in both cases, when either duration or trading intensity is used as a threshold 
variable, the smoothness parameter decreases across distributions, since the increased 
flexibility of more complex specifications seems to explain partially the DGP of 
durations (e.g., 1.0625 (E), 1.0150 (W) and 1.0045 (G) in SEST-BCACD and 0.7783 
(E), 0.8838 (W) and 0.9065 (G) in STV-BCACD in ECX I). 
Furthermore, the analysis of the switching-regime models provides a further insight into 
the trading process of the Carbon market. Long durations are followed by even longer 
durations, especially when the associated trading size is low. In contrast, when trading 
intensity is high, the momentum of the market is expected to continue with fast/large-
sized trading. Assuming that investors observe order flow and update themselves 
continuously, they tend to transact faster and in larger volumes when the market is more 
active. According to Easley and O’Hara’s (1992) propositions, this is the case when 
informed trading is more active and supports the initial description of the market as a 
highly speculative environment. In addition, considering that OTC transactions increase 
the expected duration, they seem to slow down, in terms of longer durations, and thus 
lower trading frequency, i.e., the trading momentum. Increased durations might be due 
either to traders over-reaction to the informational content of OTC trades, or, simply to 
the fact that these transactions are, on average, very large for the current order book 
depth. Both the informational and the liquidity content of trades, especially of OTC 
trades, and their associated durations, as well as their price impact, are further examined 
in the following two chapters. 
Another issue to be discussed concerns the generality and complexity required by the 
underlying distribution in order to capture higher moment features of the data. First, γ 
and λ are statistically significant in all estimations. Moreover, Wald hypothesis tests for 
these parameters are reported at the bottom of each table. The initial hypotheses that 
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        and       can all be easily rejected. This indicates that E is 
insufficient in describing the DGP of duration, while the Generalized Gamma is more 
appropriate, since   is statistically different from one. In addition, further analysis of the 
fitting and forecasting ability of the models confirms this preliminary finding. In 
particular, estimates of λ range from 1.1632 (G-ACD NP II) to 13.8026 (G-Log-ACD 
ECX I) and are, therefore, much higher than 1, although markedly more so for ECX 
than for NP, indicating the marked effect of large observations. Furthermore, in the 
Weibull models       always. This indicates a monotonically decreasing hazard 
function, which means that the probability of a transaction to occur decreases with time. 
Furthermore, in G, 0 < γ < 1 and λ > 1 always. In ECX γ*λ>1 and this implies a non-
monotonic, inverse U-shaped hazard function. In contrast, in Nord Pool γ*λ < 1 always, 
which, according to Lunde (2000), indicates a monotonically decreasing hazard 
function. This is strong evidence of different structures across market and differences in 
trading patterns.  
More importantly, the maximum Log-Likelihood function value (L) reported in the 
middle panel of the tables is significantly greater for models estimated with the 
Generalized Gamma (G) distribution than with the Weibull (W) distribution than with 
the Exponential (E), in this order.
119
 For example, in Table 2 the optimal Log-likelihood 
function values, L, are -21576.69 for W and -20828.69 for a G. These values give a 
Likelihood Ratio test statistic of 2651.74, which is far larger than the 5 percent critical 
value of 3.84. As far as this statistic is concerned, this indicates that the ACD model 
specifications, which assume that the Data Generation Process of duration follows a 
Generalized Gamma distribution is significantly better, both statistically and on the 
basis of likelihood, than the one with the Weibull distribution. This result is consistent 
throughout the tables for all estimated, both linear and non linear, models. Thus, 
Generalized Gamma distribution provides a statistically better estimation in both 
markets and both phases and across linear and non-linear models.
120
  
Focusing on the second section of tables 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6, as well as on Table 4.7, 
the BIC and Q-stat(15) confirm these results. BIC is consistently smaller when more 
                                                 
119
 The nesting property of the Generalised Gamma distribution to the Weibul and the Exponential, and 
that of the Weiibul to the Exponential facilitates testing using the Likelihood Ratio, which is distributed 
as chi-squared with a degree of freedom equal to the difference in the number test statistics of parameters 
between pairs of models. 
120
 Strictly speaking, we cannot use the Likelihood Ratio to test whether the non-linear BCACWD-OTC 
fits better than the ACWD-OTC as the former does not directly nest the latter. However, comparison is 
conducted later on the basis of in-sample forecast performance. 
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complex distributions are employed. Similarly, the autocorrelation of the squared 
standardized durations is consistently lower when higher flexibility is employed (e.g., 
8.16 (E), 6.85 (W) and 5.51 (G) in the basic ACD model in ECX I). Consequently, 
Generalized Gamma distribution appears to be more appropriate in describing the DGP 
of duration, compared to its nested alternatives. The extra flexibility adds significantly 
to the fitting of the models. This can be also seen in Table 4.8, where more complex 
distributions achieve a higher in-sample one-step “forecasting” accuracy (e.g., UNL 
(lower is better) is 6.6977 (E), 6.7994 (W) and 6.5263 (G), while CORR (higher is 
better) is 0.3904 (E), 0.4181 (W) and 0.4374 (G) in the basic ACD model in ECX I). 
However, as Bauwens et al. (2004) argue that simple models, mainly referring to simple 
distributions, are inadequate to capture duration series peculiarities.
121
 However, the 
main determinant of the DGP of duration still remains the conditional mean 
specification, although more complex distributions consistently improve fitting. 
Therefore, market peculiarities, such as OTC transactions or liquidity patterns, appear to 
be more important stylized facts that need to be modelled first. 
Focusing on the in-sample performance of the models, Table 4.7 presents the ranking of 
the models according to their ability to reduce the remaining autocorrelation in the 
standardized duration series. The higher ranking of linear specifications, according to 
lower Q-stat(15) (e.g., the ranking of ACD is 4 (E), 3 (W) and 1 (G), while the ranking 
of ACD-OTC is 9 (E), 7 (W) and 6 (G) in ECX I), supports their superiority against 
their non-linear counterparts. Although all models significantly reduce autocorrelation, 
non-linear models fail to surpass their linear counterparts (e.g., STV-BCACD ranking is 
20 (E), 15 (W) and 10 (G) and BCACD-OTC ranking is 21 (E), 18 (W) and 12 (G) in 
ECX I) and in some cases they still leave some unexplained autocorrelation (e.g., Log-
ACD ranking is 26 (E), 27 (W) and 25 (G) and BCACD ranking is 24 (E), 19 (W) and 
11 (G) in ECX I). In addition, OTC models significantly improve fitting in NP (e.g., 
ACD-OTC ranking is 2 (E), 5 (W) and 8 (G) in Phase I). In contrast, the regime-
switching framework appears to be more relevant in ECX and in Phase I in particular. 
The ranking of G-SEST-BCACD is 13, while the relative value for STV-BCACD is 10. 
Along the same lines, Table 4.8 presents the in-sample short-term “forecasts” for all 
estimated models. The main findings confirm the superiority of linear models, 
                                                 
121
 The analysis presented in the next chapter indicates that a mixture of distributions improves the, 
already good, fitting of Generalized Gamma. However, the main determinant of describing the DGP of 
duration is the conditional mean equation specification. 
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especially when G is assumed to be the associated density function.
122
 The linear 
specifications, such as the basic ACD (e.g., in ECX I the ranking is 3 (E), 5 (W) and 2 
(G) according to UNL and 9 (E), 7 (W) and 2 (G) according to CORR) and the ACD-
OTC (e.g., in ECX I the ranking is 7 (E), 9 (W) and 10 (G) according to UNL and 8 (E), 
6 (W) and 4 (G) according to CORR) models, achieve better fitting and get better 
ranking compared to their non-linear counterparts, such as the Log-ACD (e.g., in ECX I 
the ranking is 21 (E), 12 (W) and 8 (G) according to UNL and 24 (E), 23 (W) and 22 
(G) according to CORR) and the BCACD (e.g., in ECX I the ranking is 22 (E), 20 (W) 
and 14 (G) according to UNL and 18 (E), 16 (W) and 14 (G) according to CORR) 
models. The density function specification almost everywhere improves fitting of the 
same conditional mean specification (i.e., G provides consistently better results than W, 
which in turn provides higher flexibility, and thus higher accuracy, than E), but the 
latter is the major factor in describing the DGP of duration. As can be seen in Table 4.8, 
almost everywhere the conditional mean specifications improve or worsen the 
performance of a model noticeably, while more complex distributions only slightly 
increase accuracy. This is profound when OTC transactions are taken into account, 
where the ranking of the models improves significantly. These transactions appear to be 
more relevant to NP and especially in Phase I, where ACD-OTC and T-ACD-OTC are 
among the best performing models. 
Another finding is that transaction size improves the fitting of ST-BCACD models 
compared to durations, thus indicating that size does matter. The STV-BCACD model, 
especially when G is assumed to be the distribution of durations, consistently provides 
improved forecasts (e.g., according to UNL the ranking of G-STV-BCACD is 13 (ECX 
I), 7 (ECX II), 20 (NP I) and 12 NP II, while according to CORR is 10 (ECX I), 12 
(ECX II), 18 (NP I) and 11 (NP II)) compared to the SEST-BCACD. A further analysis 
of the role of trading volume in duration modelling and its connection to information 
will be undertaken in the following two chapters.  
These findings are confirmed by the KS-statistics, reported in Tables 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 
4.6, and the Q-Q plots, presented in figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. Generalized Gamma 
models always improve fitting, but the main improvements come from the conditional 
mean specification. The nested distributions, especially E, do not fit particularly well, 
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 The STM-ACD and the T-ACD models are still linear parameterizations, at least in every regime. 
These models are presented in the following chapter. Their fitting and forecasting accuracy is compared 
to the models discussed in this chapter and therefore they are all included in the same tables in appendices 
4.B and 4.C. 
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since there are significantly observable discrepancies in the long right tails of the 
empirical and theoretical distributions, which is captured by the large deviations in the 
upper end of the straight diagonal line of the Q-Q plots. The first line of panels A, B and 
C of figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 show that the empirical distribution significantly 
deviates from the theoretical. This means that these distributions cannot explain the very 
long or very short durations, either because they overestimate or underestimate their 
probability of being observed. Therefore, the need for the higher flexibility of G is 
visually obvious. In addition, the new models proposed outperform the existing models, 
which, especially Log-ACD, EX-ACD and BCACD, do not fit particularly well. 
In contrast to the in-sample forecast results of Table 4.8, the short-term out-of-sample 
forecasts of Table 4.9 indicate that, linear models, fail to capture the short-term 
dynamics needed to forecast the next duration even though they have a reasonably good 
in-sample fit. For example, in ECX I the ranking of the basic ACD model is 20 (E), 21 
(W) and 19 (G) according to UNL and 19 (E), 17 (W) and 15 (G) according to CORR, 
while the ranking of ACD-OTC is 23 (E), 24 (W) and 22 (G) according to UNL and 18 
(E), 16 (W) and 14 (G) according to CORR. The regime-switching framework seems to 
provide pretty accurate forecasts, especially in Phase I in ECX (e.g., G-STV-BCACD 
ranking is 7 according to UNL and 4 according to CORR). In contrast, OTC models 
perform better in Phase II (e.g., the average ranking in Phase II is 4 for the G-BCACD-
OTC) and in NP in particular (e.g., the average ranking of the G-BCACD-OTC is 7 in 
NP). In addition, the volume enhanced durations, using trading intensity, significantly 
improve the performance of ST-BCACD, which are always among the best performing 
models in all markets and phases. The total ranking of G-STV-BCACD is 4, and it is 
the best performing model after the ones presented in Chapter 5. These results provide 
the motivation and the foundation for the analysis of the following chapters, where the 
importance of trading intensity is analyzed further. Finally, the Generalized-Gamma 
consistently provides the most accurate forecasting and seems to be the most 
appropriate density function among the three considered. 
Table 4.10 presents long-term out-of-sample forecasts, and these raise again the 
importance of linear specifications. The results in the table show that, although G is still 
sufficient, the non-linear specifications fail to provide accurate forecasts. In some cases, 
such as in EX-ACD (total ranking is 18 (E), 20 (W) and 14 (G)) and BCACD (total 
ranking is (24 (E), 27 (W) and 25 (G)), the UNL provides pretty inaccurate results. In 
contrast, linear models, especially the OTC specifications, improve long-term 
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forecasting. OTC models are always better (that mainly refers to the T-ACD-OTC, 
discussed in Chapter 6), but, compared to the regime-switching models, the latter rank 
better according to CORR (e.g., the ranking of G-STV-BCACD is 21 (ECX I), 17 (ECX 
II), 21 (NP I) and 20 (NP II) according to UNL, and 7 (ECX I), 11 (ECX II), 5 (NP I) 
and 25 (NPII) according to CORR). This means that although the regime models are 
inaccurate in magnitude (i.e., UNL is large), they can forecast direction much better 
(i.e., CORR is high).  
Finally, the superiority of OTC models concerning long-term forecasts provides a 
further insight into the Carbon market. The regime-switching framework performs 
better in the short term, especially in ECX, while OTC transactions play a more crucial 
role in the long term, especially in NP. This could be interpreted as a strong evidence of 
structural differences between these two markets. Investors, especially in ECX and in 
Phase I, seem to update themselves continuously by observing order flow variations, 
and they adjust their trading accordingly. This is why the regime framework has a 
slightly better performance in this market, especially when past trading history, such as 
past trading intensity, is taken into account. The net effect is that order flow has a 
momentum impact on trading patterns. Therefore,     and     (tables 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 
4.6) indicate that when trading intensity is high, the expected duration is shorter. Easley 
and O’Hara (1992) argue that high trading activity could be interpreted as informative. 
This idea will be further developed in Chapter 5. In contrast, when an OTC EUA holder 
enters the market, the trading process seems to slow down, either due to asymmetric 
information across market participants or due to shortage of liquidity. Whichever the 
reason, it seems to have a long-term effect, and thus a better long-term forecasting, by 
increasing the expected duration. Consequently, these preliminary results, given the 
speculative character of the market, could practically mean that traders in the Carbon 
market are quite sensitive to new information and thus order flow creates a momentum, 
while OTC transactions are considered to carry information that is not immediately 
resolved and, thus, these transactions have a prominent role in the long term. 
4.4 Summary 
When analytical interest focuses on the intraday formation of various microstructure 
phenomena, special attention is required concerning time deformation. Economic events 
are randomly spread throughout the trading day and the intermediate time, defined as 
duration, is irregularly spaced. Therefore, several econometric models might not hold 
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unconditionally. In a seminal study, Engle and Russell (1998) propose the ACD model 
for modelling duration clustering and over-dispersion. The ACD framework models 
time exogenously as a dependent stochastic process. Modelling requires a conditional 
mean specification conditional on past durations and a density function with positive 
support. The exogeneity assumption has recently been debated and it will be further 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
The ACD class of models bears a very strong resemblance to GARCH and therefore has 
been developed rapidly and become very popular. The main objections against the basic 
ACD model of Engle and Russell (1998) focus on the appropriateness of the conditional 
mean specification and the distribution assumed for the standardized durations. 
Asymmetric effects and non-linear modelling of past durations, in particular, have been 
an area where the literature is rich. In addition, several distributions have been 
proposed. However, it seems that there is no relevant study in the Carbon market, which 
exhibits various structural differences compared to other well established, and far more 
liquid, markets. 
In the present study, the analysis focuses on duration in the Carbon market, paying 
special attention to non-linear effects and to the impact of OTC transactions. In more 
detail, the fitting and forecasting of several existing models, such as  the original ACD, 
the Log-ACD, the BCACD and the EXACD, are examined, employing the Exponential, 
the Weibull and the Generalized-Gamma distributions. Model fit is tested by the ability 
to reduce the autocorrelation of squared standardized durations, the appropriateness of 
the associated density function and short-term in-sample forecast accuracy. The 
forecasting performance is determined by their short- and long-term out-of-sample 
forecasting ability.  
In addition, two empirical extensions are proposed. The first introduces a highly non-
linear term in the existing Dufour and Engle’s (2000a) BCACD model. The size of the 
impact of past durations is allowed to vary with changes in economically relevant 
threshold variables. The threshold variables chosen are past durations (i.e., self-exciting 
process) and trading intensity (i.e., volume enhanced durations). Terasvirta’s smooth 
transition regime-switching framework is employed allowing for gradual adjustment to 
continuously changing market conditions. The second extension incorporates the 
duration impact of OTC transactions. OTC EUA holders are allowed to enter the 
market, and this is expected to have an impact on the DGP of duration. Therefore, a new 
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term is introduced that allows the effect of past durations to be revised when the last 
transaction is an OTC. The ARMA and the BCACD specifications are employed to 
account for both linear and non-linear effects. 
One of the main findings refers to the relative performance of the various specifications. 
Although more complex distributions are required to better describe the data’s higher 
moments, fitting and forecasting are mainly influenced by the particular conditional 
mean specification assumed. The Generalized Gamma performs consistently better than 
the other two nested distributions, while Exponential provides the worst forecasts and 
fitting, but the modelling of particular market peculiarities, such as the OTC 
transactions, is of particular importance, and improves performance significantly. This 
confirms the initial propositions by Bauwens et al. (2004) that simple models, especially 
the ones with a single distribution, are inadequate to capture duration peculiarities. The 
modelling of OTC transactions and of asymmetric effects appears to improve 
performance. Linear models fit the data better and provide better long-term forecasts. 
However, the short-term dynamics are better described by non-linear models, because 
they provide more accurate one-step forecasting.  
The switching regime analysis indicates that there are blocks of high or low trading 
activity in the market and that order flow creates a momentum in trading. Given Easley 
and O’Hara’s (1992) propositions concerning the presence of informed trading, these 
high trading activity blocks could be interpreted as information episodes. These 
episodes appear to be particularly relevant in Phase I, especially in ECX. They also 
provide better short-term forecasts. In contrast, OTC transactions increase the expected 
duration, either due to information reasons or because they deplete liquidity. These 
models are particularly relevant in NP and especially in Phase II and provide better 
long-term forecasts. 
The relation between trading intensity regimes and OTC transactions provides an 
insight into the Carbon market. The analysis of the regime-switching framework 
indicates that after a large, or fast (i.e., short duration), transaction trading frequency 
increases, while the opposite occurs when trading intensity is low. Therefore, given the 
speculative environment in the market, investors appear to extract information from 
previous trades and this has an impact on their trading frequency. This is consistent with 
Engle and Russell (1998) and Dufour and Engle (2000a, 2000b), who support that 
duration is exogenously determined. Yet, OTC transactions, since they have an 
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increasing effect on duration, seem to have an opposing effect to market momentum. 
They either deter other market participants from trading due to adverse-selection or they 
consume the current order book depth, so the market needs some time to reach a new 
equilibrium. Whatever the reason, they provide better long-term forecast, while trading 
intensity regimes provide better short-term accuracy. In practice, this means that 
investors seem to continuously update themselves by observing order flow variations, 
which appear to have a short-term impact on trading. In contrast, OTC transactions 
seem to carry information that cannot be resolved immediately and therefore has a long-
lasting effect. Both concepts are relevant to the analysis in the next chapter, where they 
are further developed. 
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5. Duration Modelling, Trading Intensity and Trade 
Type 
5.1 Introduction 
Continuing the analysis of duration modelling in the Carbon market, the analytical focus 
of this second empirical chapter lies in the theoretical development of ACD models, 
concerning the distributional assumptions and their connection to the informational 
content of trades. Following the remarks by Bauwens et al. (2004), who argue that a 
single distribution cannot summarize the dynamics of durations, several studies develop 
more sophisticated density functions which try to summarize the presence of different 
market participants. Consequently, a branch of literature has been developed that 
connects ACD modelling to the presence of information or informed trading in the 
market (see, inter alia, Wong et al., 2009; Tay et al., 2009; De Luca and Galo, 2009). 
More specifically, the propositions by Bauwens et al. (2004) have given rise to a new 
statistical approach, which allows the distribution of durations to be described as a 
mixture of distributions. This offers researchers great flexibility in modelling duration 
series, allowing them to take into account various issues and stylized facts present in 
each market. The basic underlying assumption in these models (Hujer and Vuletic, 
2007) is that in every market there are different groups of traders that react differently to 
the arrival of new information.
123
 Therefore, their trading behaviour cannot be captured 
by one single distribution without losing relevant information. Consequently, the 
collective distribution of duration is assumed to be a mixture of distributions, each of 
which describes more accurately one group of market participants. Thus, in order to 
distinguish among the different groups, the researcher needs to define a benchmark 
variable, the values of which indicate different stages. These stages determine different 
regimes, which can then be related to one or more groups. The transition mechanism 
should also be defined. 
According to the specification employed, the “mixture distribution” models can be 
divided into two broad categories. First, De Luca and Zuccolotto (2006) propose a 
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 An important characteristic of such traders’ actions is the arrival time of their transactions. The 
microstructure literature (see, inter alia, Bauwens et al., 2004; Gerhard and Hautsch, 2000; Hujer and 
Vuletic, 2006) connects the inter-trade arrival time with the type of traders. Since different types of 
traders are present in the market simultaneously, each transaction could come from a different Data 
Generation Process (DGP). Consequently, one single distribution should not be sufficient to capture all 
different types of trades/traders. 
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switching regime Pareto ACD model using Teräsvirta’s logistic smooth transition 
function, where the parameter of the Pareto distribution is allowed to vary across 
different regimes of an economically relevant variable. This variable is observable, and 
when its values exceed or lie between specific benchmarks, namely threshold values, 
different regimes of that variable are determined. These regimes can be further 
connected to specific market characteristics, to distinguish among different trading 
groups. This idea is implicitly assumed in the models of Zhang et al. (2001) and by 
Meitz and Teräsvirta (2004, 2006). Zhang et al. (2001) use a threshold variable to 
distinguish between various regimes of the conditional mean specification (ACD), 
where a different distribution is attributed to each regime; Meitz and Teräsvirta (2004, 
2006) allow for a smooth transition. Therefore, these studies recognize different groups 
of transactions, and thus different regimes, but they do not connect this dichotomy to 
information. 
In contrast, in another class of models the threshold variable used is latent, and therefore 
unobservable. Thus, although different regimes of this variable cannot be observed 
directly, they can indirectly indicate the presence, or absence of the factors that cannot 
be observed but are assumed to have an impact on durations. Following this branch of 
the literature some authors have proposed a discrete mixture of distributions (e.g., Liu et 
al, 2004; De Luca and Gallo, 2004) of durations, while some others have proposed a 
continuous mixture of distributions (e.g., Bauwens and Veredas, 2004; Ghysels et al., 
2004). Furthermore, Hujer et al. (2002) propose the Markov-Switching ACD model, 
which, as they show, has higher forecasting accuracy. These models describe the idea 
that, although there is no direct way of distinguishing what the motivation of a trade is, 
the probability of belonging to one regime or another can be defined more accurately.
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However, these models come at a high computational cost.  
As a compromise, Hujer and Vuletic (2007) propose the so-called Static Mixture ACD 
model, which shares a strong resemblance to Deluca and Gallo’s (2004) discrete 
mixture model, but provides better forecasts. Hujer and Vuletic (2007) allow the DGP 
of duration to be a discrete mixture of predefined distributions with regimes determined 
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 In Markov-Switching ACD models, the researcher first needs to specify the conditional mean and then 
the number of the available regimes of the latent variable and the density function associated to each 
regime. Since the threshold variable is unobservable, different regimes cannot be observed either. 
Therefore, the probability of moving from one regime to another is of utmost importance, and, depending 
on the pre-specified number of regimes, a matrix is formulated, consisting of all possible pairs of 
distributions. The cumulative distribution, i.e., the uniform distribution describing the Data Generation 
Process of duration, is then the average of all distributions, weighted by the ex ante probability of 
duration coming from each regime. For more information see Liu et al. (2004) Hujer and Vuletic (2005). 
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by a latent variable. Each regime is associated with a different mean equation 
specification for the expected duration in a way similar to the T-ACD proposed by 
Zhang et al. (2001). In their analysis, they draw inferences concerning informed trading 
based on the shape of the hazard functions of each regime’s distribution.  
The microstructure literature recognizes two main types of traders according to their 
access to price-relevant information (see, inter alia, Kyle, 1985; Glosten and Milgrom, 
1985; Easley and O’Hara, 1987, 1992; Easley et al., 1997, 2002). The first group, often 
called informed traders, possesses private information before it becomes public 
knowledge. They exploit their timing advantage in order to benefit from subsequent 
price changes. The second group, referred to as uninformed traders, does not have any 
prior knowledge of public information, and is assumed to trade because of liquidity 
reasons. More recent studies dissect the group of uninformed traders further according 
to their ability to extract information from trading variations and their flexibility in 
managing transaction size or frequency (e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988; Foster and 
Viswanathan, 1990; Spiegel and Subrahmayam, 1992; Gerhard and Hautsch, 2007). 
They argue that there is a subgroup of uninformed traders that, although they do not 
possess any price-relevant information, can choose when and how to transact. They are 
called discretionary liquidity traders and they are assumed to learn from information 
signals revealed by trades or order flow. Applied to the Carbon market, these three types 
can distinguish companies which need allowances for compliance, as non-discretionary 
uninformed liquidity traders, who, consequently, are unrelated to information, market 
participants, who possess private information, as informed traders and investment funds 
that try to extract it from order flow, as discretionary-liquidity uninformed traders.
125
  
Therefore, the trading pattern, and thus the arrival time of transactions of each trading 
group should be expected to be largely distinct. More specifically, Hujer and Vuletic 
(2007) base their inferences on the fact that transactions of uninformed traders are 
motivated by liquidity rather than by information. Their transaction rate should be 
invariant over time, since they are not affected by randomly arrived information shocks. 
Statistically, a flat hazard function could summarize their trading activity. This means 
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 As it has been mentioned earlier, the Carbon market is a cap and trade market, where quantities and 
prices are indirectly politically influenced. In addition, especially in early stages, OTC market was 
dominant and transactions were really informative. Although the relative proportion of these trades has 
declined over the years, OTC allowance holders can still enter the market and their trades are still seen as 
carrying informational content. Viswanathan (2010) raises the importance of regulation, with regards to 
information innovation and information dissemination, emphasizing on the role of the OTC market. 
Therefore, informed traders are expected to play a dominant and profound role in the European Carbon 
market. 
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that the Exponential distribution, which was employed by Engle and Russell (1998), 
should be appropriate for this group. In contrast, information-related trading should 
follow information innovations, which are usually assumed to arrive randomly in the 
market. In addition, Easley and O’Hara (1992) support the view that informed traders 
appear in the market only when there is price-relevant information. Consequently, the 
transaction rate of informed trading is expected to vary with information episodes., 
therefore a non-monotonic hazard function, a characteristic of more complex 
distributions, would be more appropriate. Moreover, Gerhard and Hautsch (2007) 
extend the idea by adopting the view that portfolio managers and fundamental trading 
should exhibit an upward slope hazard function due to the fact that they are willing to 
change the composition of their portfolio only when they aggregate sufficient 
information.
126
 In contrast, investors who acquire or accumulate information, either 
privately or by extracting it from observing order flow variations, are more likely to 
trade closer to, or shortly after the arrival of, this new information. Therefore, the 
probability of short durations is higher and the trading rate of these traders is expected 
to follow a downward slope. 
Furthermore, the mixture of distributions framework provides a better in- and out-of-
sample accuracy, but it implicitly assumes a simplified division of market participants 
that is not affected by market depth or learning speed. However, several studies 
examine the implications of different transaction sizes and frequencies, as well as of the 
learning process of market participants.  
First, several studies emphasize the importance of trading intensity. The sequential and 
strategic models of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985), respectively, examine 
the trading pattern variations when informed traders are present in the market and how 
their appearance is connected to trading intensity. As has been extensively discussed in 
the Literature Review section, in Chapter 2, Glosten and Milgraom (1985) maintain that 
informed traders transact immediately upon the arrival of new information and in large 
quantities in order to fully exploit their information advantage. In contrast, Kyle (1985) 
argues that they segment their trades, acting strategically, in order to maximize their 
profits without revealing their information. Apart from their different approach, both 
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 These traders are assumed to be naive and to have an optimal portfolio composition. They are willing 
to change it only when market conditions impose price changes that are higher than their benchmark. 
Therefore, their transaction rate, according to information arrival, should have an upward slope because it 
is more likely for them to transact after gathering enough information. The relative benchmark that 
indicates enough information is an individual choice and refers to signal strength and not to time.  
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maintain that the presence of informed traders could be identified, either through higher 
trading volumes (i.e., large informed transactions) or through higher trading frequency 
(i.e., many small transactions in a short period of time). Furthermore, the time 
dimension is underlined by Back and Baruch (2004), who postulate that different traders 
should be expected to trade at different rates. 
However, the time dimension is only implicitly assumed in these two studies. The 
importance of time is explicitly taken into account in Diamond and Verrecchia (1987). 
They postulate that longer durations should be associated with bad news, especially in 
the presence of short selling constraints. In this case, informed traders should sell the 
asset, but only when they own it. In contrast, Easley and O’Hara (1992) postulate that 
increased trading activity is associated with higher presence of informed trading. When 
new information arrives at the market, they possess that piece of knowledge prior to the 
majority of traders, and they want to exploit it, acting either at once or strategically, 
before it goes public. This is reflected in increased activity, in the form of shorter 
durations or of higher volumes. Consequently, both studies emphasize the importance of 
trading intensity and connect it with information and different types of traders. They 
provide a qualitative explanation to clustering, which is subsequently modelled 
explicitly by Engle and Russell (1998) through ACD models. 
More recently, various studies emphasize the importance of both trading volume and 
frequency in the trading process. The literature is settled in many aspects. Dufour and 
Engle (2000b) connect increased trading activity to higher price impact, confirming 
Easley and O’Hara (1992). Along the same lines, Ben Sita (2010) suggests that time is 
an important aspect of intraday trading strategies. Bowe et al. (2007) support this 
proposition arguing that investors should manage both the time and the size of 
transaction. In contrast, Grammig et al. (2007) provide evidence of more informative 
prices after inactive stages of the market, thus confirming Parlour (1998) and Foucault 
(1999). In addition, several studies, such as those by De Jong et al. (1995), Huang and 
Stoll (1997), Ahn et al. (2002) and Angelidis and Benos (2009) raise the importance of 
trading volume for prices and spreads.
127
 
All these studies, especially the ones that approach theoretically potential information 
signals of trading intensity, model intraday trading activity under the assumption that 
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 The relation of transaction size, trading frequency and intraday formation of prices and spreads will be 
further developed in the next chapter. In the analysis of this chapter these measures of trading intensity 
are mentioned to emphasize the informational content of trading signals. 
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market participants observe order flow to extract price-relevant information. In the early 
literature, inventory-holding models maintain that market makers observe continuously 
the market to identify informed trading in order to post regret free prices (see, inter alia, 
Garman, 1976; Amihud and Mendelson, 1980; Stoll, 1978; Ho and Stoll, 1981, 1983; 
O’Hara and Oldfield, 1986; Hasbrouck, 1988, 1991a, 1991b). They try to formulate 
expectations concerning the future trading intensity based on the size, the frequency and 
the direction of previous transactions. Their main concern is market viability and the 
risk aversion of the dealer. Consequently, the liquidity component of the transactions, 
which is connected with transitory effects, is taken into account. In contrast, information 
models see the trading process as a game where players learn from each other by 
observing past transactions (see, inter alia, Kyle, 1985; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; 
Easley and O’Hara, 1987, 1992; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988; Kyle, 1989; Easley et al., 
1997, 2002; Easley et al., 2008). Then, using the acquired knowledge, they formulate 
expectations of the probability of informed trading (PIN) and take it into account when 
quoting their prices. 
Another important aspect that is discussed extensively in the literature is the definition 
of learning and the speed of information dissemination.
128
 Although market participants 
observe the same, external, public information, such as the trading process, their prior 
knowledge (e.g., market share) drives them to interpret the order flow signals in 
different manners. In addition, their access to private information and the speed of its 
dissemination varies considerably and, hence, a more dynamic approach should be more 
relevant. REE literature (see, inter alia, Shiller, 1981, 1984; De Long et al., 1990; 
Chamley, 2003; Sandroni, 2005) recognizes that learning is a dynamic process, and that, 
apart from the “actual” truth, there are various perceptions, derived by trading signals 
that might turn traders, who ignore their private information, towards the “right” or 
“wrong” direction (see, inter alia, Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Smith and 
Sorensen, 2000).  According to Vives (2008), “actions speak louder than words” and 
traders, although they might have their own, potentially correct, piece of information, 
might “herd” towards an unexpected, potentially wrong signal. However, the way they 
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 The models of Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985), which set the scene for a series of 
similar models, belong to the Rational Expectation Equilibrium (REE) models and share a very strong 
resemblance to Game Theory. They model price formation as equilibrium of expectations formulated by 
knowledge gained by observing various aspects of order flow variations. Their analytical focus lies on the 
dynamics of learning and formulating price-relevant expectations. REE literature has been developed in 
parallel with microstructure literature, and this study by no means aims at developing both. However, 
several studies might be relevant and therefore they will be briefly discussed. For an extensive discussion 
please refer to Burrnnermeier (2001) and Vives (2008). 
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interpret this signal, as well as the speed with which they accumulate and disseminate 
the information through their trading might vary considerably (inter alia, Vives, 1993; 
Jun and Vives, 2004). 
This branch of literature raises two important points relevant to the present study. First, 
along with inventory and information models, it recognizes that there are price-relevant 
information signals that occur before, without necessarily including, price changes. 
More specifically, market participants in these models observe order flow variations and 
then try to extract signals that might indicate price changes. There is a time element that 
is crucial to this approach. Several studies report that different levels of trading intensity 
are more (less) informative and result in greater (smaller) subsequent price changes 
(see, inter alia, Easley and O’Hara, 1992; Dufour and Engle, 2000b). Consequently, 
when traders observe excessive trading volumes or higher trading frequency they get a 
signal that a significant price change, which could prove beneficial, might follow. They 
assess these signals and combine them with qualitative information and then they 
implement their expectations through trading strategies.
129
  
The second issue extends the afore-mentioned proposition that each trader’s learning 
speed varies with various factors (see, inter alia, Vives, 1993; Jun and Vives, 2004). 
Each trader, or group of traders, exhibits a different learning curve, depending on 
his/her access to private information, risk aversion, trading strategies (e.g., Kyle, 1985; 
Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) or volume of information.
 
All traders receive the same 
quantity and quality of public information, but their actions vary in terms of what they 
learn and how fast they learn from it.
 130
 Townsend (1978), Frydman (1982), Blume and 
Easley (1984, 1998), Feldman (1987) and Vives (2008) stress the difference between 
learning about an equilibrium and learning from an equilibrium. Predictions and 
expectations can only be formulated in the first case because there is still unresolved 
information in the market, while in the latter case prices already include all relevant 
information. Obviously, considering that any information episode has a finite life before 
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 Several studies (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992) report that learning is a dynamic process 
and is not necessarily Bayesian. Market participants that observe market variations, update themselves 
continuously and then adapt their strategies accordingly. The social learning literature emphasizes the 
possibility of market failure due to the fact that fully rational traders may “herd” in the wrong direction 
because they overestimate/underestimate trading shocks, ignoring any qualitative analysis and their 
previous knowledge. The decision making depends on the number of unknown parameters, for which 
expectations need to be formulated, and on the current market dynamics, such as the number of groups of 
traders and/or relative measures of market activity and depth. 
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 For example, according to Gerhard and Hautsch (2000) there are two types of traders who aggregate 
information but do not act in the same way. Technical traders react to every signal, while portfolio 
managers aggregate relevant information up to a level necessary for altering the optimal composition of 
their portfolios. 
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information goes public, the time dimension of information plays an important role. 
First, informed traders have an incentive to act fast or in huge quantities in order to 
exploit their informational advantage. Their actions reveal their presence to traders that 
observe order flow. However, not all traders act in the same way or at the same time. 
They might need either sufficient, aggregated information, in case they manage 
portfolios, or time to act, due to their different learning speeds. The same happens with 
non-discretionary liquidity traders, who are the last to adjust to new market conditions 
and do so mostly when information is known to everyone. 
This appears to be particularly relevant to the trading practice in the Carbon market, 
where information resolution appears to play an important role both in how informative 
prices are and in liquidity levels, which determine market depth. Viswanathan (2010) 
argues that the Carbon market needs a regulatory approach that would strictly regulate 
the market in order to restrict manipulation. Simultaneously, it should allow exchange 
and market participant innovations to enhance liquidity. A non-regulated, non-
transparent market would be liquid, but inaccurate in terms of price. In contrast, a 
strictly regulated environment would increase price accuracy, but not liquidity. Both 
would result in a divergence from the initial purpose of the EU ETS. Viswanathan 
(2010) is based on a seminal study by Kyle and Viswanathan (2008), who argue that 
organized markets improve the aggregation of diverse information, which, according to 
Hayek (1945), leads to an increased “market efficiency”. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that it increases “price accuracy” as well. Both studies explain that a 
highly manipulated market in terms of excessive volume or informed market 
participants might be highly efficient in incorporating manipulation into price, but 
assets are not necessarily priced accurately. In terms of Carbon pricing, over- or under-
pricing would lead to a highly speculative environment, which would undermine the 
efforts of emissions reduction. 
Both studies provide a solid ground for a further discussion of the link between market 
participants, trading volume, accurate pricing and regulation. They argue that particular 
market participants can manipulate the market, and therefore prices, through increased 
trading volume. This is consistent with the approach by Easley and O’Hara (1992) 
regarding the time dimension between informational signals, trading volume and 
subsequent price changes. In addition, they implicitly assume that not all traders act 
simultaneously and that there is a time difference in accumulating all necessary relevant 
information. In contrast, the ACD models that employ a mixture of distributions to 
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capture different groups of traders do not account for the quality and speed of learning. 
They only recognize different types of traders and attempt to capture their trading 
behaviour by the shape of the hazard functions of the associated durations. In addition, 
they do not account for non-pricing signals other than the duration itself and they do not 
allow for gradual information resolution. 
This is what this study primarily tries to capture. Price resolution is recognised to be a 
process that varies over time, not an immediate market adjustment, whereby prices 
immediately reflect information. In fact, every piece of information needs some time to 
be fully incorporated into prices. In this period of time, there is a “time dimension” that 
makes information exploitable.
131
 Traders can benefit from extracting this pieces of 
information during this period of time, since they can trade upon it and be make profits. 
This way, although they are initially uninformed, they can become informed, compared 
to other uninformed traders, who do not yet possess that information. Obviously the 
strength, the direction and the learning process of market participants are of outmost 
importance. In addition, since prices do not fully incorporate all available information 
immediately, these traders need to observe “non-price” information signals. This 
analysis examines whether trading intensity can reveal variations in price-relevant 
information levels. 
This contributes to the literature in various ways. First, the “time dimension” of 
information is highlighted and explicitly modelled. Prices are recognized to be efficient, 
in the sense that rationally incorporate information, but imperfect, in the sense that they 
do not immediately reflect all relevant information. This setting might be too restrictive 
in a macroeconomic context, but it is rather reasonable on an intraday level, where order 
submission can be recorded in milliseconds. Second, the ACD framework is related to 
information in a way that explicitly models the impact of an exogenous, observable 
variable on trading patterns. Variations in this observable, non-latent, variable can 
measure how informative a trade is, or has been, based on the hazard function of 
durations. Consequently, if market participants can forecast future values of this 
variable, they can have an estimate of how informative a trade is expected to be. This 
could have numerous practical applications, and could be used as an alternative to the 
PIN measure proposed in the literature. In addition, this framework can be further 
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 Even in the case of public information, not all trades are executed immediately. Trades are matched 
according to price and time of order submission. Even a fraction of a second can be exploitable in 
submitting an appropriate order on an appropriate price. Consequently, high frequency trading strategies 
that focus on the “time dimension” of information could be profitable. 
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extended to include other non-price, observable factors that can be used prior to price 
changes in order to detect price relevant information and the probability, the following 
trades to be informed.  
Third, this attribute of the proposed model can increase the descriptive power of ACD 
models. The level of how informative a trade is can be measured, using an observable 
variable, and, therefore, the behaviour of informed and uninformed traders can be 
further examined. Various issues, such as how informed traders approach the market, 
the information level of certain trades (e.g., OTC transactions) or how uninformed 
traders learn, can be further investigated using non parametric analysis. Finally, this 
analysis empirically extends the Carbon market literature by examining the trading 
patterns and the behaviour of market participants in EU ETS. Given the unique 
characteristics of the market, a better understanding of the price impact of various 
trading strategies could be highly relevant to various aspects of market development. 
Drawing on De Luca and Zuccolotto (2006) and Hujer and Vuletic (2007), a Smooth-
Transition-Mixture of Distributions ACD (STM-ACD) model is proposed. Following 
the analysis of the previous chapter, the conditional mean specification for duration is 
chosen to be the linear-ARMA, as, on average, it outperforms its non-linear 
counterparts. The associated cumulative density function employed, however, is a 
mixture of Weibull distributions, where the shape parameter is allowed to vary across 
three different regimes of trading intensity. The transition between regimes is allowed to 
be smooth according to Teräsvirta’s smooth transition function.  
This modelling allows for various interpretations. The hazard function of a Weibull 
distribution can exhibit a flat, an upward or a downward slope, depending on the value 
that the shape parameter takes on.
132
 Following the literature mentioned above, the 
shape of the hazard can indicate the type of market participants. The number of regimes 
chosen, i.e., three, accounts for non-discretionary liquidity, discretionary/fundamental 
and informed traders. Furthermore, trading intensity is used as a proxy for measuring 
the strength of order flow signals, which might be followed by price changes. In 
addition, the smooth transition function that operates between regimes would account 
for different paces of learning across participant groups.  
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 Weibull nests Exponential distribution as a special case, when the shape parameter equals one. 
Consequently the associated hazard function is flat and according to the literature can summarize 
uninformed trading activity. On the contrary, when the shape parameter is larger (lower) than one, the 
hazard function follows an upward (downward) slope, different from flat, which is associated with 
information. 
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Furthermore, in order to account for a potentially non-linear impact of these types of 
traders on the conditional mean, a Threshold-ACD (T-ACD) model (Zhang et al., 2001) 
is estimated. After identifying different regimes of trading intensity that have a 
statistically significant effect on the density function employed, it might be too 
restrictive to assume that a simple linear-ARMA specification is sufficient in 
summarizing the DGP of duration. Therefore, a further dissection of the conditional 
mean specification according to the previously identified regimes might reveal potential 
non-linearities. This model is further extended to account for OTC transactions. Then, 
the in- and out-of-sample performance of the ACD models proposed in this chapter will 
be compared with the models in Chapter 4. Finally, for robustness, a Burr-ACD model 
with more flexible hazard functions is estimated to provide further evidence for the 
trading behaviour of market participants.  
One of the most significant findings in the analysis presented in this chapter is that 
trading intensity is indeed capable of differentiating the trading behaviours of different 
participants. According to the empirical results discussed in Section 6.3, large or 
frequent transactions seem to carry information and trading intensity appears to be 
positively related to this. This is consistent with the theoretical predictions of Easley 
and O’Hara (1992) and the empirical findings of Dufour and Engle (2000b) that higher 
trading activity carries more information. Duration is the main determinant but volume 
contributes considerably, and their effect is greater at the opening and closing of the 
market, especially during the end of Phase I, when banking was restricted. Moreover, a 
gradual adjustment that accounts for different speeds of learning seems to be 
particularly relevant.  
In addition, OTC transactions appear to be motivated by information reasons, which can 
mainly be attributed to their large transaction size. In addition, the non-linear 
specifications that account for these transactions outperform all other ACD models 
employed, including the models presented in Chapter 4 (Appendix 4.C). This confirms 
the empirical findings of the previous chapter, where OTC transactions are found to 
increase the expected duration. This might be caused either by their large size, which 
consumes current liquidity, or by their informational content, which might make other 
traders reluctant to trade. The findings of this analysis provide supportive evidence for 
the second proposition. Moreover, following the discussion in Section 5.3, informed 
traders seem to act strategically, as described by Kyle (1985). Consistently, longer 
durations are associated with no news (Easley and O’Hara, 1992), while the theoretical 
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predictions of Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) do not seem to be relevant in the Carbon 
market. 
The discussion above is particularly important and relevant to various aspects of trading 
practice in the European Carbon market. First, it highlights the benefit of possessing 
information before it is fully incorporated into prices, recognising that there are non-
pricing variables that can reveal information. On microstructure level, market 
imperfections are exploitable, even for a very short period of time, and that increases the 
intrinsic value of acquiring information in “real time”. This can affect the attitude of 
market participants towards the timing and cost of acquiring information.  
Second, an increased ability of market participants to indentify informed trades by 
simply observing past transactions, can increase their market power. Given the “buyer” 
character of the market, they should easily compensate for potential losses by trading 
with better informed traders. Their main concern should be liquidity, and therefore 
spreads should only increase when they observe increased information-based trading 
and insufficient liquidity. In EU ETS there are significant information and liquidity 
shocks, as well as strong seasonalities related compliance and a more accurate pricing 
policy could be proven beneficial. Overall, better risk management, in the sense of 
information inflow, would lower spreads, and this would contribute to increased market 
efficiency.  
Third, the proposed model can be used for monitoring purposes by regulatory 
authorities. By identifying informed trading, further action can be taken to protect the 
market from “manipulation”. This is particularly relevant to Viswanathan (2010) who 
argues that in order for EU ETS to achieve its primary goal, which is emissions’ 
reduction, a fine balance between market innovation and liquidity needs to be found. 
Given that the model can identify informed trading on a transaction level, regulatory 
framework can be practically improved by applying real time monitoring tools that can 
adjust trading intensity and its price impact. 
Finally, the remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The following two 
sections present the methodology and the empirical findings, respectively. The final 
section provides a brief summary. 
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5.2 Methodology 
5.2.1 Microstructure 
Following the microstructure literature, a typical set-up of strategic trade behaviour is 
employed. Trades are motivated by the arrival of new private information and reaction 
to it varies across a pool of heterogeneous market participants that differ in their 
sensitivity to information and their speed of accumulation of price-relevant knowledge. 
The estimated model distinguishes between different types of trades, which in many 
cases determine the associate type of traders. The variables used to proxy this behaviour 
are the time (i.e., duration) and the size (i.e., number of contracts) of the transaction. 
Three major behavioural trading patterns are assumed to be present in the market. First, 
the informed act solely on the receipt of exogenous private information. This is 
consistent with Easley and O’Hara (1992) where informed trading can be only 
understood under the presence of unresolved information. Otherwise, there is no 
incentive for these traders to enter the market other than liquidity or portfolio reasons 
that motivate trades unrelated to external information. Considering the time dimension, 
discussed in the previous section, these traders are the first to receive this information 
and act in the market. They do so either immediately in large volume trades, as in 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985), or strategically in segmented patterns, as in Kyle (1985). 
Easley and O’Hara (1992) indicate that the presence of such traders can be detected 
through episodes of high trading activity. Therefore, their trading activities could 
potentially be captured by either large transactions (i.e., large transaction size, 
independently of whether the associated duration is short or long) or high trading 
frequency (i.e., short durations, independently of whether the associated transaction size 
is small or large) or both. 
The second type of trades is uninformed. These trades arrive at the market in a random 
fashion, as described by Easley and O’Hara (1992) and Hujer and Vuletic (2007), and 
are initiated by the ‘non-discretionary liquidity’ traders of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988, 
1989). Such traders are assumed to transact mainly for liquidity reasons, independent of 
information. In the context of the Carbon market they are companies that need Carbon 
allowances purely for compliance reasons. They do not observe order flow and do not 
extract any price-relevant information out of it. They only follow price resolved 
information when they need to, and after it goes public.  
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The third type of trades is also uninformed with respect to private information, but is 
carried out by fundamental traders who have discretion in varying the size and timing of 
their trades according to endogenous information they can extract from the market. 
These are similar to the discretionary liquidity traders of Admati and Pfliederer (1988, 
1989). They can continuously update themselves analyzing past trading behaviour as 
revealed by order flow variations, measured by transaction size and trading frequency. 
They are assumed to act in a similar manner as assumed by PIN models (e.g., Easley et 
al., 1996) trying to identify informed trading. They are particularly interested in this 
type of trades either because they are market makers and need to set regret free prices, 
or because they want to reveal any unresolved information in time, in order to exploit it 
before it goes public.
133
 In addition, similar to Gerhard and Hautsch (2007), they are 
assumed to have, or acquire, portfolio positions that are revised from desired positions 
only when information of a certain size or type accumulates over a certain horizon 
beyond a threshold level. This implies a delayed reaction in time, conditional on that of 
past actions of other traders, especially that of the informed. Obviously, the quality and 
the speed of their learning may vary (e.g., Vives, 1993; Jun and Vives, 2004), 
depending on how they assess the acquired information. 
Furthermore, exogenous information is assumed to arrive randomly according to a 
Poisson distribution. It is first observed by informed traders and then it is progressively 
revealed by their actions. Fundamental traders capture information signals extracted by 
trading activity and seek to resolve whether it is sufficiently strong to indicate a 
subsequent price change. In case they believe so, they act accordingly, buying (selling) 
the asset upon the arrival of good (bad) news. Finally, when information becomes 
public, partially because it is revealed by the actions of all previous traders, there is no 
incentive to further exploit it.  
Consequently, information is considered to arrive at the market randomly, creating 
disturbances in trading activity until it is disclosed in prices. The length and the strength 
of every information episode depend on the quality of the market, as it can be measured 
                                                 
133
 The underlying assumption here is that both types of traders need to manage a portfolio of some kind. 
Market makers have a basket of assets that they need to preserve on an optimal level, in order to avoid 
excessive carrying costs or loss of sales. On the other hand, portfolio managers have a basket of assets 
aiming at maximizing profit without undertaking excessive risk levels. Although they face different risks, 
both need to react to new information, especially when the signals are strong enough to substantially 
change the risk-return relation in their portfolios. In addition, in several studies, such as in Madhavan et 
al. (1997), when limit orders are allowed, their submission could be considered as market making on one 
side of the spread. Therefore, these traders could be considered as bearing similar risk to those of market 
makers. 
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by variables, such as the depth of the order book or investors’ aggressiveness, discussed 
in Parlour (1998) and Foucault (1999).The following diagram depicts the sequence of 
trading actions through every information episode. The time line has been expanded for 
clarity but the informed trades at t1 can occur at t0 and the discretionary trades at t2 can 
occur at t3. 
 
 
 
 
 
The above description of trade types and trader categories describes sequences of trade 
decisions, for every information episode, that have direct implications on the shape of 
the hazard function of durations, or else the probability of a trade to occur over a time 
interval conditional on no trades having occurred before the beginning of this interval. 
Uninformed traders, following the literature, are assumed to be unaffected by the arrival 
of new information and, since they are assumed to be naive, they do not change their 
trading behaviour within each information episode, at least not till the information 
becomes public. Therefore, the probability of uninformed transactions to occur at every 
point in time should not change for any length of time. Thus, a flat hazard function, 
which is a statistical property of the Exponential distribution, should be sufficient in 
describing their trading. 
However, this is not valid for informed traders. They are the first to observe the new 
information and they have the time advantage to exploit it before it goes public. In case 
they have the monopoly and there is no time limit and they can choose the time and size 
t0 
Exogenous 
information 
arrives 
t1 
Informed traders 
start to exploit 
their information 
(transaction) 
t2 
Discretionary 
liquidity traders act 
(after observing t1 
(or enough similar 
transactions)) 
t3 
Information ceases to 
be exploitable (goes 
‘public’). No incentive 
for any of them to 
trade. 
Information 
Episode P3 
Information 
Episode P2 
Information 
Episode P1 
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of their transactions. However, usually there are more traders, not just a single one, that 
observe the incoming information and there are also time constraints, e.g., public 
announcement of the relative piece of information, before it is incorporated into price. 
In this case, informed traders compete with each other and they need to act within a 
certain period of time t1< t3. In addition, considering that they might be revealed by their 
trading, they have an even stronger incentive to act closer to t0, when the episode starts. 
Consequently, the rate of their transactions, which is relevant only when there is 
information, should be at its highest as soon as they observe any news. This rate should 
then decrease to zero as t3 is approached, since, when information goes public, the 
probability of observing an informed trade is essentially zero. The conditional intensity 
for informed trading, i.e., the hazard function        , can be written as: 
            
   
 
 
                      (5.1) 
where the probability of an informed transaction to occur in time   (    ), given that 
there is new information, in a new information episode   , and that this information is 
not public yet (     ), is a decreasing function of time. 
In contrast, the fundamental or discretionary liquidity trades/traders have a lagged 
behaviour that is time dependent and conditional on the order flow created by informed 
traders. They are present in the market and they continuously update themselves, trying 
to extract information signal from order flow variations, probably having different 
learning speeds. After they observe one, they start revealing the informational 
advantage of informed traders and they have the incentive to exploit it as much as they 
can before it goes public. According to the previous diagram, this is from    to   . 
However, that signal needs to be sufficiently strong in order to make them deviate from 
their desired portfolio position. This gives rise to information aggregation that implies 
an increasing hazard function. This is because it should be more likely for a transaction 
to occur after some time, at least   , has passed (e.g., Gerhard and Hautsch, 2007; Hujer 
and Vuletic, 2007).  
With these depictions of association between the type of traders and the shape of the 
hazard function one can characterize trades into “regimes” using the threshold auto-
regressive methodology of Smooth Transition ACD models. The smooth transition 
accounts for variations in information aggregation or learning speed. 
Chapter 5                                Duration Modelling, Trading Intensity and Trade Type 
137 
 
5.2.2 Smooth-Transition-MixtureACD (STM-ACD) 
The model proposed in this chapter aims at capturing the trading patterns of these three 
categories of traders. It is an ACD model where the associated distribution is a Smooth 
Transition Mixture (STM-ACD) of Weibull distributions. More specifically, durations 
are assumed to be divided into three regimes, each one following a differently shaped 
Weibull distribution.  The different shapes are determined by the different values of the 
shape parameter, which is formulated to be a smooth transition function of a threshold 
variable. The threshold variable that is correlated with trading behaviour, and that 
measures changes in order flow, is conjectured to be trading intensity. The underlying 
assumption is that traders gain information by interpreting order flow signals. 
Therefore, there are three regimes of trading intensity that correspond to three different 
regimes of durations. According to the shape of the associated hazards these duration 
regimes identify the different types of traders. 
Then the model can be formulated as follows. Let            denote the (raw) 
duration of transaction  , which is the time elapsed since the preceding transaction   
 . Let    denote the diurnally adjusted duration,    the expected    ,    an error term, 
and    a threshold variable that can take up values equal to   , where       is the 
number of thresholds that determine the three regimes that are assumed to exist. The 
STM-ACD model can be written as follows: 
         (5.2) 
              (5.3) 
                     , (5.4) 
        
 
   
          
 
   
  (5.5) 
The density function of the disturbances is:  
           
     
    
            
  
  
 
     
      
            
  
  
 
     
  (5.6) 
where 
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                                              (5.7) 
                                
    (5.8) 
the shape parameter                , of the Weibull distribution is a function,  , 
of the threshold variable,   , and a vector of parameter coefficients                   
           where            are the shape parameters of the Weibull distributions in 
the respective regimes, determined by the threshold variable    and          is a 
vector of the smoothness parameter. For every duration the total shape parameter of the 
Weibull distribution (  ) is the weighted average of       and   . The weights are 
determined by two smooth transition functions,    and   . 
The range of values that the shape parameters can take on has direct implications on the 
hazard rate and consequently the type of dominant trader present in the market. 
 When      the associated distribution is Exponential and the associated 
hazard function is flat. This indicates a constant rate of arrival of trades, which 
coincides with uninformed trading. 
 When      the Weibull distribution has a monotonically decreasing slope, and 
so is the associated hazard function. This means that the probability of 
occurrence is higher for shorter durations, which is consistent with informed 
trading. 
 When      the Weibull distribution is bell shaped and the hazard function has 
an upward trend. The probability of occurrence increases with time and therefore 
it could be associated with “fundamental”, discretionary trading. 
A Wald test is used to examine the probability of      . 
In addition, the magnitude of    describes the transition rate from one regime to 
another. The higher (lower) it is, the sharper (smoother) the transition. Practically, the 
transition between regimes could be connected with either “hybrid” trades, such as 
trades that do not clearly belong to one of the assumed groups of market participants, or 
with the speed of learning of different traders, capturing how fast can one group, or 
traders within the same group, learn from information signals revealed by the actions of 
another group, or other traders within the same group. Consequently, a smoother 
transition is an indication of slow information resolution or slow pace of learning, 
probably due to market conditions, such as increased liquidity, that would allow 
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informed traders to hide their actions for longer. In contrast, higher values could 
indicate improved market efficiency or faster learning.  
The threshold variable used is a natural measure of lagged trading intensity, which 
increases (decreases) when either transaction size is large (small) or duration is short 
(long): 
    
    
    
  (5.9) 
where    is volume of transaction   and   is restricted to 1. 
This model combines methodological approaches discussed in three different papers, 
trying to offer an effective compromise in identifying informed trading. In more detail, 
first, Hujer and Vuletic (2007) employ the Markov-Switching framework in order to 
distinguish between informed and uninformed traders, using as reference point the 
different stages a latent variable can be in. This unobservable variable does not allow 
the data to determine the associated distribution to each regime. In the present study, 
similar to De Luca and Zuccolotto (2006), the threshold variable is assumed to be 
trading intensity, and thus observable, while each regime’s distribution is allowed to be 
data-driven. This is a trade-off between restriction and flexibility. Restricting the choice 
of the threshold variable might be a strong assumption, but it allows the data to 
determine the type of trades included in every regime. Consequently, if the level of 
trading intensity of subsequent trades can be forecasted, it can also be associated with 
the type of trades. This way the probability of the next trade being informed can also be 
computed. This is particularly relevant to next chapter’s analysis. Along the same lines, 
Hujer and Vuletic (2007) allow the probability of a trade to be in a specific regime to 
vary over time, while the probability of transitions is kept constant. In this study, the 
transition from one regime to the other depends on trading history, and thus it can vary 
over time, while the thresholds are kept constant, and thus the probability of a 
transaction belonging to a regime is on average constant. However, the smooth 
transition relaxes a bit the compromise that trades of the same transaction size and 
trading frequency will always belong to the same regime. It also opposes the 
assumption of a “discrete” mixture of distributions, allowing for “hybrid” trades or 
behaviour indeterminate between trade types. For example, fast acting fundamental 
traders can be considered as informed by slower acting fundamentals, who might have a 
slower learning, herd behaviour.  
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Moreover, the methodological approach employed here is a variation of De Luca and 
Zuccolotto (2006). They allow the shape parameter of a Pareto II distribution to vary 
smoothly across two regimes of trading intensity. However, there are some major 
differences. First, they recognize only two regimes, while here three are employed in 
order to account for different types of trades. Second, the choice of distribution (i.e., 
Weibull against Pareto II) constitutes a significant alteration. The three regimes can 
define different nesting distributions, such as the exponential when    , and not 
merely different shapes of the same distribution. Consequently, the hazard functions 
have totally different shapes. This enables the identification of distinctly different 
trading behaviour, rather than just degrees of the same behaviour. 
This model is also different from that of Gerhard and Hautsch (2007) in the following. 
First, it recognises that order flow signals can reveal exogenous information and not 
only price signals. This is particularly relevant to fundamental traders who are 
uninformed with regard to the possession of private information, and update their 
knowledge by observing the intermittent engagement of informed traders. Second, 
Fundamental traders cannot be distinguished from technical traders, since both need to 
manage a portfolio of some kind, even if they own only cash to use for transactions, 
which can be considered as a limited case, and use “Chartism” in order to extract 
informational content from market signals. The latter are simply considered to be faster 
in accumulating new information. Along the same lines, the present model recognizes 
two broad categories of traders, according to exogenous information: informed and 
uninformed. Uninformed traders can be further divided into liquidity and fundamental 
traders. 
Furthermore, after deriving the threshold values, a T-ACD model, similar to that of 
Zhang et al. (2001), is employed in order to examine the potential asymmetric effects of 
trading intensity on the conditional mean. In addition, the existing regimes are dissected 
even further to account for OTC transaction effects.  
The T-ACD model can be written as: 
            
     
 
   
      
     
 
   
  (5.10) 
where 
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   (5.11) 
   
                                 
                              
   
(5.12) 
and the associated density function is: 
           
  
    
      
 
    
  
 
  
      
      
 
    
  
 
  
   (5.13) 
where  
    
           
              
           
   (5.14) 
Finally, for testing the robustness of the results, a similar T-ACD model is estimated, 
where the associated distribution is assumed to be Burr, which is a finite mixture of 
Weibull distributions that nests the Weibull and hence the Exponential as special 
cases.
134
 This allows for more flexible, specifically non-monotonic hazard functions that 
could potentially add further characteristics to, or simply confirm, the regimes’ analysis. 
This could benefit current analysis in two ways. First, if STM-ACD is sufficient in 
capturing regime dynamics, the additional parameters of the Burr should provide 
consistent results in the form of, similarly shaped hazard functions. This would confirm 
that the results describe market dynamics and are not imposed by model restrictions. 
Second, the Weibull distribution is a convenient choice because of the straightforward 
distinction of regimes., in the sense that the magnitude of the shape parameter 
determines the shape of the hazard function, and because it allows for flexibility and 
generality without requiring excessive computational power. However, it can only 
produce monotonic hazard functions, which imposes a rigid set of trade types, ignoring 
some stylized facts of the market related to trading activity. In contrast, a Burr 
distribution can produce non-monotonic hazard functions, which could potentially 
reveal several peculiarities of trading activity.  
As has been discussed in the introductory section, market participants in each group 
might have a different speed of learning or a different threshold in aggregating 
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 For further analysis of distributional properties and model dynamics see Grammig and Maurer (2000). 
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information. This might cause some traders in one group to move more quickly. Such 
behaviour might decrease or increase the life of the information or the probability of 
transaction occurrence. Consequently, a monotonically increasing or decreasing 
probability might not be sufficient to describe “hybrid” trades (i.e., trades that may not 
fit only in one category). The, more flexible, hazard functions of the Burr distribution 
could provide some evidence of these trades. This would also justify the use of smooth 
transition functions, which when they are statistically significant indicate that the 
transition is not sharp and that it might capture trades that cannot fit in one category. 
The conditional mean specification of the Burr-ACD model is assumed to be the same 
as previously (the linear-ARMA): 
          
     
 
   
    
     
 
   
  (5.15) 
while the cumulative density function of the mixture of the Burr distribution is assumed 
to be a discrete mixture of Weibull distributions: 
          
   
  
 
 
  
 
 
    
     
  
  
 
 
  
 
     
  
   
  (5.16) 
where   
   
  
           
  
   
           
 
  
   
 
    
  (5.17) 
and   and c have been defined in Eqs. (5.11) and (5.12). For   
    the Burr 
distribution reduces to Weibull. The special case of Exponential occurs when    .135 
5.2.3 Estimation and Performance 
Estimation is carried out in two steps. First, the STM-ACD model is estimated to 
determine the values of the threshold variable that define the regimes, and the values of 
the shape parameters,   , of the mixture of the Weibull distributions that characterise 
the slope of the hazard function. Consequently, the types of trades that dominate the 
regimes are defined. Second, following the identification of the threshold levels,    and 
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 In addition, in the special case, where     , Burr distribution reduces to Log-Logistic, with density 
function 
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  , and the regimes, further tuning is made by estimating various Threshold-ACD 
models that allow for different linear-ARMA specifications for the conditional mean, 
one for each regime. This second step further scrutinizes whether more elaborate 
modelling of the conditional mean is beneficial in terms of model accuracy. In addition, 
it investigates OTC transaction effects more closely, and it tests modelling robustness, 
by allowing higher flexibility in conditional intensities. 
The estimation method used is maximum likelihood, using the Broyden-Fletcher-
Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) (1970) algorithm with numerical derivatives. In addition, in 
order to deal with heteroskedasticity of known form, the models have been estimated 
using robust errors.
136
 The Log-Likelihood functions      maximized depending on the 
distributions as follows. 
For STM-ACD, T-ACD and T-ACD-OTC (for the last two, only the conditional mean 
parameters are estimated, since the distribution parameters are known from the first 
step. 
         
  
  
 
    
   
      
           
  
   
           
  
 
  
 (5.18) 
For Burr-TACD 
                                  
 
  
            
  
  
 
 
  
  
 
   
 (5.19) 
Optimization is carried out subject to     
    . 
In line with Chapter 4, comparison between all models’ (i.e., the ones presented in 
Chapter 4 and the ones presented in this chapter) fitting and forecasting is carried out, 
using Q-stats(15), the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), Q-Q plots, and the in- and 
out-of-sample forecasting accuracy.
137
 The relative results are presented in Appendix 
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 The market gained complexity and liquidity gradually. Duration has decreased considerably over the 
years, while volume has increased. Consequently, the values of trading intensity are consistently higher 
over the years, introducing heteroskedasticity of known form. 
137
 The relative results, although they are discussed in this chapter, are presented in Appendixes 4.A and 
4.B. Furthermore, concerning Q-Q polts, for the STM-ACD model, the following transformation of the 
standardized durations has been employed:     
            
  
  
 
     
. According to Dufour and Engle 
(2000a)    follow a unit exponential distribution, which is the distribution    is tested against. 
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4.C. One-step forecasts are computed directly from the conditional mean specification. 
However, long-term forecasts are given by the following equations. 
For STM-ACD 
          
          
       
              (5.20) 
For T-ACD and T-ACD-OTC 
           
 
     
    
     
     
    
  
    
    
          (5.21) 
5.3 Empirical Results 
5.3.1 Estimation 
The first question posed in the analysis of Section 5.2, is whether trading intensity can 
be used to identify different types of traders. Tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 for ECX I, 
ECX II, NP I & NP II, respectively, provide supportive evidence. The first column of 
these tables presents the estimation results for the STM-ACD model, as in Eqs. (5.2) 
and (5.3). The first three coefficients refer to the conditional mean specification, as in 
Eq. (5.5), while the next three are the shape parameters,   , of the different Weibull 
distributions in Eq. (5.7). The last four coefficients are the smoothness parameters,   , 
and the threshold values,   , as in Eq. (5.8). t-statistics are in parentheses. The next 
column presents the estimation results of the T-ACD model, similar to that by Zhang et 
al. (2001), while the last two decompose further the conditional mean parameters to 
account for OTC transactions, as in Eqs. (5.10), (5.11), (5.12), (5.13) and (5.14). ω, α 
and β are displayed separately for every regime. The next section of the tables presents 
the log-Likelihood value, L, the Bayesian Information Criterion, BIC, and the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov-statistic, p-values in parenthesis. The bottom section presents the 
hypothesis (Wald) tests that     . 
An analytic inspection of the estimation results, especially the part referring to the 
STM-ACD model, confirms that trading intensity could be used to extract non-price-
related information signals from order flow. The different shape parameters,   , of the 
Weibull distributions, which are associated with different hazard functions of duration, 
indicate that it is capable of distinguishing different trading patterns in the different 
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regimes. In more detail, when trading intensity is low (i.e., below the first threshold 
value,   , 0.3943 in ECX I, 1.0123 in ECX II, 0.3684 in NP I and 0.5987 in NP II), the 
shape parameter of the Weibull distribution for the associated durations,   , varies from 
0.9877 in ECX I to 1.1226 in NP I. In addition, a Wald test, consistently, cannot reject 
the initial hypothesis that      as presented in the bottom section entitled H(O) in 
each table. Therefore, according to the previous analysis, the distribution reduces to 
Exponential, which has a flat hazard function and can be associated with non-
discretionary liquidity uninformed traders.  
In contrast, the other two regimes present a completely different picture. When trading 
intensity is very high (i.e., above the second threshold value,   , which has an estimated 
value of 0.7090 in ECX I, 2.5099 in ECX II, 0.9380 in NP I and 0.9086 in NP II), the 
shape parameter,   , is considerably lower than 1 (0.3798 in ECX I, 0.6057 in ECX II, 
0.4332 in NP I and 0.5768 in NP II). This corresponds to a Weibull distribution with a 
downward hazard, which according to the analysis in Section 5.2 describes the trading 
pattern of informed traders. Along the same lines, in the medium range of trading 
intensity, i.e., when         , the shape parameter,   , is larger than 1 (4.5947 in 
ECX I , 4.3937 in ECX II, 3.0960 in NP I and 3.5080 in NP II). This identifies a 
category of traders, previously defined as discretionary liquidity fundamental traders. A 
Wald test (with values of 127.46 and 3462.61 in ECX I, 112.90 and 807.60 in ECX II, 
56.78 and 110.01 in NP I and 69.49 and 180.04 in NP II for    and    respectively), 
consistently rejects that the last two parameters equal 1. 
An initial assumption that the model is built on, is that informed traders transact only 
when there is new or unresolved information. Otherwise, their trading cannot be 
characterised as informed. In addition, they have the incentive to act fast, and before 
their informational advantage expires. Thus, it is more likely for them to transact sooner 
upon the arrival of new information, and this behaviour would translate into a 
downward sloping hazard. According to Easley and O’Hara (1992), this results in 
increased trading intensity in the market, mainly in terms of increased trading volumes. 
This proposition seems to be confirmed here. Quiet stages of the market, where trading 
intensity is low (     ), appear to be dominated by uninformed liquidity trades, since 
the hazard function of the associated durations is flat (    ). Consequently, their 
transaction rate is observed to be rather stable during the trading day and it appears that 
it is not affected by information arrival. In contrast, higher intensity of trading is 
associated with increased levels of incoming or resolving information. When trading 
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activity reaches its highest levels (     ), the associated hazard of durations is a 
decreasing function of time. Trades in this category are more likely to occur closer to 
the information arrival, and, according to Section 5.2, are associated with informed 
trading. This confirms that, indeed, excessive trading intensity, either in the form of 
high transaction size or trading frequency, is associated with presence of information. 
On middle levels of trading intensity, when         ,     , which indicates an 
upward slope for the hazard function. The associated trades are more likely to occur as 
information starts being incorporated into prices, and, consequently, these traders 
appear to follow information.  
Moreover, panel A of Figure 5.1, presents the proportion of trades that belongs to each 
regime (i.e., uninformed, fundamental and informed) across markets and phases. It 
shows that the majority, over 70 percent, of the observations is included in the 
uninformed regime. Consequently, the majority of trades seems to be motivated by 
compliance reasons and not by speculation or informed trading. This percentage 
increases in Phase II in both the ECX and NP markets, indicating a more efficient 
market in terms of asymmetric information and how it is incorporated into price. This 
may also be seen as a sign of success and establishment of the market, considering also 
the increase in volumes and market participants Phase II as seen in Figure 3.5.  
5.3.2 Smooth Transition, Information Resolution and Learning 
The smooth transition feature of the model can capture hybrid trades recognizing that 
traders can learn from each other, but have qualitatively different learning processes and 
learning speeds. Econometrically, that is translated into different trading intensity 
ranges, where the associated durations have a mixed hazard function, which can be 
captured by a changing shape parameter, due to the smooth transition function. A closer 
inspection of the estimation tables first reveals that three distinct regimes are clearly 
identified. The threshold values,    and   , are always significant, with the distinction 
between the first, normal, and the second, fundamental, regimes being more statistically 
significant (t-statistics of    and    are 14.16 and 9.65 ECX I, 29.33 and 18.52 in ECX 
II, 12.61 and 8.02 in NP I and 7.87 and 4.96 in NP II). Second, the smoothness 
parameters are substantially large and statistically significant (   is 2.3533 (15.20) in 
ECX I, 2.3632 (22.37) in ECX II, 2.3840 (12.23) in NP I and 1.6797 (3.52) in NP II, 
while    is 1.8586 (12.84) in ECX I, 3.7037 (20.73) in ECX II, 1.9867 (9.77) in NP I 
and 3.5042 (3.20) in NP II), which confirms two things that will be presented next.  
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The first implication of estimates of smoothness parameters is that the transition 
between regimes is found to be quite sharp (the smoothness parameters    are large), 
although the shape parameter varies considerably. This could indicate increased market 
sensitivity towards new information.
138
 More specifically, since order flow is assumed 
to contain price-relevant information, market participants can extract it by translating 
order flow variations into information signals. Consequently, trading patterns, as they 
are described by the DGP of duration, change according to the level of trading intensity. 
A sharp transition between regimes indicates a quick adjustment, which can be 
translated into increased sensitivity or clear tri-chotomous behaviour of market 
participants. Consequently, when a transaction belongs to one regime, especially the 
informed one, it appears to send a sound signal to the market that is picked up by 
sensitive traders who observe transaction history. This increased sensitivity might lead 
to phenomena such as “herding” towards the wrong direction and market manipulation, 
as they are described by Kyle and Viswanathan (2008) and Viswanathan (2010).  
The second implication of the estimates of the smoothness parameters is that they 
recognise various ranges of hybrid trades or different speeds of learning for the types of 
trades/traders assumed. In more detail, in Phase I     is larger than    . This means that 
the learning process of non-discretionary liquidity traders is faster compared to the rate 
at which discretionary traders learn from informed traders. Alternatively, informed 
traders can effectively conceal their informed trades. Their actions are not revealed 
immediately, or at least not as quickly as the informational content of the actions of 
fundamental traders becomes public knowledge and, therefore, they are followed by 
uninformed traders. Consequently, the transition from the informed regime to the 
fundamental is smoother than from the fundamental regime to the uninformed. This 
means that, fundamental traders’ learning speed is slower compared to the speed at 
which their informational advantage becomes public knowledge. In contrast, in Phase II 
    is smaller than    . This means that the transition from the informed to the 
fundamental regime is sharper compared to the transition from the fundamental to the 
uninformed regime. The sharper transition indicates that fundamental traders learn 
faster in Phase II and it seems that informed traders cannot keep their private 
information exploitable for long. This can be seen as a sign of the maturity of the 
Carbon market in Phase II, where there is greater transparency and more efficient 
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 These findings, although, they cannot be exclusively supportive of this sole proposition, they can be 
considered as a first sign of heightened sensitivity of traders towards order flow variations. This idea will 
be further discussed in the following chapter. 
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information flow, and it is consistent with Vives (1993) and Jun and Vives (2004) 
propositions, who postulate that the speed of learning varies across market participants.  
Furthermore, these findings are confirmed by the analysis based on Burr-TACD models. 
Table 5.5 presents the estimation results for the Eqs. (5.15), (5.16) and (5.17). The first 
three columns present the estimation results for Phase I in both ECX and NP, while the 
next three columns refer to Phase II in both markets. In each phase, the first column 
consists of the parameters of the conditional mean (i.e., ω, α and β) and the shape 
parameters of the Burr distribution, k and   
 , for each of the three regimes (i.e., normal, 
fundamental and informed). The bottom section in each market reports hypothesis 
(Wald) testing for the shape parameters. 
In the regime of normal trades, parameter    
  is always close to zero (0.001 in ECX I, 
0.0136 in ECX II, 0.649 in NP I and 0.0135 in NP II), while     is close to one (1.0387 in 
ECX I, 0.9911 in ECX II, 1.1647 in NP I and 0.9965 in NP II). Wald tests fail to reject 
the initial hypotheses that they   
    (0.37 in ECX I, 0.14 in ECX II, 2.20 in NP I and 
6.25 in NP II) and k  = 1 (1.27 in ECX I, 0.45 in ECX II, 1.41 in NP I and 4.14 in NP 
II). For this particular subset, the normal regime, Burr reduces to exponential and as it 
can be seen in Figure 5.9 the associated hazard function is flat. In contrast, in the 
fundamental and informed regimes the distribution parameters, k and   
 , vary 
significantly and Wald tests reject easily all null hypotheses, while Figure 5.9 shows 
associated hazard functions that are non monotonic. In the fundamental regime    
  
varies across markets and phases from 0.3805 in NP I to 1.1326 in ECX II, while     is 
larger than 1 and varies from 1.5937 in ECX I to 3.0461 in NP I, which causes the 
hazard function to be non-monotonically increasing (i.e., increasing up to a point and 
then decreasing). Finally, in the informed regime    varies from 0.7634 in ECX II to 
1.2289 in NP II, while    
  varies from 0.0164 in ECX II to 1.3540 in ECX I, which 
indicates a distribution for duration that has a clearly decreasing hazard function. This 
confirms previous findings from the STM-ACD model. 
Moreover, it is really interesting to investigate further the shape of the estimated hazard 
functions, especially in the fundamental regime. Considering that in this Burr-TACD 
estimation the regimes are assumed to be discrete, there is a loss of flexibility 
accounting for different learning speeds. However, the non-monotonic shape of the 
hazard function in the second regime indicates that, compared to the informed traders,  
these traders are indeed slower in observing information, because they need to extract it 
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first, hence, the upward slope. However, the subsequent downward slope in the end 
indicates that after they gain the information, they have the incentive to exploit it, and 
they act as informed to the remaining uninformed traders. Therefore their trading 
patterns resemble those of the informed and the hazard function presents a downward 
slope.  
5.3.3 Informed Trading 
Intraday Behaviour 
The analysis of the estimation results in tables 5.1 to 5.5 confirms the existence of three 
different regimes corresponding to three different types of trades. The following 
analysis focuses on how the associated traders behave in the Carbon market. Panel A in 
Figure 5.1 shows the proportion of transactions in each regime across markets and 
phases. As expected, the first regime, the normal, includes the vast majority of 
transactions, while informed traders account for a substantial proportion of trading 
activity. Fundamental trades account for a maximum of 12 percent in NP I. Another, 
important outcome is that normal trades have an increased proportion in Phase II, while 
informed trading decreases in both markets. Again this is a sign of market maturity, 
consistent with the analysis of the smoothness parameters’ results in tables 5.1 to 5.4.  
In addition, panel B emphasizes the Probability of Informed Trading (PIN) over the 
sampled period.
139
 It increases throughout Phase I, with a peak in 2007, but decreases in 
Phase II. This coincides with a general trend of increased demand for futures contracts, 
as it can be seen in Figure 3.3. Banking (i.e., storage of allowances) between Phase I 
and Phase II was not allowed and investors started trading intensively in futures 
contracts (e.g., Daskalakis et al., 2009). This was a very volatile stage of the market and 
that appears to have been a fertile ground for informed activity (please refer to Figure 
3.5 and notice the sharp price changes after June 2006 in both markets).  
Moreover, panel C shows informed traders’ intraday activity, dividing the trading day 
into three periods: opening (i.e., the first trading hour), main period, and closing (i.e., 
the last trading hour). Informed traders appear to be more active, even marginally, in the 
opening and the closing periods. They are more active before the official closing of the 
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 Unlike previous studies, PIN here measures the proportion of informed trades. Trading intensity is able 
to identify whether a trade is informed or uninformed. The proportion of informed trades over a period of 
time could act as an expectation for the future market conditions concerning the level of informed trading. 
Therefore, PIN in this study is computed as the ratio of informed transactions over the total number of 
transactions over a period of time. 
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market.
140
 The difference seems to be more obvious in NP. This could probably be 
explained by the fact that NP closes earlier and that OTC EUA holders can enter the 
market directly. In addition, the standardized contracts allow traders to enter both 
markets, and traders that possess information might choose the appropriate 
environment, such as the more volatile session before the official closing, for their 
trades.  
Strategic versus Sequential Trading and Timing Advantage 
Furthermore, the STM-ACD model, and especially the interpretation of the hazard 
functions of durations, allows for the propositions of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and 
Kyle (1985), concerning whether informed traders act at once or strategically, to be 
tested. Panel A of Figure 5.2 shows the value of the coefficient gamma across trading 
intensity. This graphically presents the estimates of    from Tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4. 
When trading intensity is low       is always lower than one, when trading intensity 
is in a middle range       is higher than one, while when trading intensity is high 
      is consistently lower than 1. This indicates that informed trading, which is 
associated with a downward slopping hazard (i.e     ), is related to either high 
trading volume, which would be supportive of Glosten and Milgrom (1985), or high 
trading frequency, which would be supportive of strategic trading according to Kyle’s 
(1985) propositions. This finding does not provide a specific answer to whether 
informed traders act according to Kyle (1985) or according to Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985), but it confirms Easley and O’Hara (1992) who argue that informed trading is 
associated with increased trading activity. 
In addition, Table 5.6 reports the basic statistics of duration in the first four columns, of 
volume in the middle four columns and of trading intensity in the last four columns, in 
all markets and phases, focusing on each year separately. The statistics are dissected for 
Buyer (B) and Seller (O) initiated transactions across the three regimes, namely normal, 
fundamental and informed. Panel B of Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 draw from Table 5.6 
and present the relative change of volume and duration across regimes. More 
specifically, panel B of Figure 5.2 presents graphically the average transaction size 
across market and phases in each of the three regimes, while Figure 5.3 shows the 
average duration of Buys (B) and Sells (O) in all markets and phases. Both Figures 
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 This is really relevant to the Bid-Ask spread analysis presented in the following chapter, as it has a 
significant impact on implied spreads and price change volatility.  
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confirm the findings presented in panel A of Figure 5.2 and show that informed traders 
act either fast (e.g., Figure 5.3 shows that the average duration of informed transactions 
is shorter compared to the other two) or in large quantities (e.g., panel A of Figure 5.2 
shows that the average transaction size is higher in the informed regime).  
In contrast, trades in the normal regime are characterised by longer durations and low 
volumes. As trading intensity increases, traders appear to be more connected to 
information. In more detail, the large difference in durations between the normal and the 
other two regimes, explains partially the higher t-statistics of the first threshold value    
in Tables 5.1 to 5.4. Furthermore, the difference in volume between the normal and the 
other two regimes is not that large, excluding ECX II. This leads to a primary 
conclusion that the main difference of regimes is due to the large differences in the 
speed of trading (Figure 5.3). This is consistent with Kyle (1985).  
Moreover, panel C of Figure 5.2 presents the autocorrelation of order flow in each 
regime across markets and phases. The autocorrelation of Buyer and Seller initiated 
transactions is further examined. If it is higher in the informed regime, that would be an 
indication of strategic trading. The higher autocorrelation of order flow in the informed 
regime is supportive of Kyle (1985) because it indicates that many trades move towards 
the same direction, which might be part of strategic trading. Indeed, it is everywhere 
higher, apart from ECX II, which consistently appears to be structurally different. In 
addition, the fundamental regime once again appears to be very different from the other 
two regimes, which strengthens the validity of the estimation results, providing 
empirical evidence for the existence of three distinct regimes.  
Furthermore, Table 5.7, which complements Figure 5.2, examines further whether 
trades in the informed regime are strategic. The first horizontal section of Figure 5.7 
reports the proportion of identical trades, as they are compared to the previous 
transaction, in each regime across markets and phases. Identical trades, especially when 
the duration is short and the volume low, would indicate strategic behaviour in the form 
of segmented trades. The second section of the Table 5.7 presents the proportion of 
identical trades in each regime across markets and phases, as they are compared to the 
previous transaction of the same group. This section tries to capture cases, where there 
are other, probably uninformed, transactions between segmented trades. The final 
section reports the average duration of identical transactions and unique transactions in 
all markets and phases. 
Chapter 5                                Duration Modelling, Trading Intensity and Trade Type 
152 
 
A close inspection of Table 5.7 reveals that the proportion of identical trades, when 
compared with the previous transaction, is consistently higher in the informed regime. 
This practically means that 31.77 percent in ECX I, 19.51 percent in ECX II and 29.72 
percent in NP I of the transactions are identical to the previous one, which is a strong 
indication of strategic behaviour. In contrast, no identical transaction is found in NP I, 
which means that Kyle’s (1985) propositions cannot be confirmed. The same picture is 
confirmed when the current transaction is compared with the previous one from the 
same regime, but only in ECX I and NP II. ECX II, once again, appears to be different. 
Furthermore, the last section shows that the average duration of the identical 
transactions, compared to the previous trade, is consistently shorter in the informed 
regime. This is another sign of small segmented trades, and, thus, of strategic behaviour. 
Consequently, the above tables and graphs cannot provide a clear picture of the 
behaviour of informed traders. However, they appear to act strategically in ECX I and 
NP II, while in ECX II they seem to act at once, probably because their actions can be 
revealed more easily, which is consistent with the analysis of smoothness parameters in 
Tables 5.1 to 5.4. 
Another important observation can be made from the previous findings presented in 
Table 5.7 and panel A of Figure 5.2. It seems that there is a large proportion of trades 
with informational content that is not apparent in price, at least not contemporaneously. 
More specifically, panel A of Figure 5.2 shows that in ECX I almost 20 percent of the 
trades can be characterised as informed, while, according to Table 5.7, 30 percent of 
these trades is not characterised by a change in price. In Table 5.7, the proportion of 
identical transactions, compared with the previous one, of the informed regime is 30 
percent. This strengthens the belief that exogenous information can be revealed by other 
non-price-related variables of order flow, such as trading intensity, at least for some of 
this 30 percent of informed trades. Consistent with previous literature, such as the 
inventory and information models, trading intensity in the Carbon market appears to 
carry price-relevant, unresolved information that is expected to be incorporated 
favourably into prices.  
Informed Trading and OTC Transactions 
Furthermore, an issue already introduced is the relation between OTC transactions and 
informed trading. Panel A of Figure 5.4 presents the proportion of OTC in each regime, 
across markets and phases, and it shows clearly that the proportion of OTC transactions 
Chapter 5                                Duration Modelling, Trading Intensity and Trade Type 
153 
 
in the informed and the fundamental trading regimes is remarkably higher than in the 
normal regime, especially in ECX. In addition, panel B of Figure 5.4 shows that the 
average volume per transaction of OTC trades far exceeds that of non-OTC 
transactions. This is more pronounced in ECX II. This seems to be consistent with a 
previous comment, that in ECX II informed traders seem to act at once, hence the larger 
average volume. Panels A and B of Figure 5.4 seem also to confirm stylized facts 
reported in the literature on other markets concerning the informational content of OTC 
trades. OTC trades appear to be highly correlated with informed trading. In addition, 
looking at the estimation results in Tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 the t-statistics of the 
OTC-relevant coefficients in the informed regime are consistently higher than those of 
non-OTC transactions.  
Good and Bad News 
In addition, the formulation of the STM-ACD model allows for the discussion of the 
propositions of Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) and Easley and O’Hara (1992) 
concerning exogenous information and duration length. The first paper shows that 
longer durations are associated with bad news, while the second paper interprets longer 
durations as absence of new and price-related information. Considering that informed 
traders would buy (sell) upon the arrival of “good” (“bad”) news, consistently longer 
durations for Seller initiated transactions would provide supportive evidence of 
Diamond and Verrecchia’s (1987) propositions. In contrast, longer average durations in 
the normal regime, which is less related to information, would be consistent with the 
propositions of Easley and O’Hara (1992). 
Panels A, B, C and D of Figure 5.3 present the average duration in each regime, 
dissected into Buyer (B) and Seller (O) initiated trades, in ECX I, ECX II, NP I and NP 
II, respectively. They show first, that the average duration in the normal regime, for 
both Buys and Sells exceeds by far the average duration in the other two regimes in 
both markets and phases (e.g., in ECX I the average duration of Buys and Sells is 
582.82 and 419.14 in normal regime, 56.09 and 27.07 in fundamental regime and 20.66 
and 7.73 seconds in the informed regime, respectively). Following the initial 
assumption that the normal regime captures non-discretionary liquidity traders, and thus 
non-information-related trades, while the other two regimes are information related, 
these figures tend to confirm Easley and O’Hara’s (1992) proposition that no, or 
delayed, trades are related to lack of information. In addition, taking into account that 
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the normal regime accounts for more than 60 percent of total trading, as panel A of 
Figure 5.1 reports, the Carbon market could be described as a pool of uninformed, non-
discretionary, liquidity transactions with episodes of exogenous information, that 
triggers fast, information-related, trading.  
Focusing on the average duration of Buys and Sells, Figure 5.3 fails to provide 
supportive evidence of Diamond and Verrechia’s (1987) propositions. The average 
duration of the transactions in the informed regime is of particular importance, because 
it is an indication of how informed traders act upon the arrival of “good” or “bad” news. 
The average duration of Sells (O) is consistently shorter in all markets and phases. 
Especially in the informed regime, Buys and Sells are 20.66 and 7.73 in ECX I, 4.37 
and 2.48 in ECX II, 36.53 and 33.31 in NP II and 32.01 and 27.57 seconds in NP II, 
respectively. Contrary to Diamond and Verrechia (1987), longer durations are 
associated with “no” price-relevant information and not with “bad” news, since 
informed traders seem to react faster upon the arrival of bad news than upon the arrival 
of “good” news. However, the shorter duration of Sells might have another explanation. 
Panels A, B and C of Figure 5.5 show the number of Buyer (B) and Seller (O) initiated 
transactions over the years in both markets. In more detail, panels A and B report the 
absolute numbers of Buys and Sells in ECX and NP, respectively, while panel C reports 
their difference in both markets. All these graphs indicate that the Carbon market is 
predominantly a “Buyer” initiated market with an increasing demand over the years. 
This explains the shorter durations of Sells, since a Seller initiated transaction is more 
likely to find a Buy to match.  
Trade Informational Content 
The estimation results also shed light on the propositions of Pascual et al. (2004), who 
argue that trading frequency increases after a trade with high information content, and 
therefore, price discovery improves after such trades. Table 5.8 presents the average 
duration, volume and trading intensity before and after an informed trade (as identified 
by the STM-ACD). Trading intensity increases after an informed trade in both markets 
and phases (before and after; 1.4544 and 1.4861 in ECX I, 1.4232 and 1.4799 in ECX 
II, 1.5232 and 1.5754 in NP I and 1.7372 and 1.9819 in NP II). However, this increase 
is caused mainly by shorter durations (before and after; 0.6708 and 0.6613 in ECX I, 
0.7851 and 0.7678 in ECX II, 0.6441 and 0.6172 in NP I and 0.7995 and 0.7807 in NP 
II) and not by higher volume (11.8333 and 11.6745 in ECX I, 10.3196 and 10.079 in 
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ECX II, 10.3582 and 10.6613 in NP I and 10.8739 and 10.6502 in NP II). This is 
consistent with Pascual et al. (2004). It also strengthens previous findings too, since 
market participants, namely the fundamentals, who observe order flow, appear to be 
sensitive to information and, when an informed transaction arrives at the market, they 
tend to follow it. This results in increased trading frequency, which is higher than in 
normal regime (trading intensity in normal and fundamental regimes is 0.8426 and 
1.0333 in ECX I, 0.9301 and 1.1932 in ECX II, 0.8888 and 1.1835 in NP I and 0.8501 
and 1.1734 in NP II, respectively).  
5.3.4 Model Application on a Real Event 
The application of the model in identifying informed trading can be further tested, by 
examining a real event in the market. Figure 3.5 presents the daily prices and the 
aggregate volumes in both markets over the sample period. There are several sharp price 
changes that are worthy to be discussed, with the sharpest being near market inception 
(28 April 2006). At the time Spain announces lower emissions than allowances resulting 
in a sharp price drop. However, since there is a lack of data around this period, it does 
not receive any particular attention. Another sharp fall is observed after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers on 15 October 2008, with Carbon prices falling almost a month later. 
However, this is mostly related to investors’ beliefs and to insecurity caused by the 
unstable demand for industrial goods, and consequently for allowances. Another price 
fall occurs on 1 August 2008. Carbon prices follow the sharp downturn in commodities’ 
prices. This was a high volume and volatility environment, as confirmed by the highest 
unconditional volatility observed in intraday prices for all data sets employed, which 
might have created a fertile ground for informed trading. This period will be examined 
in order to test the explanatory power of the model, although it does not represent the 
more radical of graphical changes, for two reasons. First, the main source of the price 
change lies in related commodity markets and, second, there is unobstructed availability 
of data. 
Panels A and B of Figure 5.6 present the proportion of the different types of traders 
(normal, fundamental and informed) around the price event on 1 August 2008 with the 
focus lying on the time three days before and three days after the event. In both markets 
informed traders increase their transactions two (30 July 2008 in NP) or three (29 July 
2008 in ECX) days prior to the price drop. Their transactions account for around 13 
percent in ECX and 8 percent in NP of total trading. The next to follow are the 
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Fundamental traders, who start trading more intensively one day after (30 July 2008 in 
ECX and 31 July 2008 in NP) the increased presence of informed traders. Their 
presence accounts now for around 14 percent in ECX and 6 percent in NP of total 
trading. According to the assumptions of STM-ACD, this happens because they observe 
and respond to market signals with a lag. In this example their lag seems to be nearly 
one or two days. In contrast, normal traders’ market share decreases to around 77 
percent in ECX and 92 percent in NP. The presence of informed traders reaches its 
maximum, 14 percent, on 31 July 2008 in ECX and around 11 percent on 1
 
August 2008 
in NP. It is, once again, followed by fundamental traders, who reach their maximum, 16 
percent, in ECX on 1 August. Normal traders’ presence decreases to a minimum of 72 
percent in ECX and 88 percent in NP. They are the last to react and probably do so 
because of the general market movement.  
In order to further examine the actions of informed traders, it would be useful to look at 
the direction of their trades, Buys (B) or Sells (O). Panels A and B of Figure 5.7 show 
the difference in Buyer/Seller initiated transactions three days before and three days 
after 1 August 2008. Both figures, in ECX and in Nord Pool, indicate that informed 
traders, not only increase their trading, but, unlike all other market participants, also 
start selling contracts before everyone else. The other two market participants do follow, 
but with a lag. The difference of Buys minus Sells is still positive for normal traders but 
it is continuously decreasing. In contrast, on 1 August 2008 fundamental traders follow 
the informed ones and sell more than they buy. Their actions follow informed traders’ 
and their lag seems to be one or two days long.  
However, what seems strange is that immediately after the price drop informed traders 
start buying again and the other two groups follow, although not with a rush. This can 
be further explained by examining panels A and B of Figure 5.8. These figures show the 
aggregated volumes of Buys and Sells, along with the average duration, of each one of 
the three regimes, dissected into Buys and Sells, three days before and three days after 1 
August 2008. Here, informed traders clearly start selling more before the event and they 
clearly start buying immediately after it. Fundamental traders follow with a two-day lag, 
at least concerning total volume. In contrast, uninformed traders in the normal regime 
continue buying, but the total volume of Sells fluctuates according to price (e.g., they 
sell more after the sharp price drop) and act contrary to informed traders (i.e., buy more 
when informed sell more). Supposing that informed traders possess price-relevant 
information, they seem to use it accordingly. On 30 July they increase their selling. In 
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contrast, the associated volume of Buys of normal trades increases as well. This means 
that the uninformed buy from the informed traders. Exactly the opposite occurs on 1 
August. The increased demand of informed traders is met by the increased selling 
initiated by fundamental and uninformed traders. This is a strong indication, at least in 
this case, that STM-ACD indeed captures informed traders, who exploit their 
information to their benefit.  
5.3.5 Fitting and Forecasting 
Finally, it would be interesting to examine whether the modelling framework adopted in 
the analysis of this chapter improves the fitting and forecasting of duration. Panel B of 
figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 show that the T-ACD models outrun their counterparts in 
terms of fitting. In addition, when OTC trades are taken into account, fitting seems to be 
improved even further and thus the higher ranking. Along the same lines, Tables 4.8, 
4.9 and 4.10 confirm the previous findings about fitting. In particular, T-ACD models, 
with or without OTC transactions, provide far better “in-sample” forecasts and always 
obtain first place rankings. The STM-ACD comes second best, and has a better fit than 
its linear counterparts with a sole distribution. T-ACD also provides superior out-of-
sample forecasts, indicating the presence of the non-linear effects emphasized in the 
previous chapter. Moreover, OTC transactions appear to be more relevant to Nord Pool, 
especially in Phase II. Overall, trading intensity appears to be particularly relevant in the 
Carbon market and its analysis significantly improves the accuracy of duration models. 
5.4 Summary 
The analysis of the chapter proposes trading intensity as a measure of information 
revelation in the market of Carbon Allowances. A Smooth Transition ACD model with 
a mixture of distributions is used to identify different regimes of duration characterised 
by different trading intensity. This is conjectured to identify different trading behaviour 
of market participants. The results make a strong case that private information is indeed 
revealed in the rate of order flow as measured by trading intensity. Informed traders 
seem to act first and, at least in some cases, prior to price event occurrence. This is 
evidence supporting Glosten and Milgrom’s (1985) propositions about the intense 
activity of informed traders. Informed trading behaviour, however, seems to be followed 
by similar, but slightly delayed and less intense behaviour of some other traders, 
identified as fundamental traders. Their delayed order flow prolongs the effect, or 
revelation, of the information that the order flow of the informed has started, increasing 
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trading frequency. These fundamental traders act as ‘informed’ to the un-informed, who 
are the third much larger group of traders/trades present in the market, while both seem 
to follow a learning process. This is consistent with the social learning literature, where 
traders exhibit different learning speeds. The order flow of this third group is 
characterised by high duration and lower trading intensity. The behaviour of the 
“fundamental” traders gives credence to Kyle’s (1985) gradual activity of traders. 
Accordingly, the results support Back and Baruch (2004) in that there is a time 
dimension and that different traders trade at different rates. 
Amongst OTC transactions there is a higher proportion of informed and fundamental 
traders. This is evidence supporting the stylized fact in many other markets that 
informed trades tend to emanate over the counter. This obviously points to the informed 
traders to trade off the main trading mechanism of the market perhaps due to reasons 
related to price or trade anonymity or greater depth, lower costs and liquidity. It also 
points to the fact that the OTC market seems to take the lead in private information 
revelation through order flow. This piece of information seems to be extremely relevant 
to duration modelling, since it significantly improves fitting and forecasting. 
The Carbon market is a Buyer market where a higher proportion of trades are, on 
average, Buyer, rather than Seller, initiated. Duration of Buyer initiated transactions is 
longer than that of Seller initiated transactions. This opposes Diamond and Verrechia’s 
(1987) proposition that longer durations are associated with bad news.  In contrast, 
uninformed trades seem to be related with longer durations, which, accordingly, are 
more likely to be associated with no news, instead of bad news.  
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6. Trading Intensity and Intraday Price Discovery 
6.1 Introduction 
Empirical market microstructure literature recognizes information and liquidity as the 
driving forces of intraday price formation. O’Hara (1995) conjectures that, on an 
intraday level, the market’s equilibrium is determined by the trading strategies of the 
market participants, according to their access to relevant information and their liquidity 
desires. A market is viewed as a mechanism of information aggregation, in which 
investors’ beliefs about the fundamental value of the underlying asset move prices 
accordingly. Therefore, information is generally considered to have a permanent impact 
on prices. However, markets also act as a matching mechanism for instantaneous 
demand and supply at every particular point in time. Liquidity considerations might 
force the price to temporarily deviate from its “fair” value. Therefore, liquidity is 
mainly associated with transitory price effects.  
Both information and liquidity are particularly important for the presence of market 
specialists, especially in a relatively illiquid environment such as the Carbon market 
(see, inter alia, Benz and Hengelbrock, 2008) where dealers have been introduced to 
support liquidity. Access to information and marginal levels of liquidity determine 
dealers’ risks and consequently investors’ costs mainly in the form of the Bid-Ask 
spread. Unlike Stigler (1967), who sees trading costs as a sign of market 
“imperfection”, Demsetz (1968) raises the importance of spreads as a natural outcome 
of trading activity. Market makers provide a constant demand and supply in the market 
and they need to be rewarded for bearing the risks and the costs of immediate execution 
of trading. This is the price of “immediacy”, which implicitly connects costs with 
trading activity. Therefore, apart from explicit trading costs, such as market charges, the 
time dimension and the size of a transaction are seen for the first time as inextricable 
determinants of quoted prices and, consequently, of costs. Therefore, trading costs can 
no longer be ignored or be seen as mere market frictions since they are directly related 
to trading activity.  
Along the same lines, Bagehot (1971) emphasizes that, even without explicit costs, or 
even trading costs, Bid-Ask spreads should still exist. He emphasizes the time 
dimension of information. At any given point in time, market participants do not all 
possess the same level of information, and their learning rates might differ. 
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Consequently, dealers need a compensation for offering liquidity in the presence of 
better informed traders. Naturally, these two fundamental market forces, information 
and liquidity, are seen in a substantial proportion of the theoretical and empirical 
literature as the main determinants of the spread. 
Previous studies of the Bid-Ask spread have identified three main components.
141
 The 
first, already mentioned in Demsetz (1971), is associated with per transaction execution 
costs, and is called the order-processing cost.
142
 This cost is largely fixed and therefore 
should fall, at least per unit, with trading volume (see, inter alia, Huang and Stoll, 1997; 
Ahn et al., 2002). However, diversified market making in a portfolio of assets could 
amortize more efficiently this cost and this relation may weaken.
143
 In addition in a 
highly competitive market Bid-Ask spreads should equal the expected marginal cost of 
providing liquidity, in which case the order-processing cost may be irrelevant (see, inter 
alia, Bollen et al., 2004). 
The second component identified in the literature is the inventory-holding cost.
144
 A 
distinct class of models, “Inventory models”, originated by Tinic (1972), Tinic and 
West (1972) and Benston and Hagerman (1974), recognizes that market specialists face 
a complex balancing problem between inventories and incoming order flow. Dealers use 
the price to balance supply and demand trying to accommodate two types of risk. The 
first is related to their inventory position, in the form of excessive carrying cost or lost 
sales. High inventories might result in excessive carrying costs, especially overnight, 
while low inventories, might be insufficient in supporting sharp changes in incoming 
order flow. The second is related to the “fundamental” price change, in the sense that 
sharp price changes might change the value of their portfolios. Since inventories operate 
as a buffer to market activity, these models postulate that the main determinant of price 
changes, apart from a random walk component associated with information, is order 
flow deviations. These deviations are, by assumption, unrelated to the future value of 
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 For an extensive analysis refer to O’Hara (1995), Madhavan (2000), Hasbrouck (2007) and Stoll 
(2003). 
142
 It includes items such as the exchange seat, floor space rent, computer costs, informational service 
costs, labour costs and opportunity costs for the market maker’s time (Stoll, 1978). The majority of 
empirical microstructure models incorporate this cost component as a constant. This coefficient captures a 
constant fee that is charged by market makers as a compensation for supplying liquidity and it represents 
their efficient operations, their competitive advantage and their market power (Garman, 1976).  
143
 More liquid assets could bear a higher proportion of these costs, since they can reach the breakeven 
point faster. This being analogous to liquidity, amortization still allows for the development of economies 
of scale, but their effect should be limited, according to the relative weighting. 
144
 Some researchers (George et al., 1991; Hanousek and Podpiera, 2004) reject inventory-holding as a 
spread component arguing that this component exists only in the extreme situation of a general trading 
pressure. 
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the asset, and their price impact is temporary (e.g., Hasbrouck, 1988, 1991a, 1991b). 
They distinguish the informational, or permanent, from the liquidity, or transitory, effect 
of a trade. Therefore, inventory positions affect the quoted spread on the short-term.  
Several studies provide different explanations for the price and spread impact of 
inventory positions. Garman (1976), in a rather simplistic approach, emphasizes the 
“viability” of dealer’s positions. Prices are set to avoid market “failure”. Amihud and 
Mendelson (1980), extending Garman’s model, assume that there is an optimal, or 
preferred, inventory position. Dealers set their prices in order to maintain or return to 
this position and therefore they are seen as trying to maximize their profit.
145
 Stoll 
(1978) and Ho and Stoll (1981, 1983) relax the implicit assumption of a risk-neutral 
market maker in the previous model, where the “market power” is the main determinant 
of the spread, and see the dealer as a market participant trying to maximize the utility of 
his/her portfolio. In this case, the cost of immediacy is identified as order-processing 
costs, liquidity considerations and adverse-selection; this last cost component was 
developed in another class of models that will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Therefore, the main determinant of the spread is the risk aversion of the dealer about 
two types of risk, the uncertainty in returns and the uncertainty in the incoming order 
flow, in terms of size and direction.  
Furthermore, O’Hara and Oldfield (1986) examine the dynamic pricing of a risk-averse 
market maker in a competitive environment, where dealers can interact with each other 
and other market participants who can submit limit orders on only one side of the 
spread. Consequently, the size of the spread is connected with the type of order (i.e., 
market or limit order) and the “gravitational pull” (i.e., tendency to submit orders of 
similar sign and type). Some studies reject the inventory-holding component, arguing 
that this component exists only in the extreme situation of a general trading pressure, 
such as extreme liquidity or price volatility conditions. 
There are four important points that have been emphasized by inventory models and are 
relevant to this study. First, these models emphasize the temporary effect of liquidity 
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 In Garman’s (1976) model, dealers cannot borrow money and market failure occurs because they run 
out of cash or inventory. Therefore, they set their prices in order to manage that risk. However, the basic 
assumption that they set their prices once and that they cannot borrow money are rather restrictive. On the 
contrary, in Amihud and Mendelson’s  (1980) model, dealers have an optimal inventory position and 
adjust prices (i.e., decrease (increase) both Bid and Ask for long (short) positions) in order to maximize 
profit, instead of minimizing risk. Madhavan and Smidt (1993) and Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) 
provide further empirical evidence on optimal inventory levels. Therefore, even when dealers are at the 
optimal inventory level, they still quote different Ask and Bid prices, and this spread is the cost for 
departing from their desired level.  
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and risk aversion on prices and spreads.
146
 At this early stage of the literature, liquidity 
is measured by the size of inventory positions or by changes in these positions due to 
transactions.
147
 Risk aversion, introduced by Stoll (1978) and Ho and Stoll (1981, 1983) 
appears to have an unambiguous effect on the Bid-Ask spread and several measures of 
risk have been proposed in the literature to account for the price impact of various 
sources of risk. Among them, Demsetz (1968) uses transaction rate, while many studies 
use return volatility (e.g., Tinic, 1972; Stoll, 1978b; Harris, 1994).
148
 Bollen et al. 
(2004) show a positive relation between volatility and inventory-holding cost. Second, 
Stoll (1978) shows the importance of trading volume. He also shows that implied spread 
exhibits a U-shaped curve over order size. The practical implication is that there is an 
optimal level for transaction size that minimizes costs. Third, order type affects dealers’ 
decisions about setting risk-averse prices (e.g., O’Hara and Oldfield, 1986). This is 
plausible since limit orders can be seen as market making in one side of the spread and 
hence the dealers’ inventories and investors’ portfolios interact in price formation. 
Fourth, as inventory models become more complex by, for example, including more 
factors about uncertainty in dealers’ balancing problem, the importance of time becomes 
obvious. The last three comments about transaction size, time and type of order are of 
particular relevance to this analysis. 
The third component of the Bid-Ask spread is the adverse-selection cost. Bagehot 
(1971) introduces the revolutionary idea that even without explicit or inventory trading 
costs, spreads would still exist as a natural outcome of the trading process, since Bid 
and Ask market equilibrium prices would be different due to asymmetric information. 
He considers dealers as market participants who, sometimes, transact with better 
informed traders. In this case they lose money, but they can compensate by dealing with 
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 Especially risk aversion has gained considerable attention and in some studies it is considered as a 
separate cost component (e.g., Bollen, 2004). However, risk aversion cannot be measured directly. It is 
usually captured by a premium charged on top of a risk free rate that accounts for risk free market 
conditions, or perfect monopoly. In this study, risk aversion is measured as the dealers’ sensitivity 
towards their expectations about risk, and how long are they expected to be exposed to it. Risk is 
measured in relation to information, price volatility and liquidity. 
147
 Madhavan (2000) mentions that in a dealer market where all transactions are operated by dealers the 
change in inventory positions is simply the opposite of the signed volume. However, in a hybrid or a pure 
limit order market, where market participants are allowed to transact with each other without the 
intermediation of a market specialist, the change in inventories can no longer be measured by signed 
volume. This does not necessarily mean that limit orders do not contribute to spread formulation. Limit 
orders can be seen as market making on one side of the spread. They could also be part of a strategy 
referring to a portfolio of assets, similar to the inventory of a dealer. Although more recent models do not 
explicitly model inventory costs, they account for liquidity considerations and the transitory price impact 
of a trade, mainly distinguishing between the permanent and the transitory price impact of time, volume 
and order flow variations. 
148
 Other measures of risk include the idiosyncratic risk of the asset (see Benston and Hagerman, 1974) 
and the average standardized price difference (see Tinic and West, 1972). 
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uninformed liquidity traders. Therefore, spreads account for these dealers’ risk aversion 
towards adverse-selection risk. In addition, since the associated information refers to the 
future value of the asset, price changes due to adverse-selection tend to be permanent. 
These ideas have been extensively developed by a new class of models that are 
generally referred to as “information” models. A key aspect of the empirical analysis 
presented in this chapter is the informational content of trades, and whether these trades 
can be used to identify the presence of informed traders.
149
   
Information models can be divided into two broad categories according to what types of 
market participant (“players”), are recognized and how they interact (“game”). A 
common key aspect to both groups is the division of traders according to the level of 
information they possess and their learning process. This is defined as the degree of 
their “naivety”. First, the sequential trade models, originating in Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985) and extended by Easley and O’Hara (1987, 1992) and Easley et al. (1997, 2002), 
recognize two types of traders, informed and uninformed, liquidity traders. Dealers’ 
spreads include a component as a compensation for transacting with informed traders. 
These models emphasize the permanent informational content of trades. Similar to 
inventory models, the size and the time of a transaction convey information. This 
information can potentially reveal the type of a trader.
150
 Informed traders are assumed 
to act at once exploiting, as much as they can, their informational advantage. Therefore, 
the expected size of a transaction and the probability of the transaction to be informed 
determine the convergence to fully informative price and the spread.
151
 More recently 
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 Trading process is seen as a “game” that involves informed traders. The early market microstructure 
literature, involving theoretical inventory and information models, draws from the “Rational Expectations 
Equilibrium” (REE) and “Game Theory” literature and tries to explain the trading process and the 
intraday price formation theoretically. Early studies examine issues like the speed of information 
dissemination, information aggregation, learning and herding, as well as inventory positions, time, order 
size and order type. Some models, such as Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom, (1985), have been very 
influential and have been empirically confirmed from many aspects. However, since they depend heavily 
on game theory, they all have a major drawback. In order to make safe conclusions, the “game” (e.g., 
market type, market participants and order type) must be known. Otherwise, some drastic assumptions 
must be made. The focus of the present analysis, though, emphasizes the empirical aspects of market 
microstructure and therefore the use of the REE and game theory references will be limited to the most 
influential papers. For two excessive and excellent reviews of this literature please refer to Burrnnermeier 
(2001) and Vives (2008). 
150
 The majority of these models use transaction and not limit order data. The market is assumed to be a 
dealer market and the equilibrium price is determined by the order flow. However, more recent studies, 
deviate from this setting and empirically examine hybrid markets, such as NYSE. In addition, they allow 
other variables to determine market equilibriums. 
151
 A key aspect of these models is the incoming order flow, which is assumed to follow a Poisson 
process. Dealers try to anticipate whether the incoming trades are informed and they formulate the 
Probability of Informed Trading (PIN). A key element of PIN is the expected volume which might be 
either large or small. Although PIN calculation does not originate in sequential models, it has been used 
as a model assumption and not as a model prediction. Therefore, they have been developed 
simultaneously. 
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Easley et al. (2008) introduce the idea that expected duration is an integral part of PIN. 
The arrival time of transactions or orders can reveal price-relevant information and can 
provide an indication of the presence of information. Consequently, the information 
level of trades can be measured by the expected arrival time.
152
  
Although sequential models might be sufficient in explaining after-shock informative 
prices, their main drawback is that they see the transactions as a sequence of distinct 
events and they do not allow for development of informed strategies. Full information 
convergence is assumed to happen immediately after the event. This gave the incentive 
to the second category of information models; the strategic models, originated by Kyle 
(1985) and developed by Kyle (1989), Foster and Viswanathan (1993), Holden and 
Subrahmayam (1992) and Back (1992), to allow for progressive information resolution. 
These early strategic models similarly recognize two types of traders, informed and 
uninformed, but informed traders can strategically cover their advantage and thereby 
exploit it further.
153
 However, uninformed traders are still considered naive. In contrast, 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), as well as Foster and Viswanathan (1990) and Spiegel 
and Subrahmayam (1992), distinguish the uninformed traders as either “discretionary” 
or “non-discretionary” liquidity traders. This way, they recognise that there is a part of 
uninformed traders that tries to extract information from past trading they learn from it 
and they choose the time and size of their trading accordingly.
154
  
The present analysis draws the following points from information models. First, a 
common feature of sequential and strategic models is that they distinguish between 
types of trades, and consequently types of traders, recognizing that the price impact of 
their transactions might differ. Second, they see past trades as indicative of the type of 
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 In the present analysis, following the findings in the previous chapter, the information role of 
transaction size is also examined. This provides the framework for a further analysis of PIN. Employing 
the same methodology, the expected trading intensity can be forecasted, which is expected to have an 
impact on PIN. This could further enrich the analysis, by allowing other economically relevant variables 
to have an indirect price impact. 
153
 In the original model Kyle assumes one event, one auction and one informed trader. This allows for a 
fully developed strategy. However, when there are competitors, such as other informed traders, or a 
continuous trading scheme, Kyle’s equilibrium can no longer be considered valid. Subsequent studies 
extend Kyle’s framework assuming either multiple informed traders (Foster and Viswanathan, 1993; 
Holden and Subrahmayam, 1992) or continuous auction (Baruck, 1992). 
154
 Further studies examine the learning process of traders, known in the REE literature as “herding”. 
Static Bayesian approaches like Kyle (1989), Veronesi (2000) and Chamley (2007) postulate that when 
information is costly to acquire there is no possible full equilibrium informative price. Banerjee (1992), 
Bikhchandani et al. (1992)  and Chamley (2004) criticize the Bayesian learning and propose the social 
learning methodology, where fully rational market participants might “herd” towards the wrong direction, 
following other traders, disregarding existing valuable information. This partially explains financial 
market crashes, since market failure could be a natural outcome of excessive “wrong herding”. In parallel, 
Jun and Vives (2004) and Vives (2008) examine further the speed of learning, emphasizing on different 
types of traders and different types of information.. 
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traders, in a way that allows discretionary uninformed traders to learn by observing past 
order flow. This means that informative trades can be revealed by their characteristics 
such as transaction size and time of occurrence. Third, information models attribute a 
double role to past transactions. According to inventory models, they act as indicators of 
past and future liquidity and therefore they are expected to have only a transitory price 
impact. In information models, however, they are considered to convey information, 
which affects prices in the long-term. Finally, according to sequential models, dealers, 
who can be seen as risk-averse uninformed traders wanting to learn, observe past order 
flow and they form expectations in order to quote regret free prices.  
However, the major disadvantage of inventory and information models is their 
resilience to game theory. The equilibrium existence depends heavily on the knowledge 
or assumption, of the game played, such as market structure and market participants. 
Therefore, unlike these theoretical approaches, empirical market microstructure models 
have been developed in parallel. An excellent starting point is the seminal study of Roll 
(1984). He introduces a model, where half spreads can be estimated, assuming 
martingale behaviour of covariance stationary prices, known as the “covariance” model. 
Transaction prices are assumed to equal a random walk component, associated with 
information, and a cost component. This model recognizes only order-processing cost, 
but it is revolutionary, in the sense that it allows spreads to be estimated using only 
transaction prices and not using order submissions. Choi et al. (1988), Stoll (1989) and 
George et al. (1991) extend Roll’s (1984) model to include all three components. 
Furthermore, after a transformation of the random walk component, Roll’s model can 
be written as a VAR process. This approach has been followed by Hasbrouck (1991a, 
1991b, 1996) and Dufour and Engle (2000b), among others. Another extension of Roll’s 
model, proposed by Glosten and Harris (1998), introduces another source of uncertainty 
in the information component - the trade direction, recognizing the informational 
content of a trade. Further, “trade indicator” models have been developed by De Jong et 
al. (1996), Madhavan et al. (1997) and Huang and Stoll (1997).  
Several empirical aspects have emerged, alongside these models. One of the most 
important is the effect of trading intensity on prices and spreads. Two measures of 
trading intensity have been intensively examined, raising both informational and 
liquidity considerations, associated with past transactions. The first is the transaction 
size. De Jong et al. (1995) show that trading spreads are a decreasing function of 
volume. In a similar way, Huang and Stoll (1997) and Ahn et al. (2002) report that 
Chapter 6 Trading Intensity and Intraday Price Discovery 
167 
 
order-processing costs decrease with volume. Slightly variant is the study of Stoll 
(1978), who argues that the relation between transaction costs and volume follows a U-
shaped curve. In addition, other studies like Easley and O’Hara (1987), Hausman et al. 
(1992) and Easley et al. (1997) connect transaction size with information and the type of 
traders. Along the same lines, Easley and O’Hara (1992) argue that larger volumes are 
associated with increased presence of information. Furthermore, Chan and Lakonishok 
(1995) show that after large block trades the permanent, informational price impact is 
higher. More recently, Angelidis and Benos (2009), extending Madhavan et al.’s (1997) 
model, re-examine the informational and liquidity impact of transaction size. They 
report that the information cost component increases with transaction size, while the 
order-processing and inventory components decrease due to economies of scale. 
The next determinant of liquidity refers to time. Even since Glosten and Mirlgrom 
(1985), Kyle (1985) there is an underlying assumption of the significance of time.
155
 
However, time itself has not been explicitly incorporated into the microstructure 
literature until Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) and Easley and O’Hara (1992).156 From 
that point time has been used to proxy liquidity or the intensity of trading (see, inter 
alia, Jasiak and Ghysels, 1998; Engle and Russel, 1997, 1998; Engle, 2000; Renault and 
Werker, 2002; Manganelli, 2005; Spierdijk, 2004). Furthermore, Engle and Russell 
(1998), emphasizing the fact that time is irregularly spaced, propose the Autoregressive 
Duration Model (ACD). Several studies employ standardized durations to account for 
time variant effects on prices and spreads.
157
 Dufour and Engle (2000b), employing a 
VAR model, examine extensively the role of time on price formation and report that 
higher trading frequency (they refer to it as higher trading intensity) results in less 
informative prices, due to increased levels of informed traders (Easley and O’Hara, 
1992), and therefore in decreased liquidity.
158
 Recently Grammig et al. (2007), trying to 
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 Back and Baruch (2004), show that Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) can meet under 
specific time assumptions. In more details, in a continuous time context, the sequential framework meets 
the auction setting, with information being resolved in different speeds. 
156
 Diamond and Verrechia (1987), in a sequential framework, conjecture that on good news informed 
traders will always buy more, while upon the arrival of bad news, especially when short selling is not 
allowed, they cannot short sell. Therefore, long durations are associated with bad news. On the contrary, 
Easley and O’Hara (1992) maintain that informed traders will always transact upon the arrival of 
information. Therefore, longer durations are associated with the absence of new price-relevant 
information. 
157
 ACD models model time employing the ratio of actual over expected duration. The so-called 
standardized durations have been employed by several studies (e.g., Grammig et al., 2007; Ben Sita, 
2010) to account for time deformation. 
158
 This is on opposition to Kyle (1989), who argues that prices are less informative in cases of decreased 
competition, because informed traders cannot trade intensively. Easley and O’Hara (1992) postulate that 
increased market activity, which, consequently, indicates a more competitive market environment, is an 
indication of informed traders. According to Kyle (1989) this is when prices should be more informative. 
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provide a connecting link between the structural model of Madhavan et al. (1997) and 
the VAR approach of Dufour and Engle (2000b), oppose Easley and O’Hara (1992) by 
arguing that “no trade means no information”. They connect time with trading strategies 
of uninformed traders and not with information processing as in Dufour and Engle 
(2000b). They also argue that trades after inactive stages of the market are more 
informative and therefore they have a larger price impact. More recently, Ben Sita 
(2010) attributes a dual, informational-permanent and liquidity-transitory, context, 
similar to Angelidis and Benos (2009), to time and raises the importance of time in the 
transitory component of the spread. 
Two other very important issues, related to trading practice, have been discussed 
extensively in the literature. First, as Limit Order Markets (LOMs) have been 
developed, many studies discuss the informational efficiency of these markets (e.g., 
Brown and Zhang, 1997), the relation between type of orders and traders or spreads 
(e.g., O’Hara and Oldfield, 1986; Chakravaty and Holden, 1995) or more importantly 
the trader’s choice concerning the type of trades (see, inter alia, Cohen et al., 1981; 
Angel, 1994; Kumar and Seppi, 1994; Harris and Hasbrouck, 1996; Harris, 1998; 
Parlour, 1998; Foucault, 1999; Goettler et al., 2005; Wald and Horrigan, 2005). More 
recently, Bouchaud et al. (2004, 2006) and Wyart et al. (2008) derive the lagged impact 
function from the Madhavan et al. (1997) model proposing that the main determinant of 
the spread is the adverse-selection component while the transitory component causes 
most of the volatility. Their derivation helps to determine the marginal profit of a limit 
or a market order. However, the majority of studies seems to agree with the fact that 
wider (narrower) spreads are associated with limit (market) orders. Second, several 
studies associate the direction of trade with its size and informational content. Aitken 
and Frino (1996) show that Buy orders are associated with larger transactions costs, 
mainly due to information reasons. Likewise, Hedvall et al. (1997) connect the 
transaction size with information and argue that there are more often information 
reasons behind large Buys than large Sells. 
Focusing on the Carbon market, the studies examining the intraday price formation and 
the composition of the Bid-Ask spread are limited. Benz and Hengelbrock (2008), 
estimating Madhavan et al.’s (1997) model, using data from the early stages of the 
market for EUA futures contracts on the two largest European exchanges, namely ECX 
and Nord Pool, report a large and significant adverse-selection component along with a 
small and rather insignificant order-processing component. They also observe a decline 
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in the estimated spreads over the years. In parallel, in an up-to-date study, Frino (2010) 
reports an increase in liquidity throughout the years and a dramatic increase of liquidity 
costs. Also, he reports that most transactions have a large information component and 
concludes that they must have been made by informed traders. Both emphasize the 
necessity of appropriate regulations in order for the information to be efficiently 
disseminated and to have operationally large spreads. More recently, Viswanathan 
(2010) confirms the importance of appropriate regulation and argues that the proposed 
legislation should serve the ultimate purpose of the market, which is Carbon Emissions 
management. For that purpose markets should be sufficiently liquid, but at the same 
time they should allow for market innovation. 
Considering the afore-mentioned issues, this chapter employs the empirical findings 
discussed in the previous two chapters. Market makers and limit order traders, who are 
seen as market makers in one side of the spread, are recognised to formulate 
expectations about the price impact of future transactions and they quote their prices 
accordingly. Using the STM-ACD model, they can forecast expected duration and they 
can attribute a probability of the next transaction to be informed. They can do that by 
forecasting the level of activity the market is expected to be in. This way they can 
determine how long are they expected to be exposed to information related risk, and 
what the price impact of the incoming trade is expected to be.  
A key aspect of this process is the dual pricing impact of trading intensity, which unlike 
previous studies is modelled simultaneously, by allowing expectations to affect the 
information and liquidity component of price change. This dual impact can be further 
interpreted as a natural measure of market sensitivity towards information and liquidity. 
These sensitivities are expected to vary over time and across different market 
participants. Consequently, their price impact is expected to depend on current market 
conditions. This could explain the conflicting results in the literature, concerning the 
price impact of transaction time and size. 
In more detail, a new dynamic expectations structural model for intraday price changes 
is proposed, extending the existing literature in the following ways. First, it deviates 
from a static approach of modelling intraday prices and Bid-Ask spread, in the sense 
that it allows price components to vary according to trading activity. The information 
and liquidity components are revised after trading intensity fluctuations. Second, price 
revisions depend on the, Bayesian, learning process of market participants, who 
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condition their quoted prices upon expectations about the price impact of future 
transactions. Consequently, price and spread components are modelled as continuous 
latent variables that depend on past trading history, public information and market 
participants’ learning ability. Third, the dynamic character of the model provides a 
framework to measure the information and liquidity pricing impact of a trade, in a way 
that the profitability of a market or limit order strategy can be maximized. These 
components are measurable and they are revised after every transaction. Investors can 
formulate expectations and then take an appropriate market position. Finally, this model 
investigates further the intraday price formation of Carbon allowances, recognising the 
pricing impact of market participants’ behaviour. This can have numerous implications 
to regulation and trading in EU ETS.  
In more detail, the present study extends Madhavan et al.’s (1997) model towards the 
directions of Grammig et al. (2007), Angelidis and Benos (2009) and Ben Sita (2010), 
proposing a new dynamic expectations structural model for intraday returns.
159
 The 
analytical focus is upon dealers’ behaviour in the Carbon market. According to the 
literature, dealers are recognized as uninformed market participants, who continuously 
observe order flow in order to extract information signals. They use these signals to 
formulate expectations for future transactions. The quoted spreads are considered to be 
regret free, depending on these expectations. A key element of this analysis is the 
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 The choice of this particular model seems to be the obvious choice for the empirical examination of 
the issues addressed. First, it is a structural model, which is more appropriate in order to study the data 
generation process of prices, under the analytical spectrum of how market participants act. The restriction, 
though, is that it is a one period model, since only the last transaction directly affects the price formation.  
However, since investors’ acts induce serial dependence on the price residuals, an agnostic VAR, with 
non-zero serial moments of order greater than two, would be mis-specified. Although VAR is a great 
analytical tool, especially when long memories, time impulse functions and forecasting are of interest, in 
a structural specification, disturbances should possess complicated and non-intuitive properties (Greene, 
2002). Second, compared to Huang and Stoll’s (1997) structural model, which shares a very strong 
resemblance, the MRR model appears to have gained considerable popularity. Huang and Stoll (1997) 
propose a “complete” model, in the sense that it includes covariance and trade indicator models as special 
cases and that it decomposes the spread into all three widely recognized components. However, several 
studies, like Bollen et al. (2004), Kumar (2004) and Angelidis and Benos (2009) criticize the large order-
processing component of the spread. Easley et al. (1996) are in line with Huang and Stoll, maintaining 
that information costs are likely to be low in a dealer-dominated market, since informed traders are less 
likely to trade with dealers. However, the studies of Benz and Hengelbrock (2008) and Frino (2010) 
report rather small and sometimes insignificant order-processing costs. In addition, Huang and Stoll’s 
(1997) model, derives the cost components indirectly after estimating half spread and covariances first. 
Therefore, MRR model seems to be more appropriate for this analysis, because although it sacrifices the 
generality of Huang and Stoll’s (1997) or the longer memory of the VAR models, it allows for a structural 
approach that estimates the various spread components in one step. In addition, Madhavan et al.’s (1997) 
model shares a very strong resemblance with Glosten and Harris’s (1988) (GH) model. However, in the 
GH model trade sign and size are considered to be exogenous to the trading process, and therefore strong 
distributional assumptions need to be made. On the contrary, with the MRR model and the extension 
proposed in the present analysis, trading intensity, in terms of both trade size and time, and trade sign are 
derived from the trading process. 
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intensity of trading and its ability to identify the presence of informed traders, which has 
been analyzed in the previous chapter. Trading intensity is employed to decompose the 
spread into its three, widely recognized components, as a continuously updated variable. 
Therefore, spread and its components can vary across transactions. This helps in 
identifying a unique spread for every transaction, or at least for every similar event, as it 
is defined by different levels of trading intensity. Trading intensity is also allowed to 
have an impact on both the adverse-selection and liquidity components. In addition, 
following the early literature of inventory models, the transitory, liquidity component is 
enhanced with two other risk aversion measures. This “fourth” component accounts for 
the expected number of informed traders and the expected price volatility, taking into 
account the time dealers are expecting to be exposed to these types of risk.  
The proposed model conjectures that trading intensity can explain various issues related 
to the trading process and the empirical findings support its adequacy. One of the main 
findings of this study is that the spread and spread components have indeed an intraday 
pattern, similar to the findings in Madhavan et al. (1997). According to the empirical 
analysis in this chapter, these intraday patterns can be attributed to trading intensity 
variations.
160
 Trading intensity seems to be positively related to the information 
component. In particular, when the next transaction is expected to be larger or faster, 
this can be interpreted as higher informational content, dealers appear to increase the 
spread, which is consistent with Dufour and Engle (2000b). In contrast, when trading 
intensity is taken into account, the order-processing cost appears to be considerably 
larger with a negative relation to trading intensity. A potential explanation for this is 
either the economies of scale, similar to Angelidis and Benos (2009), or the illiquid 
character of the market. Also, volatility seems to be the prevailing risk component 
increasing the spread (Bollen et al., 2004).
161
  
Another main finding is the confirmation of the positive relation between limit orders 
and spread width. However, it appears that a limit order strategy could be profitable 
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 Several studies have examined the intraday, seasonal patterns of either quoted or estimated spreads 
(see, inter alia, Kim and Ogden, 1996; Madhavan et al., 1997; Huand and Stoll, 1997; Brockman and 
Chung, 1998; Chan, 2000; Ahna et al., 2002; Gwilym and Thomas, 2002; Silva and Chavez, 2002; 
Pinder, 2003; Ke et al., 2004). The results have been conflicting and they seem to be relevant to 
microsturctural aspects of each market. The present analysis provides an insight into these variations, 
conjecturing that they might depend on variations in trading patterns that can be adequately summarized 
by trading intensity. 
161
 These findings confirm and explain various issues in the literature. First, the relation between volatility 
and spreads proposed by inventory models seems empirically reasonable. Second, the conflicting results 
about transaction size (Huang and Stoll, 1997; De Jong et al., 1995, 1996; Ahn et al., 2002) and time 
(Kyle, 1989; Engle, 2000) and their relation to spreads can be explained by the different attributes of 
trading intensity on the information and liquidity components. 
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only when trading intensity is low. Otherwise, the information component indicates that 
the midpoint deviation would be larger than the spread and thus a limit order should be 
preferable. Finally, Buys and especially the large ones are associated with a higher 
adverse-selection component and wider spreads.  
These findings are particularly relevant to various aspects of trading process in EU ETS. 
First, trading practices can be improved, since investors could measure the price impact 
of their trades, which might vary over time, more precisely. They can account for 
behavioural aspects of trading in real time and they can formulate trading strategies that 
take into account the actions of other investors. These actions can be included in the 
expectations’ equation and thus can be explicitly modelled. This provides a promising 
framework that connects the theoretical approach of “inventory” and “information” 
models with the empirical flexibility of “trade indicator” models and the forecasting 
ability of “VAR” models.  
Further, this practice can also be beneficial to investors that posses price unresolved 
information, since they can adjust their trading to current liquidity levels and sensitivity 
towards new information, and maximize their profits. These traders can measure the 
post-trade price impact of their actions and they can adjust their strategies accordingly 
in order to minimize their visibility and maximize their profit.  
Second, market making can be further improved, since this model can indicate when 
market orders can be profitable. Dealers can adjust spread width according to liquidity 
and information and they can become more efficient in managing both. This would 
result in narrower spreads and further contribute to market development and maturity.  
Finally, a better understanding of trading practices and their pricing impact can improve 
regulation and monitoring, and thus the market can be more efficient in achieving its 
goal, to reduce emissions. This model proposes a natural measure of market sensitivity 
towards information and liquidity, which are both highlighted in the Carbon market 
literature. Regulatory authorities can develop policies that can manage both and allow 
the market to find a balance between “market innovation” and liquidity. 
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes methodological issues, 
while the one following discusses the empirical findings. A brief summary is provided 
at the end of the chapter. 
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6.2 Methodology 
6.2.1 Madhavan et al. (1997) (MRR) Model 
Madhavan et al. (1997) propose a structural model of the quote and return generating 
mechanism in a hybrid market (NYSE), which henceforth will be referred to as the 
MRR model and in which there are two broad categories of trader; liquidity providers 
(i.e., dealers and investors that submit limit orders) and liquidity takers (i.e., investors 
that submit market orders).
162
 They postulate that liquidity providers, after extracting 
sufficient information from the market, quote regret free prices at which they are willing 
to trade. 
Let     denote the “true” value of a risky asset at some point in time  . This is the full 
information expected present value of the asset’s future cash flows, given the full 
information set   . This value can change over time due to variations in expectations 
(future cash flows or the discount rate) according to variations in public information. 
Furthermore, let              be the post-trade conditional expectation of    , with 
      being the available information set at time  .
163
 
They assume that the change in beliefs, concerning the fundamental value of the asset, 
depends on changes in the available information set   . Contrary to Roll (1984), they 
follow the example of Glosten and Harris (1998), who introduce the trade sign as 
another source of uncertainty in determining the available information sets. Trade sign 
is defined as: 
     
                                         
                                           
  (6.1) 
They postulate that price changes are associated first with new public information (  ), 
which is not associated with trading, and second with innovations in order flow. The 
                                                 
162
 They mention that, although they do not explicitly model the limit order book, they can still extract the 
spreads from transaction prices, by assuming that limit orders submissions are one side market making. 
This, given the different scale, seems to be fairly similar to the Carbon market, where dealers have been 
introduced to enhance liquidity in a limit order market. 
163
 Hasbrouck (2007) explains that, when data sets of high frequency are employed, the estimated mean 
return is small relative to the estimation error of its arithmetic mean. Therefore, it is a common practice in 
the microstructure literature to drop the mean return from the models, implicitly assuming that it is zero. 
Zero is a biased estimator mean return, but its estimation error is lower than that of the arithmetic mean. 
This makes   , which is the current “fair” value the best future estimator,               . Then the 
conditional expectation              is a martingale with respect to the available information set   .    
is unique for every market participant and limit order traders’ quoted prices depend on it. When    
consists of all available public information     then        and is called the “fundamental” value of the 
asset or, according to the asset pricing literature, the “efficient” price. 
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timing of the events is assumed to follow this order. After a transaction in    , the 
“post-trade efficient” price is     .
164
 Then, public information arrives as the realization 
of   . At the same time, dealers formulate their expectations about order flow and trade 
direction, given the previous transaction,           , assuming that Buys and Sells are 
equally likely (       ) and that    is autocorrelated of order one (             
               ).165 When the next transaction, in  , occurs, it is either Buyer or 
Seller initiated. The realization of   , if it is different from its expectation, measures the 
size of the innovation in order flow,                . The new efficient price will 
then be   . Therefore, the change in beliefs can be mathematically formulated as: 
                               (6.2) 
where     is the post-trade efficient price, incorporating all available, public (  ) and 
trading information up to time   and                 is the term that measures the 
size of the innovation in order flow. Informed traders expose their information through 
realized strategies. They buy (sell) when the asset is under-priced (over-priced). 
Therefore, a trade initiation, different from the expected, denotes information that 
dealers and other uninformed traders do not possess and which has yet to be 
incorporated into prices.     is a parameter that measures the responsiveness of price 
towards the innovations in order flow. Madhavan et al. (1997) argue that this is a natural 
measure of information asymmetry and therefore it accounts for the permanent, 
information price impact of trades. 
Moreover, given that dealers need to quote prices, at which they are willing to trade, 
prior to the event at  , and that they are risk averse, they need to incorporate the price 
impact of the next transaction at   into their quotes. Therefore they quote two prices: the 
price they are willing to buy at, the Bid price, and, another at which they are willing to 
sell, the Ask price. In this way, they ensure that they quote regret free prices according 
to all available information, namely public information and trading information derived 
from the last trade. Denoting the transaction price at time   by   , the Bid and Ask can 
be formulated as:  
                                                 
164
 Please note that the index t stands for a particular event, such as transaction, and not fixed calendar 
time. Hasbrouck (2007) argues that, when detailed data sets with precise time stamps are employed, it is 
more accurate to mark events by the time of their occurrence and not by calendar time. This allows for a 
deeper microstructure analysis. The problem that arises, though, in this case is the modelling of duration, 
defined as the irregularly spaced time between two consecutive events.  
165
 Madhavan et al. (1997) follow Glosten and Milgrom (1985), who argue that the revision in beliefs is 
directly proportional to the actual order flow, assuming that it is autocorrelated.  
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                             (6.3) 
   
                             (6.4) 
where     is a parameter that measures dealers’ per unit cost of processing the 
transaction and for supplying liquidity, which is assumed to be constant over time and 
for all levels of liquidity. Then, assuming that the transaction occurs either on the Ask 
or on the Bid, the transaction price can be written as: 
               (6.5) 
where    captures the rounding error, induced by price discreteness.
166
 Combining Eq. 
(6.2) with (6.5), the theoretical model is given by: 
                                     (6.6) 
However, since      is latent and            cannot be observed, some transformation 
needs to be applied in order for the model to be estimated. Madhavan et al. (1997) 
assume that order flow is first order autocorrelated. They denote by ρ the first order 
autocorrelation, which is given by   
            
          
. Consequently,              
    . In addition, they substitute      using Eq. (6.5) and this gives the testable 
equation: 
                                        (6.7) 
This model decomposes price changes into an information, and thus permanent, 
component, which is measured by   and is related to the informational content of order 
flow; a transitory component, which is measured by   and is attributed to trading 
frictions; and a noise component induced either by public information (  ) or price 
discreteness (  ). Further, after estimating the parameter vector          , they draw 
inferences about the implied spread (  
    
 ): 
                  (6.8) 
the effective spread (cost of a round trip): 
                                                 
166According to Hasbrouck (2007), Madhavan’s (1997) model and trade indicator models in general 
constitute a generalized form of Roll’s (1984) model. In covariance-based models, the efficient price is 
seen as a random walk, where here a trade related component is added. This general formulation is quite 
common in the empirical microstructure literature. In addition, in the Carbon market the minimum tick is 
 0.01. Therefore    and its variance,   
 , are expected to be relatively small. 
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                  (6.9) 
and the return variance:
167
 
            
     
 
   
                  
              
           
          
           
           
           
    
            
           
  
(6.10) 
Both, estimated, spread measures include a permanent and a transitory component, 
associated with information and liquidity, respectively. Variance is decomposed into a 
Public Information, a Price Discreetness, an Asymmetric Information, a Trading Cost 
and an Interaction between Asymmetric Information and Trading Cost component.  
6.2.2 A Dynamic Expectations Structural Model 
Foundations of the model 
Although the MRR model is a very simple and convenient way to estimate the 
informational and liquidity components of the spreads and has gained popularity, it still 
has some major drawbacks. First, it is “incomplete”, in the sense that it summarizes 
order-processing and liquidity cost components in one parameter. Second, as Grammig 
et al. (2007) postulate, although Madhavan et al. (1997) recognize the spread as a 
random variable and that   and   exhibit intraday patterns, their model does not allow 
for intraday variations. In order to overcome this problem in the MRR model, they 
estimate the model various times for different trading periods during the day. However, 
this violates the usual assumption of continuous trading, when UHF data is employed. 
Third, it only provides estimations of the spread for unit (transaction) size. Angelidis 
and Benos (2009) provide evidence that this approach is “restrictive”, at least in an 
emerging market such as the Athens Stock Exchange. They argue that the information 
component should be directly proportional to the traded volume, while the transitory 
component should include a liquidity related variable. They provide evidence that the 
information component increases with volume, which is consistent with Dufour and 
Engle (2000b), while the transitory component decreases as transaction size increases. 
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 The exact formulas for the implied and the effective spread can be derived by subtracting Eq. (6.4) 
from (6.3). On the contrary, for the variance Eq. (6.6) is used under the assumptions that order flow is 
autocorrelated of order one and that Buys and Sells are equally likely, while both innovations, due to 
public information and price discreteness, are serially uncorrelated. For more information and the exact 
specifications please refer to the original paper.  
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They attribute this variation to economies of scale. Fourth, Grammig et al. (2007) and 
Ben Sita (2010) argue that time plays an important role in price formation and should 
not be ignored. They both argue that duration conveys information and therefore should 
permanently revise prices, while at the same time it is an indication of liquidity that 
should have a transitory price impact.  
The present analysis extends the MRR model in various directions of effects that have 
been discussed in the literature but that have not been implemented in a dynamic 
structural context. The role of trading intensity is examined extensively. In accordance 
with the previous chapters, it is measured as transaction size per unit of time, 
summarizing the effects of transaction size and time. Following the previous chapter, its 
different regimes and their connections to different types of traders are of particular 
importance. Moreover, trading intensity is recognized as another price-relevant factor, 
along with the trade initiation variable, that dealers need to manage explicitly and 
formulate expectations for. According to the literature, trading intensity is allowed to 
have an impact on revisions in beliefs, which is permanent, as well as a transitory on the 
liquidity component. The source of this impact is assumed to be the formulation of 
expectations concerning future levels of trading intensity and more importantly the 
potential regime that it might be in. Consequently, every transaction affects the expected 
trading intensity and therefore the quoted prices and spreads. This way,   and   are 
modelled as functions of trade-related variables and revise their values after every trade. 
Therefore, contrary to the MRR model, a single estimation is sufficient for calculating 
the spread after every transaction or over different trading periods. In addition, dealers’ 
risk aversion is taken into account, and, together with trading intensity, is used to 
decompose spreads into all three recognized components. Finally, the dynamic character 
of the model indicates different regimes of trading intensity where different types  of 
order (namely market or limit) are preferred in terms of profitability. 
More precisely, price revisions are assumed to be driven by both a permanent and a 
transitory component. The permanent component is related to information and changes 
in expectations about the value of the asset. These changes are attributed partially to 
exogenous non-trading-related public information shocks, and partially to the trading 
process. The innovation in order flow is assumed to reveal private information that has 
not been incorporated into prices yet. In the model presented in this chapter this effect is 
variant, depending on transaction size and time of trade. It is allowed to vary according 
to what dealers expect concerning the future state of the market, in terms of liquidity, 
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informed trading and price volatility. The same variables are also allowed to have an 
impact on the transitory component, which represents the dealers’ cost for supplying 
liquidity. Consequently, after every trade, dealers revise their expectations about the 
“fair” value of the asset, this is the permanent price component, and the future liquidity, 
which is the transitory price component. This is reflected in their quoted prices. 
 The model 
Similar to the MRR model, the revision in beliefs concerning the post-trade efficient 
value of the asset depends on public information shocks and innovation in the trading 
process. The main source of uncertainty is the surprise in order flow. However, in this 
analysis the sensitivity of price to the size of the innovation is assumed not to be 
constant. The characteristics of the trade, as well as the contemporary state of the 
market, are assumed to be the driving forces of the sensitivity variations. The size of the 
transaction and the time of its occurrence are used as the characteristics of the 
transaction, while market conditions are summarized by the current level of volatility 
and the number of informed traders. 
Dealers, after observing the previous transaction at    , revise their beliefs about the 
fair value of the asset     . Then, they need to quote a Bid and an Ask price for the next 
transaction. They know, though, that the post-trade fair value of the asset will be 
affected by the next transaction. Therefore, in order to be able to set regret-free prices, 
they need to take into account any post-trade effects. However, they cannot be sure of 
the size of the next incoming trade, or of when it will happen, or of the 
contemporaneous level of volatility or private information. They can only speculate.
168
  
This is the basic assumption of the proposed model. Dealers still condition their quotes 
on the sign of the incoming trades, but this is assumed constant only for a pre-specified 
depth, in terms of liquidity, as it is summarized by transaction size and time. They are 
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 Previous studies, such as De Jong et al. (1995,1996), Huang and Stoll (1997) and Angelidis and Benos 
(2009), that have examined the price impact of trade size, have used the actual values (i.e., size of the 
limit order) of the variables and not the expectations (i.e., size of the incoming transaction). The main 
reason for the difference with this analysis is the market examined. They examine a pure Limit Order 
Market (LOM), where there are not designated market makers and the spread is determined by submitted 
limit orders, compared to a hybrid market such as the Carbon market. These models emphasize the 
midpoint of the best Bid and Ask prices and its intraday formation. In a LOM, the size and the time of the 
submission of the order are known, at least to the investor, and they can be used directly. On the contrary, 
in a hybrid market, emphasis is upon the transaction prices and the price setting of market makers. 
Although they can observe the submission of limit orders, which are assumed to be market making in one 
side of the spread, they cannot be sure of the size or the timing of an incoming market order. Therefore, 
they can only formulate speculations based on information currently available.   
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assumed to formulate expectations concerning the size of the next transaction, the time 
of its occurrence and the future levels of price and information uncertainty, in a 
continuous manner, updating themselves continuously. The results of the analysis in the 
previous chapter show that trading intensity carries information concerning informed 
trading. Associating this with trading intensity expectations, dealers can, indirectly, 
speculate about the probability of informed trading, which definitely has a price impact. 
More specifically, dealers formulate expectations concerning the future levels of the 
intensity of trading. Their expectations might lie in different regimes, which might 
indicate a different type, informed or uninformed, of incoming trade. Then, they quote 
their prices accordingly. Furthermore, trading intensity is assumed to play a dual role in 
intraday price formation. Apart from the informational part, it is a natural measure of 
the liquidity of the market. This concept is of great importance in the inventory models 
and it has been reported extensively in the literature as a main determinant of the 
transitory component of the spread. Consequently, in this study, different regimes of 
trading intensity are allowed to revise the formation of dealers’ transitory cost, as well 
as their beliefs. Finally, a potentially permanent and/or transitory, or both, effect of risk 
is also examined. 
Following the analysis in Chapter 5, let    
  
  
 denote trading intensity, where    is 
transaction size and    is raw duration.
169
 Then,            is the expected value of   at 
time   and      consists of all available information up to time    .    is modelled as 
a martingale process with respect to     . It is conjectured to be affected by random 
shocks (                                  ), its previous values (     
 
   ), 
previous returns (     
 
   ), previous trade directions (     
 
   ) and other stylized 
facts, such as whether the transaction is informed (     
 
   ) or OTC (     
 
   ).
170
 
   and    are dummies with the following values: 171 
    
            
          
     and     
                       
           
  (6.11) 
Then,            and can be formulated as:  
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 In order to simplify the estimation process, the diurnally adjusted trading intensity is used. This way 
no explicit modelling of seasonalities is needed. 
170
    is modelled as an Autoregressive process in order to account for time dependence, while other 
variables have been added to indirectly account for the price impact of previous trades. More specifically, 
an abnormal return or order initiation might trigger the trading process. On a similar fashion, when an 
OTC holder or an informed trader enters the market, the intensity of trading might change accordingly. 
171
    is the threshold value, unique for each data set, that distinguishes informed versus uninformed 
trades. The value is taken from the STM-ACD model of the previous chapter. 
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where                             , is a vector of parameters to be 
estimated.
 
For consistency with the foundations of the model we assume first order 
autocorrelation throughout. This is            . 172 
Furthermore, dealers are assumed to formulate expectations about the future level of 
risk. Two sources of risk are recognized, price volatility and presence of informed 
traders. Both are measured as moving averages of the last fifteen minutes.
173
 This is: 
where       
        is the expected price volatility, and             is the expected 
number of informed traders at time   given all information available at    . 
Given the above, the revision in post-trade beliefs could be formulated as in (6.2) but 
with time varying     : 
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 A basic assumption of the original model is that a return’s covariances of second order and higher are 
essentially zero. This indicates a short memory of order one. The analysis presented here, however, 
provides a basis for incorporating older information indirectly through formulating expectations, into 
price formation. 
173
 This assumption has been made for simplicity. Both expectations could be modelled as latent 
processes with other exogenous factors and public innovations determining the conditional mean, similar 
to trading intensity. However, that would require a quite complicated modelling of the covariances of the 
innovations, or a quite strong assumption that there is no inter-relation. Another approach could be the 
use of a Heterogenous Auto Regressive Realized Volatility (HAR-RV) (see, inter alia, Corsi et al., 2008; 
Chevallier and Sévi, 2010) framework for both risk measures. However, that would require the 
assumption that both are exogenously determined. Although it could be reasonable for informed trading, 
it would be a very strong assumption for price volatility. In contrast, the moving average framework is a 
relatively simply approach that does not require any exogeneity assumption.  
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where 
where                                               ,  ’s are parameters 
to be estimated,    is the expected duration given by an STM-ACD model and      is a 
variable that indicates the regime that the expected trading intensity is in at time t.
174
      
can be defined as: 
This formulation is similar to the MRR model, but    is now decomposed in trading 
intensity and risk effects. In particular, the coefficients     measure price 
responsiveness to innovations in order flow, linked to dealers’ expectations of trading 
intensity. According to Dufour and Engle (2000b), higher trading intensity leads to 
higher price revisions, due to higher informational content of trades. This is also 
consistent with the findings of the previous chapter, where higher trading intensity was 
found to be associated with informed trading. Consequently, when dealers expect higher 
trading intensity, they should expect higher price revisions for a given surprise in order 
flow. Therefore, the sum of   , which statistically is the long-term trend of price 
sensitivity, and   , which is the weighting of trading intensity, should be higher and 
more positive in the informed regime, compared to the other two regimes. In addition, 
besides the magnitude, the sign of the coefficient (    is important as well. A positive 
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 Unlike the risk measures employed, following Engle and Russell (1998) and Dufour and Engle 
(2000b) duration is assumed to be exogenous to price formation and even though this is a strong 
assumption it might find justification with data set employed. The market is relatively new and there is 
increasing trend on the number and size of transactions. In addition, the assets examined are Futures 
contracts and they are expected to exhibit seasonal patterns. These patterns are exogenous to pricing. In 
this study duration is assumed to be exogenous for simplicity reasons. However, the literature (e.g., 
Grammig and Wellner, 2002; Grammig et al., 2007) proposes simultaneous modelling of durations and 
returns, if there is strong evidence of endogeneity. 
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sign (expected) would indicate an increased price effect of larger or faster transactions 
and would be consistent with the propositions of Easley and O’Hara (1992) and Dufour 
and Engle (2000b).
175
 A negative sign would indicate that liquidity is more important 
than information, since price variations are larger when the market is less liquid.  
The last term, third, in Eq. (6.16) is a dual measure of risk. First, dealers are assumed to 
observe the market, update themselves continuously, and interpret information signals 
according to the analysis in the previous chapter. Therefore, they can identify past 
informed transactions, or otherwise the presence of informed traders in the market. This 
allows them to manage their pricing according to how risky they believe the market is 
due to the presence of these traders. In addition, expected price volatility is another 
important risk factor that dealers need to manage. Higher volatility means that price 
variations are large. A significant part of these variations should be explained by 
information asymmetry, and, therefore, the price impact of risk should not be ignored. 
Both risk factors, informed trading and price volatility, are multiplied with expected 
duration. This term captures how risky the market is expected to be and for how long 
dealers can expect to be exposed to these risk factors. The sum of    and   , and/or   , 
measures the responsiveness of prices to changing market conditions, as they are 
measured by risk and order flow innovations. Positive signs, which are expected, would 
indicate higher price variations for a given surprise in order flow. 
Along the same lines, the transitory price component   in Eq. (6.6) can also be 
decomposed to account for trading intensity and risk variations: 
where  ’s are parameters to be estimated. More specifically,    measures the long-term 
average cost component and the constant cost component (  ) in the MRR model. It is 
constant over time and market conditions and is close to the definition of order-
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 Easley and O’Hara (1992) maintain that increased volume has a larger price impact due to the 
increased presence of informed traders. On the same vein, Dufour and Engle (2000b) argue that price 
variations are larger upon increased trading frequency. A positive    coefficient would indicate that price 
variations should be larger for a unit change in order flow innovation when the expected trade size and 
trading frequency are expected to be higher. This result would empirically support both studies. 
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processing cost, which is usually fixed. In addition, the coefficients     measure the 
transitory price impact of trading intensity.  
According to Benos and Angelidis (2009), a negative sign should be expected for the 
parameters    , due to economies of scale. Since trading costs are mainly fixed, 
increased trading volume should decrease the per unit cost. In very liquid, and rather 
competitive markets this component should equal the cost of trade realization. 
Considering that the Carbon market is rather illiquid, larger size and faster transactions 
are expected to improve dealers’ inventory positions and, hence, they should contribute 
to lower trading costs. Therefore, these parameters account for the liquidity component 
of the spread. This effect opposes the permanent, informational impact of trading 
intensity and the spread is determined by the relative magnitude of     and    . This 
would provide at least a partial explanation of the conflicting results in previous studies 
concerning transaction size, time and price.
176
 Finally, risk and time of exposure are 
expected to contribute to increasing spreads. According to the assumption of risk 
aversion, dealers should require higher compensation when they are exposed to risk 
over longer periods or to high levels, or both. This accounts for the risk-aversion 
component of the spread. 
Furthermore, following the MRR model, while incorporating the extensions proposed 
above, dealers quote the following, regret free prices: 
  
                               (6.19) 
  
                               (6.20) 
The general form could be written as: 
  
                                  (6.21) 
Finally, after the appropriate transformations and after gathering like terms, the joint 
model of returns and trading intensity can be written as: 
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 Concerning the impact of volume on prices and spreads, previous studies, such as Stoll (1978), Easley 
and O’Hara (1987), Hausman et al. (1992), De Jong et al. (1995), Huang and Stoll (1997), Easley et al. 
(1997) and Ahn et al. (2002), provide conflicting results that appear to depend on specific stylized facts of 
each market and/or the period examined. In parallel, another stream of literature (e.g., Easley and O’Hara, 
1992; Dufour and Engle, 2000b; Grammig et al., 2007; Ben Sita, 2010) discuss the implications of time 
on intraday price and spread formation, without concluding on a universally accepted principle. The 
model proposed in this study conjectures that these differences could be explained by the dual effect of 
trading intensity, which is expected to be different on the information and liquidity components. 
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                            (6.22) 
                                              (6.23) 
In this formulation,    and    are the values at time t, of continuously updated functions 
of expected trading intensity (          ) and expected risk. They measure the price 
sensitivity towards asymmetric information and trading costs. These sensitivities are 
revised after every transaction. Therefore, intraday patterns of spread components can 
be calculated non-parametrically. In addition, when                  
    , the joint model nests the original MRR model. Furthermore, by restricting to 
zero the autocorrelation of order flow      , the model can be a special case of that 
of Huang and Stoll (1997). Moreover, for                              
         and                    the model simplifies to that of 
Angelidis and Benos (2009).  
Following the MRR model, two measures of spread can be derived from the above 
specifications, subtracting Eq. (6.20) from (6.19). 
The first is the implied spread (  
    
 ):  
   
                  (6.24) 
The second is the effective spread (cost of a round trip): 
   
                  (6.25) 
The implied spread could further be decomposed into the following components (the 
formulas give the proportion of each component, relative to implied spread): 
 Adverse-selection (Permanent) 
Part 
Trading Frictions (Transitory) 
Part 
 
                          (6.26) 
Considering Eqs. (6.16) and (6.18), the Trading Frictions Part can be further 
decomposed to the order-processing cost component, which can be written as 
           , the liquidity component   
  
           
 
           
  
           and 
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the risk-aversion component   
  
                       
       
  
            . In 
line with the MRR model, the variance of price change can be written as:
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(6.27) 
Similar to the MRR model, this formulation decomposes price change variance into five 
components; variations due to Public Information, Price Discreteness, Asymmetric 
Information, Transaction Costs and Interaction between Asymmetric Information and 
Transaction Costs. Considering that information and liquidity components are functions 
of dealers’ expectations, which in turn are functions of trading intensity and risk, the 
variance is, consequently, modelled as a function of expected trading intensity and risk. 
This allows past information to have an indirect impact on variance. This is a major 
extension to the MRR model, since return variance is recognized to vary due to the 
potential effects of the actual events in shaping future expectations, and thus learning. 
The impact of these expectations might be different in different environments, due to 
structural reasons, such as the nature of the underlying asset or the legal framework of 
the market. This is recognized by the dynamic character of the return model, Eqs. (6.22) 
and (6.23), which allows for a different formulation for expectations in each data set 
employed. Finally, similar to the MRR model, autocorrelation of the order flow, ρ, has a 
decreasing effect on variance. This accounts for the Bid-Ask bounce, defined as rapid 
price changes between Bid and Ask, when the price midpoint does not necessarily 
change, which is higher when there are no market trends, such as trading in the same 
direction, due to either information or liquidity needs. 
Estimation and Further Applications of the Dynamic Model 
According to the literature, the preferred method of estimating trade indicator models is 
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). In this method, the selection of 
appropriate orthogonality (i.e., population moment conditions that are assumed to be 
zero) conditions is essential. In this study, the estimation procedure follows the example 
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 A formulation similar to Madhavan et al.’s (1997) could be written as: 
            
     
          
            
                         
A full derivation is found in the chapter’s appendix. 
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of Grammig (2002), Grammig et al (2007), Angelidis and Benos (2009) and Ben Sita 
(2010).  
First, let                 
    
  
 
  where                     be a vector of 
the parameters to be estimated,    a vector of all available variables at time  ,   
  
                
  a vector of the explanatory variables of trading intensity and    
           a vector that contains the sign of the current and preceding. In addition, let 
                                      
        
 
  be a vector of the formulated 
expectations of trading intensity,   , number of informed traders,    , and variance,     
 , 
and of an indication of the regime, according to expected trading intensity, the next 
transaction is expected to be in,     ,  while               . 
For the modelling of the expected trading intensity, the following moment conditions 
can be implied.
178
 First, the forecasting error,   ,            in (6.22), is assumed to 
have a zero mean (    
                ) and be uncorrelated (    
         
           ). Second, all independent lagged variables are assumed to be 
uncorrelated with    (    
                  
    ).179 Furthermore, for the return 
Eq. (6.23), a very important moment condition is related to the autocorrelation of order 
flow. This is,     
                                    . In addition, 
Madhavan et al. (1997) define a drift term, a, using the following moment condition, 
(    
                  ). Then in order to estimated the variance of public 
information,   
   and Price Discreteness,   
 , disturbances, they use the following 
functions; (    
                   
     
     
     ) and (    
          
          
    
    ). Moreover, the remaining coefficients in Eq. (6.23) are 
decomposed employing the following restrictions     
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 Moment conditions are functions,     
        where                      , derived from the 
estimated model, that include the parameters,  , to be estimated and variables,   , observable at time t, 
and they are assumed to be zero. GMM estimates the model parameters,  , minimizing the sample 
averages of these moment conditions to be as close as possible to the (zero) population mean. 
179
 Wooldridge (2001) mentions that the most important departure from common OLS assumptions, in the 
application of linear time series, is that the errors are serially correlated. Hansen (1982), White and 
Domowitz (1984) and Newey and West (1987) argue that implying over-identifying restrictions allows 
the GMM weighting matrix to account for serial correlation of unknown form. This can be done by 
including lagged variables. In case extra moment conditions are needed, then according to Grammig and 
Wellner (2002) the moment condition that the forecasting error is uncorrelated with each explanatory 
variable can take the form;    
 
                
     
                                . 
It follows that, depending on the appropriate lag length employed by the researcher, the autocorrelation 
restriction can be further extended, as in Grammig et al. (2007).     
                            
      . Furthermore, the inclusion of   , as instrumental variable in           , accounts for the 
interdependence between trading intensity and return disturbances.  
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                         . Summarizing, the joint model is estimated using the 
following moment conditions: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
      
      
 
           
 
      
        
          
              
      
     
     
  
        
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    (6.28) 
The GMM disturbances are then gathered in a vector           
       
    
       
    
  
        
    
       
    
         
    
        
    
          , and the sample means are 
defined as;         
 
 
        
 
   , where    contains the observations of        
      of a sample T. 
The idea behind GMM is to choose parameter values for  , such that the sample 
moments,          closely approximate the population moments,        , or else to 
make         as close to zero as possible. By the “Law of Large Numbers”         
        for large values of T, so an appropriate estimate,   , of the population parameter 
   makes          . When the number of moment conditions, K, is larger than the 
number of parameters, L, then the GMM estimator can be written as: 
          
 
        
                (6.29) 
where     is a     semi-definite “weighting” matrix, such as that    
   
       
(population).
180
 The approach employed for the estimation of    is the “iterative” GMM, 
with a heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix (Newey and West, 1987), when 
computing an estimate for     
   (where      
   
                     ). 
In the above specification,     and, therefore, the model is over-identified. Hansen 
(1982) proposes J-statistics to test the validity of the model, i.e., whether the implied 
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 Hansen (1982) shows that    is consistent, asymptotically normal and, with the right choice of   , 
asymptotically efficient. 
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moment conditions fit the data well.    is that they do. J-statistic is asymptotically Chi-
squared with     degrees of freedom. 
           
                   
   (6.30) 
Besides testing model validity, the in-sample and out-of-sample performance of the 
MRR model and the extensions will be compared, by the use of the Mean Squared Error 
(MSE). 
Another important issue that is examined is whether the enhanced MRR model can help 
traders in deciding which type of order to submit; market or limit order. The basic 
assumption here is that the information aggregated by previous transactions can 
formulate an expectation about the informational content of the next trade. The model 
describes two major forces to be the drivers of price formation: information, which is 
summarized by  , and liquidity, which is summarized by  . Information moves prices 
permanently to a new equilibrium, while liquidity considerations have only a transitory 
impact. Suppose that trading intensity has an impact on both of them, the magnitude and 
the direction of this impact could be of critical importance. If there are trades that are 
expected to increase   more than  , or even decrease  , then these trades are more 
likely to move prices permanently. Therefore, investors’ wealth would benefit from the 
submission of an appropriate market order, according to the expected direction of the 
new equilibrium. However, if the permanent price impact of a transaction is expected to 
be low, i.e., lower than the transitory component, investors can earn the spread, instead 
of treating it as an implicit trading cost, by submitting a limit order. Consequently, 
although quite rigid, the joint model can offer a tool in selecting the most beneficial 
order type.
181
 If the next transaction is expected to have a high information impact on 
price, then investors should aim at capturing capital gains after paying the spread, but if 
a low permanent price impact is expected, then investors should aim at providing 
liquidity and earn the spread, obviously while bearing the risk of return volatility.  
One way to examine the expected information and liquidity content of trades is to work 
at basic statistics of    and   . Their average values are calculated across various levels 
of expected trading intensity, price volatility, level of OTC and informed transactions, 
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 Trading intensity is assumed to be the only determinant of the informational content of the next trade. 
This provides a link with the material presented in the previous chapter. However, other variables such as 
price volatility and OTC or informed transactions are recognized to have a price impact, and even though 
they are not modelled directly here, their effect is empirically examined, through basic statistics. 
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as well as during the trading day. Larger, and probably increasing,    would be an 
indication that market orders could be more profitable, especially when it is associated 
with lower values of   . In the opposite case, a limit order strategy should be preferable. 
Another way to measure the appropriateness of the type of order submission, while 
accounting for the sensitivity of the permanent and transitory price impact of trades, is 
to compare the rate of change of return variance with the rate of change of the implied 
spread for a given change in expected trading intensity. This measures the sensitivity of 
variance and spread towards expectations, and can be calculated by the partial 
derivatives with respect to expected trading intensity. This is: 
 
   
           
           
 
    
        
           
   (6.31) 
where    is the difference between the rate of change of the implied spread, which is 
computed as   
  
                
 
 
  
  and the rate of change of the return variance (the 
full derivation is given in the appendix). When     , the rate of change of variance is 
expected to be higher than the rate of change of the implied spread. In this case, the risk 
of exposure is expected to be higher than the compensation paid by the implied spread 
and, therefore, no market making can be considered profitable. Conversely, when 
    , the change in the implied spread due to variations in expectations is higher than 
that of the variance, and, therefore, limit orders should be considered more appropriate, 
since they are less risky. If the above analysis provides evidence of a consistent pattern, 
then this would lead to the conclusion that managing both transaction size and time 
should be profitable, or at least less expensive.  
6.3 Empirical Results 
6.3.1 Estimation 
Table 6.1, which consists of the Tables A. ECX I, B. ECX II, C. NP I and D. NP II, 
reports the estimation results for the original, MRR, and the Dynamic Expectations 
Joint models, for all markets and phases. In more detail, the first column presents the 
estimates of the MRR model. In the next three columns, the coefficient theta,   , is 
decomposed, as in Eq. (6.16), following a stepwise regression analysis. First,     
coefficients are added, which are related to expected trading intensity,           , T.I., 
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while in the middle column, Risk, the risk factors, captured by the coefficients    and 
  , are examined separately. Then their combined impact on theta is examined in the 
last column, named T.I + Risk. Along the same lines, the following three columns 
decompose phi,   , into T.I, Risk and their combined effect, according to Eq. (6.18). 
The last two columns present the full model, where both    and    are decomposed, 
with the last one including only the statistically significant parameters. Furthermore, the 
first six rows decompose    across models, while the next six decompose   . Then the 
autocorrelation of the order flow, ρ, along with the coefficients of Eq. (6.12) and the 
variances of the innovations,   
  and   
 , are presented. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
The last two sections present the J-statistics and the associated p-values in parentheses, 
as well as the Mean Squared Error (MSE) for in- and out-of-sample forecasts. 
The MRR model 
The first point to note is that the parameter estimates of the MRR model do not 
significantly differ in sign and magnitude from the estimates of the same model applied 
to other trading environments such as the New York Stock Exchange (Madhavan et 
al.,1997) and the Athens Stock Exchange (Angelidis and Benos, 2009). They are also 
consistent with those reported by Benz and Hengelbrock (2008) and Frino (2010) for 
European Climate Exchange (ECX) and Nord Pool (NP). More specifically, as can be 
seen in the first column of Tables 1.A, 1.B, 1.C and 1.D, the information component, θ, 
is considerably larger (0.0808 in ECX I, 0.0496 in ECX II, 0.1201 in NP I and 0.0657 in 
NP II) than the transaction cost component, φ, (0.0410 in ECX I, 0.0182 in ECX II, 
0.0369 in NP I and 0.0597 in NP II). Both of them are statistically significant in both 
markets and phases, but θ’s t-statistics are consistently much higher (i.e., in ECX it is 
almost three times larger in Phase I (9.31 and 3.26) and almost five times larger in 
Phase II (15.38 and 3.10)).
182
 This is an initial sign indicating that information is the 
driving force in intraday formation in the Carbon market. 
Furthermore, the sum of θ and φ, which according to the MRR model is half spread, is 
consistently larger in Phase I (           in ECX and 0.1570 in NP) compared to 
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 This opposes Benz and Hengelbrock (2008) who report very small and, sometimes, insignificant 
estimates for the transitory component. However, they estimate the MRR model dividing their data sets 
per Quarter of the Calendar year. This seems to have a decreasing impact on the significance of the cost 
component, which seems to reduce in Phase II and especially in Nord Pool. In this study, since φ and θ  
are decomposed into continuously updated components, the model is estimated once for the whole period. 
Specific values for given periods of time can then be computed using basic statistics. This seems to boost 
the significance of the parameters (at least on average). Finally, another, critical difference is that they 
exclude OTC transactions, which are expected to have a statistically significant price impact. 
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Phase II (0.0678 in ECX II and 0.1254 in NP II), especially in the less liquid market, 
Nord Pool. In addition, the information component decreases significantly in Phase II in 
both markets (from 0.0808 to 0.0496 in ECX and from 0.1201 to 0.0657 in NP). 
Another similarity with results on NYSE is the highly significant presence of 
autocorrelation in order flow, which seems to be substantially higher in ECX (0.5022 in 
Phase I and 0.4756 in Phase II) than in NP (0.2708 in Phase I and 0.2946 in Phase II). 
This is consistent with the analysis in Chapter 5, Figure 5.2.C, where the autocorrelation 
of order flow is consistently lower in NP, raising considerations about its connection 
with liquidity. Furthermore, the variances of the public information and Price 
discreteness are significantly higher in Phase I (0.0066 and 0.00017 in ECX and 0.0046 
and 0.00025 in NP) than in Phase II (0.0034 and 0.00005 in ECX and 0.0018 and 
0.00016 in NP)), indicating a less volatile environment as the market grows and 
matures.  
This preliminary analysis provides some initial evidence concerning the evolution of 
intraday formation of prices and trading spreads in the Carbon market. The narrower 
spreads that can be observed in Phase II, indicate a progress to maturity, mainly due to a 
decrease in the information component and they raise liquidity considerations. Given 
the increased liquidity in both markets, reported in Chapter 3, Figure 3.5 and in Chapter 
5, Table 5.6, this can be interpreted as a decrease in the proportion of informed traders 
or an indication that a lower compensation dealers need for transacting with them, or 
both. Figures 5.1.A and 5.1.B show clearly a decrease in the proportion of information 
based trading in Phase II. This could be the result of either an increase in uninformed 
transactions or the provisions of less information incentives, as a result of improved 
information dissemination. Therefore, dealers seem to decrease the information 
component of the spread either because the risk of transacting with an informed trader is 
lower or because they can earn more by transacting with uninformed traders. In 
addition, spreads appear to be narrower in the largest and more liquid market (ECX), 
underlining the importance of market size and depth. Finally, what is also noticeable is 
that although the public innovations’ variance is consistently larger in ECX, the 
variance of price discreteness is consistently higher in NP. This could be an initial 
indication that ECX is the price leader and more mature. Information shocks are higher, 
while, pricing is more accurate (i.e., lower price discreteness variance). 
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Theta and Phi 
The next two sections of Table 6.1 decompose theta, θ, and phi, φ, in order to take into 
account trading intensity, T.I., and risk, Risk, expectations, as discussed in Section 
6.2.2. The first three columns under theta decompose the information component,   , as 
in Eq. (6.16). A close inspection reveals a decrease in magnitude and significance of the 
initial parameter  , of the MRR model (0.0808 to 0.07771 in ECX I, 0.0496 to 0.0326 
in ECX II, 0.1201 to 0.0285 in NP I and 0.0657 to 0.0508 in NP II), when expected 
trading intensity is taken into account. In addition, the significance of that parameter 
decreases dramatically (9.31 to 2.06 in ECX I, 15.38 to 2.02 in ECX II) and in some 
cases it becomes insignificant (6.95 to 1.75 in NP and 2.38 to 1.56 in NP II), indicating 
that expected trading intensity could be an important determinant of intraday price 
variations. Risk, in contrast, fails to provide any statistically significant change.  
A closer inspection of the impact of expected trading intensity on the information 
component, in the columns under T.I. and T.I+Risk, reveals that it increases theta across 
all different regimes, although with a different rate. This is consistent with Dufour and 
Engle (2000b), in the sense that more frequent trading carries higher informational 
content and, therefore, has a higher price impact. The same seems to happen for larger 
transaction size as well, which confirms Easley and O’Hara (1987), Hausman et al. 
(1992), Easley et al. (1997) and Angelidis and Benos (2009), who argue that higher 
trading volume indicates the presence of informed trading and therefore that these trades 
should have a higher price impact. The regimes of fundamental and informed trades in 
particular have always a statistically significant effect, with the informed regime having 
consistently higher t-statistics. In addition, in ECX when trading intensity is included 
along with theta, the magnitude and the significance of phi decrease as well. This 
emphasizes the role of size and time on determining the price impact of the adverse-
selection component. In contrast, in Nord Pool, especially in Phase I, theta becomes 
insignificant (t-stat = 1.75) and phi plays a more significant role in pricing, since it 
increases in both magnitude (0.0369 to 0.0592) and significance (2.01 to 3.64).  
The next section of Table 6.1, under phi, decomposes the liquidity component φ, 
according to Eq. (6.18) into the impact of expected trading intensity, T.I., and risk, Risk. 
When expected trading intensity is taken into account, a major change in magnitude 
(0.0410 to 0.0760 in ECX I, 0.0182 to 0.0308 in ECX II, 0.0369 to 0.0491 in NP I and 
0.0597 to 0.0700 in NP II) is observed in the parameter   of the MRR model. In 
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addition, the impact of expected trading intensity appears to be statistically significant, 
especially in the fundamental and the informed traders’ regimes. Coefficients     are 
all negative and mostly statistically significant (e.g., in ECX II              is -0.0117 
(-2.54),                is -0.0109 (-2.93) and             is -0.0035 (-2.97)) especially 
in the fundamental and informed regimes.  
This suggests a negative relation between prices and expectations of trading intensity. 
This negative relation causes   , which is a long-term average, to be much larger, and 
this is consistent with Angelidis and Benos (2009). They mention that due to economies 
of scale, transaction size is expected to have a decreasing price effect. Moreover, this 
relation seems to be enhanced by time as well, since expected trading intensity consists 
of size and duration. Higher trading frequency reduces trading costs in an analogous 
fashion to transaction size. Consequently, in accordance with previous literature, it 
seems that a fixed cost (captured by   ) exists. This cost decreases as trading intensity 
increases. This is probably due to economies of scale, leading to more opportunities to 
trade or more efficient cost allocation. 
In addition, unlike theta, risk expectations appear to be significant determinants of the 
liquidity component. However, they are summarized in price volatility, as informed 
trading fails to provide statistically significant results. Coefficient    is always positive, 
and statistically significant, indicating that spread increases when dealers, or limit order 
traders, expect to be exposed to higher price volatility for longer.  
Several comments are relevant to these findings. First, the transitory price component is 
found to be inversely related to trading intensity expectations, compared to the 
information component. Ben Sita (2010) report a transitory and a permanent pricing 
component related to the time dimension of trades. Bowe et al. (2007) extend this idea 
to include transaction size, which in Angelidis and Benos (2009) is related to permanent 
and transitory effects. The present study confirms the empirical findings of these studies 
and summarizes the effects of both on trading intensity. Consequently, trading intensity 
seems to play a dual role in price formation, affecting in a different way information and 
liquidity.  
This becomes more obvious by looking at Table 6.2, which presents the average 
expected trading intensity and the estimates of theta and phi, along with half spreads, 
according to the estimates of the last columns of Table 6.1. More specifically, the first 
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column, Average Trading Intensity, presents the average, arithmetic mean, of the 
expected trading intensity in each regime, in each phase and in each market. The next 
column, Theta, presents the estimates of theta across regimes, markets and market 
phases, while the third column, Average Theta, is the product of the previous two and 
indicates the average adverse-selection component for each regime in the different 
datasets. Along the same lines, the next two columns present the estimates of the 
liquidity component, phi, and its average values.
183
 The last column is the sum of 
Average Theta and Average Phi and is half the implied spread.  
The Average Theta increases across different regimes of expected trading intensity (e.g., 
0.0533 in the uninformed regime, 0.0791 in the fundamental and 0.0977 in the informed 
in ECX I). This can be seen as the need for higher compensation due to a higher 
presence of informed traders. When dealers or limit order traders expect higher 
transaction size and/or higher trading frequency, they see that as a signal of more 
prominent presence of informed traders. Therefore they widen the spread to compensate 
for potential losses. In contrast, Average phi follows a U-shape pattern (0.0489 in the 
uninformed regime, 0.0060 in the fundamental and 0.0657 in the informed in ECX I). 
This could indicate that, in practice, dealers manage their Inventories, in a similar 
fashion to “inventory” models (inter alia, Stoll, 1978), and that they have an optimal 
position that they want to return to, either because it is less risky, or less costly. 
Consequently, when trading intensity is expected to be low they charge more for 
providing liquidity. When it is high they widen the spread, so they will not deviate 
significantly from their target. In between, there should be a range where inventory 
deviations, as well as “immediacy” costs, are not that high, and thus there is a lower 
liquidity cost component. This seems to explain the differences between Stoll (1978), 
who describes a U-shape relation between spread and transaction size, De Jong et al. 
(1995, 1996) who maintain that spread is a decreasing function of volume, and Huang 
and Stoll (1997) and Ahn et al. (2002), who maintain that order-processing cost is a 
decreasing function of volume. Trading intensity is negatively related to the liquidity 
component, but that decreasing relation varies in magnitude in different regimes and 
thus the U-shape relation.  
The MRR model seems to summarize a large order-processing cost component, and its 
adjustments to liquidity and risk variations, in one parameter. According to the results 
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 For clarity, Table 6.2 emphasizes the impact of Expected Trading Intensity on half spreads and, 
therefore, Risk is not present in the calculations. 
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that seems to be quite a rigid approximation and it probably underestimates this 
component, unlike Huang and Stoll (1997) who report a much higher proportion of 
order-processing cost. This might also be the reason why Benz and Hengelbrock (2008) 
report a small and insignificant transaction cost component, φ, after estimating the MRR 
model in the Carbon market. 
Full Model 
The last two columns of Table 6.1 present the estimation results of the full model, as in 
Eqs. (6.22 and 6.23). The last column especially, named Full-Significant, presents the 
final version of the joint model that includes only the statistically significant parameters. 
Focusing on Eq. (6.23) and on the components of the spread, the only significant 
parameters of    are the ones associated with expected trading intensity, while for    
only the expected Informed Trading is not relevant. Therefore, unlike phi, theta seems 
to be directly proportional to trading intensity, without any long-term average, since    
is statistically insignificant (t-stat is 0.35 in ECX I, -0.40 in ECX II, -1.47 in NP I and -
0.95 in NP II). This is consistent with Angelidis and Benos (2009), who report that the 
adverse-selection component is an increasing function of trade volume without a long-
term average. In contrast, phi can be further decomposed into order-processing,   , 
liquidity,    , and risk aversion,   , components. Consequently, according to this 
model, prices and spreads are the outcome of balancing expectations of the dual effect 
of trading intensity and risk.  
Another important comment concerns the trading intensity equation, presented in Eq. 
(6.22). Trading intensity appears to be autoregressive, since    is statistically significant 
(t-stat is 15.24 in ECX I, 23.39 in ECX II, 7.51 in NP I and 3.10 in NP II), but, 
surprisingly, it seems that it is not endogenously related to returns (e.g., t-stat is -0.14 in 
ECX I, -0.46 in ECX II) or order flow (e.g., t-stat is 0.92 in ECX I, 1.84 in ECX II). In 
contrast, a negative (-1.2069 in ECX I, -0.4697 in ECX II, -1.2723 in NP I and -1.1223 
in NP II) and statistically significant (t-stat is -28.78 in ECX I, -14.60 in ECX II, -6.72 
in NP I and -6.41 in NP II) estimate of parameter   , indicates that OTC transactions 
have a statistically significant decreasing effect on expectations. This is consistent with 
the empirical finding in Chapter 4 (Eq. (4.41) and Tables 4.3.B, 4.4B, 4.5.B and 4.6.B), 
where    , and OTC transactions increase the expected duration and therefore 
decrease the expected trading intensity.  
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A positive (0.2271 in ECX II, 0.5765 in NP II) and statistically significant (t-stat 6.53 in 
ECX II and 2.76 in NP II) estimate of parameter   , as in Eq. (6.12), indicates that as 
the market gains complexity over time, from Phase I to Phase II, informed transactions 
play a more crucial role in formulating expectations of trading intensity. This might 
happen either because informed traders act strategically in Phase II, or because of more 
efficient information dissemination. In the former case, one informed transaction is 
likely to be followed by similar transactions (strategic), which should increase trade 
frequency, and, therefore, the traded contracts per unit of time. In the latter case, price-
relevant, unresolved information is more efficiently disseminated and market 
participants, such as dealers, who observe order flow to extract price-relevant 
information, can track it and benefit from the time space till it goes public. Trading 
intensity is expected to increase in that period of time.  
Empirical evidence provided in Chapter 5 tends to support that the most relevant 
scenario is mostly determined by the market. More specifically, Figure 5.2.B shows that 
the average transaction size increases in Phase II, while Figure 5.3 shows that the 
average duration consistently decreases. This indicates a general increase in trading 
intensity, which, as Figures 5.1.A and 5.1.B suggest, is not necessarily being followed 
by an analogous increase in informed trading, since the proportion of informed trades is 
decreasing in Phase II. Furthermore, Figure 5.2.C shows that the autocorrelation of the 
order flow in the informed regime is lower in ECX II, compared to ECX I, but higher in 
NP II, compared to NP I. Likewise, Table 5.7 shows that the proportion of identical 
trades in informed regime, which would indicate strategic trading, is lower in ECX II 
(19.51 percent), but higher in NP II (14.29 percent), compared to Phase I (31.77 percent 
and 0 percent respectively). This suggests that in Phase II, the actions of informed 
trades are more likely to be revealed in ECX II, while informed traders appear to act 
strategically in NP II. In both cases their actions increase the expected trading intensity. 
Further, the sign of better information dissemination is also another indication that 
ECX, probably due to its higher liquidity, is a more efficient market compared to Nord 
Pool. 
Finally, the last two rows of Table 6.1 present the performance of all estimated models 
according to the Mean Squared Error (MSE). MSE seems to reward the enhanced 
flexibility of the joint model, especially, when only the statistical significant parameters 
are taken into account. It is consistently smaller in magnitude across markets and phases 
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in both in- and out-of-sample forecasts. This indicates that the original, MRR, model is 
restrictive, because it ignores trading intensity variations. 
6.3.2 Spread as continuous variable 
Spread and Variance Components 
One of the characteristics of the model, described in Section 6.2.2 in Eqs. (6.22) and 
(6.23), refers to describing the Bid-Ask spread as a continuous variable. Expectations of 
theta and phi are continuously revised after every transaction, according to Eqs. (6.16) 
and (6.18). This means that on the occurrence of a transaction, market participants are 
assumed to formulate expectations concerning the incoming trading intensity and the 
price volatility. Using these expectations they determine the compensation they require 
for the probability of trading with better informed traders and for supplying liquidity, 
and they revise the Bid and Ask prices they are willing to trade, and thus the spread. 
Consequently, any intraday pattern of the spread or the price change variance, as well as 
their components, can be examined through basic statistics of    and   , according to 
Eqs. (6.24), (6.25) and (6.27), without re-estimating the model. Table 6.3, from which 
Figures 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.9, 6.10, 6.11, 6.17, 6.18, 6.19, 6.25, 6.26 and 6.27 are derived, 
presents the intraday formation of spread, spread components, price change variance 
and its components. 
Specifically, the first three columns of Table 6.3 present the Time of the Day, the 
Trading Intensity and the Expected Trading Intensity, as it is formulated by Eq. (6.22) 
and the estimates in the last column of Table 6.1. The next section presents the Adverse-
selection component, which is    as in Eq. (6.16), and Phi, which is the sum of 
Liquidity,              
 
           , and Risk Aversion,          
           , as 
in Eq. (6.18). The next section presents the Implied and Effective Spread, which is  
double the sum of Adverse-selection and Phi, as in Eqs. (6.24) and (6.25). The next 
section presents the Asymmetric Information, Trading Costs and Interaction, between 
them, components of the price change variance, as in Eq. (6.27), which is presented in 
the last column. Furthermore, panel A in figures 6.1, 6.9, 6.17 and 6.25 presents 
graphically the two sections of Table 6.3, that refer to the Trading Intensity, the 
Expected Trading Intensity and the Bid-Ask Spread, Implied and Effective, while panel 
B presents the section that refers to the spread components. Panel C summarizes 
intraday variations of variance and its components. Next, panels A and B of Figures 6.2, 
6.10, 6.18, 6.26 decompose the spread in its components, in absolute numbers and as 
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percentages, while panels C and D do the same for variance. Finally, Figures 6.3, 6.11, 
6.19 and 6.27 show the intraday variation of the relation between spread, in panel A, or 
variance, in panel B, and expected trading intensity. 
Looking at the columns that refer to the Implied and Effective Spread in Table 6.1, and 
in panel A of Figures 6.1, 6.9, 6.17 and 6.25, Spread consistently follows a U-shape 
pattern. In some cases, as in ECX, a tube-shaped pattern better describes the spread 
variations, because of a relatively long period with small fluctuations. In the beginning 
of the trading day, for the first hour the spread is wide and it starts declining. It stays 
quite stable, with an exception around lunch break where it increases marginally, up 
until an hour before the official closing of the market, where it increases again. During 
Phase I the spread at the beginning of the day (the average spread is 25.73 cents in ECX 
and 38.8 cents in NP) is larger than at the closing, but during Phase II the closing 
session appears to be more volatile and, therefore, wider spreads are observed (from 
14.87 to 16.53 cents in ECX and from 53.92 to 54.59 cents in NP, in the opening and 
closing sections, respectively). Narrower spreads are observed just after the opening or 
before the closing sessions. A close inspection of the graphs reveals that fluctuations in 
spreads follow the fluctuations in trading intensity, which appears to be a major 
determinant of these changes. Trading Intensity, and expected trading intensity, are 
either decreasing, in Phase I, or U-shaped, in Phase II, but always declines sharply over 
the first trading hour and increases over the last, while the lowest point is always around 
midday, the well-known lunch break effect. This is when a slight increase in the spreads 
is observed. Consequently, the level of expected trading intensity appears to influence 
the Bid-Ask spread, either because the information component or the cost of providing 
liquidity, or both, are high. 
This becomes more obvious by examining panel B, 6.1, 6.9, 6.17 and 6.25, along with 
the section of Table 6.3 that refers to spread components. Spread components follow 
patterns similar to the ones reported in Madhavan et al.’s (1997) original paper. The 
asymmetric information component,   , described in Eq. (6.16), generally declines over 
the day (e.g., in ECX I    is 7.52 cents during the opening, while the lowest point is at 
closing at 5.20 cents), with a slight increase in the closing session (e.g., in NP II    is 
11.40 cents during the opening session, it decreases to 6.03 cents an hour before closing 
and increases slightly, to 8.14 cents, during the closing session) or it exhibits a U-shape 
pattern (e.g., in NP I    is 15.6 cents during opening, the lowest point is around lunch 
time at 11.50 cents, while at closing increases to an average of 13.75 cents). A 
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comparison between panels A and B in the above figures indicates that    variations 
seem to follow, in a rigid way, the fluctuations of trading intensity. This is to be 
expected since    is directly proportional to expected trading intensity, according to the 
last column in Table 6.1. Moreover, according to panel B of Figures 6.2, 6.10, 6.18 and 
6.26, adverse-selection accounts for 40 to 80 percent of the total spread, depending on 
the market, the phase and the time of the day.  
In contrast, the liquidity component, as it is summarized in coefficients,    and     in 
Eq. (6.18), follows the opposite pattern and accounts for 30 to 50 percent of the total 
spread. It is generally increasing during the trading day and the peak is always during 
the closing session (6.62 cents in ECX I, 2.57 cents in ECX II, 4.01 cents in NP I and 
6.37 cents in NP II). The lowest level in Phase II is observed during the opening session 
(1.44 cents in ECX and 5.24 cents in NP), while in Phase I it is one hour later (4.33 
cents in ECX 2.57 cents NP). The risk aversion component, which according to the last 
column in Table 6.1 is summarized in coefficient   , Eq. (6.18), in ECX and NP I, and 
in coefficient    in NP II, generally increases over the trading day, although it is small 
in magnitude. The maximum values are always observed during the closing session 
(0.93 cents in ECX I, 0.68 cents in ECX II, 1.38 cents in NP I and 3.24 cents in NP II), 
while this component accounts, as can be seen in panel B of Figures 6.2, 6.10, 6.18 and 
6.26, for less than five percent of the total spread. Looking at panels A and B of Figures 
6.1, 6.9, 6.17 and 6.25, that is sufficient to explain part of spread variations, especially 
when expected trading intensity is in a middle range.  
Moreover, considering that theta and phi, as they are defined in Eqs. (6.16) and (6.18) 
respectively, measure price sensitivities, these variations are to be expected. At the 
beginning of the trading day there is overnight information that is yet to be observed. 
Therefore, dealers’ reactions, and consequently their quoted prices, are expected to be 
very sensitive to trades, in case they carry information. However, as time lapses this 
information is incorporated into prices and dealers aggregate data as well, and the 
information component,   , declines. The revived trading activity at the end of the day 
increases, again, the probability of informed trading and therefore the information 
component. In contrast, following the U-shaped formation of    (excluding Risk 
Aversion) across expected trading intensity, presented in Table 6.2, the liquidity 
component,              
 
           , seems to depend on the configuration of 
dealers’ portfolios. They appear to have an optimal inventory position, which is affected 
by trading intensity. Consequently, different levels of trading intensity should affect 
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their actions in a different way, and this should result in a preferred range of market 
activity that minimizes risks or costs. Therefore, assuming that their preferences are not 
time variant, the liquidity component should be expected to increase over the trading 
day, since there is less time to adjust to new information or liquidity needs. Along the 
same lines, the risk aversion component,   or   , should be expected to increase over 
the trading day for similar reasons. 
Panel C of Figures 6.1, 6.9, 6.17 and 6.25 presents the intraday pattern variance of price 
change,         , and its components in ECX I, ECX II, NP I and NP II, respectively. 
As has been explained in Section 6.2.2 in Eq. (6.27), the variance consists of public 
information shocks,   
 , rounding errors,   
 , and a trading component. Since the 
variance of the error terms has been implicitly assumed to be constant, any intraday 
variations are attributed to asymmetric information,         
 , trading costs 
fluctuations,          
  , and any interaction between them,   
      
  
        .
184
 Consequently the variance is expected to exhibit similar patterns to 
spreads, which are also determined by the same components. Indeed, it exhibits the 
familiar U-shaped intraday variation, where it appears to be higher in the opening and 
the closing sessions and around the lunch break. In more detail, in Phase I both markets 
appear to be volatile during the opening session (0.0206 in ECX I and 0.0408 in NP I) 
whereas in Phase II, maximum volatility is observed during the closing session (0.077 
in ECX II and 0.0420 in NP II). The minimum variance is usually observed just before 
the closing session (0.0193 in ECX I, 0.0065 in ECX II and 0.0310 in NP II) and it 
usually follows a local maximum (0.0199 in ECX I, 0.0068 in ECX II and 0.0363 in NP 
II), which is observed around the lunch break.  
A large information component at the beginning of the trading day (0.0061 in ECX I, 
0.0023 in ECX II, 0.0226 in NP I and 0.0148 in NP II) progressively decreases in Phase 
I, while in Phase II it exhibits an increase during the closing section. In contrast, the 
trading costs component is low during the opening (0.0028 in ECX I, 0.0004 in ECX II, 
0.0021-0.0016 in NP I and 0.0066 in NP II) and progressively increases during the 
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 In Chapter 5, information shocks have been assumed to arrive at the market randomly, with frequency 
of arrival that follows a Poisson distribution. This does not allow for any systematic intraday variation in 
its variance. Therefore, for consistency, a constant variance is assumed throughout the period of each data 
set. In addition, even in the MRR model, rounding error variance is found to be very small and mostly 
insignificant. In the model presented in Eqs. (6.22) and (6.23), the variance is restricted to be constant, but 
any potential loss of information, because of this generalization, is expected to be limited. On the 
contrary, the difference between Phase I and Phase II is expected to be substantial because of market 
improvement and thus a new pair of coefficients   
  and   
  will be estimated in each market. 
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trading day. These opposing intraday variations could happen because information is 
resolved over the trading day and, therefore, dealers do not need to charge more, which 
would result in higher   , to compensate for transacting with better informed traders, 
while liquidity considerations rise because of the limited time they have to react closer 
to the closing of the market. Their movements are in the opposite direction and their 
effect seems to cancel out. Moreover, the interaction component, which measures their 
combined outcome, seems to have a major impact on variance, since they seem, with 
the exemption of ECX I, to follow similar patterns. 
Along the same lines, Figures 6.2, 6.10, 6.18 and 6.26 as well as Figures 6.3, 6.11, 6.19 
and 6.27 confirm the same findings. The first group describes intraday variations of half 
spreads and price change variance and their components in both absolute and relative 
terms for ECX I, ECX II, NP I and NP II. The second consists of “area” graphs that 
present visually the spread and return variance against expected trading intensity and 
time of the day, for the two markets and phases. Both spread and return variance exhibit 
a U-shape pattern both over time and across expected trading intensity. The lowest 
values are observed in the fundamental trading regime and especially after the opening 
and before the closing sessions. In addition, the public information contribution to the 
variance accounts for around 40 percent to 50 percent in ECX and 5 percent to 15 
percent in Nord Pool. Given that ECX is the dominant market, in terms of size, this 
could be an indication that public information is first resolved in the largest market, 
which is expected to be the price leader.  
Contrary to the MRR model, the trading frictions component in the Carbon market does 
not consistently increase over the day, and, consequently, the significance of public 
information does not decrease. In contrast, according to panel D of the first group of 
graphs, the proportion of return variance attributed to public information shocks 
increases during the day and it is lower during the opening and closing sessions, where 
the activity of the market is higher. In the opening and the closing sessions, when the 
most intensive trading is observed, the main determinant of return variance seems to be 
the formulated expectations about trading intensity and risk, and, therefore, the trading 
process itself. However, during the day, trading intensity calms down. Consequently, 
the contribution of the trading process to the variance is lower and price fluctuations are 
mainly caused by exogenous public information. This, together with the U-shape pattern 
of return variance, seem to partially confirm Kyle and Roll’s (1986) proposition that 
prices during trading hours, when the market is more active, are more volatile than in 
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non-trading hours. However, the second group of figures clearly shows that return 
variance increases around the lunch break, which coincides with the lowest level of 
market activity. This raises the importance of liquidity and suggests that, when trading 
intensity is “normal” for the market, its contribution to the variance is minimal. Both 
very active and inactive stages, however, increase the price fluctuations, at least in a 
rather illiquid market, such as the EU ETS.  
The Impact of Trading Intensity on Spread and Variance components 
The next two groups of figures (6.4, 6.12, 6.20 and 6.28 is the first group, while 6.5, 
6.13, 6.21 and 6.29 is the second) provide a deeper insight into the relation between 
spreads and return variance and levels of price volatility, informed trading and number 
of OTC transactions across different levels of expected trading intensity. In more detail, 
panel A of these presents the variations of spreads and return variance across expected 
trading intensity,           , as in Eq. (6.12), according to the estimates in the last 
column of Table 6.1, and the expected level of informed trading,            , as in Eq. 
(6.14). Next, panel B presents the variations of spreads and return variance across 
expected trading intensity and expected number of OTC transactions, which is 
computed as a moving average of the OTC transactions during the last fifteen minutes. 
Similarly panel C focuses on expected trading intensity and the expected price 
volatility,       
       , as in Eq. (6.13). 
The main finding in these graphs is that the main determinant of spreads and return 
variance variations is the expectations concerning trading intensity, while the other 
variables fail to exhibit significant influence. More specifically, in all graphs, when 
dealers expect the market to be in an inactive stage, spreads and, consequently, return 
variance are relatively high. When the market is expected to be in the “fundamental” 
regime, however, they decrease to their minima, while as the expected trading intensity 
increases they increase as well, reaching their maxima when the market is really active. 
In parallel, spreads and return variance increase, independently of the level of expected 
trading intensity, when market participants expect more informed traders, more OTC 
traders and higher price volatility.  
The effect of these variations, although rather moderate compared to trading intensity, 
should not be ignored. Spreads and return variance increase even further when past 
transactions result in expectations that constitute a riskier market environment. 
Increased risk can be due to higher price volatility or greater presence of informed 
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traders. The same happens when an increased presence of OTC transactions is expected. 
The first two factors have been found, in the last column of Table 6.1, to affect mainly 
the transitory component,   , where the informational component,     is mainly 
determined by trading intensity. OTC transactions, however, seem to have a 
considerable impact on theta, indicating a potentially increased informational content of 
these trades. This confirms the findings in the previous Chapters that connect registering 
of OTC positions with unresolved price information. The effect of OTC transactions 
becomes stronger when trading intensity expectations are higher as well. In other words, 
when the market environment is volatile and the market is expected to be in a high 
trading intensity stage, both spread and variance reach their highest levels. This raises 
even further the importance of managing both size and time of trading. 
The next two groups of figures (the first group consists of 6.6, 6.14, 6.22 and 6.30, 
while the second consists of 6.7,6.15, 6.23 and 6.31), try to identify the source of, the 
afore-mentioned, spread and return variance variations by focusing on the impact of 
expectations on the adverse-selection,    as in Eq. (6.16), and the trading cost,    as in 
Eq. (6.18), components. Both groups are organized as the previous two groups: panel A 
presents the variations of Theta and Phi across expected trading intensity and expected 
level of informed trading; panel B focuses on their variations across expected trading 
intensity and expected number of OTC transactions; panel C examines the importance 
of expected price volatility. 
Similar to previous findings, expected trading intensity is the main determinant of both 
components. Theta appears to be an increasing function of expected trading intensity, 
where the rate of change is different in each regime. In contrast, Phi is found to be 
relatively high when the expected trading intensity is in the uninformed regime. It drops 
sharply in the “fundamental” regime, increases sharply in the “informed” regime and 
then decreases moderately as expected trading intensity increases.
185
  
Combining all the above information, spreads and return variance fluctuate because of 
the relative combination of theta and phi. The main determinant of these two 
components appears to be the expected trading intensity, since the expectations of the 
other variables fail to provide radical changes. Consequently, theta and phi seem to 
summarize the informational, and thus permanent, and the liquidity, and thus transitory, 
content of trades respectively. Therefore, when the market is expected to be in an 
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 Please note that the thresholds for identifying these regimes are derived from the analysis in Chapter 5. 
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inactive stage, uninformed, the information component is low, but the cost of holding 
inventories (or portfolios) is high, because it is more difficult to adjust positions to the 
optimal level. But when the market is expected to be in a mid-stage of activity, 
“fundamental” regime, spread and return variance reach their lowest levels. The main 
reason for this is a very low liquidity cost component,              
 
           , 
and thus a small transaction cost,   . In the “fundamental” regime this component is at 
its lowest level and counteracts the relatively small increase in the information 
component,   . If expectations belong to the highest regime, informed, spread and 
return variance increase considerably. The main source of this increase is theta, which 
surpasses the relatively moderate diminishing effect of increased liquidity in the 
transitory component. The further the transaction is expected to be from the threshold, 
   as in Eqs. (5.7) and (5.8), the greater is the informational over the liquidity impact on 
prices.  
6.3.3 Type of order 
Limit versus Market orders 
Another important point that has been mentioned in Section 6.1, is the choice of the 
type of order to be submitted. Considering that investors should submit market orders 
when they expect the “true” price to change (i.e., when there is unresolved information 
that has yet to be incorporated into prices), and limit orders when they expect moderate 
“true” price changes (where they can earn the spread from liquidity traders), trading 
intensity could potentially help in determining the right strategy. In more detail, trading 
intensity has been found to play a dual contradictive role, which is reflected in theta and 
phi. After a transaction, dealers formulate expectations about trading intensity and risk. 
These expectations revise their beliefs about the “true” value of the asset, and 
consequently about any unresolved price-relevant information, and about future 
liquidity and risk. The first alters the compensation they require for trading with better 
informed traders, measured by    as in Eq. (6.16), while the second revises their price 
for supplying liquidity, measured by    as in Eq. (6.18). Previous findings have shown 
that these changes are mainly caused by trading intensity and, therefore, that it could 
help in choosing the appropriate trade type. Assuming they are rational uninformed 
traders who observe market history trying to learn, they should be expected to submit a 
market order when they expect radical “true” price changes, measured by large   , since 
the spread might not be enough to cover a high probability of an “unfavourable” price 
Chapter 6 Trading Intensity and Intraday Price Discovery 
205 
 
change. In contrast, when    is low, price changes are expected to be moderate, and thus 
the spread, after submitting a limit order, should be profitable. 
Looking at the variations of theta and phi across expectations, in Figures 6.4, 6.12, 6.20, 
6.28, which refer to half spread variations, 6.6, 6.14, 6.22, 6.30, which refer to Theta 
variations and 6.7, 6.15, 6.23, 6.31, which refer to phi variations, suggests that limit 
orders should be preferred when the market is expected to be in the uninformed regime, 
while market orders should be preferred when the market is expected to be in the next 
two regimes. More specifically, in the uninformed regime, in quiet stages of the market, 
theta is very low, while phi is quite high. This, according to the assumption presented in 
the previous paragraph, is the ideal environment for limit order submission. Investors 
can earn the spread, without bearing substantial information-related risk. In the 
fundamental trading regime, however, spread reaches the lowest point, mainly because 
of phi, and therefore, market orders become more profitable, since the informational 
content of trades,   , increases. Along the same lines, in the informed regime, limit 
orders should not be expected to be profitable due to a very high theta. 
The last group of figures (6.8, 6.16, 6.24 and 6.32) presents the difference in the rate of 
change of variance and the rate of change of spread due to variations in expected trading 
intensity, as in Eq. (6.31), in all markets and phases. When a transaction is expected to 
increase the probability of price change, and thus the variance,         , more than 
spread is expected to vary, the variance change, 
           
           
, is larger than spread 
variation, 
    
       
 
           
, which, according to Eq. (6.31) means that     . This is when 
market orders should be preferred because the “extra” profits expected by the 
subsequent price change are expected to be higher than the spread. But when     , 
the subsequent price changes are expected to be moderate and, therefore, spreads should 
be expected to be more profitable. In accordance with previous findings, these figures 
show that    is negative in the uninformed regime, which represents the majority of 
transactions and is associated with large spreads. This is where limit orders should be 
preferred. In the other two regimes, however,    is positive and market orders appear to 
be more beneficial. This finding is very important, considering that the majority of 
studies dealing with this issue (see, inter alia, O’Hara and Oldfield, 1986; Chakravaty 
and Holden, 1995; Brown and Zhang, 1997; Parlour, 1998; Foucault, 1999; Bouchaud 
et al., 2004, 2006; Wyart et al., 2008) finds that limit orders are associated with wider 
spreads. This study provides evidence that this holds only when low levels of trading 
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intensity are expected. In the opposite case, a large    would indicate a high probability 
of informed trading, and thus a large, probably “adverse”, subsequent price change, 
which would deter market participants from submitting a limit order and expecting to 
earn the spread. 
Buy versus Sell orders 
Finally, Table 6.4 provides an insight into the relation between trade initiation and 
market variables, such as spread, return variance and asymmetric information. The table 
is divided into two sections, A and B. Panel A presents the average implied spread, as in 
Eq. 6.24, and the adverse-selection component,   , as in Eq. (6.16), across different 
levels of transaction size and trading frequency, in all markets and phases. The 
threshold values for both variables have been arbitrarily chosen to indicate low, middle 
and high trading activity and they are the same for both markets in both phases. 
Furthermore, the table differentiates the relative sizes of spreads between Buyer (B) and 
Seller (O) initiated transactions. Focusing on each market, the first two columns present 
the width of the implied spread and the size of the adverse-selection component after a 
trade that belongs to one of the pre-described different regimes, namely uninformed, 
fundamental and informed. The next two columns summarize the values of spreads and 
adverse-selection across different levels of trading intensity of the current transaction. 
Panel B presents the relative values for the second moment of price change. 
This allows for the examination of various issues. First, Aitken and Frino (1996) present 
evidence showing that Buy orders are associated with larger transactions costs, and thus 
wider spreads. Their proposition is confirmed by the results in Table 6.4 for both size 
and time in the Carbon market. When the previous or the current transaction is larger or 
has occurred after a short duration, the associated implied spread is higher for Buys than 
for Sells. This is consistent across all sections of Table 6.4. The information component, 
Adverse-selection, is higher as well. This indicates that, on average, Buyer initiated 
traders are more likely to be driven by information, or at least dealers, or limit order 
traders, seem to believe so and require a higher compensation in the form of higher   . 
However, panel B suggests that variance is consistently larger after larger Sells, which 
could probably be attributed to a larger interaction component. This could in practice 
mean that when good news hits the market, informed traders initiate Buy orders before 
everyone else. Their actions are observed by dealers who start incorporating the “extra” 
information into prices, and who buy, increasing the adverse-selection component,   . 
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Consequently, spreads are larger. However, when bad news hits the market, informed 
traders sell, or short sell, and dealers once again increase the information component 
according to their expectations, but this time their revision is more conservative. This 
can be attributed to the “Buy” character of the market (Figure 5.5), which can create 
“false optimism”. Companies will always need to buy emission allowances, so there is a 
strong rather inelastic demand.
186
 However, the high variance after large Sells indicates 
that not all traders react in the same way after large Sells. Some might under-react 
(Kaswan, 2010) charging a lower spread, or some might over-react by changing their 
quoted prices significantly. 
Along the same lines, Hendall et al. (1997) postulate that large Buys convey more 
information than large Sells. Similarly, Chan and Lakonishok (1995) argue that large 
block trades have a higher informational impact. In both cases, a larger informational 
content of previous trades should result in a higher adverse-selection component, theta. 
Indeed, evidence presented in Table 6.4 suggests that when the previous transaction is 
either larger or occurred after a short period of time (i.e., the intensity of trading is high) 
theta is consistently higher, especially when trades, current or previous, are Buyer 
initiated. In contrast, Grammig et al. (2007) argue that after an inactive stage of the 
market, the next transactions are more informative, therefore higher thetas should be 
observed. However, a consistently larger asymmetric information component after 
higher trading intensity, observed in both panels of Table 6.4, is in opposition to this 
and tends to support the proposition of Chan and Lakonishok (1995), who connect 
higher demand for immediacy, and thus higher trading intensity, with larger 
informational impact and, therefore a larger adverse-selection component,   .  
Summarizing, the findings above suggest that large, high frequency transactions indeed 
carry more information and have a higher permanent impact on prices, and thus wider 
spreads are observed. Furthermore, considering the direction of trade, Buys could be 
associated with good news and Sells with bad. Therefore, when there is a positive 
information shock, traders seem to act quickly and in large volumes, buying the asset. 
Their actions though are observed by other market participants, such as dealers, who 
now require higher compensation, due to a higher asymmetric information component, 
and therefore the spread widens. In the opposite case, when bad (good) news hits the 
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 Both positive and negative information shocks are assumed to be equally strong. A further analysis 
could examine the degree of the information shocks and their different price impacts. However, that 
would be far beyond the limits of this analysis. For a detailed presentation of relevant studies please refer 
to Vives (2008).  
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market, not all traders appear to act the same way and therefore higher (narrower) 
spreads, but also higher variance, are observed. Finally, considering that OTC trades are 
relatively much larger than the normal trades (Figure 5.4.B), they can be easily 
associated with these findings, concerning large Buys or Sells, and their increasing 
impact on duration, trading intensity, spreads and return variance price can be justified. 
6.4 Summary 
The analytical focus of this study emphasizes the price impact of trading intensity, as it 
is measured by both transaction size and trading frequency. Different dynamics of these 
two variables, such as different regimes and their permanent or transitory impact, 
extensively discussed in the literature, are taken into account. Since the early 
microstructure literature, volume of trading has been utilized to proxy various market 
characteristics, such as liquidity, the informational content of a trade and the probability 
of informed trading. It has gained particular attention in the inventory models as a 
determinant of prices and spreads. More recently, the role of time and the informational 
content of inter-trade durations have gained particular attention. Especially the role of 
time in information dissemination and learning has been extensively studied, both 
empirically and theoretically. Moreover, many theoretical models have examined the 
dynamics of learning and formulating expectations, as well as how they affect price 
changes and therefore volatility, taking into account investors’ risk aversion. 
Furthermore, other issues, such as the relation between particular market characteristics 
and spread/variance or the preferred order type, have also been examined. 
This study extends Madhavan et al.’s (2007) idea towards Angelidis and Benos (2009) 
and Ben Sita (2010), proposing a new dynamic expectations joint model. The intraday 
price formation process is assumed to be determined by a permanent component, related 
to information and a transitory component, related to liquidity and risk aversion. 
Trading intensity plays a dual role that is allowed to have a different impact on price 
components. First it is used to proxy the informational content of trades and second, it 
acts as a natural measure of liquidity. Furthermore, prices, and consequently spreads, 
are recognized as being determined by expectations, concerning risk, information and 
liquidity. Trading intensity is used to proxy the informational and the liquidity content 
of trades, while the expected level of informed trading and the expected price volatility, 
as well as how long dealers can expect to be exposed to it, are used to measure risk. 
Consequently, the formulation of the expectations is of particular importance. 
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Expectations of informed trading and price volatility are computed as moving averages 
for the last fifteen minutes, while expected duration is calculated using the STM-ACD 
model discussed in Chapter 5. Concerning trading intensity, a linear autoregressive 
function is assumed to summarize its dynamics and is modelled jointly with return. This 
framework could be extended to include more parameters or potential non-linearities. In 
this way, expectations, and consequently price components, are revised after every 
transaction, which allows price-related variables, such as spread and variance, to be 
modelled as continuous variables. 
In conclusion, the formulated expectation of trading intensity is found to be an 
important determinant of intraday price formation, especially when it is expected to be 
in the fundamental or the informed regimes. The theoretical predictions of its dual role, 
are also confirmed, since it affects in a different way the permanent and the transitory 
pricing components. The permanent price component is found to be an increasing 
function solely of trading intensity, where different regimes of trading intensity change 
the sensitivity of price change. The transitory price component, however, can be 
decomposed into a constant order-processing component, a decreasing function of 
trading intensity that accounts for liquidity considerations and a risk aversion 
component measured by the expected price volatility levels and the time dealers expect 
to be exposed. This transitory component reaches its lowest point in the fundamental 
regime and its highest point in the informed regime. Both components, which are 
updated after every transaction, determine spread and return variance, which are found 
to exhibit the usual U-shape intraday pattern found in other markets. All these relations 
seem to strengthen when price volatility, the level of informed trading and the presence 
of OTC transactions are higher. Moreover, surprisingly enough, although trading 
intensity appears to have a significant impact on prices, there is no sign of endogeneity, 
since return is not found to have a significant impact on trading intensity. In addition, 
the common conviction that limit orders are associated with and preferred when there 
are wide spreads, is confirmed, but only for the uninformed regime. In the other two 
regimes, namely fundamental and informed, market orders are more appropriate due to 
a high adverse-selection component that indicates that it should be more profitable to 
follow “true” price changes than trying to earn the spread. Finally, large (i.e., high 
transaction size), high frequency (i.e., short duration) transactions seem to carry more 
information and have a higher permanent impact on prices. Also, Buyer initiated 
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transactions are related to wider spreads, while Seller initiated trades are associated with 
narrower spreads and higher variance. 
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7. Summary, Limitations and Future Research 
7.1 Non Technical Summary 
Since UHF data has been available to both practitioners and researchers, financial 
theory has been seen from a whole new perspective. In particular, the intriguing area of 
price formation has shifted from a macroeconomic perspective to a transaction level 
focus, creating a new field of study that examines the micro-foundations of intraday 
trading activity. Market microstructure, as it is called, focuses on the determinants of 
intraday, microstructure, phenomena, employing all available public information of the 
highest precision, since every transaction is now recorded. On this level, behavioural 
aspects of market participants are taken into account, allowing the desires/needs of 
investors to have an impact on various market stylized facts. 
More precisely, one branch of literature approaches intraday price formation from 
market makers’ perspective, underlying the importance of their inventories. Market 
makers are recognized to face continuous exposure to incoming order imbalances. 
Orders of any direction might outnumber the opposite orders, creating an imbalance that 
needs to be covered by the dealer’s portfolio. The risk of exposure is twofold, either in 
the form of carrying cost, in case of excessive inventory, or in the form of loss of sales, 
when dealers’ inventories are not sufficient to support sales. Considering that market 
makers need to be ready to transact (i.e., immediacy), they need to have an optimal 
portfolio composition to match incoming order flow, in order either to avoid market 
failure, or to make profit, or simply because of a competitive environment. However, 
when transactions make them deviate from it, they can use their price quoting to attract 
or deter other market participants from trading. Therefore, Bid-Ask spreads are seen as 
a natural outcome of trading activity, since they derive from market makers’ need to 
compensate for providing immediacy. As soon as they return to their optimal level, 
prices return to their “fully” informational level. 
This class of models is called inventory-based models and, although it is a rather 
incomplete approach, it gives a further insight into price formation. First, these models 
investigate further the price impact of liquidity and distinguish that particular cost 
component from transaction costs that are mainly fixed. The liquidity component of the 
spread fluctuates along the various levels of liquidity, according to the positions of 
dealers. Second, they recognize that market makers observe the market, through past 
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trading activity, in order to formulate expectations concerning any incoming order flow 
imbalances. Consequently, they see the intensity of trading as an undeniable market 
determinant. Third, they implicitly assume that there is a time dimension of the arrival 
of trades, by relaxing the assumption of fixed time intervals. The time of occurrence of 
transactions is studied separately and it is related to price-relevant information. 
Although the probability of the direction of a trade might be 1/2 over longer periods of 
time, excessive imbalances might occur and order flow might be highly autocorrelated 
on shorter periods over the trading day. Fourth, inventories are described as a “buffer” 
to market activity, since these price revisions are driven only by inventory needs, which 
are unrelated to information. Price variations occur in case of persistent order flow 
fluctuations and the quotes return to their “fair” values after the end of the episode. 
Consequently, the price impact of liquidity is understood as transitory, where 
competition, in the form of higher number of market makers or the type of orders (limit 
orders are seen as market making in one side of the spread), might shorten that effect 
even further. 
Another branch of literature emphasizes the informational content of trades. These 
models maintain that spreads would exist even without explicit trading costs due to 
asymmetric information. They argue that market makers will always lose money when 
dealing with better informed traders. Their only compensations can be in the form of 
earning the spread from trading with uninformed traders. Considering that they cannot 
be in a position to know the level of private information in the market, they can only 
speculate. Therefore, they observe market activity, in the form of past trading, they 
learn (PIN is a key concept that summarizes their beliefs) and they formulate 
expectations concerning the level and the content of price unresolved information. This 
constitutes the information component of the spread, which is seen as their 
compensation for their “immediacy” and “lack of knowledge”. This, along with order-
processing and inventory-holding, is the third most widely recognized component of the 
trading spread. 
The contribution of information-based models, as they are referred to in the literature, is 
multidimensional. First, they recognize that there are different types of traders 
according to their access to price-relevant information and that their trading behaviour 
has a significant price impact. According to these models, informed traders possess 
information about the “fair” value of the underlying asset, prior to everyone else. They 
have the incentive to exploit the inforamtion against uninformed traders. Their choice to 
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act immediately or strategically depends on the market setting and the level of 
competition. Furthermore, uninformed traders are divided into two categories. 
“Discretionary”-liquidity traders observe the market and try to learn from past trading 
history, while “non-discretionary”-liquidity traders possess only public, price resolved 
information and they trade for reasons other than the arrival of exogenous information. 
Consequently, intraday price formation is understood as an equilibrium of the 
proportion of these market participants, considering the strength of the information 
signal. Second, similar to inventory models, there is an implicit consideration of time. 
Informed traders possess their information before everyone else and they reveal it 
progressively through their trading. Therefore, there is a period of time from the 
information arrival until it is fully resolved into prices.  
Third, this space in time allows other traders to learn, but their learning might vary both 
in terms of quality and speed, although they observe the same events. This point raises 
significant issues. The event they observe to formulate their expectations about PIN 
refers to information that can be extracted by past trades. More precisely, they recognize 
that there are actions that reveal future price changes, due to information that is not 
incorporated into prices yet. This way these models implicitly assume that there is 
price-relevant information in non-price variables, such as order flow and the intensity of 
trading. Consequently, trading history is available to all market participants, but not all 
traders interpret it the same way. When aggregating information, they might have 
different portfolio needs, either because of different quality or different quantity 
thresholds, or simply different learning speeds. In addition, the informational, and thus 
permanent, content of trades cannot easily be distinguished from the liquidity impact, 
which is transitory. According to the last point, these models also recognize that price 
revisions due to information alter the beliefs of market participants concerning the “fair” 
value of the asset and therefore it is permanent. 
Although inventory and information models offer a better understanding of market 
microstructure, they both operate under a very strong limitation. Their approach is fairly 
theoretical and they understand the market as a “game” with different players. However, 
the “prior knowledge” of the game or the “set-up” of the framework, describing market 
structure, market participants and other similar issues, must be known. Obviously, that 
framework is not appropriate when empirical issues are of interest. Therefore, another 
class of models has emerged that aims at explaining price changes, and consequently the 
determinants of Bid-Ask spreads, by employing a stationary covariance assumption. 
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These models have become very popular due to their simplicity of estimation, and due 
to the fact that spreads can be derived directly from transaction prices. Furthermore, 
another source of uncertainty is “re”-introduced to account for order flow variations, 
introducing a new class of models; the trade indicator models. These models try to 
derive spread components by assessing the direction of trade. 
In parallel, several other, empirical, aspects have been discussed in various empirical 
models. One of the most important issues is the informational or liquidity content of 
trades and how that can be extracted by past trading. The literature emphasizes the role 
of trading volume and trading frequency. The trading behaviour of informed traders is 
related to the arrival of information. When there is no price-relevant information they do 
not have an incentive to transact and therefore when they enter the market they increase 
the volume of trading. Consequently, increased trading volumes are related to informed 
trading. Along the same lines, higher trading frequency could indicate the same thing. 
Time has also been connected to the quality of information, and in particular to the 
arrival of good or bad news. More recently, several studies emphasize empirically the 
price impact of trades and they try to derive permanent and transitory price components 
by either transaction size or trading frequency. 
Time has gained considerable attention. Unlike data sets of lower frequency, when 
transaction level data are employed, time is irregularly spaced. Several studies underline 
the importance of its modelling, because it violates the basic assumption of fixed time 
intervals, present in empirical models, and because it might convey price-relevant 
information. Furthermore, time series of duration are persistent and over-dispersed. 
Considering these stylized facts of time, Autoregressive Conditional Duration (ACD) 
models have been developed. They model duration as a dependent point process. 
Modelling needs a conditional mean specification that depends on past durations and a 
conditional density function with a positive support.  
The main objections to the initial model concern the simplicity of the specifications. 
Several studies maintain that non-linear specifications for the conditional mean should 
be more appropriate for describing the Data Generation Process (DGP) of durations. 
Along the same lines, distributions of higher complexity are employed in order to 
capture more precisely higher moments of duration series. More recently, ACD models 
have been connected, empirically or theoretically, to informed trading. The trading 
activity of different types of traders should follow different patterns that can be 
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described by the arrival of their trades. Statistical properties of the duration series could 
reveal their presence. 
The application of microstructure concepts, and especially whatever refers to 
information and price resolution, is particularly relevant in young and illiquid markets, 
because information is an important price determinant. This last comment is important 
in the Carbon market due to its unique stylized facts. It is politically influenced and 
therefore an appropriate regulatory framework is needed to ensure the right balance 
between market innovation, price informativeness and liquidity, in order to achieve its 
final goal, which is to make emissions expensive. However, this market has only 
recently gained academic attention, which emphasizes mainly regulatory and market 
structure issues. Furthermore, several studies analyze the nature of the asset, the price 
formation between spot and futures contracts, as well as the determinants of price 
volatility. They mainly use daily data sets. More recently, several studies examine 
microstructure issues, such as intraday price formation, spread decomposition and price 
leadership, but the literature remains rather sparse. 
Several microstructure issues have not been examined in the Carbon market. It appears 
that there is no relevant study that models time since the inception the market. This is 
the primary concern of Chapter 4 of this thesis. In this section, time is explicitly 
modelled using various specifications of ACD models. The market differs significantly 
from other more liquid and well established financial markets and this might have an 
impact on the time the next transaction is expected to occur. Two main market features 
that are of particular interest are the consistently increasing trading volume, as market 
gains complexity and the OTC transactions. Trading volume, in terms of number of 
transactions, as well as aggregated volumes, has increased considerably over the last 
years and exhibits strong seasonalities. In addition, it is a buyer dominated market, with 
periods of illiquidity, especially in early stages, which magnifies potential price impact 
of microstructure effects. In addition, OTC allowance holders are allowed to register 
their positions in the organize market to mitigate counterparty risk. 
The models proposed in this section contribute to the literature in various ways. First, 
they extend the Carbon market literature, by further investigating intraday market 
dynamics of the trading process. Previous studies emphasize the lead-lag relation 
between spot and future prices, as well as its time dependence and clustering, focusing 
mainly on price dynamics. This study focuses on the trading process in terms of trading 
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patterns and models time, trying to incorporate market stylized facts in order to explain 
potential autoregressive dynamics of market liquidity. Second, this study contributes to 
the ACD literature as well, by suggesting two empirical adjustments in order to account 
for market unique features. This adds to the debate challenging the simplicity of the 
model specifications arguing that further empirical adjustments should be employed in 
order to better describe the Data Generation Process (DGP) of duration, especially when 
the market environment is rather illiquid and significantly differs from other organized 
markets. Finally, the proposed models explicitly incorporate other variables in duration 
modelling, in a way that does not challenges the time endogeneity assumption of ACD 
models. This extends the ACD literature by providing a framework, which allows for 
the inclusion of other variables, according to the particular modelling needs of the 
market under investigation. 
In more detail, in this chapter the performance of several ACD specifications is 
examined, focusing on whether empirical adjustments further improve forecasting and 
fitting accuracy. Two new models are proposed that allow for asymmetric impact of 
past duration on expected duration, without challenging the assumption that time is 
endogenously determined. Expected duration still depends on past durations, but their 
effect is not constant. It might be asymmetric depending on other variables. The choice 
of these variables depends on the market environment and this framework allows for 
numerous specifications. The first model is a non-linear specification and focuses on the 
potential asymmetric effects of past durations. The size of the impact of past realized 
arrival times is allowed to vary across different regimes of an economic relevant 
variable. In this study trading intensity is chosen.
187
 The second model allows the 
impact of past durations to be adjusted on a piece-wise linear fashion, depending on the 
regimes of an economic relevant variable. The overall impact is asymmetric and non 
linear, but the regime-specific relation is still linear. In this study a binary (dummy) 
variable is employed to account for the presence of OTC transactions.  
The main finding in this chapter indicates that, although ACD models perform well in 
this new market, empirical adjustments significantly improve model performance. This 
is also consistent with the proposition of Bauwens et al. (2004), that the conditional 
mean specification contributes more to fitting and forecasting than the distributional 
assumptions. In more detail, more complex density functions better describe the DGP of 
                                                 
187
 To proxy trading intensity, in accordance with Engle and Russell (1998) and De Luca and Zuccolotto 
(2006), a natural measure is employed, which is the ratio of trading size to duration. This measures the 
number of contracts traded per unit of time. 
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duration, but the main improvement comes from the conditional mean specification. 
Precision of the models is further improved after accounting for potential asymmetries. 
Trading in the most liquid ECX appears to be influenced by innovations in trading 
intensity, while OTC transactions have a more profound effect in NP. In addition, 
although expected duration seems to asymmetrically depend on past durations, the 
linear approach fits and forecasts better, especially on the long term. Both 
parameterizations capture the illiquid shocks in the market. The non-linear 
parameterization suggests that there is a market momentum. Large and frequent 
transactions increase market liquidity and the expected duration decreases. However, 
OTC transactions appear to increase the expected duration, either because they carry 
information and deter other traders from transacting, or because they consume the 
current levels of liquidity. The market might then need some time to reach a new 
equilibrium. These two combined provide an initial indication of a market that is 
sensitive to liquidity and information. 
These finding are particularly relevant to the trading process in the European Carbon 
market and they could improve the practices of the following groups. First, a better 
understanding of intraday trading activity can enhance market regulation in reaching a 
balance between market innovation and liquidity needs. According to Viswanathan 
(2010), this would provide the foundations of more accurate pricing and would help the 
market to serve its purpose of reducing emissions. The market appears to be sensitive in 
both information and liquidity and an accurate, empirically adjusted, duration model 
could provide a natural measure of sensitivity towards both. This can improve 
monitoring and consequently effectiveness of regulation. In addition, a more precise 
duration model could also improve market making practices in EU ETS. Market makers 
can better manage risk if they know how long (i.e., expected duration) they are going to 
be exposed to it. This could contribute further to market efficiency, since it would result 
in narrower spreads. This applies to limit order traders, who can also benefit from a 
better duration model. Their trading resembles market making on one side of the spread, 
and thus they can develop better trading strategies by managing the time dimension of 
“execution” risk. 
In Chapter 5, the trading patterns in the European Carbon market are further 
investigated, relating duration with information and volume. In more details focus shifts 
to the informational content of trading intensity, and the role of duration modelling. A 
new ACD framework is proposed focusing on connecting the probability of a 
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transaction to occur now, given that it has not until now (i.e., hazard function) with 
different types of trades and, consequently, different types of traders. A key idea is the 
role of time in information resolution, and more precisely when and for how long a 
piece of information is exploitable. Unlike previous literature, the proposed model 
focuses on the process of information resolution rather than on its content. The quality, 
the strength and the direction of information are not modelled explicitly, but they are 
assumed to be progressively revealed by traders’ actions. Market is seen as being 
efficient, in the sense that rationally incorporates information, but imperfect, in the 
sense that it takes some time from the moment that information hits the market up to 
when prices reflect that information. This period of “price adjustment” provides the 
opportunity to some traders to act before everyone else and make a profit. The prices do 
not fully incorporate available information, even if it is public, and in fact given market 
conditions, this period might be prolonged. However, other observable variables, such 
as trading intensity might convey that information. Consequently, the information 
benefit is now translated into a “timing” benefit. Modelling such time dimension of 
information allows for identifying informed trades/traders in a natural way, derived 
from past observable information. The “time dimension” of information along with the 
proposed framework that can attach a probability to a transaction to be informed 
constitute the main contributions to the literature. 
Drawing on De Luca and Zuccolotto (2006) and Hujer and Vuletic (2007), a Smooth-
Transition-Mixture of Distributions ACD (STM-ACD) model of duration is proposed. 
Teräsvira’s smooth transition framework is applied to the shape parameter of a Weibull 
distribution, allowing it to vary across three different regimes of an economically 
relevant variable. This determines the shape of the distribution (the Weibull nests the 
Exponential) and consequently the shape of the hazard function. The three recognized 
regimes correspond to three different types of trades/traders; uninformed, fundamental 
and informed. The smooth transition function accounts for the learning process between 
regimes and therefore for hybrid trades. Following Hujer and Vuletic (2007), the shape 
of the hazard function is then related to a particular type of trades/traders, according to 
its slope. However, unlike previous work, trading intensity, which is observable, is used 
as threshold variable, and this allows the identification of the regime to which each 
transaction belongs. Further, focusing on informed trading activity, the probability of 
the next transaction to be informed can be computed after forecasting the level of future 
trading intensity. 
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The most important finding of Chapter 5 involves the role of trading intensity in 
transmitting information signals. First, trading intensity appears to be sufficient in 
identifying three distinct regimes. Then, according to the shape of the hazard function, 
the STM-ACD confirms the theoretical propositions of Easley and O’Hara (1992) and 
Dufour and Engle (2000b) that increased trading activity is associated with information. 
According to the shape of the hazard function, low trading intensity, in the form of 
either low trading size or long duration, is related to uninformed trades/traders, while 
high trading intensity is related to more informed trading. The higher the trading 
intensity, the more informed the trade. Consequently, large or fast transactions are 
interpreted as closely related to information and are, therefore, expected to have a 
greater price impact. Similarly, based on the findings of Pascual et al. (2004), trading 
intensity increases following informed trades, but this happens because of higher 
trading frequency rather than higher trading size. In addition, empirical findings provide 
further evidence that longer durations are associated with no news, according to Easley 
and O’Hara’s (1992) propositions, and contrary to Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), 
who argue that longer durations are associated with absence of new information. 
Findings also support Kyle (1985) indicating that informed traders act strategically by 
segmenting their trades. 
The discussion above is particularly important and relevant to various aspects of trading 
practice in the European Carbon market. First, it highlights the benefit of possessing 
information before it is fully incorporated into prices, recognising that there are non-
pricing variables that can reveal information. On microstructure level, market 
imperfections are exploitable, even for a very short period of time, and that increases the 
intrinsic value of acquiring information in “real time”. This can affect the attitude of 
market participants towards the timing and the cost of acquiring information. Second, 
an increased ability of market participants to indentify informed trades by simply 
observing past transactions, can increase their market power. Given the “buyer” 
character of the market, they should easily compensate for potential losses by trading 
with better informed traders. Their main concern should be liquidity, and therefore 
spreads should only increase when they observe increased information-based trading 
and insufficient liquidity. On overall, lower spreads should be observed, and this 
contributes to increased market efficiency. Third, the proposed model can be used for 
monitoring purposes by regulatory authorities. By identifying informed trading, further 
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action can be taken to protect the market from “manipulation”. This can also be applied 
in real time to adjust the balance between market innovation and liquidity. 
In Chapter 6 the focus shifts on the application of the previous findings. Market makers 
and limit order traders formulate expectations and they quote their prices accordingly. 
Using the models discussed in the previous two chapters they can forecast expected 
duration and they can attribute a probability of the next transaction to be informed by 
forecasting the level of activity the market is going to be in. Therefore they can have an 
estimated time that they will be exposed to various type of risks, as well as they can 
anticipate the price impact of the incoming trade. A key aspect of this process is the 
dual pricing impact of trading intensity. According to previous models duration and 
transaction size have an undeniable impact on prices, both permanent and transitory. In 
this study, their post-trade price impact is further investigated, by allowing expectations 
to affect the information and liquidity component of price change. This can be 
interpreted as a natural measure of market sensitivity towards information and liquidity, 
which has been discussed in the previous chapters, and could explain the conflicting 
results in the literature. 
In more detail, a new dynamic expectations structural model for intraday price changes 
is proposed, extending the existing literature in the following ways. First, it deviates 
from a static approach of modelling intraday prices and Bid-Ask spread, in the sense 
that it allows price components to vary according to trading activity. The information 
and liquidity components are revised after trading intensity fluctuations. Second, price 
revisions depend on the, Bayesian, learning process of market participants, who 
condition their quoted prices upon expectations about the price impact of future 
transactions. Consequently, price and spread components are modelled as continuous 
latent variables that depend on past trading history, public information and market 
participants’ learning ability. Third, the dynamic character of the model provides a 
framework to measure the information and liquidity pricing impact of a trade, in a way 
that the profitability of a market or limit order strategy can be maximized. These 
components are measurable and they are revised after every transaction. Investors can 
formulate expectations and then take an appropriate market position. Finally, this model 
investigates further the intraday price formation of Carbon allowances, recognising the 
pricing impact of market participants’ behaviour. This can have numerous implications 
to regulation and trading in EU ETS.  
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The model proposed in this chapter extends the original model of Madhavan et al. 
(1997) and draws on the studies of Grammig et al. (2007), Angelidis and Benos (2009) 
and Ben Sita (2010). Market makers, in the context of a hybrid market, continuously 
observe trading history through trading intensity, trying to extract price-relevant 
information. They quote their prices based on liquidity considerations and the post-trade 
effect of their actions. Similar to Madhavan et al. (2007), intraday returns are driven by 
both an information and a liquidity component. In this thesis, however, these are 
allowed to be determined by dynamic expectations of trading intensity, and by the 
expected exposure to risk. The employed risk measures account for both level of risk 
and time of exposure. Thus, the model can be used to define the components of 
estimated spread and intraday volatility, as well as to help identify the most appropriate 
type of order, between Market and Limit Orders. 
One of the main findings is that spread components follow intraday patterns that seem 
to be adequately explained by the dual role of trading intensity. Trading intensity is 
positively related to the information component, and, probably due to economies of 
scale or the illiquid character of the market, expectations of higher trading intensity 
have a decreasing effect on price changes. The higher the expectation, the higher the 
price impact of a trade, which confirms the empirical findings of Dufour and Engle 
(2000b). In addition, and consistent with the literature, risk, in the form of price 
volatility, seems to affect only the liquidity component of the spread and not the 
information component. Another, main finding is the confirmation of the positive 
relation between limit orders and spread width. However, it appears that a limit order 
strategy could be profitable only when trading intensity is low. Otherwise, the 
information component indicates that the midpoint deviation would be larger than the 
spread. Finally, Buy orders, especially the large ones, are associated with a higher 
adverse-selection component and wider spreads than Sell orders. 
These findings are particularly relevant to various aspects of trading process in EU ETS. 
First, trading practices can be improved, as investors could measure more precisely the 
price impact of their trades, which might vary over time. They can account for 
behavioural aspects of trading in real time and they can formulate trading strategies that 
take into account the actions of other investors. These actions can be included in the 
expectations’ equation and thus can be explicitly modelled. This provides a promising 
framework that connects the theoretical approach of “inventory” and “information” 
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models with the empirical flexibility of “trade indicator” models and the forecasting 
ability of “VAR” models.  
Further, this practice can also be beneficial to investors who possess price unresolved 
information, as they can adjust their trading to current liquidity levels and sensitivity 
towards new information, and maximize their profits. These traders can measure the 
post-trade price impact of their actions and they can adjust their strategies accordingly 
in order to minimize their visibility and maximize their profit. Second, market making 
can be further improved, since this model can indicate when market orders can be 
profitable. Dealers can adjust spread width according to liquidity and information and 
they can become more efficient in managing both. This would result in narrower 
spreads and further contribute to market development and maturity. Finally, a better 
understanding of trading practices and their pricing impact can improve regulation and 
monitoring, and thus the market can be more efficient in achieving its goal, to reduce 
emissions. This model proposes a natural measure of market sensitivity towards 
information and liquidity, which are both highlighted in the Carbon market literature. 
Regulatory authorities can develop policies that can manage both and allow the market 
to reach a balance between “market innovation” and liquidity. 
7.2 Limitations and Future Research 
The empirical findings presented in the previous three chapters, although they support 
the validity of the models proposed, are recognized to be extracted under some quite 
restrictive assumptions. In the first empirical chapter (Chapter 4) duration is modelled 
solely as an exogenous variable. This is in line with Engle and Russell (1998) and Engle 
(2000), but several studies, even in Dufour and Engle (2000a, 2000b), raise concerns 
about the validity of this assumption. Expected duration is only conditioned on past 
arrival times and no external variable is allowed to have a direct impact on its DGP. 
Trading intensity is highly correlated to duration, since it is derived from it, and it 
affects only indirectly the magnitude of the coefficient that measures the size of the 
impact of past durations. The variable that accounts for OTC transactions is a dummy 
variable and it affects only the magnitude of the coefficient that measures the impact of 
past durations. Furthermore, contrary to Bauwens et al. (2004), who argue that simple 
ACD models cannot capture duration’s higher moments, a single distribution is 
considered to be sufficient in modelling duration series. In addition, although several 
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distributions of increased flexibility are examined, they all belong to the same family, 
and they all require the same restrictions. 
In the second empirical chapter (Chapter 5), the chosen distribution, although it helps 
identifying differently shaped hazard functions, belongs to the exponential family and it 
can only allow for specific shapes. The Weibull distribution appears to be a flexible and 
convenient framework for the analysis that follows, but it is recognized to produce only 
monotonic hazard functions. In addition, the choice of an observable variable might be 
too simplistic for generalizing. It might be sufficient for empirically examining the 
informational impact of trading intensity, but by no means, can proxy all relevant 
information. Moreover, the assumption that only the last trade has an impact on 
expected duration, while any informational content of previous transactions is ignored, 
is rather strong. The proposed model is an empirical investigation of the informational 
content of trading intensity and it is a convenient compromise in the trade-off between 
flexibility and applicability. It cannot summarize all available information and therefore 
it suffers from loss of generality. But trading intensity is observable and its future 
values, and thus the regime the next transaction is expected to be, can be forecasted. 
The main restriction in the model discussed in the third empirical chapter (Chapter 6) is 
the assumption that only price-relevant information is included in the last transaction. 
Asymmetric or asynchronous effects of past trading are assumed to be summarized on 
the last, post-trade, efficient price, which is unobservable. According to Hasbrouck 
(2007), depending on the context, this might be appropriate or too restrictive, but in any 
case it is a structural approach, mainly aiming at describing the trading process. Along 
the same lines, although the proposed model tries to connect the VAR framework with a 
structural model, through formulating expectations that depend on past trading history, 
it is still a structural approach. The dynamic character of the trading intensity 
expectation, allows a continuously updating process, but the only level of price-relevant 
information recognized is summarized in the last transaction. Moreover, for simplicity 
of the estimation process, the other two expectations, namely duration and price 
volatility, are assumed to be completely exogenous. This could be a rather strong 
assumption, especially when liquidity and risk are of great importance. 
However, the limitations of this study can work as a facilitator for future extensions of 
that framework. Some ideas that could be further developed, first refer to the model 
proposed in the second empirical chapter. The choice of the threshold variable might be 
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too restrictive. A latent variable, although it would increase the complexity of the 
estimation process, would be more appropriate in generalizing the empirical findings. 
The additional source of uncertainty could potentially be jointly modelled with the 
density function of duration using copulas. Other variables could also be included as 
determinants of potentially different regimes of duration, generalizing both in time and 
in the informational content of other marks. In addition, a distribution with higher 
flexibility, such as the Generalized Gamma or the Burr distribution, could provide non-
monotonic hazard functions that allow for deeper interpretation. The additional free 
parameters could be allowed to be affected by different variables, creating a multi-
dimensional modelling. The model in the third empirical chapter could be extended 
towards a more dynamic approach, in which all expectations can be modelled 
endogenously and thus jointly. This would allow for a better description of the trading 
process. Further, the existing framework could be extended to take into account longer 
memories, in order to enforce the link with the time series (VAR) approach. 
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Appendix 4.A 
 
 
 
Tables 
Summary of Models 
This section summarizes the models estimated in this chapter (Table 4.1) and the 
functions       of the innovations, employed to compute the long-term forecasts of 
non-linear models in Eq. (4.26) (Table 4.2).  
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Table 4.1: Summary of Estimated Models 
ACD 
E 
                  
W 
G 
Log-ACD 
E 
                          W 
G 
EXACD 
E 
                                 W 
G 
ACD-OTC 
E 
                            W 
G 
BCACD-OTC 
E 
                          
           W 
G 
BCACD 
E 
               
           W 
G 
STV-BCACD 
- 
STD-BCACD 
E 
               
            
                                 
W 
G 
E, W and G stand for Exponential, Weibull and Generalized Gamma distributions. All the models are 
abbreviated as in presented above. For parsimony reasons all lags have been restricted to 1. 
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Table 4.2: Functions       for the innovations, for the long-term forecasts 
Models       
Log-ACD         
EXACD             
BCACD-OTC,              
 
 
BCACD,       
  
ST-BCACD      
                              
 Table 2 presents the non-linear functions of standardized durations, used in the 
calculation of 10 steps forecasts. 
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Tables 
Estimation-Maximum Likelihood 
Tables 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 summarize the estimation results of all models for ECX I, 
ECX II, NP I and NP II, respectively. Panel A in each table presents the estimation 
results, the associated statistics and the hypotheses tests of three existing models: ACD 
(Eq. (4.4)), Log-ACD (Eq. (4.5)) and EXACD (Eq. (4.7)). Panel B in each table 
presents similar information for the ACD-OTC family of models, as in Eqs. (4.12) and 
(4.14). Panel C in each table presents similar information for the ST-BCACD family of 
models. The first three columns report the estimation results for the BCACD model, as 
in Eq. (4.8), the next three columns refer to the SEST-BCACD, while the last three 
columns refer to the STV-BCACD, as in Eqs. (4.15), (4.16), (4.17) and (4.18). E, W and 
G stand for Exponential, Weibull and Generalized Gamma distributions and γ and λ are 
the additional parameters. In addition, the first section in each table presents the 
estimates of the parameters of the models examined, where the values in parentheses are 
the associated t-statistics. The next section presents the Log-Likelihood function value, 
L, and the Bayesian Information Criterion, BIC. The next section presents the 
hypothesis testing for the additional parameters in W and G models, where the values in 
parentheses are the associated p-values. The last section presents the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistic, KS-stat, and the associated p-values. 
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Table 4.3: ECX I-Estimation Results 
A. Estimation of Existing Models 
ACD Log-ACD EXACD
Models E W G E W G E W G
Coefficients
omega 0.0201 0.0287 0.0451 0.0405 0.1348 0.2641 -0.0545 -0.0728 -0.0681
(8.87) (8.90) (11.75) (2.45) (13.57) (36.74) (-17.43) (-39.65) (-34.24)
alpha 0.1238 0.1795 0.2996 0.0367 0.1410 0.2432 0.1432 0.2303 0.3807
(12.74) (13.56) (15.25) (2.32) (11.99) (36.63) (17.41) (22.89) (25.59)
zeta -0.0932 -0.1723 -0.3240
(-13.25) (-14.98) (-26.92)
beta 0.8586 0.7962 0.6970 0.9548 0.7856 0.6271 0.9751 0.9517 0.9130
(59.51) (52.99) (40.04) (41.97) (35.91) (46.32) (55.42) (32.93) (47.32)
γ 0.6640 0.3039 0.6511 0.1647 0.6632 0.2669
(26.47) (37.77) (24.31) (11.30) (26.44) (36.88)
λ 4.1684 13.8026 5.4276
(20.89) (49.46) (19.84)
L -29515.01 -21576.69 -20828.688 -30726.29 -21816.49 -20230.44 -29494.59 -21456.77 -20493.14
BIC 1.3862 1.0138 0.9790 1.4431 1.0251 0.9509 1.3855 1.0085 0.9635
H(0)
zeta=0 175.69 224.31 42816.38
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
γ=1 22497.11 7484.90 21607.79 318460.06 19699.77 856444.51
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
λ=1 252.10 2104.90 19196.455
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
γ=λ=1 244282 3424821.4 9384582
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Fitting
KS-stat 0.0086 0.0072 0.0044 0.0069 0.0061 0.0049 0.0123 0.0110 0.0058
cv 0.01 =0.0074 (0.00) (0.01) (0.31) (0.02) (0.06) (0.19) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07)
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B. ACD-OTC Models 
ACD-OTC BCACD-OTC
Models E W G E W G
Coefficients
omega 0.0266 0.0373 0.0615 -0.1711 -0.3463 -1.3651
(7.71) (9.90) (13.86) (-6.96) (-10.22) (-10.20)
alpha 0.1007 0.1412 0.2053 0.1790 0.3702 1.4859
(9.84) (12.94) (17.52) (6.70) (9.83) (10.65)
zeta 0.0509 0.0736 0.1050 0.0595 0.0992 0.2801
(8.58) (10.88) (14.09) (7.06) (10.38) (20.92)
delta 0.5915 0.4501 0.1816
(21.38) (21.10) (12.37)
beta 0.8485 0.7852 0.6897 0.9653 0.9335 0.8384
(57.32) (49.53) (42.73) (69.90) (60.31) (56.35)
γ 0.6670 0.3157 0.6637 0.1965
(25.93) (43.46) (29.04) (38.64)
λ 3.9865 10.9840
(23.81) (19.65)
L -29261.30 -21433.42 -20668.39 -29275.00 -21291.33 -19931.86
BIC 1.3746 1.0074 0.9717 1.3755 1.0010 0.9374
H(0)
zeta=0 73.57 118.44 198.40 49.88 107.70 437.48
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
delta=1 218.09 664.90 3105.53
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
γ=1 18982.77 8868.60 21451.08 10704.36
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
λ=1 318.05 550.89
(0.00) (0.00)
γ=λ=1 345251 541689
(0.00) (0.00)
Fitting
KS-stat 0.0063 0.0048 0.0042 0.0158 0.0071 0.0051
cv 0.01 =0.0074 (0.05) (0.21) (0.36) (0.00) (0.05) (0.22)
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C. Smooth Transition BCACD Models 
 
BCACD SEST-BCACD STV-BCACD
Models E W G E W G E W G
Coefficients
omega -0.1783 -0.3741 -1.8384 -0.1290 -0.2535 -1.7009 -0.1347 -0.2810 -2.2934
(-6.92) (-9.80) (-8.54) (-9.19) (-6.85) (-5.41) (-6.69) (-8.55) (-3.62)
alpha 0.2174 0.4496 2.0691 0.1905 0.3543 1.9353 0.1937 0.3755 2.5167
(6.84) (10.11) (9.24) (8.81) (7.61) (6.06) (6.92) (9.69) (3.38)
delta 0.5434 0.4081 0.1332
(21.21) (19.86) (9.72)
delta 1 0.4707 0.3928 0.1286 1.1861 0.6833 0.1466
(16.28) (19.54) (6.92) (19.77) (9.98) (6.08)
delta2 1.2394 0.8003 0.1463 0.4935 0.4082 0.1031
(11.86) (9.07) (5.49) (5.04) (21.33) (15.76)
beta 0.9740 0.9466 0.8837 0.9877 0.9647 0.8842 0.9828 0.9570 0.8829
(92.57) (55.00) (30.17) (51.50) (43.21) (27.80) (58.14) (47.81) (30.30)
g 4.5118 6.1052 5.9850 4.2546 7.3534 6.9540
(2.91) (2.44) (2.81) (0.98) (2.15) (2.78)
s 1.0625 1.0150 1.0045 0.7783 0.8838 0.9065
(11.55) (7.19) (8.69) (7.33) (5.97) (6.89)
γ 0.6627 0.1924 0.6650 0.1932 0.6640 0.1902
(23.06) (18.61) (29.37) (20.08) (25.23) (16.89)
λ 10.2259 10.1474 10.4548
(9.83) (10.24) (8.98)
L -29465.09 -21401.73 -20181.12 -29226.83 -21347.74 -20180.85 -29329.07 -21374.10 -20179.66
BIC 1.3841 1.0059 0.9488 1.3737 1.0041 0.9491 1.3785 1.0053 0.9490
H(0)
delta=1 317.71 829.60 2063.44
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
γ=1 16591.97 7364.36 15782.26 7032.85 20825.08 5170.96
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
λ=1 90.42 85.21 65.91
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
γ=λ=1 1201960 1232191 1120516
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Fitting
KS-stat 0.0101 0.0059 0.0054 0.0079 0.0057 0.0054 0.0056 0.0049 0.0043
cv 0.01 =0.0074 (0.00) (0.06) (0.12) (0.00) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.11) (0.21)
  
 
Appendix 4.B 
 
265 
 
Table 4.4: ECX II-Estimation Results 
A. Existing Models 
 
ACD Log-ACD EXACD
Models E W G E W G E W G
Coefficients
omega 0.0486 0.0659 0.1107 0.1518 0.1781 0.2483 -0.0654 -0.0764 -0.0551
(10.04) (14.41) (21.15) (28.11) (42.49) (53.81) (-22.03) (-36.70) (-15.56)
alpha 0.1755 0.2381 0.3793 0.1483 0.1889 0.2414 0.2302 0.3160 0.4401
(18.75) (24.92) (33.62) (25.50) (39.19) (56.64) (20.74) (62.12) (35.03)
zeta -0.1690 -0.2578 -0.3925
(-15.77) (-46.52) (-35.16)
beta 0.7892 0.7114 0.5853 0.7234 0.6618 0.5812 0.9095 0.8731 0.8195
(62.22) (58.06) (49.26) (49.41) (58.76) (58.21) (63.30) (56.11) (40.42)
γ 0.6577 0.1787 0.6581 0.1990 0.6606 0.1990
(46.16) (44.46) (45.04) (43.13) (36.42) (44.27)
λ 10.4856 12.4657 9.7654
(29.49) (19.47) (24.47)
L -78630.22 -60400.79 -56690.16 -78314.85 -59709.62 -55187.00 -77763.556 -59740.54 -55680.46
BIC 1.7235 1.3242 1.2430 1.7166 1.3090 1.2100 1.7046 1.3098 1.2210
H(0)
zeta=0 248.77 2163.67 2516.44
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
γ=1 49177.57 3807033 55876.60 3941314 39415.72 3956501
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
λ=1 1218.09 1759.71 1409.43
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
γ=λ=1 3807172 3959833 4835595
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Fitting
KS-stat 0.0041 0.0029 0.0027 0.0055 0.0054 0.0035 0.0142 0.0130 0.0103
cv 0.01 =0.0048 (0.05) (0.20) (0.24) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
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B. ACD-OTC Models 
ACD-OTC BCACD-OTC
Models E W G E W G
Coefficients
omega 0.0534 0.0775 0.1378 -0.3649 -0.6964 -2.0810
(10.14) (15.29) (22.98) (-12.77) (-13.31) (-9.47)
alpha 0.1672 0.2167 0.2932 0.4420 0.7960 2.2348
(19.41) (26.46) (36.36) (13.22) (14.03) (10.03)
zeta 0.0463 0.0881 0.1442 0.0437 0.1167 0.3203
(7.12) (13.57) (19.26) (5.44) (15.03) (31.07)
delta 0.4068 0.2813 0.1190
(20.83) (16.64) (9.85)
beta 0.7814 0.6952 0.5626 0.9012 0.8518 0.7634
(59.02) (55.72) (46.51) (60.61) (57.43) (42.55)
γ 0.6584 0.1986 0.6609 0.1999
(43.26) (59.22) (49.90) (51.76)
λ 10.1968 9.9298
(26.50) (34.48)
L -78508.07 -60237.19 -56413.56 -77377.90 -59381.01 -54664.66
BIC 1.7210 1.3207 1.2370 1.6963 1.3021 1.1988
H(0)
zeta=0 50.72055 184.09 370.97 29.58 225.85 965.10
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
delta=1 923.02 1806.61 5317.06
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
γ=1 43792.66 4221307 63209.93 5057331
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
λ=1 1307.64 1010.50
(0.00) (0.00)
γ=λ=1 4226338 5057332
(0.00) (0.00)
Fitting
KS-stat 0.0053 0.0032 0.0028 0.0051 0.0464 0.0042
cv 0.01 =0.0048 (0.00) (0.15) (0.19) (0.00) (0.04) (0.05)
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C. Smooth Transition BCACD Models 
 
BCACD SEST-BCACD STV-BCACD
Models E W G E W G E W G
Coefficients
omega -0.3778 -0.7564 -3.2812 -0.3091 -0.6258 -2.3955 -0.3114 -0.6053 -2.0981
(-11.06) (-12.30) (-5.26) (-12.99) (-11.88) (-7.27) (-12.88) (-12.37) (-10.96)
alpha 0.4679 0.8889 3.5173 0.3941 0.7580 2.6356 0.3983 0.7385 2.3406
(11.56) (13.30) (5.62) (13.50) (13.06) (7.93) (13.05) (13.59) (12.13)
delta 0.3896 0.2551 0.1174
(17.41) (15.16) (5.21)
delta 1 0.3786 0.2523 0.0989 0.5080 0.3381 0.1207
(20.60) (15.02) (0.73) (17.39) (16.45) (10.40)
delta2 0.5107 0.3233 0.2936 0.3844 0.2560 0.0834
(15.99) (12.89) (2.69) (16.76) (13.78) (10.51)
beta 0.9080 0.8718 0.8258 0.9159 0.8771 0.8266 0.9145 0.8771 0.8284
(67.30) (54.99) (53.13) (63.64) (51.13) (63.15) (71.75) (40.21) (60.70)
g 1.5066 2.0784 0.0146 3.3074 2.9474 2.6592
(1.34) (1.42) (1.17) (1.86) (2.11) (1.02)
s 2.1682 2.3865 2.1778 0.4051 0.4517 0.5377
(11.84) (23.56) (12.61) (13.94) (19.47) (8.35)
γ 0.6611 0.1991 0.6614 0.1991 0.6614 0.1992
(39.46) (54.47) (37.20) (46.36) (37.25) (44.50)
λ 11.8453 10.4985 10.3584
(23.87) (29.77) (28.48)
L -77441.93 -59500.57 -55165.27 -77362.83 -59480.26 -55155.45 -77360.49 -59472.88 -55144.16
BIC 1.6976 1.3045 1.2097 1.6962 1.3045 1.2098 1.6962 1.3043 1.2096
H(0)
delta=1 743.65 1958.41 4209.12
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
γ=1 37836.79 5720736 41355.12 3827346 28062.47 3052941
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
λ=1 1044.09 1171.22 1108.49
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
γ=λ=1 5734443 3827370 3053508
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Fitting
KS-stat 0.0050 0.0041 0.0037 0.0060 0.0043 0.0034 0.0072 0.0041 0.0032
cv 0.01 =0.0048 (0.01) (0.05) (0.12) (0.00) (0.05) (0.14) (0.00) (0.05) (0.15)
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Table 4.5: NP I-Estimation Results 
A. Existing Models 
ACD Log-ACD EXACD
Models E W G E W G E W G
Coefficients
omega 0.0625 0.0674 0.0747 0.1262 0.1660 0.2277 -0.0863 -0.0982 -0.0951
(3.47) (4.64) (12.08) (5.78) (8.20) (10.57) (-4.87) (-19.51) (-5.44)
alpha 0.2116 0.2580 0.3138 0.1248 0.1682 0.2018 0.2516 0.3078 0.3569
(5.40) (6.51) (10.75) (4.99) (7.50) (11.05) (8.09) (19.23) (10.41)
zeta -0.1807 -0.2318 -0.2759
(-7.42) (-14.48) (-8.32)
beta 0.7334 0.6880 0.6533 0.7378 0.6679 0.6244 0.9074 0.8938 0.8830
(14.31) (15.18) (33.70) (10.61) (12.40) (13.29) (31.55) (39.31) (39.44)
γ 0.6253 0.3798 0.6215 0.3236 0.6293 0.3888
(17.23) (15.75) (7.53) (24.19) (27.85) (17.10)
λ 2.3997 3.2261 2.3381
(19.31) (13.07) (9.91)
L -2853.21 -1940.95 -1911.35 -2901.99 -1941.74 -1893.54 -2810.67 -1920.31 -1891.13
BIC 1.5066 1.0291 1.0158 1.5323 1.0296 1.0064 1.4864 1.0205 1.0073
H(0)
zeta=0 55.03 209.76 69.19
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
γ=1 3393.76 56636.23 2841.40 2558.39 3323.59 722.69
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
λ=1 1634.20 81.38 32.17
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
γ=λ=1 83218.83 20773.67 16032.65
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Fitting
KS-stat 0.0276 0.0232 0.0141 0.0222 0.0197 0.0159 0.0398 0.0354 0.0186
cv 0.01 =0.0239 (0.00) (0.01) (0.31) (0.02) (0.05) (0.19) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08)
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B. ACD-OTC Models 
ACD-OTC BCACD-OTC
Models E W G E W G
Coefficients
omega 0.0689 0.0782 0.0928 -0.4323 -0.7010 -1.2033
(3.44) (4.56) (5.12) (-3.54) (-11.51) (-3.94)
alpha 0.1764 0.2123 0.2453 0.4606 0.7308 1.2589
(5.45) (7.11) (6.78) (3.47) (9.55) (3.99)
zeta 0.0645 0.1023 0.1273 0.1119 0.1831 0.2897
(2.13) (3.56) (3.91) (2.52) (5.80) (6.37)
delta 0.3823 0.2855 0.1869
(5.00) (11.95) (3.92)
beta 0.7264 0.6690 0.6275 0.8705 0.8322 0.7914
(13.60) (13.61) (13.78) (25.41) (40.63) (30.76)
γ 0.6257 0.3783 0.6286 0.3257
(15.92) (16.86) (11.98) (12.25)
λ 2.4350 3.2336
(9.79) (6.69)
L -2846.32 -1935.87 -1904.16 -2801.31 -1907.26 -1863.19
BIC 1.5052 1.0286 1.0141 1.4837 1.0158 0.9948
H(0)
zeta=0 18.87 12.65 15.31 16.33 19.1594 40.57
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
delta=1 65.17 94.47 290.47
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
γ=1 4014.62 767.68 3360.72 643.73
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
λ=1 33.30 21.34
(0.00) (0.00)
γ=λ=1 18860.22 25766.64
(0.00) (0.00)
Fitting
KS-stat 0.0203 0.0154 0.0136 0.0338 0.0207 0.0144
cv 0.01 =0.0239 (0.06) (0.22) (0.36) (0.00) (0.06) (0.29)
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C. Smooth Transition BCACD Models 
 
BCACD SEST-BCACD STV-BCACD
Models E W G E W G E W G
Coefficients
omega -0.3959 -0.6100 -0.9445 -0.3792 -0.5840 -0.9782 -0.3395 -0.5620 -0.9236
(-3.68) (-3.95) (-3.05) (-4.09) (-3.88) (-18.47) (3.82) (-3.06) (-4.68)
alpha 0.4775 0.7270 1.1293 0.4635 0.7030 1.1608 0.4433 0.6904 1.1111
(3.74) (4.11) (3.36) (4.14) (4.08) (14.47) (4.31) (3.60) (5.15)
delta 0.4145 0.3272 0.2384
(5.76) (4.77) (3.47)
delta 1 0.3535 0.2986 0.1399 0.6013 0.3801 0.3645
(4.81) (4.25) (2.23) (6.11) (5.08) (2.88)
delta2 0.4571 0.3528 0.3281 0.3973 0.3248 0.2266
(5.68) (4.62) (6.07) (3.15) (2.66) (2.09)
beta 0.8943 0.8696 0.8482 0.8969 0.8715 0.8474 0.8976 0.8720 0.8489
(30.43) (31.70) (32.39) (30.54) (30.29) (41.51) (32.23) (31.95) (32.98)
g 10.5006 9.4302 0.0314 3.8299 5.3254 1.1698
(1.70) (1.64) (0.28) (2.19) (1.79) (0.81)
s 1.5875 2.3260 2.9797 0.7198 0.7577 0.8038
(8.92) (25.86) (0.96) (2.39) (3.86) (8.35)
γ 0.6280 0.3534 0.6282 0.3527 0.6283 0.3543
(14.27) (12.59) (9.50) (13.74) (18.44) (16.24)
λ 2.7681 2.7768 2.7560
(6.89) (7.69) (8.96)
L -2814.23 -1917.49 -1880.80 -2811.68 -1917.07 -1880.76 -2811.75 -1920.12 -1883.79
BIC 1.4883 1.0190 1.0019 1.4934 1.0253 1.0083 1.4935 1.0269 1.0099
H(0)
delta=1 66.20 22.74 12.06
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
γ=1 3814.98 530.87 3194.98 636.01 2321.16 875.89
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
λ=1 19.39 24.21 32.57
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
γ=λ=1 19322.36 17512.98 13812.93
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Fitting
KS-stat 0.0326 0.0191 0.0174 0.0282 0.0206 0.0195 0.0200 0.0176 0.0155
cv 0.01 =0.0239 (0.00) (0.06) (0.12) (0.00) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.11) (0.21)
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Table 4.6: NP II-Estimation Results 
A. Existing Models 
ACD Log-ACD EXACD
Models E W G E W G E W G
Coefficients
omega 0.1123 0.1329 0.1379 0.1168 0.1402 0.1565 -0.0494 -0.0542 -0.0510
(2.95) (2.88) (3.09) (6.77) (7.74) (6.96) (-4.06) (-3.57) (-2.88)
alpha 0.1263 0.1721 0.1829 0.1133 0.1328 0.1407 0.2372 0.2856 0.2965
(5.43) (4.55) (4.51) (7.30) (8.86) (8.50) (6.22) (8.90) (8.09)
zeta -0.2007 -0.2467 -0.2580
(-4.71) (-7.80) (-6.64)
beta 0.7619 0.7016 0.6897 0.5931 0.5864 0.5811 0.8206 0.8057 0.8063
(14.00) (9.08) (9.25) (7.72) (9.34) (8.82) (16.47) (20.21) (19.56)
γ 0.6338 0.5782 0.6351 0.5297 0.6382 0.5664
(8.08) (15.72) (8.76) (14.59) (8.04) (15.97)
λ 1.1636 1.3542 1.21953951
(10.21) (8.91) (10.12)
L -3338.22 -2558.04 -2556.90 -3315.56 -2537.43 -2533.29 -3286.11 -2529.05 -2527.11
BIC 1.8583 1.4279 1.4295 1.8457 1.4164 1.4164 1.8317 1.4140 1.4152
H(0)
zeta=0 22.15 60.78 44.04
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
γ=1 2588.95 131.42 2316.44 167.70 2324.05 149.54
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
λ=1 2.06 5.44 3.32
(0.15) (0.02) (0.07)
γ=λ=1 2907.79 4164.64 1523.05
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Fitting
KS-stat 0.0256 0.0181 0.0170 0.0277 0.0271 0.0175 0.0717 0.0657 0.0521
cv 0.01 =0.0242 (0.01) (0.20) (0.19) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
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B. ACD-OTC Models 
ACD-OTC BCACD-OTC
Models E W G E W G
Coefficients
omega 0.1154 0.1371 0.1432 -0.4843 -0.7557 -0.9202
(2.50) (3.88) (3.51) (-2.35) (-3.23) (-2.88)
alpha 0.1117 0.1399 0.1474 0.5441 0.8129 0.9827
(3.71) (3.98) (3.63) (2.49) (3.40) (2.98)
zeta 0.0250 0.0589 0.0689 0.0653 0.1348 0.1686
(5.98) (12.04) (2.35) (2.45) (3.89) (4.90)
delta 0.2662 0.1962 0.1678
(2.92) (3.40) (2.83)
beta 0.7605 0.6999 0.6860 0.7696 0.7416 0.7297
(10.44) (11.56) (9.31) (10.14) (12.97) (15.71)
γ 0.6338 0.5698 0.6368 0.5194
(14.27) (17.06) (9.63) (15.48)
λ 1.1924 1.4064
(10.59) (9.90)
L -3336.98 -2556.13 -2554.63 -3293.78 -2525.78 -2520.82
BIC 1.8599 1.4291 1.4305 1.8382 1.4145 1.4140
H(0)
zeta=0 10.96 14.15 86.77 12.11 18.37 25.22773
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
delta=1 65.00 194.57 196.24
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
γ=1 3629.37035 165.94 3230.57 205.16
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
λ=1 2.92 8.18
(0.09) (0.00)
γ=λ=1 1291.49 2464.97
(0.00) (0.00)
Fitting
KS-stat 0.0214 0.0131 0.0115 0.0208 0.0189 0.0171
cv 0.01 =0.0242 (0.03) (0.42) (0.59) (0.04) (0.08) (0.14)
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C. Smooth-Transition BCACD Models 
BCACD SEST-BCACD STV-BCACD
Models E W G E W G E W G
Coefficients
omega -0.4563 -0.6776 -0.7738 -0.3002 -0.4743 -0.5364 -0.2987 -0.4278 -0.4796
(-2.43) (-2.54) (-3.60) (-3.11) (-3.00) (-3.16) (-3.35) (-3.41) (-3.36)
alpha 0.5457 0.7972 0.9097 0.4012 0.6093 0.4599 0.4129 0.5818 0.6526
(2.59) (2.78) (3.93) (3.35) (3.34) (3.59) (3.57) (3.96) (3.89)
delta 0.2860 0.2262 0.2064
(3.16) (2.87) (4.95)
delta 1 0.2656 0.1998 0.1793 0.6069 0.4801 0.4385
(3.14) (2.59) (3.40) (3.02) (3.04) (3.30)
delta2 0.5512 0.3827 0.3494 0.2523 0.1909 0.1710
(3.26) (3.29) (3.36) (3.18) (3.26) (3.56)
beta 0.7890 0.7727 0.7676 0.8404 0.8069 0.7996 0.8262 0.8049 0.7977
(10.81) (14.30) (12.12) (13.63) (13.50) (15.13) (14.68) (14.61) (14.51)
g 8.5006 9.3534 9.9002 2.4758 2.7121 2.8036
(3.70) (2.18) (2.13) (3.96) (2.99) (2.91)
s 2.6766 3.3260 3.9797 0.6051 0.7326 0.6038
(17.42) (15.86) (13.96) (13.94) (15.86) (8.35)
γ 0.6369 0.5431 0.6374 0.5442 0.6379 0.5463
(11.80) (15.10) (77.20) (14.97) (8.64) (15.00)
λ 1.3042 1.3014 1.2950
(9.11) (9.37) (9.60)
L -3296.76 -2530.45 -2527.20 -3288.75 -2527.74 -2524.54 -3287.51 -2526.11 -2523.00
BIC 1.8376 1.4148 1.4153 1.8399 1.4201 1.4206 1.8393 1.4192 1.4198
H(0)
delta=1 62.32 96.25 362.15
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
γ=1 3368.98 161.37 1928.04 157.26 2531.75 155.12
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
λ=1 4.51 4.71 4.79
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
γ=λ=1 1876.12 1734.30 3067.37
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Fitting
KS-stat 0.0253 0.0208 0.0187 0.0402 0.0289 0.0226 0.0488 0.0273 0.0214
cv 0.01 =0.0242 (0.01) (0.04) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03)
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Fitting and Forecasting 
Table 4.7 in Appendix 4.C presents the ranking of the models according to their Q-
statistics. The first column presents the models and the associated distributions. The 
next three columns report the ranking, the Q-statistic and the p-value in parenthesis for 
ECX I. The next three sections present similar results for ECX II, NP I and NP II, 
respectively. Table 4.8 in Appendix 4C reports the ranking of the models according to 
their in-sample one-step “forecasts”. The first column presents the models along with 
the associated distributions. The first section reports the rank and the actual value of 
UNL in both markets and phases. The next section reports similar results according to 
CORR loss function. The next two columns present the average ranking of each model 
in each phase. The next two columns present the average ranking of each model in each 
market, while the last reports the average ranking (Total) of each model. Table 4.9 
presents similar results according to the out-of-sample one-step forecasts of the models, 
while Table 4.10 focuses on the out-of-sample ten-step forecasts.  
Finally figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 present the Q-Q plots of all models in ECX I, ECX 
II, NP I and NP II, respectively. Panel A in each figure presents the Q-Q plots of 
existing models. The first column refers to the basic ACD model, the second refers to 
the Log-ACD, while the last to the EX-ACD. Panel B in each figure presents the Q-Q 
plots of new models proposed in this study. The first two columns refer to the ACD-
OTC and BCACD-OTC models, while the last column refers to the STM-ACD, T-ACD 
and T-ACD-OTC models. Panel C in each figure presents the Q-Q plots of the BCACD 
(first column), the SEST-BCACD (second column) and the STV-BCACD (third 
column) models. E, W and G refer to the Exponential, Weibull and Generalized Gamma 
distributions. 
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Table 4.7: Q-statistics at 15 lags 
 
Rank ECX I Pr Rank ECX II Pr Rank NP I Pr Rank NP II Pr
ACD E 4 8.16 (0.88) 9 14.88 (0.46) 1 1.46 (1.00) 3 6.33 (0.97)
W 3 6.85 (0.94) 7 14.63 (0.48) 4 1.81 (1.00) 5 6.35 (0.97)
G 1 5.51 (0.99) 5 14.01 (0.51) 7 2.11 (1.00) 4 6.33 (0.97)
Log-ACD E 26 43.00 (0.00) 22 30.88 (0.00) 27 44.88 (0.00) 27 68.07 (0.00)
W 27 47.20 (0.00) 14 28.49 (0.00) 26 40.96 (0.00) 26 66.10 (0.00)
G 25 35.40 (0.00) 12 26.70 (0.00) 25 33.96 (0.00) 25 63.12 (0.00)
EXACD E 22 30.20 (0.00) 17 29.87 (0.00) 19 19.47 (0.00) 18 23.58 (0.00)
W 16 24.10 (0.00) 16 29.82 (0.00) 17 15.75 (0.00) 16 22.36 (0.00)
G 14 17.90 (0.00) 13 28.03 (0.00) 15 10.75 (0.00) 13 20.02 (0.00)
BCACD E 24 30.80 (0.00) 19 30.03 (0.00) 18 17.26 (0.00) 22 26.54 (0.21)
W 19 25.30 (0.00) 21 30.68 (0.00) 16 13.06 (0.00) 20 25.20 (0.22)
G 11 12.40 (0.00) 18 29.98 (0.00) 12 8.44 (0.00) 17 23.06 (0.25)
SEST-BCACD E 23 30.70 (0.00) 25 40.23 (0.00) 22 21.06 (0.00) 21 25.57 (0.22)
W 17 24.60 (0.00) 27 41.33 (0.00) 21 20.42 (0.00) 10 14.80 (0.39)
G 13 17.40 (0.00) 26 40.51 (0.00) 14 9.75 (0.00) 15 21.99 (0.25)
STV-BCACD E 20 27.80 (0.00) 24 31.68 (0.00) 24 33.08 (0.00) 23 27.76 (0.21)
W 15 21.00 (0.00) 15 29.28 (0.00) 20 20.29 (0.00) 12 17.80 (0.28)
G 10 11.75 (0.00) 10 15.64 (0.00) 11 8.17 (0.00) 11 16.17 (0.37)
ACD-OTC E 9 11.01 (0.75) 8 14.72 (0.46) 2 1.71 (1.00) 7 6.51 (0.97)
W 7 9.62 (0.84) 6 14.29 (0.48) 5 1.85 (1.00) 8 6.52 (0.97)
G 6 8.76 (0.89) 4 13.79 (0.51) 8 2.17 (1.00) 6 6.51 (0.97)
BCACD-OTC E 21 29.90 (0.00) 23 31.46 (0.00) 23 24.07 (0.00) 24 29.97 (0.01)
W 18 24.70 (0.00) 20 30.11 (0.00) 13 9.68 (0.00) 19 24.21 (0.06)
G 12 14.70 (0.00) 11 19.66 (0.00) 10 5.88 (0.00) 14 21.58 (0.12)
STM-ACD 8 9.98 (0.00) 3 13.40 (0.00) 3 1.72 (1.00) 1 5.57 (0.99)
T-ACD 2 6.81 (0.96) 1 10.04 (0.82) 6 1.96 (1.00) 9 10.76 (0.77)
T-ACD-OTC 5 8.25 (0.91) 2 10.39 (0.79) 9 2.64 (1.00) 2 5.61 (0.99)
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Table 4.8: In-Sample Forecasts 
 
UNL CORR RANK
Rank ECX I Rank ECX II Rank NP I Rank NP II Rank ECX I Rank ECX II Rank NP I Rank NP II Phase I Phase II ECX NP Total
ACD E 3 6.6977 14 3.8849 15 2.6001 20 1.2568 9 0.3904 21 0.2085 9 0.3550 9 0.1908 8 16 11 10 10
W 5 6.7994 18 3.9595 16 2.6100 25 1.2630 7 0.4181 11 0.2241 8 0.3568 8 0.1938 8 14 9 12 9
G 2 6.5263 11 3.8205 11 2.5203 23 1.2624 2 0.4374 2 0.2320 6 0.3594 6 0.1974 3 7 3 9 7
Log-ACD E 21 8.2731 9 3.6757 9 2.5012 26 1.2689 24 0.2707 10 0.2243 26 0.2808 18 0.1844 21 15 16 20 18
W 12 7.7151 8 3.6356 4 2.4390 24 1.2629 23 0.2782 9 0.2262 25 0.2810 16 0.1847 17 13 13 17 15
G 8 6.8834 2 3.4283 3 2.4112 22 1.2592 22 0.2824 8 0.2275 24 0.2815 15 0.1848 12 10 8 15 12
EXACD E 23 8.3093 26 4.3735 26 2.6684 19 1.2389 27 0.1699 27 0.1004 27 0.2796 21 0.1829 27 27 26 27 27
W 27 8.5721 27 4.5028 25 2.6674 18 1.2322 26 0.1724 26 0.1059 19 0.2894 19 0.1834 26 26 27 23 26
G 26 8.5292 25 4.1261 17 2.6217 17 1.2262 25 0.2335 25 0.1513 17 0.2939 13 0.1859 22 24 25 15 23
BCACD E 22 8.3026 19 4.0329 24 2.6590 16 1.2205 18 0.3056 19 0.2120 22 0.2856 21 0.1829 23 20 22 24 21
W 20 8.2333 22 4.0557 21 2.6561 15 1.2124 16 0.3178 17 0.2148 16 0.2940 20 0.1833 19 19 20 18 19
G 14 7.8488 17 3.9336 14 2.5763 13 1.2052 14 0.3240 18 0.2146 14 0.3009 17 0.1846 11 17 15 13 15
SEST-BCACD E 25 8.5107 24 4.0683 22 2.6570 11 1.2006 19 0.3048 20 0.2088 23 0.2850 23 0.1805 25 21 24 20 25
W 24 8.4688 23 4.0596 23 2.6585 21 1.2580 13 0.3259 16 0.2176 15 0.2944 27 0.1396 20 25 21 26 22
G 15 7.9891 16 3.9076 18 2.6527 27 1.2860 11 0.3328 14 0.2188 13 0.3019 14 0.1853 12 18 14 18 17
STV-BCACD E 17 8.1441 21 4.0400 27 2.7664 10 1.1848 21 0.2931 23 0.2018 21 0.2880 25 0.1604 23 22 23 24 23
W 16 8.1374 15 3.9039 19 2.6556 14 1.2079 15 0.3230 24 0.2014 20 0.2884 26 0.1529 18 22 18 20 20
G 13 7.8237 7 3.6338 20 2.6559 12 1.2018 10 0.3387 12 0.2214 18 0.2930 11 0.1880 15 7 10 14 11
ACD-OTC E 7 6.8600 12 3.8373 7 2.4833 9 1.1488 8 0.4044 6 0.2280 4 0.3641 5 0.2010 6 6 7 6 6
W 9 6.9920 5 3.5861 8 2.4947 8 1.1458 6 0.4214 5 0.2289 3 0.3665 4 0.2019 6 4 5 4 4
G 10 7.0723 6 3.5997 5 2.4475 7 1.1366 4 0.4306 3 0.2319 2 0.3681 2 0.2037 3 3 4 3 3
BCACD-OTC E 18 8.2077 4 3.5405 13 2.5419 6 1.1225 20 0.3043 22 0.2045 12 0.3046 24 0.1763 16 12 16 11 14
W 19 8.2135 20 4.0387 12 2.5282 5 1.0935 17 0.3144 15 0.2180 11 0.3093 10 0.1881 14 11 19 8 13
G 11 7.5186 13 3.8710 10 2.5129 4 1.0743 12 0.3296 13 0.2198 10 0.3096 12 0.1875 10 7 12 7 8
STM-ACD 6 6.8152 10 3.8159 6 2.4539 3 1.0621 5 0.4269 7 0.2277 7 0.3582 7 0.1943 5 5 6 4 5
T-ACD 4 6.7113 1 3.4259 2 2.3379 1 1.0235 3 0.4341 4 0.2316 5 0.3635 3 0.2033 2 2 2 2 2
T-ACD-OTC 1 4.7420 3 3.5100 1 2.2984 2 1.0400 1 0.4545 1 0.2425 1 0.3893 1 0.2176 1 1 1 1 1
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Table 4.9: Out-of-Sample Short-Term Forecasts 
 
UNL CORR RANK
Rank ECX I Rank ECX II Rank NP I Rank NP II Rank ECX I Rank ECX II Rank NP I Rank NP II Phase I Phase II ECX NP Total
ACD E 20 4.7389 9 4.8883 26 2.6268 15 2.3921 19 0.1501 9 0.2471 20 0.2165 27 0.0448 24 15 13 25 22
W 21 4.7935 10 4.9699 27 2.6525 12 2.3370 17 0.1561 6 0.2538 18 0.2176 26 0.0463 23 12 10 23 20
G 19 4.5967 6 4.7732 25 2.5760 11 2.3107 15 0.1604 4 0.2574 17 0.2181 25 0.0469 22 9 7 22 15
Log-ACD E 5 3.8659 8 4.8167 8 2.0341 20 2.5545 13 0.1620 22 0.2113 10 0.2330 5 0.0940 8 14 8 10 7
W 4 3.7441 7 4.7792 3 2.0050 18 2.4727 11 0.1637 20 0.2125 9 0.2340 3 0.0941 4 11 6 4 5
G 3 3.4867 4 4.5142 13 2.1933 17 2.4134 10 0.1640 21 0.2113 7 0.2348 4 0.0941 7 9 5 6 6
EXACD E 25 18.3581 23 5.4671 24 2.2761 25 2.6501 27 0.0120 27 0.1395 22 0.2061 21 0.0794 26 27 26 27 27
W 27 25.7743 25 5.5980 22 2.2604 23 2.5937 26 0.0126 26 0.1418 26 0.1967 18 0.0820 27 26 27 26 26
G 26 24.9345 19 5.3037 18 2.2214 21 2.5675 25 0.0196 25 0.1740 27 0.1859 17 0.0826 25 24 25 23 25
BCACD E 12 4.1626 17 5.2585 19 2.2252 26 2.6589 24 0.1428 15 0.2222 12 0.2263 20 0.0807 16 22 21 21 22
W 13 4.1723 21 5.3325 21 2.2536 22 2.5921 23 0.1465 17 0.2178 13 0.2261 15 0.0827 20 20 23 18 22
G 9 4.0682 16 5.2325 16 2.2200 19 2.5500 9 0.1650 23 0.2088 11 0.2283 14 0.0834 10 19 13 15 13
SEST-BCACD E 17 4.2367 20 5.3256 23 2.2714 27 2.6795 8 0.1710 16 0.2219 4 0.2424 22 0.0772 11 25 18 20 20
W 11 4.1581 22 5.3550 20 2.2439 16 2.3941 6 0.1717 18 0.2158 6 0.2360 24 0.0500 9 23 13 16 17
G 8 4.0680 15 5.2199 15 2.2173 8 2.1778 3 0.1757 24 0.2030 3 0.2425 16 0.0827 5 17 9 7 8
STV-BCACD E 18 4.3894 18 5.2918 17 2.2210 24 2.6451 7 0.1711 14 0.2234 14 0.2213 19 0.0815 12 20 13 19 18
W 10 4.1547 14 5.0733 14 2.2002 10 2.2788 12 0.1627 18 0.2158 21 0.2119 23 0.0513 13 18 10 17 15
G 7 4.0480 5 4.7728 12 2.1070 9 2.1857 4 0.1745 13 0.2254 8 0.2342 13 0.0835 6 5 4 7 4
ACD-OTC E 23 5.6038 27 5.7783 10 2.0648 14 2.3741 18 0.1513 8 0.2507 19 0.2176 12 0.0875 20 16 24 14 18
W 24 5.6398 26 5.6552 11 2.0683 13 2.3463 16 0.1569 7 0.2522 16 0.2186 8 0.0906 16 12 22 12 14
G 22 5.4910 24 5.5278 9 2.0627 4 2.1314 14 0.1605 5 0.2571 15 0.2191 7 0.0919 14 5 20 5 10
BCACD-OTC E 14 4.2018 12 5.0363 6 2.0212 7 2.1395 22 0.1467 12 0.2313 25 0.2042 11 0.0879 16 8 17 13 12
W 16 4.2082 13 5.0373 7 2.0213 6 2.1357 21 0.1467 11 0.2318 24 0.2046 10 0.0879 19 5 18 11 11
G 15 4.2066 11 5.0303 5 2.0212 5 2.1352 20 0.1469 10 0.2318 23 0.2049 9 0.0879 15 4 12 7 9
STM-ACD 6 3.9187 3 4.3941 4 2.0187 3 2.0380 5 0.1725 2 0.2596 5 0.2369 1 0.0999 3 2 3 3 3
T-ACD 2 3.4699 2 4.2631 2 2.0045 2 2.0273 2 0.1976 3 0.2585 2 0.2606 6 0.0922 2 3 2 2 2
T-ACD-OTC 1 3.4695 1 4.2323 1 2.0018 1 2.0174 1 0.1979 1 0.2655 1 0.2698 2 0.0952 1 1 1 1 1
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Table 4.10: Out-of-Sample Long-Term Forecasts 
 
UNL CORR RANK
Rank ECX I Rank ECX II Rank NP I Rank NP II Rank ECX I Rank ECX II Rank NP I Rank NP II Phase I Phase II ECX NP Total
ACD E 9 4.2328 7 6.3974 9 2.3367 11 2.3641 9 0.0421 3 0.2229 7 0.0438 6 0.0791 5 4 5 6 5
W 8 4.1868 8 6.5088 8 2.3233 9 2.2582 14 0.0403 6 0.1945 4 0.0480 4 0.0837 5 4 6 4 5
G 5 3.3839 6 5.7660 7 2.1941 7 2.1805 4 0.0516 5 0.2000 3 0.0488 3 0.0859 3 3 3 3 3
Log-ACD E 7 3.5080 4 5.3990 5 1.8145 8 2.2104 26 0.0093 20 0.0275 12 0.0373 12 0.0417 9 11 13 10 11
W 6 3.4609 5 5.4507 4 1.7979 6 2.1308 25 0.0096 19 0.0276 10 0.0398 13 0.0412 8 10 10 6 9
G 2 2.4434 2 4.9096 3 1.7907 3 2.0182 27 0.0092 17 0.0315 9 0.0429 11 0.0418 7 9 8 5 7
EXACD E 12 5.3554 26 16.1917 20 5.1700 17 4.4079 24 0.0118 14 0.0468 21 0.0311 10 0.0420 21 17 19 17 18
W 16 6.2081 22 13.1523 22 5.3994 18 6.9647 23 0.0127 15 0.0403 20 0.0315 14 0.0409 22 18 19 19 20
G 3 2.5328 16 9.3016 19 5.1621 16 4.1113 22 0.0135 16 0.0340 16 0.0323 9 0.0424 14 14 13 14 14
BCACD E 24 12.9065 24 13.8989 17 4.8325 22 7.2302 15 0.0402 22 0.0076 27 0.0261 19 -0.0010 26 21 26 23 24
W 27 14.8943 21 13.0769 24 5.6111 26 8.7122 12 0.0418 25 0.0016 26 0.0261 22 -0.0029 27 24 26 25 27
G 20 11.1956 20 12.67 27 5.6845 27 8.7157 11 0.0419 26 0.0000 23 0.0297 24 -0.0031 22 26 22 27 25
SEST-BCACD E 23 12.2849 23 13.2880 16 4.7906 21 7.1995 5 0.0429 18 0.0300 19 0.0316 23 -0.0029 17 20 18 20 19
W 26 14.5418 25 14.7598 23 5.5456 25 8.4906 8 0.0422 23 0.0029 24 0.0278 26 -0.0041 22 27 25 25 26
G 19 10.62 18 12.06 26 5.6536 24 8.4810 13 0.0416 27 0.0000 6 0.0441 27 -0.0044 18 25 22 22 22
STV-BCACD E 22 12.2245 27 16.2424 18 4.8569 19 7.0312 6 0.0427 21 0.0092 25 0.0271 20 -0.0013 19 21 19 21 21
W 25 14.4614 19 12.5751 25 5.6351 23 7.9753 10 0.0419 24 0.0021 22 0.0298 21 -0.0029 25 21 24 24 23
G 21 11.87 17 11.37 21 5.1720 20 7.0966 7 0.0425 11 0.0910 5 0.0453 25 -0.0032 11 19 11 18 16
ACD-OTC E 14 5.8555 11 7.7420 11 2.6845 5 2.0835 18 0.0211 7 0.1198 14 0.0327 8 0.0429 12 8 9 11 9
W 15 5.9393 12 7.8367 12 2.7301 10 2.3191 20 0.0165 9 0.1042 15 0.0324 15 0.0393 16 12 11 12 12
G 13 5.7442 10 7.5478 10 2.6698 4 2.0789 16 0.0222 8 0.1099 13 0.0329 7 0.0456 10 6 7 9 8
BCACD-OTC E 11 4.9309 14 8.1209 14 3.8030 13 3.0570 19 0.0196 13 0.0905 17 0.0322 18 0.0010 15 15 13 15 15
W 18 10.0790 15 8.4875 15 3.8658 15 3.5977 21 0.0149 12 0.0905 18 0.0321 17 0.0023 20 16 17 16 17
G 17 8.4774 13 8.0879 13 3.0179 12 3.0422 17 0.0216 10 0.0991 11 0.0382 16 0.0103 13 13 13 12 13
STM-ACD 10 4.5124 9 7.1409 6 1.9705 14 3.3782 3 0.0739 2 0.2297 8 0.0432 5 0.0830 4 7 4 6 4
T-ACD 1 2.2699 3 4.9110 1 1.6376 2 1.8912 1 0.0939 1 0.2356 2 0.0610 2 0.0917 1 2 1 2 1
T-ACD-OTC 4 2.6344 1 4.7169 2 1.7696 1 1.8155 2 0.0921 4 0.2223 1 0.0795 1 0.0958 2 1 2 1 2
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Figure 4.1: Q-Q Plots ECX I 
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B. ACD-OTC and Mixture of Distributions Models 
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C. ACD-OTC and Mixture of Distributions Models 
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Figure 4.2: Q-Q Plots ECX II 
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B. ACD-OTC and Mixture of Distributions Models 
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C. ACD-OTC and Mixture of Distributions Models 
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Figure 4.3: Q-Q Plots NP I 
A. Existing Models 
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B. ACD-OTC and Mixture of Distributions Models 
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C. ACD-OTC and Mixture of Distributions Models 
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Figure 4.4: Q-Q Plots NP II 
A. Existing Models 
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B. ACD-OTC and Mixture of Distributions Models 
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C. ACD-OTC and Mixture of Distributions Models 
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Tables 
Estimation-Maximum Likelihood 
Tables 5.1 (ECX I), 5.2 (ECX II), 5.3 (NP I) and 5.4 (NP II) present the estimation 
results for all models presented in Section 5.2 in both markets and phases. Each Table is 
divided horizontally into three parts. In the first part the estimates of all parameters of 
the STM-ACD model described in Eqs. (5.2), (5.3), (5.4), (5.5), (5.6), (5.7) and (5.8), 
and of the T-ACD, described in Eqs. (5.10), (5.11), (5.12), (5.13) and (5.14) are 
presented. The values in parentheses are the associated t-statistics. In the second part, L 
stands for the Log-Likelihood function value, BIC stands for the Bayesian Information 
Criterion, while KS-stats stands for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics along with 
critical values. The values in parentheses are the associated p-values. The third part 
presents hypotheses tests for the distribution parameters. The numbers in parentheses 
are the associated p-values.  
Table 5.5 presents the estimation results of the Burr-T-ACD models, as in Eqs. (5.15), 
(5.16) and (5.17). The table is divided into four sections, one for each market in each 
phase. In each section the first three rows report the estimates of the parameters of the 
conditional mean specification (i.e., Eq. (5.15)), while the next two refer to the shape 
parameters of the Burr distribution (i.e., Eqs. (5.16) and (5.17)). Values in parentheses 
are t-statistics. The bottom three rows in each section present hypotheses tests for the 
distribution parameters. The numbers in parentheses are the associated p-values. 
Table 5.6 reports the basic statistics (i.e., Mean, Minimum, Maximum and Standard 
Deviation) of Duration, Volume and Trading Intensity in both markets and phases. The 
statistics are reported separately for every regime for every year. Furthermore, they are 
dissected into Buyer (B) and Seller (O) initiated transactions. 
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Table 5.7 presents the proportion of identical trades and their associated durations in 
both markets and phases. In more detail, the first three rows of the table present the 
proportion of total trades that is identical to the previous transaction, when the current 
trade is normal, fundamental or informed. Along the same lines, the next three rows 
report the proportion of total trades that is identical, when the current trade is identical 
to the previous transaction from the same regime (e.g., a current informed transaction is 
compared to the previous informed). The bottom section of the table shows the average 
duration for both unique and identical transactions, in both markets and phases, for 
every regime. 
Table 5.8 reports the average duration, volume and trading intensity in both markets and 
phases, before and after an informed transaction. In more detail, the first panel of the 
table presents the results for ECX, where the first three rows refer to Phase I and the 
next three refer to Phase II. In each phase, the results are organized according to the 
normal, fundamental and informed regimes. The next panel presents the results for NP.  
ECX I stands for the data referred to ECX for the Phase I (2005-2007). Respectively, 
ECX II stands for Phase II (2008) in ECX, NP I for Phase I in Nord Pool and NP II for 
Phase II of the same market.  
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Table 5.11: Estimation Results-ECX I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STM-ACD
Threshold 
ACD
Models Models Non-OTC OTC
Coefficients Coefficients
omega 0.0258 omega normal 0.0297 0.0960 0.1027
(9.88) (4.42) (8.75) (7.44)
alpha 0.1367 alpha normal 0.0943 0.1130 0.1253
(5.22) (6.95) (12.89) (14.16)
beta 0.8214 beta normal 0.8910 0.8120 0.8747
(33.70) (25.39) (44.37) (48.91)
γ 1 0.9877 omega fundamental 0.0191 0.0190 0.0370
(11.40) (2.42) (3.20) (2.56)
γ 2 4.5947 alpha fundamental 0.1724 0.2427 0.2031
(12.72) (4.88) (9.34) (4.84)
γ 3 0.3798 beta fundamental 0.8276 0.7573 0.7969
(26.91) (23.44) (29.16) (18.99)
g 1 2.3533 omega informed 0.0021 0.0433 0.0501
(15.20) (2.17) (5.67) (8.79)
g 2 1.8586 alpha informed 0.3468 0.2702 0.1355
(12.84) (2.93) (9.28) (9.70)
s 1 0.3943 beta informed 0.8614 0.7067 0.8645
(14.16) (23.85) (31.11) (51.83)
s 2 0.7090
(9.65)
L -21082.34 L -24802.41057
BIC 0.9991 BIC 1.1668
KS-stat 0.0037 0.0032
cv 0.01 =0.0074 (0.53) (0.71)
H(0)
γ1=1 0.04
(0.83)
γ2=1 127.46
(0.00)
γ 3 =1 3462.61
(0.00)
0.0030
Threshold ACD-OTC
-23131.36
1.0903
(0.81)
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Table 5.12: Estimation Results-ECX II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STM-ACD
Threshold 
ACD
Models Models Non-OTC OTC
Coefficients Coefficients
omega 0.0702 omega normal 0.0810 0.0866 0.2442
(15.62) (13.04) (10.26) (12.51)
alpha 0.0592 alpha normal 0.1624 0.1685 0.1396
(68.09) (22.91) (20.89) (15.75)
beta 0.8465 beta normal 0.7765 0.7543 0.7256
(49.14) (69.95) (29.69) (36.69)
γ 1 1.0026 omega fundamental 0.0099 0.0165 0.0186
(19.91) (3.49) (2.12) (2.87)
γ 2 4.3937 alpha fundamental 0.2344 0.2653 0.2359
(21.87) (9.83) (7.41) (9.41)
γ 3 0.6057 beta fundamental 0.7656 0.7347 0.7641
(16.98) (32.11) (20.51) (25.75)
g 1 2.3632 omega informed 0.0085 0.0108 0.0572
(22.37) (2.95) (6.08) (6.20)
g 2 3.7037 alpha informed 0.4387 0.1821 0.0547
(20.73) (7.09) (8.35) (10.78)
s 1 1.0123 beta informed 0.8385 0.8179 0.8425
(29.33) (38.29) (15.53) (18.14)
s 2 2.5099
(18.52)
L 60209.48 L -70616.96
BIC 1.3848 BIC 1.5487
KS-stat 0.0019 0.0018
cv 0.01 =0.0048 (0.70) (0.85)
H(0)
γ1=1 0.60
(0.43)
γ2=1 112.90
(0.00)
γ 3 =1 807.60
(0.00)
0.0017
(0.86)
Threshold ACD-OTC
-65736.20
1.4430
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Table 5.13: Estimation Results-NP I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STM-ACD
Threshold 
ACD
Models Models Non-OTC OTC
Coefficients Coefficients
omega 0.0698 omega normal 0.0887 0.1372 0.1319
(4.53) (4.21) (3.34) (2.82)
alpha 0.2137 alpha normal 0.1801 0.1650 0.2039
(5.84) (6.29) (5.92) (5.85)
beta 0.7013 beta normal 0.7500 0.6603 0.7359
(11.46) (15.04) (9.38) (11.92)
γ 1 1.1226 omega fundamental 0.0045 0.0571 0.0478
(16.55) (2.25) (2.05) (3.45)
γ 2 3.0960 alpha fundamental 0.2316 0.4234 0.0093
(11.77) (3.24) (3.72) (5.08)
γ 3 0.4332 beta fundamental 0.7684 0.5766 0.9907
(21.13) (10.74) (6.43) (8.34)
g 1 2.3840 omega informed 0.1387 0.1639 0.1534
(12.23) (3.26) (2.07) (3.87)
g 2 1.9867 alpha informed 0.4138 0.0279 0.3625
(9.77) (5.96) (4.06) (5.75)
s 1 0.3684 beta informed 0.5862 0.4200 0.6375
(12.61) (13.61) (8.44) (10.84)
s 2 0.9380
(8.02)
L -1849.76 L -2237.43
BIC 1.0052 BIC 1.1959
KS-stat 0.0120 0.0103
cv 0.01 =0.0239 (0.51) (0.70)
H(0)
γ1=1 0.10
(0.79)
γ2=1 56.78
(0.00)
γ 3 =1 110.01
(0.00)
1.1949
0.0096
(0.78)
Threshold ACD-OTC
-2194.41
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Table 5.14: Estimation Results-NP II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STM-ACD
Threshold 
ACD
Models Models Non-OTC OTC
Coefficients Coefficients
omega 0.1251 omega normal 0.0346 0.0460 0.0040
(3.48) (2.73) (3.25) (3.40)
alpha 0.1310 alpha normal 0.2631 0.1959 0.1483
(4.39) (6.79) (5.91) (6.19)
beta 0.7625 beta normal 0.7369 0.7145 0.8517
(13.02) (13.40) (9.25) (11.82)
γ 1 1.0629 omega fundamental 0.5486 0.4354 0.5478
(4.00) (2.98) (2.41) (2.80)
γ 2 3.5080 alpha fundamental 0.0766 0.0795 0.0786
(9.79) (4.76) (2.09) (2.93)
γ 3 0.5768 beta fundamental 0.4979 0.5228 0.5244
(12.00) (5.05) (2.50) (3.26)
g 1 1.6797 omega informed 0.2923 0.4734 0.5211
(3.52) (2.80) (2.55) (2.79)
g 2 3.5042 alpha informed 0.3995 0.3123 0.1882
(3.20) (5.47) (4.55) (4.60)
s 1 0.5987 beta informed 0.5091 0.3473 0.4242
(7.87) (8.53) (9.23) (10.80)
s 2 0.9086
(4.96)
L -2501.60 L -2839.48
BIC 1.4082 BIC 1.5953
KS-stat 0.0104 0.0089
cv 0.01 =0.0242 (0.71) (0.87)
H(0)
γ1=1 0.03
(0.86)
γ2=1 69.49
(0.00)
γ 3 =1 180.04
(0.00)
-2935.73
1.6714
Threshold ACD-OTC
0.0088
(0.87)
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Table 5.15: Burr-TACD-All Markets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ECX I ECX II
Models Normal Fundamental Informed Normal Fundamental Informed
Coefficients
omega 0.0236 0.0513 0.0314 0.1125 0.0448 0.0110
(3.07) (4.58) (10.00) (9.10) (6.18) (2.85)
alpha 0.0634 0.2095 0.7306 0.2717 0.1613 0.1213
(4.50) (6.42) (11.45) (16.89) (6.94) (4.46)
beta 0.9293 0.4505 0.2694 0.6771 0.5352 0.7266
(34.81) (4.65) (7.91) (34.81) (7.99) (8.48)
k 1.0387 1.5937 1.1224 0.9911 2.1229 0.7634
(9.52) (12.52) (14.21) (23.52) (17.94) (14.11)
σ 2 0.0010 (0.39) 1.3540 0.0136 1.1326 0.0064
(1.91) (11.35) (14.69) (1.12) (13.29) (1.32)
H(0)
k=1 1.27 382.93 1.89 0.45 188.58 88.15
(0.16) (0.00) (0.15) (0.64) (0.00) (0.00)
σ 2 =0 0.37 128.86 165.28 0.14 108.50 0.26
(0.78) (0.00) (0.00) (0.81) (0.00) (0.81)
σ 2 =1 119.27 318.13 113.21 955.69 2.08 157
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
NP I NP II
Models Normal Fundamental Informed Normal Fundamental Informed
Coefficients
omega 0.0536 0.1141 0.0069 0.1125 0.0903 0.0097
(6.99) (10.61) (4.23) (6.20) (3.41) (1.65)
alpha 0.1209 0.0076 0.2699 0.1171 0.0515 0.1207
(9.27) (2.42) (4.11) (9.13) (3.22) (2.05)
beta 0.8507 0.6443 0.4493 0.7981 0.6609 0.4019
(16.67) (6.15) (5.97) (14.29) (3.87) (2.42)
k 1.1647 3.0461 1.1628 0.9649 2.9886 1.2289
(13.33) (10.17) (8.41) (16.01) (6.16) (13.60)
σ 2 0.0649 0.3805 0.0596 0.1347 0.4771 0.8104
(2.16) (5.98) (1.76) (2.26) (2.95) 3.6372
H(0)
k=1 1.41 46.64 6.64 4.14 16.82 4.42
(0.18) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04)
σ 2 =0 2.20 35.76 0.98 6.25 8.67 13.23
(0.05) (0.00) (0.26) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)
σ 2 =1 21.672 17.11 29.43 46.71 10.41 2.2
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.14)
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Table 5.16: Duration, Volume and Trading Intensity: Basic Statistics 
 
 
ECX Average Min Max StDev Average Min Max StDev Average Min Max StDev
2006 Normal Total 1640.28 4 30979 3117.01 14.32 1 500 16.68 0.08 0.00 0.40 0.09
B 1712.82 4 30480 3157.80 15.84 1 500 18.36 0.08 0.00 0.40 0.10
O 1396.22 4 30979 2963.96 9.19 1 50 6.85 0.07 0.00 0.40 0.09
Fundamental Total 67.56 3 1819 108.27 23.72 1 500 31.70 0.54 0.40 0.67 0.08
B 77.08 3 1819 118.04 27.00 1 500 34.23 0.55 0.40 0.67 0.08
O 26.78 3 99 15.51 9.66 1 50 7.00 0.53 0.40 0.67 0.08
Informed Total 22.83 1 374 40.40 24.07 1 500 40.06 4.13 0.67 78.93 5.83
B 32.68 1 374 48.49 32.76 1 500 48.76 4.05 0.68 78.93 6.48
O 7.13 1 76 9.41 10.24 1 50 8.13 4.27 0.67 35.30 4.61
2007 Normal Total 308.32 3 21091 496.87 9.50 1 500 9.51 0.12 0.00 0.40 0.10
B 312.19 3 15675 492.90 10.70 1 500 10.49 0.12 0.00 0.40 0.11
O 301.29 3 21091 503.94 7.31 1 150 6.87 0.10 0.00 0.40 0.10
Fundamental Total 44.56 2 840 49.67 15.90 1 250 16.47 0.53 0.40 0.67 0.08
B 53.67 2 840 54.42 19.04 1 250 18.13 0.53 0.40 0.67 0.08
O 27.09 2 777 32.50 9.89 1 200 10.28 0.52 0.40 0.67 0.08
Informed Total 14.03 1 480 24.64 17.41 1 500 29.61 3.99 0.67 264.25 6.61
B 19.55 1 480 31.12 22.97 1 500 38.59 3.85 0.67 264.25 7.58
O 7.77 1 217 11.08 11.09 1 150 10.35 4.15 0.67 68.23 5.28
2008 Normal Total 92.43 1 4332 170.77 7.42 1 500 11.57 0.24 0.00 1.03 0.27
B 99.82 1 4332 179.23 9.20 1 500 13.96 0.24 0.00 1.03 0.26
O 82.47 1 4136 158.11 5.01 1 216 6.42 0.24 0.00 1.03 0.28
Fundamental Total 8.63 1 380 14.67 15.15 1 500 26.32 1.62 1.03 2.48 0.40
B 11.21 1 380 18.47 19.85 1 500 33.36 1.61 1.03 2.48 0.40
O 5.30 1 114 5.83 9.11 1 190 9.35 1.63 1.03 2.48 0.40
Informed Total 3.73 1 141 6.73 23.37 3 500 43.08 6.84 2.48 419.02 8.69
B 4.72 1 141 8.52 30.38 3 500 54.80 7.27 2.48 419.02 10.22
O 2.42 1 52 2.42 14.01 3 185 13.20 6.26 2.48 132.11 6.04
NP Average Min Max StDev Average Min Max StDev Average Min Max StDev
2006 Normal Total 7827.03 68 29933 8037.06 17.50 1 200 22.35 0.04 0.00 0.33 0.06
B 7979.82 68 29549 8180.61 16.20 1 200 21.38 0.04 0.00 0.33 0.07
O 7545.57 140 29933 7800.55 19.89 1 120 23.98 0.04 0.00 0.33 0.06
Fundamental Total 160.00 37 360 116.98 20.45 5 50 15.57 0.62 0.39 0.81 0.12
B 156.56 37 360 121.45 21.67 5 50 16.96 0.66 0.54 0.81 0.10
O 175.50 80 271 135.06 15.00 10 20 7.07 0.47 0.39 0.55 0.11
Informed Total 91.64 16 300 82.34 25.45 5 60 16.65 1.53 0.92 2.45 0.44
B 83.00 16 300 97.52 22.14 5 60 18.45 1.46 0.92 2.11 0.40
O 106.75 60 180 55.70 31.25 20 50 13.15 1.65 1.21 2.45 0.55
2007 Normal Total 2121.94 21 28356 3257.22 9.14 1 150 7.67 0.08 0.00 0.34 0.08
B 2158.97 27 28356 3290.25 9.54 1 100 8.23 0.08 0.00 0.34 0.09
O 2080.43 21 25982 3220.39 8.69 1 150 6.96 0.07 0.00 0.34 0.08
Fundamental Total 109.10 10 2462 137.43 12.46 2 250 14.41 0.55 0.34 0.85 0.15
B 106.14 10 540 82.83 12.27 2 50 9.34 0.56 0.34 0.85 0.15
O 112.54 14 2462 181.45 12.67 2 250 18.66 0.54 0.34 0.85 0.14
Informed Total 34.38 1 578 50.77 14.22 2 200 16.13 5.92 0.85 120.85 12.06
B 35.80 1 578 53.17 14.66 2 175 15.51 5.90 0.85 120.85 11.77
O 32.26 1 450 47.01 13.57 3 200 17.03 5.96 0.86 110.73 12.49
2008 Normal Total 1608.95 5 20542 2303.49 9.70 1 308 11.26 0.10 0.00 0.68 0.14
B 1673.41 7 20270 2271.06 10.04 1 215 10.12 0.10 0.00 0.68 0.15
O 1546.87 5 20542 2333.18 9.37 1 308 12.24 0.10 0.00 0.68 0.14
Fundamental Total 95.03 7 1320 176.51 16.37 2 200 27.49 0.77 0.68 0.85 0.05
B 92.45 7 1320 220.05 16.18 2 200 34.34 0.77 0.68 0.84 0.05
O 97.61 7 600 121.33 16.55 2 100 18.77 0.77 0.68 0.85 0.05
Informed Total 29.80 1 1200 90.44 16.08 1 250 25.13 6.75 0.86 99.49 10.47
B 27.57 1 616 48.15 16.53 2 200 22.90 7.47 0.88 99.49 12.43
O 32.01 1 1200 118.32 15.63 1 250 27.19 6.03 0.86 71.92 8.04
Duration Volume Trading Intensity
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Table 5.17: Proportion on Identical Trades and Associated Durations  
 
 
Table 5.18: Duration, Volume and Trading Intensity before and after Informed 
Trading 
  
Previous Trade
Normal
Fundamental
Informed
Same Group
Normal
Fundamental
Informed
Prevous Trade Unique Identical Unique Identical Unique Identical Unique Identical
Normal 552.68 230.89 96.33 49.59 2570.64 N/A 1664.79 594.92
Fundamental 51.77 19.81 9.02 4.89 110.1811 N/A 98.17 58.33
Informed 19.00 5.40 3.90 2.11 35.27 N/A 34.09 19.67
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Average 
Duration 
adfasd
Total
Transactions Transactions Transactions Transactions
0.00 14.29
ECX I ECX II NP I NP II
Total
8.17 10.08 0.00 4.62
6.30 5.31 0.00 0.00
Total
7.72 8.34 0.00 5.21
16.37 9.51 0.00 7.89
31.77 19.51
20.94 8.06
0.00 29.72
ECX I ECX II NP I NP II
Duration Volume
Trading 
Intensity Duration Volume
Trading 
Intensity
Uninformed 1.3504 12.6340 0.8520 1.3526 12.6724 0.8426
Fundamental 0.8421 12.4998 1.0315 0.8346 12.5955 1.0333
Informed 0.6708 11.8333 1.4544 0.6613 11.6745 1.4861
Uninformed 1.0475 9.5621 0.9213 1.0519 9.6195 0.9301
Fundamental 0.8705 10.1273 1.1611 0.8527 9.9071 1.1932
Informed 0.7851 10.3196 1.4237 0.7678 10.0790 1.4799
Duration Volume
Trading 
Intensity Duration Volume
Trading 
Intensity
Uninformed 1.1049 10.9069 0.8588 1.0963 10.8047 0.8888
Fundamental 0.7581 10.7089 1.0636 0.7282 10.8122 1.1835
Informed 0.6441 10.3582 1.5232 0.6172 10.6613 1.5754
Uninformed 0.9728 10.5877 0.8926 0.9801 10.6648 0.8501
Fundamental 0.9347 12.0526 0.9940 0.8778 11.1171 1.1734
Informed 0.7995 10.8739 1.7372 0.7807 10.6502 1.9819
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Before After
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Figures 
Empirical Findings 
The following Figures provide evidence for the various applications of the estimated 
models. Figure 5.1 presents the proportion of the different types of trades in both 
markets and phases and during the trading day, according to the estimation results of 
STM-ACD (Eqs. (5.5), (5.6) and (5.7)) reported in Tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4. In more 
detail, panel A reports the average proportion of normal, fundamental and informed 
trades in both ECX and NP, both in Phase I and II. Panel B focuses on the proportion of 
informed trading over the trading years (2006-2008) in both ECX and NP. Panel C 
presents the proportion of informed trading during the opening, main and closing 
sessions of both markets in both phases. 
Figure 5.2 focuses on the shape parameter of the Weibull distribution, the volume and 
the autocorrelation of trading. In more detail, panel A of Figure 5.2 graphically presents 
the estimation results (Tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4) for the shape parameter of the 
Weibull distribution associated with each regime in both markets and phases, as well as 
the transition from one regime to the other. Panel B reports the average trading volume 
in each regime, while panel C reports the autocorrelation of order flow in ECX and NP 
and in both phases 
Figurer 5.3 presents the average duration (in seconds) of Buyer (B) and Seller (O) 
initiated transactions in each regime in all markets and phases. Panel A refers to ECX 
Phase I, while panel B refers to ECX Phase II, panel C refers to NP Phase I and panel D 
refers to NP Phase II. The first two bars report the average duration in the normal 
regime, the next two in the fundamental regime and the last two in the informed regime. 
The actual durations are reported below each bar. 
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Figure 5.4 focuses on the attributes of OTC transactions. Panel A reports the proportion 
of OTC transactions in each regime in both markets and phases. Panel B compares the 
average transaction size (in number of contracts) of normal and OTC transactions. 
Figure 5.5 reports the relative number of Buyer (Bid) and Seller (Offer) initiated 
transactions over the years in both markets. In more detail, panel A presents the number 
of Buys and Sells in ECX, while panel B refers to NP. Panel C reports the difference of 
Buys and Sells (Buys minus Sells) over the years in both markets. 
Figures 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 present various statistics derived from the estimated model 
(STM-ACD, Eqs. (5.5), (5.6) and (5.7)) around a sharp price drop on 1 August 2008. In 
more detail, panels A and B present the proportion of normal, fundamental and 
informed trading in ECX and NP, respectively. Figure 5.7 reports the difference in the 
number of Buyer and Seller (Buyer minus Seller) initiated transactions, dissected to the 
different regimes around the price drop. Panel A refers to ECX, while panel B refers to 
NP. Along the same lines, Figure 5.8 presents the relative volumes and durations of 
Buys and Sells in each regime (normal, fundamental and informed) in ECX (panel A) 
and NP (panel B), three days before and three days after the price drop. 
Finally, Figure 5.9 presents the hazard functions derived from the estimation results of 
Burr-T-ACD model, as in Eqs. (5.15), (5.16) and (5.17), reported in Table 5.5. The first 
column presents the hazard function of the durations associated with low trading 
intensity (normal regime) in both markets and phases. Similarly, the second column 
presents the hazard functions of the durations associated with the fundamental regime, 
while the last column refers to the informed regime.  
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Figure 5.1: Probability of Informed Trading (PIN) 
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Figure 5.2: Average Volume and Autocorrelations of Regime Trades 
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Figure 5.3: Duration by Market, Trader Type and Trade Sign Indicator 
 
Normal Fundamental Informed
B 582.82 56.09 20.66
O 419.14 27.07 7.73
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
A
ve
ra
ge
 d
u
ra
ti
o
n
 i
n
 s
e
co
n
d
s
A. ECX I
Normal Fundamental Informed
B 103.66 10.94 4.37
O 86.39 5.84 2.48
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
A
ve
ra
ge
 D
u
ra
ti
o
n
 i
n
 s
e
co
n
d
s
B. ECX II
Normal Fundamental Informed
B 2329.61 113.21 36.53
O 2246.53 107.92 33.31
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
A
ve
ra
ge
 D
u
ra
ti
o
n
 i
n
 s
e
co
n
d
s
C. NP I
Normal Fundamental Informed
B 1673.41 97.61 32.01
O 1546.87 92.45 27.57
0
300
600
900
1200
1500
1800
A
ve
ra
ge
 D
u
ra
ti
o
n
 i
n
 s
e
co
n
d
s
D. NP II 
Appendix 5.B 
305 
 
Figure 5.4: Average Duration and Proportion of OTC Trades 
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Figure 5.5: Volume by Trade Sign Indicator 
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Figure 5.6: Proportion of Trader Type Around a Negative Price Event 
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Figure 5.5: Trades by Sign (Difference between Bid and Offer) Around a Negative 
Event 
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Figure 5.8: Sum of Signed Volume and Average Duration by Trader Type Around 
a Negative Price Event 
 
 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
2
8
-J
u
l
2
9
-J
u
l
3
0
-J
u
l
3
1
-J
u
l
0
1
-A
u
g
0
4
-A
u
g
0
5
-A
u
g
0
6
-A
u
g
2
8
-J
u
l
2
9
-J
u
l
3
0
-J
u
l
3
1
-J
u
l
0
1
-A
u
g
0
4
-A
u
g
0
5
-A
u
g
0
6
-A
u
g
2
8
-J
u
l
2
9
-J
u
l
3
0
-J
u
l
3
1
-J
u
l
0
1
-A
u
g
0
4
-A
u
g
0
5
-A
u
g
0
6
-A
u
g
Normal Fundamental Informed
A
ve
ra
ge
 D
u
ra
ti
o
n
V
o
lu
m
e
A. ECX
Bid (volume) Offer (volume) Bid (duration) Offer (duration)
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
2
8
-J
u
l
2
9
-J
u
l
3
0
-J
u
l
3
1
-J
u
l
0
1
-A
u
g
0
4
-A
u
g
0
5
-A
u
g
0
6
-A
u
g
0
1
-A
u
g
0
6
-A
u
g
3
0
-J
u
l
3
1
-J
u
l
0
1
-A
u
g
Normal Fundamental Informed
A
ve
ra
ge
 D
u
ra
ti
o
n
V
o
lu
m
e
B. NP
Bid (volume) Offer (volume) Bid (duration) Offer (duration)
Appendix 5.B 
310 
 
Figure 5.9: Hazard functions For Burr-TACD, All Markets 
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Derivation of Equations 
The next section presents the derivation of model equations required for post estimation 
analysis. More specifically, in the first part, the second moment of price change,    , 
(Eq. (6.27) in Section 6.2.2) is analyzed taking into account all relevant model 
assumptions. The second part explicitly describes the derivation of the partial derivative 
of price change with respects to expected trading intensity,           , discussed in Eq. 
(6.31) in Section 6.2.2. 
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Eq. (6.27) in Section 6.2.2 
The derivation of the second moment of the price change can be expressed as: 
      
                     
 
                           
 
 
 
    
 
  
 
           
 
    
 
               
  
           
  
   
     
                            
 
   
     
          
            
                        
This variance Expression is evaluated under                
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Eq. (6.31) in Section 6.2.2 
The derivation of the first order partial derivative of the price change variance, with 
respect to           : 
The return variance can be written as: 
 
        
  
  
     
 
           
 
        
             
 
            
           
       
           
         
  
Then, applying the following rules of partial differentiation: 
 The generalized power function rule: 
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and 
             
 
           
            
           
           
            
              
           
           
 
                       
 
 
   
 The product of functions rule: 
                       
           
 
    
           
           
           
             
           
         
    
             
                 
      
           
          
 
              
           
           
        
   
 
 
 
 
 
           
  
                
 
   
                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Then, the first order partial derivative of         , with respect to           , after 
gathering like terms can be written as: 
           
           
  
 
 
 
 
 
        
  
          
            
 
   
 
                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
Appendix 6.B 
 
 
Tables 
Estimation Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) 
and Post Estimation Analysis 
 
The following section presents the estimation results for the MRR and the Dynamic 
Expectations Joint Model, discussed in Section 6.2, as well as a tabulated post 
estimation analysis of price changes, spreads, price change variance and their 
components, based on basic statistics.  
More specifically, Table 6.1 presents the estimates of the coefficients of Eqs. (6.22) and 
(6.23), with moment conditions in Eq. (6.28). t-statistics are in parentheses. The first 
column presents the original, MRR, model, while the next three columns examine 
explicitly the information spread component,   , applying a stepwise regression 
analysis, incorporating trading intensity, T.I. and the Risk, as in Eq. (6.16). The next 
three columns examine in a similar fashion the liquidity spread component,   . The last 
two columns present the estimation results of the joint model, where in the last column 
only the statistically significant parameters are included. The coefficients are arranged 
as follows. First,    (Eq. (6.16)) is analyzed, being followed by    (Eq. (6.18)), the 
autocorrelation of the order flow, ρ, and the estimates of the coefficients in Eq. (6.12). 
The bottom two sections present the J-statistics and the associated p-values in 
parentheses, as well as the Mean Squared Error for in- and out-of-sample forecasts. 
Table 6.2 presents the average trading intensity (arithmetic mean) and the parameter 
estimates of the joint model presented in Eqs. (6.22) and (6.23), as well their product, 
for every regime of trading intensity, as they have been found in Chapter 5. The last 
column is the implied (Eq. (6.24)) half spread (excluding the risk aversion component). 
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Table 6.3 presents the intraday variations of Actual and Expected Trading Intensity, 
Estimated Spread and Variance and their Components. 
Table 6.4.A presents the average implied spread, as in Eq. (6.24), and adverse-selection 
component,   , as in Eq. (6.16), across different levels of transaction size and 
frequency, in all markets and phases. The threshold values have been arbitrarily chosen 
to indicate low, middle and high trading activity and they are the same for both markets 
in both phases. Furthermore, the table differentiates the relative sizes of spreads 
between Buyer and Seller initiated transactions. Focusing on each market, the first two 
columns present the width of the implied spread and the size of the adverse-selection 
component after a trade that belongs to one of the pre-described different regimes. The 
next two columns summarize the values of spreads and adverse-selection across 
different levels of trading intensity of the current transaction. Table 6.4.B presents the 
relative values for the second moment of price change. 
Finally, the abbreviations ECX I, ECX II, NP I and NP II stand for European Climate 
Exchange Phase I, European Climate Exchange Phase II, Nord Pool Phase I and Nord 
Pool Phase II, respectively. 
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Table 6.19: Estimation Results 
A. ECX I
 
 
 
Theta Phi Full
MRR T.I Risk T.I+Risk T.I Risk T.I+Risk All Significant
θ 1 0.0808 0.0771 0.0762 0.0707 0.0816 0.0804 0.0821 0.0112
(9.31) (2.06) (5.94) (2.03) (9.05) (8.68) (9.13) (0.35)
θ 2, uninformed 0.0159 0.0186 0.0921 0.0987
(1.62) (1.71) (2.23) (5.45)
θ 2, fundamental 0.0077 0.0095 0.0698 0.0469
(2.42) (2.51) (2.36) (3.04)
θ 2, informed 0.0017 0.0016 0.0206 0.0398
(2.97) (2.79) (3.84) (2.93)
θ 3 0.0269 0.0307 0.0756
(0.43) (0.47) (0.88)
θ 4 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0005
(0.66) (0.68) (-0.76)
φ 1 0.0410 0.0393 0.0413 0.0391 0.0760 0.0317 0.0701 0.0985 0.0969
(3.26) (3.31) (3.02) (3.32) (3.27) (2.71) (2.45) (3.33) (3.40)
φ 2, uninformed -0.0337 -0.0313 -0.0834 -0.0889
(-1.96) (-1.87) (-2.19) (-2.24)
φ 2, fundamental -0.0261 -0.0213 -0.0561 -0.0539
(-2.39) (-2.21) (-2.87) (-2.84)
φ 2, informed -0.0124 -0.0125 -0.0124 -0.0127
(-3.19) (-2.98) (3.39) (2.96)
φ 3 0.0454 0.0060 -0.0457
(0.58) (0.75) (-0.43)
φ4 0.0011 0.0010 0.0015 0.0011
(2.58) (2.48) (2.64) (2.64)
p  1 0.5022 0.5002 0.5001 0.5007 0.5003 0.5003 0.5000 0.4999 0.5001
(17.08) (17.20) (17.16) (17.22) (17.09) (17.15) (17.08) (17.07) (17.11)
c 1 0.5965 0.5971 0.5960 0.5961 0.5945 0.5963
(14.00) (14.02) (13.97) (13.97) (13.90) (14.08)
c 2 0.2626 0.2631 0.2637 0.2638 0.2641 0.2632
(15.25) (15.28) (15.26) (15.27) (15.25) (15.24)
c 3 0.0010 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0016
(0.09) (0.09) (-0.25) (-0.45) (-0.14)
c 4 0.0128 0.0129 0.0171 0.0171 0.0181
(0.66) (0.67) (0.87) (0.87) (0.92)
c 5 0.0354 0.0346 0.0374 0.0374 0.0372
(0.39) (0.69) (0.63) (0.73) (0.72)
c 6 -1.1828 -1.1828 -1.1879 -1.1880 -1.1927 -1.2069
(-24.41) (-24.40) (-24.24) (-24.20) (-24.21) (-28.78)
σ ε
2 0.0066 0.0082 0.0082 0.0082 0.0082 0.0082 0.0082 0.0082 0.0082
(2.24) (2.11) (2.04) (1.96) (1.99) (2.02) (1.97) (2.01) (2.01)
σ ξ
2 0.00017 0.00020 0.00020 0.00020 0.00020 0.00020 0.00020 0.00020 0.00020
(2.32) (2.31) (2.18) (2.24) (2.23) (2.21) (2.26) (2.22) (2.29)
J-stats 2.50 8.71 7.65 9.86 8.13 6.47 11.70 2.52 1.57
(0.11) (0.07) (0.05) (0.13) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.11) (0.21)
MSE in sample 1.5058 1.5033 1.6494 1.5013 1.4996 1.5075 1.4990 1.4981 1.4945
MSE out-of-sample 2.3101 2.3065 2.4662 2.3027 2.2965 2.3023 2.2961 2.2957 2.2946
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B. ECX II 
 
 
 
Theta Phi Full
MRR T.I Risk T.I+Risk T.I Risk T.I+Risk All Significant
θ 1 0.0496 0.0326 0.0478 0.0272 0.0498 0.0497 0.0498 -0.0090
(15.38) (2.02) (10.86) (1.75) (15.51) (15.25) (15.52) (-0.40)
θ1 , uninformed 0.0242 0.0366 0.0715 0.0613
(2.27) (2.39) (2.39) (8.31)
θ1 , fundamental 0.0133 0.0150 0.0456 0.0391
(2.31) (2.47) (2.98) (9.85)
θ1 , informed 0.0044 0.0049 0.0248 0.0286
(3.50) (3.57) (3.07) (9.91)
θ2 0.0313 0.0473 0.0383
(0.91) (1.35) (0.94)
θ3 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0014
(-0.04) (-0.34) (-1.83)
φ 1 0.0182 0.0126 0.0165 0.0117 0.0308 0.0083 0.0159 0.0590 0.0599
(3.10) (2.35) (2.85) (2.20) (2.94) (2.07) (1.93) (2.44) (3.76)
φ 2, uninformed -0.0117 -0.0068 -0.0561 -0.0522
(-2.54) (-2.11) (-2.02) (-2.63)
φ 2, fundamental -0.0109 -0.0042 -0.0401 -0.0385
(-2.93) (-2.76) (-2.61) (-3.57)
φ 2, informed -0.0035 -0.0011 -0.0128 -0.0128
(-2.97) (-3.88) (-3.26) (-3.55)
φ 3 0.0698 0.0620 0.0334
(1.41) (1.23) (0.57)
φ4 0.0022 0.0024 0.0034 0.0022
(2.39) (2.51) (2.15) (2.42)
p  1 0.4756 0.4758 0.4754 0.4757 0.4758 0.4756 0.4757 0.4758
(15.84) (16.79) (16.82) (16.88) (16.80) (16.82) (16.83) (16.82)
c 1 0.2688 0.2685 0.2709 0.2709 0.2705 0.2718
(14.32) (14.31) (14.44) (14.45) (14.42) (14.41)
c 2 0.1785 0.1784 0.1790 0.1801 0.1787 0.1790
(23.93) (23.39) (23.48) (25.80) (23.44) (23.39)
c 3 -0.0031 -0.0037 -0.0043 -0.0032 -0.0041
(-0.44) (-0.52) (-0.45) (-0.45) (-0.46)
c 4 0.0161 0.0158 0.0161 0.0281 0.0260
(1.25) (1.76) (1.86) (1.86) (1.84)
c 5 0.2293 0.2299 0.2274 0.2047 0.2276 0.2271
(6.62) (5.97) (6.57) (6.47) (6.57) (6.53)
c 6 -0.4531 -0.4351 -0.4540 -0.4015 -0.4529 -0.4697
(-13.09) (-11.64) (-13.12) (-11.59) (-13.09) (-14.60)
σ ε
2 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034
(4.51) (4.80) (4.88) (4.83) (4.87) (4.85) (4.86) (4.94) (4.90)
σ ξ
2 0.00005 0.00005 0.00004 0.00005 0.00005 0.00005 0.00005 0.00005 0.00005
(0.71) (0.67) (0.60) (0.62) (0.68) (0.61) (0.60) (0.73) (0.65)
J-stats 2.30 5.86 6.43 9.43 9.71 7.92 8.72 1.65 1.15
(0.13) (0.21) (0.09) (0.15) (0.05) (0.05) (0.19) (0.20) (0.28)
MSE in sample 0.7225 0.7214 0.7385 0.7216 0.7199 0.7231 0.7199 0.7195 0.7184
MSE out-of-sample 1.1667 1.1657 1.1833 1.1653 1.1648 1.1671 1.1645 1.1604 1.1596
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C. NP I 
 
 
 
Theta Phi Full
MRR T.I Risk T.I+Risk T.I Risk T.I+Risk All Significant
θ 1 0.1201 0.0285 0.0917 0.0314 0.1201 0.1201 0.1201 0.0195
(6.95) (1.75) (5.17) (1.68) (6.94) (6.95) (6.95) (-1.47)
θ1 , uninformed 0.3450 0.3641 0.4634 0.3796
(2.84) (2.74) (2.81) (2.41)
θ1 , fundamental 0.1729 0.1728 0.2347 0.2204
(4.81) (3.88) (4.25) (4.14)
θ1 , informed 0.0630 0.0630 0.0735 0.0733
(4.97) (4.25) (4.75) (4.89)
θ2 0.3072 -0.0165 0.0087
(1.87) (-0.12) (0.52)
θ3 0.0121 0.0105 -0.0107
(1.65) (1.45) (-0.89)
φ 1 0.0369 0.0592 0.0763 0.0498 0.0491 0.0416 0.0539 0.1302 0.1103
(2.01) (3.64) (4.53) (3.02) (2.69) (2.70) (2.67) (4.32) (4.06)
φ 2, uninformed -0.0467 -0.0468 -0.3211 -0.2769
(-2.26) (-2.18) (-2.14) (-2.73)
φ 2, fundamental -0.0320 -0.0192 -0.1684 -0.1538
(-2.41) (-2.34) (-2.64) (-2.57)
φ 2, informed -0.0076 -0.0066 -0.0329 -0.0325
(-2.79) (-2.71) (-2.65) (-3.37)
φ 3 -0.1671 -0.1767 -0.1820
(-1.46) (-1.64) (-1.39)
φ4 0.0127 0.0124 0.0192 0.0103
(2.27) (2.18) (2.06) (2.76)
p  1 0.2708 0.2660 0.2724 0.2709 0.2708 0.2709 0.2709 0.2710 0.2708
(13.71) (13.55) (13.88) (13.87) (13.71) (13.72) (13.72) (13.73) (13.72)
c 1 0.7447 0.7464 0.8126 0.8123 0.8126 0.8919
(3.94) (3.95) (4.41) (4.43) (4.41) (8.25)
c 2 0.2457 0.2461 0.2582 0.2583 0.2588 0.2829
(4.02) (4.01) (4.32) (4.34) (4.32) (7.51)
c 3 -0.2988 -0.2984 -0.2960 -0.2967 -0.2897 -(0.30)
(-2.51) (-2.51) (-2.42) (-2.43) (-2.45) (-2.49)
c 4 -0.0443 -0.0393 -0.0173 -0.0172 -0.0168
(-0.52) (-0.45) (-0.20) (-0.21) (-0.19)
c 5 0.1795 0.1545 0.1445 0.1444 0.1444
(0.55) (0.47) (0.46) (0.46) (0.65)
c 6 -1.2096 -1.1872 -1.2677 -1.2679 -1.2576 -1.2723
(-6.49) (-6.46) (-6.72) (-6.69) (-6.70) (-6.72)
σ ε
2 0.0046 0.0046 0.0039 0.0040 0.0046 0.0046 0.0046 0.0046 0.0046
(2.03) (1.98) (1.97) (1.80) (2.13) (2.06) (2.16) (2.01) (2.01)
σ ξ
2 0.00025 0.00024 0.00025 0.00023 0.00025 0.00025 0.00025 0.00024 0.00024
(1.94) (2.13) (1.51) (2.80) (2.10) (1.94) (2.09) (2.09) (2.08)
J-stats 0.14 8.10 7.01 11.40 2.14 1.82 4.20 0.13 0.11
(0.71) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.71) (0.66) (0.65) (0.72) (0.74)
MSE in sample 0.6907 0.6394 0.6372 0.6346 0.6380 0.6384 0.6362 0.6247 0.6140
MSE out-of-sample 1.5114 1.3598 3.4869 1.3362 1.5865 1.6670 1.4127 0.9561 0.9494
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D. NP II 
 
 
Theta Phi Full
MRR T.I Risk T.I+Risk T.I Risk T.I+Risk All Significant
θ 1 0.0657 0.0508 0.1385 0.0650 0.0666 0.0657 0.0665 -0.0655
(2.38) (1.56) (3.47) (1.57) (2.44) (2.38) (2.43) (-0.95)
θ 2, uninformed 0.0421 0.0412 0.7702 0.7121
(2.22) (1.21) (2.92) (3.02)
θ 2, fundamental 0.0046 0.0034 0.6868 0.5591
(2.01) (2.32) (3.05) (2.99)
θ 2, informed 0.0015 0.0013 0.0142 0.0295
(2.28) (2.62) (3.20) (3.59)
θ 3 -0.4164 -0.3575 0.2454
(-1.88) (-1.62) (0.61)
θ 4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(-1.05) (-0.92) (-0.98)
φ 1 0.0597 0.0656 0.0371 0.0464 0.0700 0.1272 0.1074 0.1227 0.1080
(2.09) (2.45) (1.97) (2.01) (2.31) (2.81) (3.12) (3.59) (4.97)
φ 2, uninformed -0.0716 -0.0701 -0.0961 -0.0729
(-2.05) (-1.95) (-2.56) (-2.56)
φ 2, fundamental -0.0220 -0.0229 -0.0464 -0.0445
(-2.28) (-2.29) (-2.96) (-2.89)
φ 2, informed -0.0079 -0.0074 -0.0177 -0.0169
(-3.33) (-3.37) (-3.03) (-2.98)
φ 3 -0.5408 -0.5404 -0.6984 -0.3585
(-2.68) (-2.77) (-2.03) (2.80)
φ4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(-0.42) (-0.61) (0.46)
p  1 0.2946 0.2965 0.2950 0.2973 0.2945 0.2946 0.2945 0.2945 0.2944
(14.68) (14.80) (14.70) (14.84) (14.67) (14.68) (14.64) (14.60) (14.66)
c 1 0.4027 0.3974 0.4584 0.4583 0.4581 0.4717
(2.69) (2.66) (3.13) (3.15) (3.12) (3.35)
c 2 0.1530 0.1508 0.1700 0.1690 0.1696 0.1661
(2.62) (2.59) (2.92) (2.94) (2.91) (3.10)
c 3 0.0867 0.0877 0.0863 0.0856 0.0862
(1.41) (1.43) (1.49) (1.43) (1.43)
c 4 -0.0410 -0.0375 -0.0576 -0.0575 -0.0570
(-0.53) (-0.49) (-0.78) (-0.83) (-0.77)
c 5 0.6094 0.6128 0.5873 0.5838 0.5896 0.5765
(2.73) (2.74) (2.71) (2.68) (2.70) (2.76)
c 6 -1.1298 -1.1261 -1.0856 -1.1084 -1.0856 -1.1223
(6.17) (-6.18) (-6.12) (-6.37) (-6.11) (-6.41)
σ ε
2 0.0018 0.0019 0.0020 0.0019 0.0018 0.0019 0.0019 0.0019 0.0019
(2.54) (2.44) (2.08) (2.86) (2.52) (2.47) (2.51) (2.42) (2.40)
σ ξ
2 0.00016 0.00015 0.00014 0.00019 0.00018 0.00015 0.00015 0.00015 0.00015
(1.73) (1.99) (1.79) (1.96) (1.73) (1.81) (1.81) (1.90) (1.89)
J-stats 0.24 5.43 4.67 10.66 2.54 1.75 4.32 0.08 0.04
(0.63) (0.25) (0.20) (0.10) (0.63) (0.63) (0.63) (0.78) (0.85)
MSE in sample 0.4761 0.3829 0.3842 0.3800 0.4497 0.4690 0.4438 0.3798 0.3777
MSE out-of-sample 0.6378 0.6019 0.6135 0.6001 0.6247 0.6341 0.6192 0.5995 0.5873
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Table 6.20: Information and Liquidity Spread Components 
 
Average 
Trading 
Intensity Theta
Average 
Theta Phi
Average 
Phi
Implied 
Spread (No 
Risk)
0.0969
Uninformed 0.5405 0.0987 0.0533 -0.0889 0.0489 0.2951
Fundamental 1.6873 0.0469 0.0791 -0.0539 0.0060 0.1058
Informed 2.4551 0.0398 0.0977 -0.0127 0.0657 0.2110
0.0599
Uninformed 0.6945 0.0613 0.0426 -0.0522 0.0237 0.1699
Fundamental 1.3916 0.0391 0.0544 -0.0385 0.0063 0.0908
Informed 2.7120 0.0286 0.0776 -0.0128 0.0252 0.1076
0.1103
Uninformed 0.5405 0.3796 0.2052 -0.2769 -0.0394 0.6805
Fundamental 1.6873 0.2204 0.3719 -0.1538 -0.1492 0.1424
Informed 2.4551 0.0733 0.1800 -0.0325 0.0305 0.2076
0.108
Uninformed 0.5405 0.7121 0.3849 -0.0729 0.0686 1.5614
Fundamental 1.6873 0.5591 0.9433 -0.0445 0.0329 1.1840
Informed 2.4551 0.0295 0.0724 -0.0169 0.0665 0.1920
N
P
 II
N
P
 I
EC
X
 II
EC
X
 I
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Table 6.21: Intraday Variations of Spread, Variance and their Components 
A. ECX 
 
ECX I
Time of 
the Day
Trading 
Intensity
Expected 
Trading 
Intensity
 Adverse 
selection  Liquidity
 Risk 
Aversion  Phi
Implied 
Spread
Effective 
Spread
Assymetric 
Information Trading Costs  Interaction
Return 
Variance
07 1.2700 1.1700 0.0752 0.0492 0.0043 0.0534 0.2573 0.1821 0.0061 0.0028 0.0032 0.0206
08 1.2600 1.1674 0.0721 0.0433 0.0043 0.0476 0.2394 0.1673 0.0052 0.0028 0.0036 0.0202
09 0.9883 1.0521 0.0662 0.0468 0.0047 0.0515 0.2354 0.1692 0.0044 0.0032 0.0035 0.0197
10 0.9668 0.9517 0.0606 0.0506 0.0043 0.0549 0.2310 0.1704 0.0040 0.0036 0.0033 0.0194
11 0.9656 0.8681 0.0554 0.0547 0.0053 0.0600 0.2307 0.1753 0.0035 0.0039 0.0033 0.0193
12 1.0800 1.0108 0.0621 0.0509 0.0056 0.0565 0.2371 0.1750 0.0042 0.0035 0.0035 0.0199
13 1.0828 1.0179 0.0634 0.0490 0.0048 0.0537 0.2342 0.1709 0.0043 0.0034 0.0034 0.0197
14 0.8991 0.9359 0.0600 0.0505 0.0057 0.0561 0.2322 0.1723 0.0038 0.0035 0.0033 0.0193
15 1.0440 0.8972 0.0563 0.0539 0.0059 0.0598 0.2323 0.1759 0.0035 0.0039 0.0033 0.0193
16 1.1500 1.0500 0.0520 0.0662 0.0093 0.0755 0.2550 0.2030 0.0037 0.0045 0.0036 0.0204
ECX II
Time of 
the Day
Trading 
Intensity
Expected 
Trading 
Intensity
 Adverse 
selection  Liquidity
 Risk 
Aversion  Phi
Implied 
Spread
Effective 
Spread
Assymetric 
Information Trading Costs  Interaction
Return 
Variance
07 1.2400 1.1600 0.0570 0.0144 0.0070 0.0174 0.1487 0.0917 0.0023 0.0004 0.0009 0.0071
08 1.0205 1.0490 0.0495 0.0148 0.0030 0.0164 0.1317 0.0822 0.0020 0.0005 0.0008 0.0067
09 1.0489 1.0137 0.0480 0.0160 0.0016 0.0188 0.1336 0.0856 0.0019 0.0005 0.0008 0.0066
10 0.9156 0.9685 0.0464 0.0176 0.0028 0.0209 0.1346 0.0881 0.0018 0.0005 0.0009 0.0066
11 0.9665 0.9170 0.0467 0.0175 0.0032 0.0226 0.1386 0.0919 0.0019 0.0006 0.0009 0.0068
12 0.8500 0.8900 0.0475 0.0166 0.0052 0.0217 0.1384 0.0909 0.0019 0.0006 0.0009 0.0068
13 1.0002 1.0161 0.0481 0.0159 0.0036 0.0195 0.1352 0.0871 0.0020 0.0005 0.0009 0.0068
14 1.0767 1.0274 0.0484 0.0155 0.0030 0.0186 0.1340 0.0856 0.0019 0.0005 0.0008 0.0067
15 1.0205 0.9758 0.0459 0.0172 0.0038 0.0210 0.1339 0.0880 0.0016 0.0006 0.0010 0.0065
16 1.4000 1.1900 0.0501 0.0257 0.0068 0.0325 0.1653 0.1152 0.0019 0.0009 0.0015 0.0077
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B. NP 
 
NP I
Time of 
the Day
Trading 
Intensity
Expected 
Trading 
Intensity
 Adverse 
selection  Liquidity
 Risk 
Aversion  Phi
Implied 
Spread
Effective 
Spread
Assymetric 
Information Trading Costs  Interaction
Return 
Variance
08 1.4795 1.1502 0.1560 0.0359 0.0022 0.0380 0.3880 0.2320 0.0226 0.0021 0.0110 0.0408
09 1.4503 1.1431 0.1417 0.0257 0.0070 0.0327 0.3488 0.2071 0.0186 0.0016 0.0086 0.0339
10 1.2663 0.9997 0.1294 0.0318 0.0069 0.0387 0.3363 0.2069 0.0155 0.0022 0.0093 0.0321
11 0.9890 0.9360 0.1318 0.0282 0.0095 0.0378 0.3392 0.2074 0.0161 0.0021 0.0092 0.0325
12 0.8395 0.7098 0.1150 0.0384 0.0140 0.0524 0.3348 0.2198 0.0123 0.0032 0.0091 0.0296
13 1.1651 0.9900 0.1302 0.0312 0.0131 0.0443 0.3491 0.2189 0.0157 0.0029 0.0107 0.0344
14 0.9272 1.0058 0.1304 0.0400 0.0134 0.0534 0.3676 0.2372 0.0158 0.0042 0.0129 0.0379
15 1.0927 1.1258 0.1375 0.0401 0.0138 0.0539 0.3828 0.2453 0.0175 0.0042 0.0137 0.0406
NP II
Time of 
the Day
Trading 
Intensity
Expected 
Trading 
Intensity
 Adverse 
selection  Liquidity
 Risk 
Aversion  Phi
Implied 
Spread
Effective 
Spread
Assymetric 
Information Trading Costs  Interaction  Variance
08 1.1072 1.1640 0.1140 0.0524 0.0089 0.0613 0.3505 0.2365 0.0148 0.0066 0.0133 0.0370
09 0.9627 0.9972 0.0714 0.0553 0.0226 0.0779 0.2987 0.2273 0.0058 0.0107 0.0127 0.0300
10 1.0119 0.7915 0.0649 0.0577 0.0216 0.0794 0.2885 0.2236 0.0048 0.0112 0.0118 0.0277
11 0.9801 0.9725 0.0697 0.0537 0.0273 0.0810 0.3013 0.2316 0.0055 0.0116 0.0129 0.0300
12 1.0418 0.9580 0.0682 0.0550 0.0261 0.0810 0.2985 0.2303 0.0053 0.0116 0.0126 0.0310
13 1.0125 1.0884 0.0751 0.0504 0.0398 0.0902 0.3305 0.2555 0.0064 0.0144 0.0155 0.0363
14 0.9550 0.9035 0.0603 0.0591 0.0352 0.0943 0.3092 0.2488 0.0042 0.0157 0.0130 0.0310
15 1.1209 1.1271 0.0814 0.0637 0.0324 0.0961 0.3548 0.2735 0.0076 0.0163 0.0150 0.0420
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Table 6.22: Spread and Variance across different regimes of Transaction size, 
Trading Frequency and Trade Initiation 
 
Adverse 
Selection
Implied 
Spread
Adverse 
Selection
Implied 
Spread
Adverse 
Selection
Implied 
Spread
Adverse 
Selection
Implied 
Spread
0-50 0.0491 0.2331 0.0731 0.2332 0.0496 0.1307 0.0497 0.1301
51-100 0.0569 0.2445 0.0725 0.2444 0.0532 0.1356 0.0516 0.1329
>100 0.0735 0.2473 0.1015 0.2801 0.0574 0.1338 0.0527 0.1335
0-50 0.0331 0.2189 0.0556 0.2195 0.0468 0.1305 0.0470 0.1305
51-100 0.0430 0.2286 0.0473 0.2175 0.0490 0.1334 0.0442 0.1317
>100 0.0558 0.2297 0.0457 0.2120 0.0536 0.1354 0.0448 0.1323
0-500 0.0783 0.2373 0.0759 0.2359 0.0501 0.1310 0.0498 0.1385
501-1000 0.0366 0.2022 0.0548 0.2154 0.0296 0.1295 0.0419 0.1347
>1000 0.0251 0.2017 0.0480 0.2116 0.0259 0.1283 0.0408 0.1377
0-500 0.0613 0.2228 0.0574 0.2209 0.0474 0.1306 0.0471 0.1351
501-1000 0.0290 0.2019 0.0480 0.2125 0.0283 0.1294 0.0407 0.1340
>1000 0.0190 0.2023 0.0380 0.2105 0.0249 0.1281 0.0401 0.1309
0-50 0.1284 0.3404 0.1309 0.3428 0.1218 0.4923 0.1307 0.5093
51-100 0.1369 0.3564 0.1408 0.3456 0.4437 1.0831 0.2219 0.6311
>100 0.1565 0.4387 0.1980 0.4419 1.1244 2.3842 0.2303 0.6383
0-50 0.1180 0.3316 0.1129 0.3008 0.0624 0.3828 0.1187 0.4782
51-100 0.1309 0.3425 0.1155 0.3274 0.0773 0.4039 0.1451 0.5106
>100 0.1446 0.3693 0.1282 0.3403 0.1208 0.4816 0.1988 0.5699
0-500 0.1494 0.3894 0.1449 0.3549 0.1642 0.5444 0.2020 0.5407
501-1000 0.1252 0.3180 0.1290 0.3267 0.0987 0.4537 0.0624 0.5209
>1000 0.1024 0.3160 0.1166 0.3058 0.0946 0.4810 0.0595 0.3726
0-500 0.1434 0.3582 0.1400 0.3540 0.1323 0.4834 0.1773 0.5007
501-1000 0.1166 0.3117 0.1223 0.3241 0.1182 0.5030 0.0603 0.3704
>1000 0.1031 0.3097 0.1184 0.3057 0.1019 0.4662 0.0486 0.3012
Assymetric 
Information
Return 
Variance
Assymetric 
Information
Return 
Variance
Assymetric 
Information
Return 
Variance
Assymetric 
Information
Return 
Variance
0-50 0.0033 0.0190 0.0052 0.0184 0.0021 0.0069 0.0021 0.0069
51-100 0.0045 0.0208 0.0056 0.0192 0.0024 0.0070 0.0023 0.0069
>100 0.0052 0.0210 0.0085 0.0195 0.0028 0.0077 0.0022 0.0070
0-50 0.0011 0.0203 0.0026 0.0203 0.0019 0.0068 0.0015 0.0068
51-100 0.0033 0.0222 0.0031 0.0217 0.0020 0.0072 0.0016 0.0070
>100 0.0034 0.0224 0.0034 0.0249 0.0024 0.0077 0.0019 0.0070
0-500 0.0057 0.0193 0.0055 0.0192 0.0021 0.0071 0.0023 0.0074
501-1000 0.0012 0.0176 0.0032 0.0184 0.0007 0.0070 0.0017 0.0073
>1000 0.0006 0.0180 0.0026 0.0184 0.0006 0.0070 0.0014 0.0072
0-500 0.0040 0.0207 0.0037 0.0206 0.0019 0.0073 0.0021 0.0076
501-1000 0.0008 0.0174 0.0026 0.0183 0.0007 0.0070 0.0015 0.0072
>1000 0.0004 0.0177 0.0018 0.0186 0.0005 0.0071 0.0014 0.0071
0-50 0.0213 0.0329 0.0213 0.0272 0.0176 0.0488 0.0655 0.0836
51-100 0.0236 0.0356 0.0231 0.0317 0.0245 0.0526 0.0659 0.0999
>100 0.0272 0.0381 0.0363 0.0366 0.0273 0.1132 0.0736 0.2713
0-50 0.0139 0.0373 0.0131 0.0357 0.0055 0.1199 0.0350 0.1120
51-100 0.0189 0.0399 0.0152 0.0376 0.0099 0.1442 0.0528 0.1124
>100 0.0208 0.0518 0.0189 0.0506 0.0107 0.1518 0.0582 0.1204
0-500 0.0290 0.0386 0.0243 0.0518 0.0852 0.1337 0.0846 0.1318
501-1000 0.0205 0.0335 0.0227 0.0399 0.0829 0.1175 0.0753 0.0957
>1000 0.0136 0.0303 0.0180 0.0381 0.0318 0.0754 0.0409 0.0739
0-500 0.0242 0.0419 0.0239 0.0526 0.0431 0.1536 0.0487 0.1640
501-1000 0.0167 0.0355 0.0213 0.0399 0.0423 0.0941 0.0451 0.1075
>1000 0.0158 0.0292 0.0136 0.0373 0.0109 0.0861 0.0294 0.0746
Contemporaneous Trade
B
B
O
B
O
NP I NP II
B
O
O
Previous Trade Contemporaneous Trade Previous Trade
ECX II
B
O
B
O
NP I NP II
B
O
B
O
ECX I
A. Spread
B. Variance
ECX I ECX II
Previous Trade Contemporaneous Trade Previous Trade Contemporaneous Trade
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Figures 
Empirical Findings 
 
The figures presented in the following section are based on basic statistics and examine 
various model implications related to price changes, spreads, price change variance and 
their components. There are 8 figures per market and they are organized across markets 
and phases. This results in 32 figures in total, where Figures 6.1-6.8 are related to ECX 
I, 6.9-6.16 to ECX II, 6.17-6.24 to NP I and 6.25-6.32 to NP II, where ECX I, ECX II, 
NP I and NP II stand for European Climate Exchange Phase I, European Climate 
Exchange Phase II, Nord Pool Phase I and Nord Pool Phase II, respectively. 
Focusing on each market, the first group of figures (6.1, 6.9, 6.17 and 6.25) presents the 
intraday variations (hours are expressed in 24h format) of Trading Intensity,   , 
Expected Trading Intensity,           , Implied Spread,   
       
, and Effective 
Spread,   
         
, (Figure A), of the Components of the Implied spread (Figure B) and 
of Price Change Variance,         , and its Components (Figure C). 
Along the same lines, the second group of figures (6.2, 6.10, 6.18 and 6.26) focuses on 
the intraday formation of Implied Spread, Price Change Variance and their components 
in absolute numbers (Figures A and C) and as a proportion of the total values (Figures B 
and D). 
The third group of figures (6.3, 6.11, 6.19 and 6.27) presents the average Implied spread 
(Figure A) and Price Change Variance (Figure B) across Expected Trading intensity 
(the values are calculated according to Eq. (6.22)) and during the trading day. 
The fourth (6.4, 6.12, 6.20 and 6.28) and fifth (6.5, 6.13, 6.21 and 6.29) group of figures 
present the variations of Implied Spread and Price Change Variance, respectively, 
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across expectations. More specifically, Figure A examines the variations across 
Expected Trading Intensity and Expected Informed Trading, noted as “Informed 
Trading”,            , formulated as in Eq. (6.14). Figure B emphasizes the relative 
importance of the expected presence of OTC traders, noted as “OTC Transactions”, 
which is measured by their proportion of total trading in the last 15 minutes, along with 
the Expected Trading Intensity. Figure C examines the spread’s and variance’s 
variations across Expected Trading Intensity and Expected Price Volatility, noted as 
“Price Volatility”,       
       , formulated as in Eq. (6.13)  
The sixth (6.6, 6.14, 6.22 and 6.30) and seventh (6.7, 6.15, 6.23 and 6.31) group of 
figures present the variations of the Adverse-selection,   , and Liquidity,   , component 
of the Implied Spread, respectively, across expectations. Figure A focuses on the 
Expected Trading Intensity and the Expected Informed Trading, Figure B focuses on the 
Expected Trading Intensity and the expected presence of OTC traders, while Figure C 
focuses on the Expected Trading Intensity and the Expected Price Volatility. 
Finally, the last group of figures (6.8, 6.16, 6.24 and 6.32) presents the difference 
between the rate of change of the Implied Spread and the rate of change of the Price 
Change Variance,   , computed according to Eq. (6.31), across Expected Trading 
Intensity and Expected Informed Trading (Figure A), Expected presence of OTC traders 
(Figure B) and Expected Price Volatility (Figure C). 
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Figure 6.6: ECX I Intraday Variations of Spread, Variance and Their Components 
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Figure 6.7: ECX I Intraday Spread and Variance Components 
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Figure 6.8: ECX I Spread and Variance over the Trading Day and across Trading 
Intensity 
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Figure 6.4: ECX I Spread across Trading Intensity, Risk and OTC Transactions 
 
 
 
 
0-0.1
0.2-0.3
0.4-0.5
0.6-0.7
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0-0.25
0.5-0.75
1-1.25
1.5-1.75
2-2.252.5-2.75
Informed
Trading
Sp
re
ad
 in
 €
Expected Trading Intensity
A. Trading Intensity, Informed Trading and 
Spread
0-0.1
0.3-0.4
0.6-0.7
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0-0.25
0.75-1
1.5-1.75
2.25-2.5
OTC 
Transactions
Sp
re
ad
 in
 €
Expected Trading Intensity
B. Trading Intensity, OTC Transactions and 
Spread
0-1
3-4
6-7
9-10
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0-0.25
0.5-0.75
1-1.251.5-1.75
2-2.252.5-2.75
Price
Volatility
Im
p
lie
d
 S
p
re
ad
 i
n
 €
Expected Trading Intensity
C.  Trading Intensity, Price Volatility and 
Spread
Appendix 6.C 
330 
 
Figure 6.5: ECX I Variance across Trading Intensity, Risk and OTC Transactions 
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Figure 6.6: ECX I Theta across Trading Intensity, Risk and OTC Transactions 
 
 
 
 
0-0.1
0.2-0.3
0.4-0.5
0.6-0.7
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0-0.25
0.5-0.75
1-1.25
1.5-1.75
2-2.25
2.5-2.75
Informed
Trading
Th
e
ta
Expected Trading Intensity
A. Trading Intensity and Informed Trading
Theta
0-0.1
0.2-0.3
0.4-0.5
0.6-0.7
0.8-0.9
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0-0.25
0.5-0.75
1-1.25
1.5-1.75
2-2.25
2.5-2.75
OTC
Transactions
Th
e
ta
Expected Trading Intensity
B. Trading Intensity and OTC Transactions
Theta
0-1
2-3
4-5
6-7
8-9
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.20
0-0.25
0.5-0.75
1-1.25
1.5-1.75
2-2.25
2.5-2.75
Past 
Volatility
Th
e
ta
Expected Trading Intensity
C. Trading Intensity and Price Volatility
Theta
Appendix 6.C 
332 
 
Figure 6.7: ECX I Phi across Trading Intensity, Risk and OTC Transactions 
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Figure 6.8: ECX I Marginal Variance over Spread change across Trading 
Intensity, Risk and OTC Transactions 
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Figure 6.9: ECX II Intraday Variations of Spread, Variance and Their Components 
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Figure 6.10: ECX II Intraday Spread and Variance Components 
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Figure 6.11: ECX II Spread and Variance over the Trading Day and across 
Trading Intensity 
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Figure 6.12: ECX II Spread across Trading Intensity, Risk and OTC Transactions 
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Figure 6.13: ECX II Variance across Trading Intensity, Risk and OTC 
Transactions 
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Figure 6.14: ECX II Theta across Trading Intensity, Risk and OTC Transactions 
 
 
 
 
0-0.05
0.1-0.15
0.2-0.25
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0-0.5
0.5-1
1-1.5
1.5-2
2-2.5
2.5-3
Informed 
Trading
Th
e
ta
Expected Trading Intensity
A. Trading Intensity and Informed Trading
Theta
0-0.2
0.4-0.6
0.8-1
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0-0.5
0.5-1
1-1.5
1.5-2
2-2.5
2.5-3 OTC 
Transactions
Th
e
ta
Expected Trading Intensity
B. Trading Intensity and OTC Transactions
Theta
0-0.1
0.1-0.2
0.2-0.3
0.3-0.4
0.4-0.5
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0-0.5
0.5-1
1-1.5
1.5-2
2-2.5
2.5-3
Price
Volatility
Th
e
ta
Expected Trading Intensity
C. Trading Intensity and PriceVolatility
Theta
Appendix 6.C 
340 
 
Figure 6.15: ECX II Phi across Trading Intensity, Risk and OTC Transactions 
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Figure 6.16: ECX II Marginal Variance over Spread change across Trading 
Intensity, Risk and OTC Transactions 
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Figure 6.17: NP I Intraday Variations of Spread, Variance and Their Components 
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Figure 6.18: NP I Intraday Spread and Variance Components 
  
  
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
Half Spread in  €
Ti
m
e 
of
 t
he
 D
ay
A. Half Spread Components over 
The Trading Day
Adverse selection Liquidity Risk Aversion
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
Half Spread in  %
Ti
m
e
 o
f 
th
e
 D
ay
B. Half Spread Components over 
The Trading Day
Adverse selection Liquidity Risk Aversion
0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
Variance
Ti
m
e
 o
f 
th
e
 D
ay
C. Intraday Price Change Variance Components
Public Information Price Discretness Assymetric Information Trading Costs Interaction
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
Proportion of Variance
Ti
m
e
 o
f 
th
e
 D
ay
D. Intraday Price Change Variance Components
Public Information Price Discretness Assymetric Information Trading Costs Interaction
Appendix 6.C 
344 
 
Figure 6.19: NP I Spread and Variance over the Trading Day and across Trading 
Intensity 
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Figure 6.20: NP I Spread across Trading Intensity, Risk and OTC Transactions 
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Figure 6.21: NP I Variance across Trading Intensity, Risk and OTC Transactions 
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Figure 6.22: NP I Theta across Trading Intensity, Risk and OTC Transactions 
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Figure 6.23: NP I Phi across Trading Intensity, Risk and OTC Transactions 
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Figure 6.24: NP I Marginal Variance over Spread change across Trading Intensity, 
Risk and OTC Transactions 
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Figure 6.25: NP II Intraday Variations of Spread, Variance and Their Components 
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Figure 6.26: NP II Intraday Spread and Variance Components 
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Figure 6.27: NP II Spread and Variance over the Trading Day and across Trading 
Intensity 
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Figure 6.28: NP II Spread across Trading Intensity, Risk and OTC Transactions 
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Figure 6.29: NP II Variance across Trading Intensity, Risk and OTC Transactions 
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Figure 6.30: NP II Theta across Trading Intensity, Risk and OTC Transactions 
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Figure 6.31: NP II Phi across Trading Intensity, Risk and OTC Transactions 
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Figure 6.32: NP II Marginal Variance over Spread change across Trading 
Intensity, Risk and OTC Transactions 
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